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A NOTE ON THE USE OF ‘CONVERT’ AND 
‘REVERT’ 
 
Throughout this thesis I use the term ‘convert’ to refer to participants, in 
keeping with the standard language set by the literature. You may note that 
some participants use the word ‘revert’ when speaking about themselves. The 
term ‘revert’ is used by some people within the Muslim community as a 
preferable term to convert due to the belief that it better invokes the idea that all 
human beings are born with an innate and primordial inclination towards 
Islam. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the lived experiences of white Australian converts to Islam, 
and analyses the impacts of racialisation on white converts in a national context 
where Islam is broadly racialised as ‘non-white,’ and constructed as 
oppositional to the Australian nation. This research moved beyond previous 
sociological literature that deals with macro-level racialisation of Muslims 
deployed through institutions, legislation and policy, social structures and 
national discourses, to detail how racialisation is reproduced and experienced 
in everyday interpersonal encounters by white converts who move from an 
‘unraced’ or invisible racial positioning to a highly racialised one. Qualitative 
data for this research were collected through semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with twenty-nine self-identified white converts to Islam from 
Sydney, and underwent thematic analysis. 
This project makes substantial empirical contributions to research about 
Australian Muslim communities and converts in particular, and contributes to 
broader knowledge about the racialisation of Islam and Muslims in Australia 
through its discussion of the racialised frames through which white converts 
are understood. In interactions with non-Muslims, this was done by explicitly 
framing Islam as a non-white race, or through the more subtle approach of 
constructing Islam as antagonistic to the Australian nation, which is 
underpinned by a national construction of whiteness. Importantly, interviews 
with white converts revealed that non-white Muslims also had dualistic and 
reified perceptions of Islam and whiteness that constructed Islam as 
incompatible with whiteness, which led some non-white Muslims to either 
question participants’ commitment to the religion or conversely, glorified them 
for having the will to ‘abandon’ their whiteness for Islam. 
vii 
 
The thesis additionally contributes to the sociology of race and the sociology of 
religion in Australia by highlighting how the production of contemporary 
Australian nationalism vis-à-vis the concurrent evocation of whiteness and 
Christian-coded secularism serves to position Islam as a religion that is not just 
antithetical to the Australian way of life, but to whiteness itself. These findings 
make an important contribution to the sociology of whiteness and national 
identity, which has not dealt sufficiently with the secular dimension of 
whiteness. It is hoped that this thesis aids in deepening and extending current 
theoretical understandings of racialisation, and of the operation of whiteness 
and Christian-coded secularism in the construction of Australian national 
identity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SITUATING THE WHITE MUSLIM CONVERT 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, media commentators and scholars have alluded to the idea that 
we live in a post-racial world (Dawson & Bobo 2009; Rich 2013). In both 
academic and popular discourse, Barack Obama’s 2008 election as the first 
Black President of the United States was heralded by many as the key marker of 
the post-racial moment. It was a symbol that the United States of America had 
successfully solved its ‘race problem’; a sign that racial prejudice and inequality 
had been relegated to the nation’s history books. As President Obama took the 
stand to give his inaugural address on January 20 2009, a collective sigh of relief 
gently rippled across the country. There had been no riots, no attempted 
assassinations and no revolution of outraged white people desperate to reclaim 
power. Black America was jubilant and exuberant (Dawson 2011). The United 
States of America had its first Black President, and the United States of America 
had remained intact. 
Eight years on, as we approach the end of Obama’s second term as President, 
commentaries in support of post-racialism as a political reality in the United 
States appear to have been overshadowed by the voices of its detractors 
(Dawson 2011, Goldberg 2013; Lentin 2014, 2015). In his chapter titled “The 
Postracial Contemporary,” eminent critical race theorist David Theo Goldberg 
asks: “Are we postracial yet?” and immediately answers himself: “Hell, no, the 
evidence screams back” (2013, p. 16). “The evidence,” he states, is clear - the rise 
of racial segregation in housing and education in the United States, significant 
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and structural racialised disparities of wealth in South Africa, and systemic 
racism in policing and immigration policies in Europe, all speak loudly and 
clearly to the fact that race continues to have significant social and material 
relevance.  
Alongside the examples offered by Goldberg, we are also seeing a growing 
body of empirical and theoretical work documenting the racialisation of 
Muslims in white-dominant, Western nations such as the United Kingdom 
(Kyriakides et al 2009, Meer & Modood 2009; Moosavi 2015a, 2015b), the United 
States of America (Joshi 2006; Selod & Embrick 2013), Canada (Nagra 2011), 
France (Galonnier 2015) and Australia (Poynting et al 2004; Dunn et al 2007; 
Humphrey 2007). What this literature illustrates is that rather than race 
receding from public life, as a post-racial politic would suggest, it continues to 
have as much resonance and relevance as before. For Muslims, racialisation in a 
post-9/11 climate is manifest in institutional and interpersonal Islamophobia, 
increased surveillance of Muslim communities, and constant and repeated 
demands from Western governments that their Muslim constituents ‘prove’ 
their allegiance to the state - famously captured by former Prime Minister of 
Australia Tony Abbott’s statement that "everyone has got to be on team 
Australia,” a directive that was widely perceived to be directed at Muslims 
(quoted in Sydney Morning Herald 2014). 
It is from within this political climate that my research on the post-conversion 
experiences of white converts to Islam emerges. On the one hand, we are told 
that we are living in a post-racial world where race is no longer a relevant 
element of identity; on the other, racialisation is encroaching into areas that 
some argue were not previously thought to be racialised, such as religion, and 
particularly Islam. White converts to Islam are implicated in both post-racial 
discourses and the argument that Islam is a racialised religion, which is why 
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they are the focus of this thesis. As posited by scholars of whiteness studies, 
whiteness is an ‘unraced race’ which is experienced by white people as a 
racially neutral identity (Dyer 1997, p. 70); its only presence is in the silence that 
surrounds it. Whiteness is anchored to race through the notion of its very 
racelessness, a concept which Goldberg states is at the heart of the postracial, 
along with the colourblindness of the US Civil Rights movement and the 
nonracialism of anti-apartheid (Goldberg 2013, p. 17). But white Muslim 
converts are also Muslim, and as this thesis will illustrate, the category of 
Muslim is far from raceless. White converts thus occupy an ambiguous and 
conflicted social location, but one that can help us to better understand the 
operation of both whiteness and racialisation in Australian society. Unlike non-
white Muslims in Australia who have always experienced life as racialised 
individuals, and unlike white 'born Muslims' who identified as Muslim from 
childhood, white converts have the unique ability to discuss their lived 
experiences of race as a white Muslim and a white non-Muslim. This thesis thus 
centres the narratives of white converts to Islam through a thematic analysis of 
twenty-nine in-depth interviews with white Muslim converts in Sydney, 
Australia. Relying on the rich data that originated from the interviews, I argue 
that far from living in a post-racial society, the experiences of white converts to 
Islam demonstrate that racialisation continues to play a prominent role in 
Australian society and other Western societies, as illustrated by the construction 
of Muslims as a racialised group historically and contemporarily.  
 
1.2 Research aims and contributions 
This research project explored how white Muslim converts in Australia 
experience race and negotiate their racial identity post-conversion, and in doing 
3 
 
so analysed the racialisation of Islam and Muslims in Australia and its 
reproduction in everyday interpersonal interactions experienced by the white 
Muslim converts I interviewed. In order to operationalise my broader visions 
for this research project, I developed the following research aims: 
 
1. To uncover the lived experiences of white converts to Islam post-
conversion, as they relate to their understanding and experience of race, 
racism, whiteness, and privilege;  
2. To contribute to the further theoretical development of the concept of 
racialisation, particularly as it relates to the racialisation of religious 
communities; 
3. To evaluate the utility of using the concepts of racialisation and 
whiteness to understand Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice in 
an Australian context; 
4. To analyse the presence of Christianity and whiteness in 
constructions of Australian citizenship and nationhood, and its 
implications for Australian Muslims. 
 
Through the fulfilment of these aims, this research project makes innovative 
and significant contributions to the scholarly fields of religious conversion, 
whiteness and racialisation studies. 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. In this chapter, I introduce the subject 
matter and political context of my research project and outline my research 
aims. In the following chapter, Chapter Two, I position my research within the 
existing academic scholarship in the sociology of race and ethnic studies by 
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providing a critical review of the key literatures of a number of separate but 
interrelated fields that centre on race and racialisation. The first section of 
Chapter Two provides a brief summary of a number of seminal texts on 
racialisation, beginning with the work of Frantz Fanon, and ending with a more 
focused analysis of recent studies on the racialisation of Islam and Muslims. I 
then move to examine the literature on Islamophobia, and consider the 
assertion by scholars that Islamophobia is a form of cultural racism. The final 
section, section 2.4, focuses on the relationships between whiteness and 
Christianity, whiteness and Australian nationhood, and Christianity and the 
Australian national imaginary. My review of the literature suggests that 
academic scholarship is increasingly interested in the notion that Muslims are 
racialised in Western nations like Australia that cohere around a Christian 
religious identity and a white racial identity, but that there is room for further 
theorisation of the phenomenon in addition to empirical studies. In this section, 
I highlight the way that my thesis engages with the sociology of religion in 
Australia. This chapter thus serves two primary functions: to map out the 
theoretical frameworks that guide and inform my analysis of the qualitative 
data in later chapters, and also to situate my research as a contribution to the 
existing literature in the sociology of race and ethnic studies and the sociology 
of religion. 
In Chapter Three, I outline the methodological decisions I made in order to best 
operationalise the research aims described in this chapter, and outline the 
methods and research design used in the collection of data to meet my research 
aims. Central to the aims of my study was to uncover how white converts to 
Islam conceptualise their experiences of race prior to and after their conversion 
to Islam. My research thus required me to explore and document the 
experiences of white Muslim converts through an interpretivist process that 
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privileged depth, nuance and complexity, through narratives designed by the 
participants themselves. In-depth interviews allowed for such details to be 
captured, as they are based on the implicit idea that reality is socially 
constructed (Husserl 1965). This chapter also outlines my overall research 
philosophy, and offers a brief exploration of the question of how the quality of 
qualitative research can be assessed. In line with the findings of my review of 
the academic scholarship on this very topic, I attempt to be as transparent and 
‘auditable’ as possible in this chapter by providing a comprehensive and 
detailed description of my research method, the limitations of my research 
project, and a reflection on the ethical considerations of my research project, 
including my own positionality as a non-white Muslim researcher. 
Chapter Four is the first of my discussion chapters, centring on the conversion 
narratives of my research participants and the contexts in which their 
conversions took place. Chapter Four provides background knowledge about 
the participants’ pre-conversion and conversion experiences, in order to 
provide a contextual framework for the reader to better understand their post-
conversion experiences. This is done by first providing a review of the key 
literatures on religious conversion to Islam to date, and then focusing on three 
primary aspects of participants’ pre-conversion lives: participants’ religious 
identities prior to becoming Muslim, their contact with Muslims and 
knowledge of Islam, and their motivations or reasons for converting to Islam.  
Chapters Five and Six attend to participants’ post-conversion experiences and 
interactions. While Chapter Five is about converts’ experiences with non-
Muslims, Chapter Six focuses on their interactions with Muslims, an area that is 
currently under-researched in the conversion literature. Both of these chapters 
uncover a rich and substantial amount of data that indicates that both non-
Muslims and Muslims are involved in racialising discourses that position 
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“Muslim” and “white” as dichotomous and incompatible categories. Within the 
broader non-Muslim community, white converts decision to convert to a 
religion that is seen as antithetical to Western values and beliefs either 
diminishes or eradicates their whiteness in others' eyes, or alternatively sees 
them labelled as race traitors who act against and destabilise the white race.  
White converts to Islam may also be constructed as un-Australian or even anti-
Australian, and as culturally foreign. 
Chapter Six highlights how the Muslim community also grapples with the 
concept of a white Muslim, because of the association made between whiteness 
and power, immorality, and cultural and spiritual vacuousness. White converts 
are thus sometimes treated with suspicion, or expected to prove their devotion 
to the religion through acts of piety. Alternately, some white converts express 
feeling that white converts were glorified, and their religious devotion assumed 
because the large cultural gap they had to bridge in order to become Muslim 
was perceived as a symbol of their spirituality and observance. 
The final discussion chapter recentres the focus on how white converts to Islam 
think about race and whiteness, and how they negotiate their racial identities in 
the face of the racialised frames through which they are viewed. The findings of 
Chapter Seven suggest that amongst participants who were comfortable to talk 
about race and whiteness, converting to Islam either precipitated their 
cognisance, reinforced their perception of themselves as white, or made them 
feel ‘less white’ than they were previously. These responses often arose out of a 
combination of their interactions with Muslims and non-Muslims, as 
documented in Chapters Five and Six, and their own political, ideological and 
intellectual leanings. While some participants expressed their feelings of being a 
white Muslim through explicit references to race and whiteness, others did so 
through more indirect ways, by talking about their feelings of belonging and 
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exclusion, and their attitudes towards ‘culture,’ which was often seen through 
racialised lenses. 
Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, draws together the key findings of my 
research with reference to my research aims, as outlined earlier in this chapter. I 
conclude with suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PERSPECTIVES ON RACIALISATION, RACISM 
AND WHITENESS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I situate my thesis in relation to the broad fields of scholarship 
that it straddles, with specific attention to the diverse range of sociological texts 
that study and dissect the concepts of race, racialisation and whiteness. While 
this thesis does engage with the sociological field of religion, with a particular 
focus on Islam and secularism, the religious dimension of the lives of the white 
converts interviewed is far less salient to the aims of the research project than 
the racial dynamic. In other words, this thesis is primarily concerned with 
religion as a conduit through which racialisation can occur.  
In order to understand how racial meaning can be so readily extended to and 
projected upon a religious community, the way that religion is conceptualised 
in this thesis - primarily as a social marker of difference, with less attention to 
the substantive elements of Islam itself - needs to be briefly clarified, before 
attending to the primary analytical framework of racialisation. Functional 
approaches to religion have long asserted that religious affiliation plays a 
significant role in constituting and symbolising group identity, social cohesion, 
reinforcing communal borders, and providing ‘believers’ with a common moral 
framework (Chidester 1988, Durkheim 1965, Mitchell 2006, Yang 1997). The 
similarities between functional understandings of religion as a “dynamic 
between personal and group identification” (Mitchell 2006, p. 17), race and 
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ethnicity have been expounded upon in great detail by legal scholar Tseming 
Yang (1997), who contends that religion, race and ethnicity are “types of 
cultural groupings and consequently are important sources of self-definition; 
they serve as reference points of identity for an individual and others” (p. 128). 
Arguably, functional approaches to religion that de-emphasise the substantive 
elements of religion such as belief, practice and ritual, in favour of group 
belonging and social identification, more easily enables the conflation between 
religion, race and ethnicity, and allows for racialisation to occur more fluidly. 
Thus, in order to critically explore the racialisation dynamic, this thesis focuses 
on a functional approach to religion both in its theoretical framework and also 
methodologically, by recruiting participants based solely on their identification 
as ‘Muslim’ and affiliation to Islam, rather than asking about their specific 
religious beliefs and practices. 
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to building the key conceptual 
frameworks utilised by this thesis in later chapters through a critical review of a 
number of seminal and other relevant works in  the areas of race, racialisation 
and whiteness.. A thorough inquiry of this literature is essential to this project – 
not only are there numerous ways in which these concepts can and have been 
understood, but they are also sometimes in conflict with one another. Finally, I 
will outline the key findings of research on religious conversion to Islam that 
have emerged from various Muslim-minority countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and France. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising Race and Racialisation 
Since a comprehensive genealogy of race in the sociological literature cannot be 
provided in this thesis (due to constraints of time and length), this section will 
instead focus on works on racialisation alone. Racialisation has become a 
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common word in the sociological lexicon, the magnitude of its usage belying 
the relative newness of its coinage. One understanding of racialisation offered 
by American sociologists and race theorists Michael Omi and Howard Winant 
sees it as “the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified 
relationship, social practice or group” (1994, p. 64). Writing from Britain, Robert 
Miles uses the word racialisation to refer to the “historical emergence of the 
idea of ‘race’ and to its subsequent reproduction and application” (1989, p. 76). 
Other descriptions suggest that racialisation most often occurs around 
perceived social problems, such as immigration and crime, which become 
associated with certain racial groups (Murji & Solomos 2005).  
Criticism levelled at literature on racialisation by theorists such as David 
Goldberg (2005) and Clara Rodriguez (2000) can be attributed in part to the lack 
of agreement about the term. Goldberg (2005) and Rodriguez (2000) argue that 
the ambiguous nature of racialisation and the diversity of its application has led 
to the development of a theoretically weak body of work. Indeed, an appraisal 
of the variety of texts that employ the term racialisation does suggest the 
concept of racialisation has been over-used and under-theorised in the short 
duration of its academic existence, often employed as a normative fact rather 
than an analytical tool that may itself need interrogation. The rapidity of the 
term’s spread across multiple disciplines, including those far removed from 
sociology, to apply to most any and every phenomenon known to humankind 
has been observed by several commentators, including British scholars of race 
and ethnicity Karim Murji and John Solomos who state in their introduction to 
the edited book on the topic, “What is in a word? When that word is 
racialisation, the short answer is a great deal and, perhaps, too much” (2005, p. 
1).  
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Even a cursory glance at the literature illustrates racialisation has been applied 
to such varied topics as intimacy (Eng 2010), women’s household work (Bakan 
& Stasiulis 1995), labour in the computer game World of Warcraft (Nakamura 
2009), space (Lipsitz 2007), pregnancy (Bridges 2011) and white opinions on 
social security (Winter 2006). This is not to say that the above cited texts have 
used the concept of racialisation incorrectly or uncritically, but they do help to 
illustrate the latitude of its use in a number of disciplinary fields. A more 
generous assessment could perhaps just as easily argue that the span of this 
coverage simply demonstrates its utility and highlights the continued 
significance of race and racialisation today. Still, criticisms about the 
effectiveness of the term must be acknowledged and addressed. Goldberg’s 
dissatisfaction with the term has led him to repudiate the use of the term at all, 
stating that “Quite often it is put to work simply to suggest race-inflected social 
situations, those informed or marked by racial characterization” (2005, p. 88) 
and that as a result the concept of racialisation is analytically bankrupt.  
Despite such criticism, or perhaps because of it, the literature on racialisation 
continues to expand and evolve. This brief review of the literature 
acknowledges the challenges of adopting an idea that is as dynamic, contested 
and possibly analytically troublesome as racialisation, but believes that it is still 
important to come to a working understanding of the concept in order to better 
understand its operative function in society. This thesis further asks whether it 
is possible to define it and employ it in a way that invokes “deeper normative, 
critical thrust” (Goldberg 2005, p. 88), and attempts to do so in future chapters. 
Before beginning this task, however, it is important to state that the word ‘race’ 
is used in this thesis to describe a political idea (Lentin 2004) that is culturally 
and socially constructed, historically contingent, but nonetheless has a material 
impact on people in the social world (Alcoff 2006), and thus remains a salient 
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category for examining people’s lived experiences. Despite declarations that we 
live in a post-racial era, as I referred to in Chapter One, race continues to be an 
operative marker of identity in the social world. Physical and visibly apparent 
differences between people are still consistently drawn upon, not just to 
categorise and classify people into different but neutrally valued ‘races,’ but to 
project upon these categories social and moral meanings. When I use the word 
race in this thesis, I use it not as a fixed and immoveable scientific classification 
schema, but as a culturally bounded system of categorisation that affects a 
variety of aspects of people’s lives including but not limited to life expectancy, 
educational and employment outcomes, and incarceration rates. 
Race is thus employed in a critical and cautious way. It must be acknowledged 
too that some scholars in the field prefer that it not be used at all. In his original 
overview of racial theories published in 1987, British social scientist Michael 
Banton contended that the reliance of race on hierarchical and biologically 
determined categories which have long since been discredited in the natural 
and social sciences, meant race should be banished from the language of 
sociology. In the first edition of Racial Theories, Banton defined race primarily as 
a biological instrument that used ‘science’ to justify the treatment of black 
people as inferior and subservient to white people. His preoccupation with the 
biological aspect of race can be seen in his focus on race as lineage, type and 
subspecies, with lesser import placed on social, economic, and political factors 
that contributed to different understandings of race through the ages. Banton’s 
emphasis on the pseudoscientific use of race has the effect of divorcing the 
concept of race from the historical contexts in which it has been used, and limits 
our ability to understand the continued existence of race in popular discourse. 
This is despite the fact that biological understandings of race are less likely to be 
invoked in this day, particularly in the social sciences. 
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Although the second edition of Banton’s Racial Theories (1998) conceded that 
social constructions of race are an important category for sociology, through the 
addition of a concluding chapter on “Race as Social Construct,” Banton (1998) 
insists that just as biological definitions of race eventually fell to disuse, so too 
will race disappear from the pages of sociology. Like Banton, Miles and Brown 
(2003) discouraged the use of race as an analytical concept, positing that it is not 
the criteria used for what defines a race but the very act of naming something as 
a race which is dangerous and leads to racism and racial superiority. Writing 
from a British context, Miles and Brown (2003) highlighted the highly 
politicised nature of racialisation, stating that there are no races but only the 
belief that there are races. These beliefs, they contended, are what cause some 
groups to “construct an Other (and therefore the Self) in thought as a prelude to 
exclusion and domination, and by other social groups to define Self (and so to 
construct an Other) as a means of resisting exclusion” (Miles & Brown 2003, p. 
43). It is unsurprising then that Miles and Brown (2003), like Banton (1997), are 
more interested in a reduction in the usage of race as a sociological concept than 
in a broadening of the term.  
Although I recognise the considerable contributions that Banton, Miles and 
Brown have made to the study of race and racism, I question whether simply 
refusing to entertain the concept of race will lead to its everyday abolition. It is 
particularly questionable whether abolishing the naming and categorisation of 
racial groups in line with liberal conceptions of equality will do away with 
institutionalised racism in structures, social systems and institutions, or 
whether it will simply allow for the same exclusion and domination to continue 
without providing a name for the source nor a remedy for groups suffering 
from racism. In the famous words of Colette Guillaumin, in reference to the 
legal inscription of race, “Race does not exist. But it does kill people” (2002, p. 
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107). simply stating that race has no biological basis does nothing to eradicate 
its sociocultural effects, and by refusing to use the concept serves to mask its 
impact on the lived experiences of racialised groups. 
Instead of using the term race, Miles and Brown prefer to talk of ‘racialisation.’  
Miles and Brown (2003) explicitly emphasise the importance of biological 
references in racialisation processes, describing it as a “dialectical process by 
which meaning is attributed to particular biological features of human beings, 
as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general category of 
persons that reproduces itself biologically” (Miles & Brown 2003, p. 102). In his 
earlier book, Racism, Miles (1989, p. 84) stated that it is the biological features of 
a person that are used to determine collectivity, and then these and cultural 
features are negatively evaluated based on the socio-political context of the 
time. Their emphasis on the significance of physically apparent features on the 
face and body continues the line of thought that was begun by noted 
Martinician psychiatrist and philosopher of race Frantz Fanon, who Miles 
claims originated the term racialisation in a discussion about national culture – 
an assertion that is contested by Rohit Barot and John Bird’s genealogy of 
racialisation (2001). However, even before Fanon started to use the term 
racialisation, he was already writing about racialisation in earlier genealogies of 
race. Writing about how Black people came to be imbued with racial 
characteristics in colonial societies, Fanon argued that the process of 
racialisation is integrally bound up in the body, produced through a racial-
epidermal schema that imposes meanings onto the skin that are defined by the 
white gaze and the white imagination (1967, p. 92). In other words, Fanon 
contends that the ontological experience of epidermal difference, and the idea 
that that difference is constitutive of a ‘black essence,’ is produced through 
encounters with white people.  
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Beneath this racial-epidermal schema exists what Fanon calls a “historico-racial 
schema,” or a package of myths about black inferiority that have been produced 
by “the Other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, 
anecdotes, and stories” (p. 91). Fanon describes these two schemas as two 
fundamental stages of racialisation. The body, as the foundation of the racial-
epidermal schema, thus features prominently in the work of Fanon, who 
perceives it as integral to the operationalisation of racialising processes. In the 
chapter, “The Lived Experience of the Black Man,” Fanon states: 
I was responsible not only for my body but also for my race and my ancestors. I 
cast an objective gaze over myself, discovered my blackness, my ethnic 
features… I transported myself on that particular day far, very far, from my self, 
and gave myself up as an object. What did this mean to me? Peeling, stripping 
my skin, causing a haemorrhage that left congealed black blood all over my body 
(1967, p. 92). 
 
And later: 
My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in 
mourning on this white winter's day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, 
the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly; look, a Negro; the Negro is trembling… 
(1967, p. 93). 
 
Fanon’s visceral descriptions of his perception of his body illustrates his belief 
that bodies, and particularly skin, play a central role in creating and cementing 
race in encounters between black and white people. According to Fanon, the 
racial-epidermal schema is imposed upon black people and internalised (or in 
Fanon’s language, epidermalised), rather than being collaboratively produced. 
Importantly, while visibly apparent physical attributes are a central aspect of 
Fanon’s theory, culture is also significant to the racialising of bodies. In the 
seminal book Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon illustrates how racialisation is 
enacted and transmitted through culture and language. Language is of central 
importance to Fanon’s work, a fact that he acknowledges from the very first 
sentence of the first chapter. He goes on to state, “To speak means to be in a 
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position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that 
language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a 
civilization” (1967, p. 8). For Fanon, culture and language serve not just as keys 
to a particular racial world, but racially alter the ontology of the person who 
employs them – they can make a person ‘blacker’ or ‘whiter,’ indicating that his 
theory of racialisation is not just about phenotypical attributes. Fanon suggests: 
Every colonized people - in other words, every people in whose soul an 
inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural 
originality - finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; 
that is, with the culture of the mother country. The colonized is elevated above 
his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural 
standards. He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle (1952, 
p. 18). 
The notion that colonisation and its racialising structures allows for a person to 
“become whiter” through language and culture despite their physical 
appearance suggests that it is also possible for one to become “less white” 
through language and culture as well. This idea poses an interesting question 
for this thesis, which considers the problematic of whether white converts to a 
religion such as Islam can become less white through their adoption of certain 
cultural attributes, despite their “white” features. Can people become racialised 
as non-white through their conversion to a religion whose vast majority of 
adherents are considered to be non-white? 
In order to unpack this question, it is necessary to first delve ever deeper into 
the literature on racialisation. Two of the leading and most influential scholars 
of racialisation, Howard Omi and Michael Winant (1994), posit that race 
continues to be analytically and politically significant. In their sociological 
study of race in the United States of America, they argue that while race has no 
biological basis and is continuously altered by historical and social forces, the 
category of race is “central to everyone's identity and understanding of the 
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world” (1994, p. 55), and thus remains a category that needs to exist in order to 
be interrogated. In contrast to Banton, Miles and Brown, Omi and Winant do 
not promote the disuse of the term race, but instead contend that race needs to 
be destabilised (1994, p. 68). Their book Racial Formation in the United States, first 
published in 1986, was ground-breaking for its time because it challenged 
traditional ideas of race that either saw it as an essentialised and static form of 
identity or as a purely illusory system of categorisation.  
Drawing on Antonio’s Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony, Omi and 
Winant's (1994) racial formation theory asserts that racialisation is an 
ideological and historically informed process that is integral to the construction 
of a racial order. These racial hierarchies are continually contested by 
competing ‘racial projects’ that themselves change and adapt depending on the 
dominant socio-political discourses of the time. Racial projects can be created at 
the institutional level of government, big business, and mass media, but also by 
the ways in which people interact with each other and view their own identity, 
and take part in political action based on race (1994, p. 59). Omi and Winant 
convincingly argue that its anchoring in political structures and debates means 
that racialisation is an inherently political process “by which racial categories 
are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (1994, p. 55). This is so even 
though the reproduction and performance of racialisation on an everyday level 
may be apolitical, ordinary and indeed banal. 
Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory has been popular with scholars who 
take a broader view of race and racialisation than that provided by Banton and 
Miles, influenced by the “cultural turn in the social sciences and the influence of 
postmodernism and post-structuralism” (Murji & Solomos 2005, p. 19). Their 
description of racialisation as “the extension of racial meaning to a previously 
racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group” (1986, p. 64) is 
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supported by Murji and Solomos (2005) who suggest that racialisation often 
occurs around issues that are at the heart of social and national anxieties (2005, 
p. 3). Contemporary discourse on race has shifted away from a preoccupation 
with biological differences to an understanding of race which does away with 
biological descriptors altogether, and focuses instead on cultural or religious 
differences between groups (Barker 1981, Gordon & Klug 1986, Tucker 1987, 
Solomos 1989). British academics Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992) 
integrate this expanded concept of race and racialisation into their research. 
They argue that a narrow view of racialisation that refuses to entertain 
culturalist forms of racism overlooks the experiences of groups that are 
portrayed as inferior but not in ways that employ the same racial nomenclature 
as classical racism does.  Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) refer to how migrants 
and refugees are constructed within dominant discourses as inferior on ethnic 
grounds, to ultimately contend that racism does not even need to rely on 
racialisation but can use the notion of 'undesirability' to “assimilate, 
exterminate, or exclude’” (1992, p. 11). Anthias and Yuval-Davis thus contend 
that racialisation does not need to occur in order for racism to exist, as racism is 
“a discourse and practice of inferiorizing ethnic groups” (1992, p. 11) that relies 
on the “negative attribution given to culture, ethnic identity, personality as well 
as ‘racial’ stock” (1992, p. 11). 
Emerging literature about the racialisation of religious communities draw on 
similar definitions of racialisation that preclude the need for a ‘race.’ In a post 
9/11 political climate, sociologists and race theorists have become particularly 
interested in the racialisation of Islam in Western societies, with a substantial 
body of work emerging over the past decade (Al-Saji 2011; Amiraux 2012; 
Bayoumi 2008, 2009, 2015; Dunn et al 2007; Gotanda 2011; Elver 2012; Meer 
2013; Meer & Modood 2009, 2012; Moosavi 2015a, Peucker and Akbarzadeh 
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2014; Selod & Embrick 2013). While all of these texts will not be reviewed in this 
chapter, it is sufficient to note that they demonstrate how the concept of 
racialisation has been increasingly used to explain Islamophobia and anti-
Muslim racism as a form of cultural racism, a topic that I explore in more depth 
in the following section. 
In one of the earliest texts to write explicitly about the racialisation of Islam, 
“The Racialisation of Hinduism, Sikhism, and Islam in the United States,” 
Khyati Joshi elaborates on the multi-tiered process of racialisation that takes 
place, in which race, religion, and ethnicity combine in a complex way to 
racially mark young South Asian people in the United States. She states that the 
ways in which Hinduism, Sikhism, and Islam are represented in popular 
American discourse blurs the boundaries between race and religion and the 
racialisation of religion, wherein particular sets of phenotypical attributes come 
to be associated with a particular religion (2006, p. 216). Importantly for this 
thesis, Joshi argues that Christianity is also a racialised religion – it is racialised 
as white, and minority religions are pitted against its normative whiteness 
(2006, p. 212). Joshi makes a compelling argument about the dire consequences 
of such racialisation for Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, despite the different ways 
in which they experience it: “…they face a common outcome, whether by 
exoticization, vilification, or ‘terrorization’… They suffer the same final fate: 
They are rendered theologically, morally, and socially illegitimate… These 
phenomena function cyclically to maintain a white, Christian hegemony in the 
United States” (2006, p. 223).  
Joshi’s (2006) concluding warning underlines the need for more extensive and 
more rigorous research on the impacts of racialisation at an individual, cultural 
and institutional level in white-dominant and Christian-centric countries. She 
argues that the racialisation of religious others is used as a dehumanising tool 
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by politicians and other leaders, the discursive ramifications of which can 
include the theological conflation of Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam, and the 
representation of each religion as monolithic, dismissing the possibility for 
differences and diversity within each religion. Joshi also raises concerns about 
the question of ‘mistaken identity’ (2006, p. 220) wherein people who are 
mistaken for Muslim, most commonly Sikhs wearing turbans, become the 
victims of anti-Muslim violence. A recent example of this can be found in the 
shooting of six Sikh people at a temple near Milwaukee in August 2012, which 
many believed to be motivated by Islamophobia (NY Times 2012). The increase 
of such attacks against Sikhs since September 11 2001 has led diasporic Sikh 
communities to actively resist racialisation by differentiating themselves from 
Muslims through strategies such as t-shirts and badges proclaiming ‘Don’t 
freak, I’m a Sikh!,’ that problematically imply that the fear of Muslims is a 
legitimate one (Sian 2010). 
Similar arguments have been made by sociologist Tariq Modood (2002), whose 
work on race, ethnic minorities, and secularism in Britain has often centred on 
South Asian and Muslim communities. Modood et al (2002) contends that there 
is a “palpable racialisation of Muslims going on in Britain and elsewhere” (2002, 
p.  422) despite the fact that those engaging in anti-Muslim rhetoric and 
violence rarely use the rationalisation of biological or genetic inferiority. The 
discourse of inferiority that is employed is instead anchored in religion, culture 
and community, not in colour. Despite this, physical appearance is still a 
significant part of the racialisation process as physical attributes such as skin 
colour, clothing, headgear, and facial hair can and are connected to particular 
religions at any given socio-historical juncture, which may also correspond with 
a racialised ethnic group (2002, p. 118). In the case of Britain, many Muslims are 
of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, or Indian backgrounds, and most – though not all - 
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South Asians in Britain are Muslim, which can lead to a conflation of ethnicity 
and religion to the point where Muslims specifically are particularly racialised 
(Modood at al 2002, p. 422). Modood’s argument is supported by the findings of 
Dunn et al in Australia (2007), except that in Australia the term ‘Muslims’ is 
more likely to be used interchangeably with ‘Arab’ or ‘Middle Eastern’. In 
addition, observable features of dress such as ḥijāb, thawbs, and kufis, as well as 
beards for men, become the symbols of Islam and differentiate Muslims who 
choose to don them (2007, p. 583). Importantly, Dunn et al additionally contend 
that the theory of racialisation can be applied to religious groups like Muslims 
because the aims and outcomes of racialisation are similar, regardless of 
whether a group is racialized with reference to phenotypical features or to the 
clothes they wear.  
More recently, also writing from the United Kingdom, Leon Moosavi has 
spoken of the racialisation of white converts to Islam in work which closely 
mirrors the research aims and findings of this doctoral thesis, and my 
previously published work based on research conducted in 2010 as part of my 
Honours thesis (Alam 2012). Moosavi’s interviews with 37 Muslim converts in 
the United Kingdom, 27 of them white, illustrated that white converts are ‘re-
racialised’ to “a status of ‘non-white’ or ‘not-quite-white’ which leads to them 
being recipients of Islamophobia” (2015a, p. 52).  The Islamophobia that 
participants described in Moosavi’s study usually marked them out as being 
non-white and racialised ‘Others’, although interestingly, in contrast to my own 
research, Moosavi’s interview participants described the slurs that they were 
subjected to as being “teasing rather than threatening” (2015a, p. 46).  Moosavi 
argues that this racialisation occurs because of the characterisation of Islam as a 
‘non-white’ religion, which is closely linked to the fact that the majority of 
Muslims living in Britain are South Asian, namely Pakistani, Bangladeshi and 
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Indian. Islam becomes imagined as an extension of South Asian culture, in the 
same way that I found Islam is imagined as part of Arab culture in Australia - a 
process which sees Islam as being a non-white religion, thus rendering 
adherents of the religion non-white as well, or at least, not as white as before. 
He attributes the Islamophobia that participants experienced to their loss of 
white privilege, a concept that he articulates in more depth in an earlier article 
based on the same research (Moosavi 2014). 
The work of Saher Selod and David Embrick in this area is particularly 
illuminating, as they provide a compelling account of how Muslims can come to 
be racialised (2013). They do this by “situating the Muslim experience in race 
scholarship,” as stated in the title of their article, employing racialisation as an 
analytical tool rather than simply as a description of a phenomenon that is 
accepted as fact. Selod and Embrick demonstrate that long prior to the 
emergence of racial classification, non-Christian religious groups were 
demarcated and placed into hierarchies based on whether they were considered 
“godless” and thus capable of being enslaved and treated cruelly, and those 
who were of the “wrong religion,” in other words, Judaism and Islam. Jews and 
Muslims were treated better than those who belonged to a pagan religion, but 
were classed as innately inferior to Christians because their blood was 
considered impure. In other words, Selod and Embrick argue, religious 
differences and religious inferiority were seen to be biologically driven, a logic 
that in conjunction with racial classification schemes served as the ideological 
foundation for colonialism in much of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 
For Selod and Embrick, this historical phenomenon is sufficient to situate 
Muslims and Jews firmly into race theory, because the process of categorising 
people into religious hierarchies based on the purity of their blood operates on 
the same logic as the hierarchisation of races. They use it as a basis to explore 
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the contemporary racialisation of Muslims and Arabs in the United States of 
America, suggesting that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Arabs in the United 
States became a visible minority, although they were still racially classified as 
white. Selod and Embrick suggest that racialisation occurs unevenly across 
Arab American populations, with Arab Muslims less like to identify as white 
than Arab Christians at 50% versus 73% (2013, p. 649). This phenomenon is 
supported by English professor Moustafa Bayoumi’s argument that historically 
in the United States, “religion determines race,” as evidenced by the rulings of 
judges hearing naturalisation cases in the 1940s (Bayoumi 2015, p. 48). Like 
Modood, Meer and other scholars before them, Selod and Embrick attribute this 
difference to the cultural motifs and markers that are associated with Muslims 
and which they claim contribute to a form of cultural racism against Muslim. 
They state: 
Current Muslim experiences with racism illustrate a return to essentializing 
religious differences to differentiate between the deserving and undeserving in 
America as well as in a global society. When cultural traits are racialised, this 
enables an understanding of how Muslim experiences with discrimination are 
racial in nature (Rana 2011). Muslim signifiers and symbols have become 
riddled with essentialized racial meanings such as foreign, violent, aggressive, 
and misogyny. Taken together, these stereotypes result in the belief that a 
Muslim body is incapable of upholding democratic or Western ideals and 
values (p. 650-651). 
Importantly, Selod and Embrick state that the perceived religious and cultural 
differences that the racialisation of Muslims relies on need to be analysed in 
tandem with other perceived differences such as skin tone and physical features 
when drawing conclusions about the racialisation of Muslim communities and 
the subsequent racism against Muslim communities.  
A review of the literature suggests that the question of whether or not religious 
communities can become racialised remains contentious, due in large part to 
the lack of consensus about what racialisation looks like in today’s era.  
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However, the growing body of literature that studies and analyses the 
racialisation of Muslim communities is a compelling one, with several scholars 
of race and racialisation contending that the racialisation of Muslims relies on 
cultural markers as well as phenotypical markers that are associated with 
already racialised Muslim groups. These scholars posit that the combination of 
these factors leads to a form of cultural racism against Muslims. In the 
following section, I briefly outline some of the key works in writings about 
Islamophobia and also about cultural racism, to explore whether Islamophobia 
can be conceptualised as a form of cultural racism. 
 
2.3 Islamophobia as Cultural Racism 
In 1997, the Runnymede Trust in the United Kingdom published a report titled 
“Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All.” This report contained 60 
recommendations targeted at government departments, the media and the not-
for-profit sector, amongst others. Although the term Islamophobia had emerged 
at least 15 years earlier (Tamdgidi 2012), and most probably as early as the late 
nineteenth century (Bravo Lopez 2011; Meer et al 2010), it is widely accepted 
that the Runnymede Report was the first time it was formally and officially 
defined as “the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, 
therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” (1997, p. 1). Since the 
report’s publication, Islamophobia has become a commonly used term to 
describe anti-Muslim prejudice and racism, although notably it did not gain 
significant discursive popularity outside of the United Kingdom until the mid-
2000s (Allen 2010).   
Erik Bleich contends that while Islamophobia is an “emerging comparative 
concept in the social sciences” (2011, p. 1582), there is a noticeable lack of 
consensus on the definition of Islamophobia, making it difficult to assess and 
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compare Islamophobia across “time, location and social group” (2011, p. 1582). 
In his comprehensive examination of the range of definitions adopted by social 
scientists, Bleich suggests that the lack of precision is due to the fact that 
Islamophobia developed as a political, rather than analytical, concept (2011, p. 
1593). He summarises the approaches taken by a number of key writers in the 
field to illustrate the range of understandings of Islamophobia, ultimately 
arguing that even where the definitions adopted are cogent and coherent in 
their own right, the differences between them make it difficult to use 
Islamophobia as a comparative tool. Bleich makes a strong case for the need to 
move towards a more widely accepted, common understanding of 
Islamophobia that is geared towards analytical rather than political ends. 
Sayyid (2010) makes a similar assessment of the field as it currently stands, 
stating that: 
Those who see Islamophobia not as a polemical but as an analytical term are 
confronted with the paucity of its current formulation. Neither consistently 
defined, deployed or understood, Islamophobia comes off as a nebulous and 
perpetually contested category. This has allowed it to circulate widely, but 
ineffectively: useful, for some, to vent grievances; used, by others, to 
pontificate; conveniently toothless platitudes and sound bites for canvassing 
politicians (p. 1). 
Sayyid (2010) points out that as well as its supporters, the concept of 
Islamophobia has just as many detractors. Bravo López notes that some authors 
have argued that Islamophobia is an invention designed to mute genuine, well-
founded criticisms of the religion (Bravo López 2011). These authors dispute the 
widespread existence of a specific prejudice that produces measurable acts of 
discrimination, vilification and violence against Muslims. Such sentiments belie 
the fact that a significant portion of the literature in support of the term, 
including the Runnymede report, makes a distinction between “legitimate 
criticism and disagreement” (The Runnymede Trust 1997) of the doctrine of 
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Islam with prejudice and hostility towards Muslims and “the practical 
consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim 
individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from 
mainstream political and social affairs” (1997, p. 4). 
The debate has led some to argue that the term Islamophobia is misleading. 
Modood has convincingly argued that the phenomenon referred to is “more a 
form of racism than a form of religious intolerance, though it may perhaps be 
best described as a form of cultural racism, in recognition of the fact that the 
target group, the Muslims, are identified in terms of their non-European 
descent, in terms of their not being white, and in terms of their perceived 
culture” (1997, p. 4). I agree with Modood that Islamophobia is more often 
enacted as a form of cultural racism than as religious intolerance. However, I 
argue that Islamophobia is not always simply an attack on Muslims, but can 
also be an attack on a racialised understanding of Islam as a faith, that is 
separate from a critique of the doctrines of Islam on a theological or political 
level. This ‘attack’ does not simply refer to direct interpersonal racism that may 
occur as a result of a racialised construction of Islam, but also the structural 
implications of the discursive construction of Muslims as incompatible with 
Western values.  This thesis thus takes the view that racialisation and religion 
are both important elements of Islamophobia due to this process of 
racialisation, a position taken by a number of authors including van Nieuwkerk 
(2004), Werbner (2005), Dunn et al (2007), Meer (2008) and Meer and Modood 
(2012).    
The critiques of Islamophobia as a theoretical concept in academia are 
replicated within the general public. Writing from the United Kingdom, Meer 
and Modood (2012) examine why British people may be unsympathetic to the 
idea that Muslim minorities suffer racism, and list four main reasons:  
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1. Islam is a voluntarily chosen faith, and Muslims should thus not enjoy 
the same protections afforded to racial and ethnic minorities; 
2. Because religion is looked down upon/mocked by intellectuals, the 
denigration of Islam becomes acceptable as its simply contributing to 
“healthy intellectual debate;” 
3. An uneasiness with the display or practice of religion in the public 
sphere in a secular society; 
4. An inability to feel compassion or empathy for a minority group that is 
associated with terrorism in public discourse, which leads to Muslims 
being viewed as a “threat rather than as a disadvantaged minority 
subject to increasingly pernicious discourses of racialisation” (Meer and 
Modood 2012, p. 50). 
The argument that the negative stereotyping and fear of Islam and Muslims 
should not be conceptualised as a form of racism because being Muslim is a 
choice fails to acknowledge that both racial and religious forms of identity are 
socially constructed, multi-layered and contain elements of both choice and 
ascription. Meer (2008) argues precisely this when he advocates viewing 
“Muslim identity as a quasi-ethnic sociological formation” (p. 66). Furthermore, 
even if Muslim identity was simply a matter of personal choice, this does not 
mean Muslims should therefore be open to vilification, discrimination and 
incitement to hatred unless they are willing to change. Meer (2008, p. 77) points 
out; “If we argue that people’s ‘difference’ is less deserving of protection if it is 
in anyway ‘changeable’, then we are advocating that those subject to 
discrimination or hostility should choose, where possible, to change their 
identity in order to avoid discrimination.” 
When reading the work of scholars like Meer and Modood, it must be 
recognised that studies on Islamophobia conducted in Europe reveal different 
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forms of Islamophobia to those undertaken in Australia (see Morgan and 
Poynting 2012 for case studies from Europe, North America and Australia). 
Alice Aslan’s (2009) monograph Islamophobia in Australia (2009) argues that in 
Australia, Islamophobia manifests itself largely as a form of cultural racism that 
is “intertwined with a widespread anxiety and resentment felt towards 
migration and multiculturalism amongst the dominant white Anglo-Celtic 
Australians” (p. 21). This phenomenon was highlighted by the moral panic 
surrounding the now infamous gang rapes in Sydney’s south-west in 2001, 
wherein Islamophobia and a fear of Muslim masculinity specifically were 
evident in the rhetoric surrounding the cases, in mainstream and new media as 
well as from political commentators (Dagistanli & Grewal 2012). In their 
chapter “Perverse Muslim Masculinities in Contemporary Orientalist 
Discourse: The Vagaries of Muslim Immigration in the West” (2012), Australian 
criminologist Selda Dagistanli and legal theorist Kiran Grewal examine the 
ways in which the moral panic which erupted around the gang rapes created 
folk devils of all “Middle Eastern men” regardless of whether they were 
Muslim or not (2012, p. 126). They posit that at the same time that the gang 
rapists were being ‘othered,’ racialised, and demonised by the media and public 
opinion, the victims of the crimes were simultaneously ‘whitened’ (2012, p. 
126). This whitening was demonstrated in the way that news outlets 
emphasised that some victims had been called “Aussie pigs” and asked if they 
were Australian before being attacked, while ignoring the fact that the victims 
were from multiple ethnic backgrounds (Dagistanli & Grewal 2012).  
The discursive strategy in the media juxtaposed the sinister, sexualised and 
violent Muslim/Arab/Middle Eastern man against their white victims who were 
constructed as being representations of white Australia itself; attacks against 
them were viewed as attacks against the nation, and Muslim and Arab people 
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were consequently racialised and vilified for their cultural deviancy (Dagistanli 
& Grewal 2012, p. 127). This was further exacerbated by the fact that the gang 
rapes took place in the same two year period of the September 11 attacks and 
the TAMPA “children overboard” incident in 2001, and the flurry of media 
around Muslims and refugees resulted in a conflation between Muslim, Arab, 
and refugees with terrorists, criminals, gang rapists, and child abusers 
(Dagistanli & Grewal 2012, p. 127). Here, Islamophobia is intertwined with a 
fear of “ethnic patriarchy,” which was a phenomenon that appeared again 
around the Cronulla riots of 2006. Writing about the Cronulla riots, Christina 
Ho (2007) has argued that this form of anti-Muslim racism is derived from a 
paternalistic nationalism that hides under the cloak of defending women’s 
rights.  
In a similar vein, the authors of the article “Contemporary Racism and 
Islamophobia in Australia” (Dunn et. al 2007) argue that anti-Muslim attitudes 
within Australia are “reproduced through racialisation that includes well-
rehearsed stereotypes of Islam” (2007, p. 564) and that create a ‘culture’ rather 
than ‘colour’ racism. They draw on three data sets including surveys and print 
media to show how Muslims are constituted as culturally inferior, barbaric, 
misogynistic, fanatical, intolerant, and ultimately alien. Dunn et. al. contend 
that this perception is ultimately a racialised one that sets 'Muslim' up as a 
homogenous and reified identity that is incompatible with Australia as a 
white/Christian culture (2007, p. 569). Importantly, they suggested that the 
contemporary racialisation of Muslims is primarily derived from ‘observable 
elements of culture’ (2007, p. 567) that are either based on clothing or 
phenotypical attributes, such as skin colour, having a beard or wearing Islamic 
clothing. 
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In addition to research on the negative portrayal of Muslims in the media and 
negative attitudes towards Muslims documented in quantitative surveys, there 
has been a growing body of work on Muslim experiences of direct and 
interpersonal racism after September 11 2001. The Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission conducted a nationwide investigation in 2003 into the 
experiences of Muslims and Arabs in Australia after September 11, which found 
that out of the 1423 participants who were consulted during the project, the 
majority of them had experienced prejudice as a result of their ethnicity or their 
religion (HREOC 2004). The report, Isma, found that prejudice documented 
ranged from verbal insults to physical attacks, from strangers in public spaces 
to colleagues and neighbours, and in the provision of government services. 
Those who visibly identified as Muslim or Arab through their clothes or 
physical appearance were most at risk of abuse. This was made particularly 
evident in the Islamic Women’s Welfare Council’s 2008 report “Race, Faith and 
Gender,” which examined the ways in which different types of discrimination – 
in this case, religious, racial and gender-based – converged upon Muslim 
women from non-white backgrounds. Focus groups held with 96 Victorian 
Muslim women between 2006 and 2007 revealed 137 experiences of racism, 
with 80% of them stating that they felt unwelcome and unsafe in Australia 
(IWWCV 2008). 
More recently, Atie and Dunn (2013) found that 61.2% of Sydney Muslims they 
surveyed between 2011 and 2012 had experienced discrimination in the 
workplace, compared with 17.5% nationwide (not exclusively Muslim, between 
2001 and 2008). Almost two thirds of Sydney Muslims had experienced racism 
through names or other insults. However, while many of the survey 
respondents had experienced racism, it was not necessarily an occurrence that 
they perceived to happen daily or even weekly, with only 16% stating that they 
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experienced racism frequently. Nonetheless, Atie’s and Dunn’s (2013) data 
indicates that direct racism is undeniably still a part of the contemporary 
Muslim experience in Australia, and one that necessitates exploration within 
this thesis. 
It is clear from the variety of studies on Islamophobia conducted in minority 
Muslim contexts worldwide, some of which have been outlined above, is that 
Islamophobia is often conceptualised as a form of cultural racism that stems 
from the racialisation of Muslims. Such studies demonstrate how ‘cultural’ 
racism can be invoked against religious communities who are portrayed as 
being incompatible with and even hostile to the West, such as Muslims, to fulfil 
political agendas. Cultural racism relies on a belief that outsiders are 
'undesirable', and was first used by Martin Barker to describe the political 
discourse used in Britain during Thatcher's era, which actively avoided the use 
of physical or biological referents and instead relied on aggressive nation-
building through a strict stance against immigration (Barker 1981). The threat of 
the other to national cohesion is evoked through the language of 'cultural 
difference' rather than racial inferiority, something which is applied on an 
international level in the work of Samuel Huntington (1993), who argues that 
the primary source of conflict and threat to global security in a post-Cold War 
era lay not in politics or ideology but in a clash of cultures between Islamic and 
Western civilisations.  
Writing in the 1980s, Phil Gordon and Francesca Klug (1986) provide a concise 
summary of Barker's work and the meaning of 'new racism': 
The new racism, therefore, may be summarised as a cluster of beliefs which 
holds that it is natural for people who share a way of life, a culture, to bond 
together in a group and to be antagonistic towards outsiders who are different 
and who are seen to threaten their identity as a group. In this, the proponents of 
the new racism claim that they are not being racist or prejudiced, nor are they 
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making any value judgements about the 'others', but simply recognising that 
they are different. (1986, p. 22). 
In the above excerpt, Gordon and Klug refer to cultural racism as “new” as 
opposed to the “old” or “biological” racism that they claim preceded it. It is 
debatable, however, whether so called cultural racism is new at all, or whether 
it has in fact always been a feature of racism, from its very inception. In her 
article “Post-race, Post-politics: The Paradoxical Rise of Culture after 
Multiculturalism,’ Alana Lentin persuasively argues that it is the latter, and that 
attempts to attribute certain forms of racism to ‘culture’ rather than to ‘colour’ 
belie the historical complicity of both in constructions of racism and processes 
of racialisation (2014). She uses the example of anti-Semitism to support her 
position, stating that: 
While European anti-Semitism constituted the Jews as a race apart, the tropes of 
their difference were cultural as often as they were ‘biological’, just as in the 
case of Muslims today. Because it has become taboo to refer to race in biological 
terms, culture has become the means through which difference is now most 
commonly marked. Whereas this is often merely descriptive, the reference to 
cultural difference also implies a hierarchy in societies that are stratified along 
ethno-national and often colour-coded lines (2014, p. 7). 
Lentin asserts that treating ‘culture’ and ‘race’ as separable and unrelated is not 
only an inaccurate representation of how both function in the social world, 
historically and contemporaneously, but has also enabled the rise of anti-
multiculturalism in Europe.  To explain her argument, Lentin traces the lineage 
of anti-racist discourse in Europe to the ‘UNESCO tradition’ which sought to 
abolish racism by mandating the removal of any references to race and 
replacing it with culture. In doing so, UNESCO made a strong statement 
against the idea of there being any biological or genetic rationale for differences 
between ethnocultural groups, claiming instead that “Differences in the 
achievements of different peoples should be attributed solely to their cultural 
history. The peoples of the world today appear to possess equal biological 
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potentialities for attaining any level of civilization” (the authors of the UNESCO 
statement 1950, cited in Lentin 2004, p. 270). By removing any reference to race 
and talking solely about culture, UNESCO failed to acknowledge that race and 
culture have been inextricably entwined in modern racism, and that 
understandings of culture are also racially inflected. Lentin posits that as a 
result, rather than eradicating racism, the UNESCO tradition simply 
redistributed the social anxieties that gripped Europe onto cultural differences 
instead of so-called racial ones. Since blaming social problems culture was not 
considered racist because there was no reference point to biology, by the terms 
of UNESCO’s own statements, it allowed for anti-multiculturalist and 
assimilationist ideologies to thrive, which it continues to do in Europe today 
(Lentin 2004, 2011, 2014). 
My review of the scholarship on Islamophobia has illustrated that while there is 
some contention about the meaning of the term and its analytical salience, a 
large body of theoretical and empirical studies suggest that Islamophobia 
operates as a form of anti-Muslim racism. While scholars such as Modood 
contend that Islamophobia is a ‘new’ form of racism that relies on culture rather 
than colour, I am persuaded by Lentin’s argument that there is no discernible 
distinction between so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of racism, and that culture 
and colour have both been implicated in racism from its very inception. I 
suggest that Islamophobia can be understood as the racialisation of Islam and 
Muslims, and the corresponding attribution of negative characteristics to them. 
Arguably, examining the experiences of white converts to Islam can help us to 
test whether this conceptualisation of Islamophobia is a useful one, by 
exploring the experiences of white converts to Islam who move from the subject 
identity of unraced, to raced, through the process of conversion. 
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2.4 Whiteness, Christianity, and Australian Nationhood 
Implicit in the racialising discourses that construct Muslims in Australia as 
culturally inferior is the idea that Islam is diametrically opposed to the ideals 
and values of whiteness. This is despite a reluctance to talk about race where it 
pertains to whiteness, with a preference to framing discussion in terms of 
ethnicity (Anglo-Celtic) or nationality (Australian) instead. The literature on 
whiteness is vast, and this thesis does not intend to try and address it in its 
entirety. Instead, this section will outline a number of key texts in whiteness 
studies that can help us to consider the relationship between discursive 
elements of whiteness and Christianity that arguably underpin Australia’s 
national identity, in seeming contradiction to the multicultural and multi-faith 
composition of Australian society.  
Whiteness scholars have argued that whiteness is rarely discussed in nations 
such as Australia because in white dominant countries it is not racialised; it is a 
‘non-race,’ invisible but omnipresent (Bonnett 2005; Dyer 1997; Garner 2007; 
Moreton-Robinson 2004). Several scholars have argued that whiteness is thus 
naturalised, and constructed as normative (Frankenberg 1993; Hartigan 1997; 
McIntosh 1998). One of the earliest sustained scholarly examinations of 
whiteness can be found in cultural theorist Richard Dyer’s essay White, later 
expanded into a book, in which he argues that whiteness is constructed and 
lived by white people as a racially or culturally neutral identity (Dyer 1997, p. 
70). According to Dyer, the cultural practices and values associated with 
whiteness are viewed as normative and 'common sense,' while “race has come 
to mean that one is interested in any racial imagery other than that of white 
people” (Dyer 2000, p. 539). He analyses the representation of white people in 
film, television and photography in recent history, and concludes that while 
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other racialised groups are represented in a way that draws attention to their 
racial difference, white people are simply represented as ‘human’ and unraced. 
Dyer calls on people to deconstruct white hegemony by “mak[ing] whiteness 
strange” (Dyer 1997, p. 10); to do so, he advised, we must treat it as a racial 
identity rather than a racially neutral experience, and racially mark whiteness in 
the same way that whiteness racially marks anything that is unlike it.  
Dyer’s assertions are compelling, although it should be noted that he is 
speaking to white people; it is only those who occupy whiteness as a site of 
power that are unable to perceive whiteness. As scholars such as bell hooks and 
W.E.B. Dubois have made abundantly apparent, for Black people, an already 
racialised group, whiteness has never been invisible or culturally neutral, but is 
indeed omnipresent; a factor that governs their lives through racially inflected 
institutions, social structures, and political systems. For such groups, whiteness 
is also perceptible on the bodies of white people, as bell hooks points out in her 
1992 chapter, “Representing Whiteness in the Black Imagination.” Speaking of 
her experiences teaching in the US university, she states: 
Usually, white students respond with naïve amazement that black people 
critically assess white people from a standpoint where ‘whiteness’ is a privilege 
signifier… Many of them were shocked that black people think critically about 
whiteness because racist thinking perpetuates the fantasy that the Other who is 
subjugated, who is subhuman, lacks the ability to comprehend, to understand, 
to see the working of the powerful (1992, p. 339-340). 
In this chapter, bell hooks situates whiteness as the subject of the Black gaze, 
following the example of W.E.B. Du Bois who wrote evocatively of this same 
phenomenon in his 1920 essay, “The Souls of White Folk.” However, Du Bois 
does not only talk of being able to perceive whiteness, but also emphasises that 
he can see through whiteness precisely because his ontological and epistemic 
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blackness has been moulded by whiteness, as all racialised groups have. Of 
“white souls,” W.E.B. Du Bois states: 
Of them I am singularly clairvoyant. I see in and through them. I view them 
from unusual points of vantage. Not as a foreigner do I come, for I am native, 
not foreign, bone of their thought and flesh of their language. Mine is not the 
knowledge of the traveler or the colonial composite of dear memories, words 
and wonder… I know their thoughts and they know that I know. This 
knowledge makes them now embarrassed, now furious! They deny my right to 
live and be and call me misbirth! My word is to them mere bitterness and my 
soul, pessimism (2007, p. 44). 
For Du Bois, whiteness is not simply one racial identity among many, but a 
social location conferring structural privilege upon those who inhabit it. It is for 
this reason that scholars such as Dyer and hooks have proposed that the white 
gaze be flipped back onto whiteness, in the hopes that by exposing whiteness, 
the racial structures that sustain it will also be exposed and eventually 
dismantled. This is exemplified by hooks in her earlier book “Yearning: Race, 
Gender and Cultural Politics” where she stated that she wanted “all those white 
folks who are giving blacks their take on blackness to let them know what's 
going on with whiteness” (1992, p. 54). She suggests the need for “the 
production for a discourse on race that interrogates whiteness,” claiming that 
“In far too much contemporary discourse – though there are some outstanding 
exceptions – race is always an issue of Otherness that is not white” (1992, p. 54). 
Central to any discussion of whiteness, then, is the understanding that 
whiteness carries significant privilege and authority within a racialised 
hierarchical schema that centres white experiences and white bodies. The 
privilege that whiteness affords white people is sustained through structures 
and schemas that normalise whiteness and construct it as both natural and 
common sense. Through this process whiteness becomes, in the words of Homi 
Bhabha, “a screen for projecting the political phantoms of the past on the 
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unfulfilled surfaces of the present; but at the same time it resembles what house 
painters call a primer, a base color that regulates all others, a norm that 
spectacularly or stealthily underlies powerful social values” (Bhabha 1998, p. 
23).  Through this quotation, Bhabha situates whiteness as not just a racial 
identity, but as a “strategy of authority” (Bhabha 1998, p. 22), in the vein of 
W.E.B. Du Bois (2007). 
In contrast, British-born sociologist Ruth Frankenberg posits that in order to 
destabilise and decentre whiteness, it should be reinscribed as one racial 
identity amongst many (1993, p. 1). In her now classic book White Women, Race 
Matters (1993), Frankenberg recounts and analyses the life histories of 30 white 
women as they discuss their thoughts on whiteness, race, and racism in the 
United States. Frankenberg provides a deep empirical exploration of how race 
shapes white people's lives, and increasingly, the study of whiteness adopts 
Frankenberg's theory that whiteness derives much of its power from the very 
fact that it usually isn't treated as a racial identity. This is highlighted through 
Frankenberg’s model of three discursive repertoires that she believes 
encapsulates the forms that the narratives of her interview participants took 
(1993, p. 14): essentialist racism, colour and power evasion and race cognisance. 
These racial repertoires will be delineated further and deployed in Chapter 
Seven of this thesis. 
Du Bois, hooks, Frankenberg and Bhabha have all theorised whiteness from the 
perspective of the United States, with Dyer writing from the United Kingdom. 
While they provide a helpful introduction to the concept of whiteness and a 
background to how whiteness studies emerged as a field of study, it is 
important to acknowledge that the function and motility of whiteness differs 
according to national context. The centrality of whiteness to the formation of the 
Australia nation state and the Australian national identity is indisputable. It is 
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apparent both in Australia’s violent colonial past and present and in its policies 
on immigration, which have operated in tandem to attempt to affix 
‘Australianness’ with a white racial identity through the exclusion of Indigenous 
Australians and non-white immigrants and refugees. The origin of ‘White 
Australia’ began with the myth of terra nullius, meaning “no one’s land,” 
whereby in 1788 white British colonists declared Australia to be uninhabited, 
denying the existence of the land’s Indigenous inhabitants while 
simultaneously exterminating them (Grimshaw et al. 1994). The claim of terra 
nullius enabled colonists to ‘claim’ Australia without having to formally 
‘conquer’ it. Goenpul woman and Professor of Indigenous Studies Aileen 
Moreton-Robinson states that the formation of Australia as a nation state was 
built on the dispossession of land from Indigenous people, just as Canada, 
Hawaii, New Zealand and the United States were too (2015). The process of 
dispossession has continued since white invasion until today, by denying 
Indigenous sovereignty and making “piecemeal concessions” (2015, p. xi). By 
dispossessing Indigenous people of their land, she argues, the Australian nation 
is constructed as a white possession (Moreton-Robinson 2005, 2015).  Moreton-
Robinson asserts that in Australia, “white possession operates socio-
discursively to produce the racial contract that enables, constrains and 
disciplines subjects in various ways. The possessiveness of white subjectivity is 
thus regulated through its relationship with the nation state” (2015, p. 54). 
The mode of rationality that is produced through this process, which she calls 
the “white possessive,” is at the core of Moreton-Robinson’s prolific writings on 
whiteness and the Australian national project. Moreton-Robinson also refers to 
the role of immigration policies in the establishment of Australia as a white 
possession, in tandem with Indigenous dispossession. She suggests that after 
Australia officially became a nation in 1901, Australia continued to be 
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constructed and enforced as a white man's land through the White Australia 
Policy which intentionally restricted the immigration of non-white persons up 
until 1973. Whiteness was again marked as the identifier around which the 
nation was to be built (Moreton-Robinson 2005). Moreton-Robinson suggests 
that the cultural inscription of whiteness in Australia has led to not only the 
conflation of race and ethnicity with the nation, but also with a broader 
understanding of 'the West' and the values it upholds, claiming that “whiteness 
secures hegemony through discourse by normalising itself as the cultural space 
of the West” (2004, p. 78). The cultural space that Moreton-Robinson alludes to 
may potentially exclude those who do not fit the white Australian archetype, 
including people of non-Christian faiths. 
Another notable Australian scholar in whiteness studies is Ghassan Hage 
(1998), who describes the role that whiteness continues to play in the Australian 
nation through an evaluation of the “discourse of Anglo-decline.” Hage posits 
that politicians like John Howard and Pauline Hanson in the mid- to late-1990s, 
were skilled in the perpetuation of this discourse, which enabled white 
Australians to lament the multicultural nature of Australia and dream of the 
days of Anglo-Celtic centrality. Hage also notes in later work that Howard was 
successful in articulating “white paranoia” (2002, p. 433), stating:  
For despite his firm belief in the transhistorical nature of Australian society 
based on these values, Howard also advances the thesis that society and its 
people are drifting or have drifted away from the core values and that there is a 
need to bring them back. There is no paranoid politics without some whingeing 
about some corruption to the core values of society (2002, p. 433). 
Hage’s (1998) and Moreton-Robinson’s (2015) extensive research have 
significantly shaped the field of whiteness studies in Australia today. 
Noticeably absent from their scholarship, however, is a sustained inquiry into 
the ways in which religion - specifically Christianity - interacts with whiteness 
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and national identity, despite the White Australia Policy’s legacy in creating a 
nation where Christianity is the dominant faith. This absence is representative 
of the broader whiteness literature; while there is the occasional tacit allusion to 
the exclusion of racialised non-Christian religious groups from the bounds of 
whiteness, there is little to be found in the way of explicit analyses on the 
relationship between Christianity and whiteness. Dyer (1997) touches on this 
interconnection in White, although he notes early on that he does not believe 
that Christianity is essentially white. Instead, he argues that the European 
construction of whiteness evolved from a Christian understanding of the battle 
between the body and the spirit, the former of which is seen as inferior and 
something to be conquered and transcended (Dyer 1997, p. 17). This, coupled 
with the dualism of the Cartesian worldview that underpins modern sciences 
(Grosfoguel 2011), was central to the logic of colonising missions. To be 
governed by the body was something of non-white races, who were studied 
and categorised by way of their physical features, while to perform the same 
analysis on white people would be to concede the body’s control over them 
(Dyer 1997, p. 23). Although Dyer’s argument that whiteness was developed via 
Christianity’s body/spirit dualism is not particularly persuasively made, he 
does offer some examples of how Christianity was whitened by Europeans: 
Yet not only did Christianity become the religion, and religious export, of 
Europe, indelibly marking its culture and consciousness, it has also been 
thought and felt in distinctly white ways for most of its history, seen in relation 
to, for instance, the following: the persistence of the Manichean dualism of 
black:white that could be mapped onto skin colour difference; the role of the 
Crusades in racialising the idea of Christendom (making national/geographic 
others into enemies of Christ); the gentilising and whitening of the image of 
Christ and the Virgin in painting; the ready appeal to the God of Christianity in 
the prosecution of doctrines of racial superiority and imperialism (1997, p. 17).  
Dyer’s (1997) examples are illustrative of the ways in which Christianity was 
associated with whiteness early on in the formative stages of race classification 
41 
 
in Europe. Dyer’s argument supports the work of Selod and Embrick, which I 
have outlined in section 2.2 of this chapter, who contend that non-Christian 
religions were considered inferior to Christians due to the impurity of their 
blood, a concept which is intrinsically mired in racial language. 
A more common approach in the literature is to make discursive connections 
between Christianity and whiteness through its relationship to another cultural 
space - ‘the West’. Sohail Daulatzai has argued that the concept of the West is 
both racially and religiously inflected, positing that the idea of ‘the West’ and 
the Europe has for several centuries been articulated through reference to a 
white racial identity and a Christian religious identity. He draws on the work of 
noted sociologists of religion such as Gil Anidjar and Talal Asad to argue that 
“the very idea of the West emerges from and through the figure of the Muslim” 
(2012, p. xvii). Daulatzai contends that this phenomenon continues today, 
positing that: 
Although 9/11 is what seems to have raised the spectre of Islam in relation to 
the West, a genealogy of the idea of race reveals that the Muslim – as the Other 
to a normative whiteness – has not only haunted the very foundation of the 
West since its inception but has also given the West (now Europe and the 
United States) meaning, defining who is civilized and who is savage, who is 
democratic and who is autocratic, who is peaceful and who is violent, who is 
human who is not (2012, p. xvii). 
Similar arguments have been made by British cultural geographer Alastair 
Bonnett, who convincingly argues that the concept of “the West” has become a 
stand-in for whiteness as it “helped resolve some of the problematic and 
unsustainable characteristics of white supremacism” (Bonnett 2005, p. 17).  In 
his article, ‘From the Crises of Whiteness to Western Supremacism,’ Bonnett 
maps the ways in which the term ‘white’ came to be dropped from common 
English parlance from the 1930s onwards, at the same time as the concept of 
‘the West’ was starting to be introduced more frequently into British discourses 
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(2005). Bonnett links what he terms the ‘crisis of whiteness’ with the rise of 
Western supremacism, stating that, “White attitudes became things to be 
studied, and eventually ‘whiteness’ became a term to be problematised. But ‘the 
West’ and ‘Western’ emerged as categories to be believed in; understood not as 
constructs but as coherent and meaningful expressions” (2005, p. 23). 
Additionally, Bonnett posits in an earlier article that Christianity is an 
important element of how the West perceives itself (2003, p. 332), stating that 
“The West is defined as a set of principles or values inherent within (or 
associated with) a “European” or “Western Christian” heritage, culture and 
history” (2005, p. 334). If we agree with his suggestion that the concept of the 
West has come to be used as a stand-in for whiteness as references to race 
decline in public discourse, then Christianity is arguably the religious 
expression of whiteness. 
Bonnett’s articulation of the synonymity of ‘whiteness’ and ‘Western’ finds 
purchase in this thesis. As stated previously, while it is no longer considered 
acceptable to refer explicitly to ‘race’, this does not mean that race is no longer 
relevant. I suggest that in contemporary Australia, race is more commonly 
evoked through references to civilisation such as ‘the West,’ as Bonnett 
contends, but also through culture and nation. In Australia, race is often evoked 
through references to the Australian way of life and Australian values, and 
Australia’s national identity is constructed around whiteness, Christianity and 
so-called Western values such as democracy and modernity. In her article 
“’Common Values': Whiteness, Christianity, Asylum Seekers and the Howard 
Government” (2006), Holly Randell-Moon makes the assertion that in Australia, 
the association between Christianity, whiteness, and Australian identity re-
emerged after the election of John Howard as Prime Minister in 1997. Randell-
Moon convincingly argues that the Howard Government's use of Christianity in 
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its political discourse ‘is reflective of an investment in, and protection of, a 
white teleology of Australian nationalism.’ The article posits that in contrast to 
the nation building tactics of the era of the White Australia Policy, the Howard 
Government did not seek to develop the national identity around a whiteness 
that was explicitly racially marked, but rather did so through references to 
'common values' that are ultimately tied up in Christianity and implicitly, 
whiteness, while purporting secularity. Randell-Moon contends that this lead to 
the construction of an “Anglocentric national identity where whiteness may not 
always be located on the body but can be an imagined investment in a system of 
values that associates Australianness with whiteness through Christianity” 
(2006, p. 11). She points out that during his time as Prime Minister, John 
Howard maintained his insistence that while anyone could freely practice 
whatever religion they chose, Australia’s Judeo-Christian heritage should 
always be acknowledged. Here, “Judeo-Christian” is used in to refer to the 
civilisation space of the West, of which whiteness and Christianity are central 
components. 
Howard’s contribution to the discursive association of whiteness, 
Australianness and Christianity throughout his administration has been well 
documented (Maddox 2005, 2007; Casey 2006; Randell-Moon 2006; Sunderland 
2007). Marion Maddox’s work on Christianity in the Australian public sphere 
and the rise of the religious right has been particularly instrumental in exposing 
the influence of Christian religious fundamentalism on Liberal Party policy 
under Howard’s leadership. In her book, ‘God Under Howard’ (2005), Maddox 
argues that Howard and his cabinet somewhat successfully imported the 
rhetoric and tactics of the Christian religious right in the United States into 
Australian politics, albeit in a more covert way through the indirect 
manipulation of public policy including policy on euthanasia (p. 59), same-sex 
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marriage (p. 101), abortion and stem cell research (p. 224), and diverting 
resources from the poor to the rich (p. 218). Importantly, Maddox notes that 
Howard did not present himself as a particularly religious or fundamentalist 
Christian, as many Presidents in the US have been known to do, but instead 
was a very astute and calculated politician who made “vaguely religious 
allusions” (2005, p. 218) that implied he was guided by Christian values, when 
it was strategic to do so. 
Howard’s use of religious, specifically Christian, references is said to have 
encouraged an increase in the presence of religion in political discourse in 
Australia (Maddox 2005, 2009; Warhurst 2007). Anna Crabb’s (2009) analysis of 
2422 speeches given by prominent Australian MPs between 2000 and 2006 to 
measure the frequency of Christian references indicated that in the first half of 
the decade references to Christianity in speeches steadily rose, as did the 
amount of policy issues which drew on those references (2009, p. 275). Terms 
such as ‘Christ’, ‘Jesus’, ‘God’, ‘Bible’ and ‘church’ were present in an average of 
21.3% of the speeches, with 2000 seeing approximately 9% of speeches carrying 
those terms, and 2005 seeing a peak of 24% (2009, p. 263). Crabb argues that 
following September 11, politicians increasingly alluded to a Christian basis for 
national identity in order to draw the majority-Christian nation together in an 
era of perceived security threats against the nation from non-Christian enemies 
(2009, p. 275). To support her assertion, she demonstrates that the three key 
policy areas in which Christian terms were used throughout speeches were in 
foreign relations, followed by fabric of society, and finally freedom and 
democracy (2009, p. 267). 
More recently, Australian sociologist Farida Fozdar has looked beyond the 
Howard era to analyse how former Prime Ministers Kevin Rudd and Tony 
Abbott utilised Christianity in their political rhetoric. In her article “The 
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Choirboy and the Mad Monk” (2011), Fozdar draws on speeches and essays by 
Rudd and Abbott to demonstrate that Australian politicians have been moving 
away from asserting Australia as a secular nation to unabashedly embracing 
and promoting the association between Australian identity and Christianity 
(2011, p. 632). She notes that the increased references to Christianity in political 
discourse are in addition to the already existing Christian framework of 
Australia’s political and judicial system (Fozdar 2011). Fozdar (2011) points to 
the Christian prayers used to open parliaments and the default of swearing in 
politicians on the Bible as two overt examples. As well as successfully drawing 
attention to the lack of secular neutrality in Australian politics, Fozdar examines 
the consequences of privileging Christianity over minority religions such as 
Islam which is positioned as at best, suspicious, and at worst, antithetical and 
even a threat to the Australian nation due to its perceived moral distance from 
Christianity (2011, p. 630). Fozdar highlights the importance of race in this 
positioning as well, stating that “Australia can increasingly be seen as a 
‘Christian’ nation, as part of the ‘whiteness’ that Hage (1998) identified as 
fundamental to Australia’s concept of its nationhood” (2011, p. 630). 
What we find in the contemporary Australian texts is the suggestion that the 
rise of Christian-centrism in Australia after the election of John Howard 
accelerated in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This 
phenomenon has been met by some with unease. The Secular Party of Australia 
was formed in 2006 and registered as a Federal political party in 2010, in order 
to help curb what they saw as an encroachment of the Church into both the 
Labor and Liberal parties (Secular Party of Australia 2016). For others, however, 
it simply reinforced their belief that Christianity was and should remain a core 
tenet of Australian identity in the wake of increasing religious diversity. Nelson 
et al’s article on the Freedom of Belief in Australia inquiry highlights that 40% of 
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submissions to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) drew 
attention to the nation’s ‘Judeo-Christian core,’ and many of these “were 
despondent or resentful of its displacement from the centre of Australian 
cultural life” (Nelson et al 2012, p. 309). In contrast, only 6% of submissions 
stated that Australia should see itself as a secular nation (2012, p. 309).  
Of course, submissions are not necessarily reflective of broader public opinion, 
as is pointed out by the authors when they state that “The submission process 
privileges those with a vested interest, and in this case they were very specific 
sub-sections of ‘the public’” (2012, p. 314). Keeping this in mind, Nelson et al’s 
content analysis highlights the tensions between divergent national visions of 
Australia’s ‘religious character.’ The positions with the most backing in the 
submissions were taken by those arguing for a secular state, and to a much 
larger degree for those whom Christianity remains central to the Australian 
national identity (Nelson et al 2012).  On the face of it these appear to be 
competing visions; however, this thesis takes the view put forth by Sophie 
Sunderland in her article “Post-Secular Nation; or how “Australian spirituality 
privileges a secular, white, Judaeo-Christian culture” (2007). Sunderland argued that 
while s 116 of the Australian Constitution’s posits Australia as a secular nation 
through the separation of Church and State, the very concept of ‘secularism’ is 
an elastic one that is moulded by the cultural landscape of the nation (2007), 
and “the meanings and assumptions that shape secularism also vary” (Asad 
2003 cited in Sunderland 2007, p. 58). According to Sunderland, the form that 
secularism takes in Australia is one that “includes the elevation of ‘Judeo-
Christian ethic’ to the level of the national culture” (2007, p. 58). Importantly, 
like Randell-Moon (2008), Sunderland (2007) links Australian secularism to an 
“imagined, core, white, Anglo-Celtic subjectivity” (2007, p. 67) which she 
argues is “coterminous to national identity” (2007, p. 67). I examine the 
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association between secularism and Christianity further in sections 5.3.2 and 
5.3.3 of this thesis, with reference to the work of Talal Asad (2003, 2006) and Gil 
Anidjar (2006). 
This review of the literature suggests that there is a limited amount of research 
on the association between whiteness and Australianness, and Christianity and 
Australianness, but the work is suggestive of the possibility of a connection 
between whiteness and Christianity with ‘Australianness’ playing an 
intermediary role. Although some academics do make reference to it (Hage 
1998; Moreton-Robinson 2005; Fozdar 2009), there is a need for a more rigorous 
evaluation of the link and how it may affect the development of a multi-faith as 
well as multi-cultural nation. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a critical analysis of three different but closely 
interrelated bodies of scholarship and in doing so, provided an introduction to 
the conceptual framework utilised by this thesis. I reviewed key theoretical and 
empirical studies of racialisation to map the genealogy of racialisation studies, 
emphasising that the past decade has seen a rapidly-growing body of work on 
the racialisation of Islam and Muslims in Western nations. This trend in the 
literature departs from earlier studies of racialisation that did not explicitly 
address the question of religion, and in some cases, disputed whether religious 
groups could even become racialised.  
 
Despite the substantial amount of empirical research that has already been 
conducted in the field of racialisation broadly, there is room to further 
contribute to and expand on understandings of racialisation as it relates to 
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Islam. For the purposes of this research project, I rely on the claims of relevant 
and recent literature that argues that Muslims are cast as a racialised group in 
Western nations like Australia, in order to analyse the experiences of white 
converts to Islam who, prior to their conversion, occupied an ‘unraced’ or 
‘invisible’ racial positioning. I suggest that racialisation may be a useful concept 
to examine their experiences because Australia’s national identity coheres 
around a Christian religious identity and a white racial identity, as I have 
argued through my review of the Australian and international whiteness 
studies literature. This raises the question of whether the concept of 
‘Australianness’ is central to the racialisation of Muslims and Islam. 
 
In the following chapter, I elaborate on the methodological approach of my 
research project, and carefully outline the research methods that were utilised 
in the course of my fieldwork.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a comprehensive review of scholarly literature 
relevant to this thesis, in which I critically analysed pertinent scholarship on 
race, racialisation, and racism, Islamophobia, and the Muslim experience in 
Australia. Through my evaluation of the literature, I highlighted the 
contemporary debates and gaps within the scholarship and clearly established 
the contribution that this project makes to the relevant fields, providing further 
explanation and support for the research objectives outlined in Chapter One. In 
this chapter, I describe the methodology chosen to operationalise these same 
research objectives, and outline the methods and research design used in the 
collection of data to meet my research aims. 
Central to the aims of my study was to uncover how white converts to Islam 
conceptualise their experiences of race prior to and after their conversion to 
Islam. My methodological decisions were thus strongly influenced by the 
epistemological paradigm offered by social constructionism, a theory which 
suggests that knowledge about the social world is ultimately constructed by 
individuals through an interactive relationship between the individual and the 
subject of knowledge (Rogoff 1992). Social constructionism assumes that 
people's perceptions of their actions, thoughts, and feelings are best understood 
in relation to their broader social and cultural context (Hussey and Hussey 
1997), and thus privileges the lived experiences of individuals and how they 
make sense of those experiences. 
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In keeping with my commitment to exploring the lived experiences of white 
Muslim converts and the epistemology of social constructionism, I conducted 
twenty-nine in-depth, semi-structured interviews with people who identified as 
white and had converted to Islam prior to the interviews taking place. The 
qualitative method of in-depth interviews lent itself to the task of exploring 
how white converts to Islam construct their identities, sense of self and racial 
reality as described in their own words, by privileging the depth, detail and 
complexity of their experience over generalisability and identifiable truths 
(Phillimore and Goodson 2004, p. 157).  By taking a semi-structured approach to 
the interviews and guiding the participants through specific themes I wanted to 
cover, I attempted to capture the subjective nuances within participants' 
personal narratives by allowing them some degree of flexibility in the telling of 
their stories, whilst attempting to maintain the integrity of my research aims.  I 
then used thematic analysis to analyse the transcripts of the interviews and 
draw out key concepts and patterns in the participants’ narratives. A thematic 
coding framework was developed during this process.  
 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy of this study complements its theoretical positioning, 
which departs from the positivist conceptualisation of race as a fixed and 
immutable part of one’s identity that can be observed, measured and often used 
as a biological determinant of human behaviour.  As outlined in Chapter Two, 
this thesis adopts the approach of Omi and Winant (1994), who view race as a 
category that is socially constructed, contingent and fluid, influenced by 
prevailing social norms and discourses. Omi and Winant’s framework does not 
deny that there are observable differences between people, for example with 
regards to physical attributes such as skin or hair colour, but posits that the way 
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these differences are categorised and the meanings that individuals give to 
physical features are informed by social factors. The study is thus most 
appropriately located within the post-positivist realm of critical realism, which 
posits that while an objective reality does exist, our knowledge of it is mediated 
by socially constructed interpretations that differ from individual to individual, 
and group to group. Critical realism can perhaps be best characterised as 
ontologically realist – in that it accepts the existence of a reality external to 
human thoughts and impulses – whilst adopting a constructivist 
epistemological position which argues that reality is unknowable outside of 
human interpretations and standpoints. The ontological positioning of critical 
realism avoids the challenges thrown up by radical constructivist or subjectivist 
approaches to knowledge that are inclined to deny the existence of any external 
reality, in either the natural or social world. 
More significantly for this study, critical realism still allows room for 
constructivist epistemologies such as social constructionism, the paradigm that 
argues that individuals construct rather than uncover knowledge about the 
world, by sharing their experiences and perception of reality with others in a 
way that can commonly be understood. Social constructionism relies on the 
notion of intersubjectivity, in which groups of individuals develop shared 
understandings based on common experiences and assumptions about the 
world that then form the ground for their communication (Rogoff 1990). Any 
personal meanings shaped through these experiences are affected by the 
intersubjectivity of the community to which she or he belongs. French 
anthropologist and sociologist of science Bruno Latour (2003) argues that it is 
this process of knowledge-production that puts the ‘social’ into ‘social 
constructionism’ – the fact that it is a collaborative process, rather than because 
it is concerned with the social world. 
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In other words, unlike essentialist positivist epistemologies that view race as 
static and naturally defined, social constructionist paradigms conceive of race 
as a socio-cultural reality, albeit a flexible one that can shift and change as 
different groups undergo varying processes of racialisation guided by group-
defined norms of the time. By adopting a critical realist approach, it is possible 
to acknowledge that race is a reality for people who are racialised and who 
experience life as raced individuals, while simultaneously affirming that the 
categories we use and the very way we talk about race has been developed 
through collaborative processes in various social groups. This foundation is 
particularly relevant to this study which explores how whiteness can be 
challenged, disrupted, ‘crossed over’ or temporarily erased, depending on the 
social circumstances that participants found themselves in. 
It is also necessary to indicate here that the concept of experience is central to the 
epistemological thrust of this thesis, whereby experience is used as an analytical 
category and not just an ordinary word. The experiences referred to by 
participants are not treated solely as discrete, personalised and neutral 
occurrences in time, but reveal the workings of the racial hierarchies and 
racialisation processes that they are imbricated within. Feminist theorists 
writing in the late 20th century were amongst the first to suggest that utilising 
experience as a category of analysis could expose the power relations inherent 
in knowledge production, arguing that theorising women’s experience 
contributed to the destabilisation of patriarchal structures and hierarchies in the 
process (Bordo 1990; Tanesini 1994). By adopting the view that women’s 
material experience was necessarily shaped by the gendered ordering of 
society, feminist scholars challenged the idea that knowledge is neutral, 
objective and universal, and introduced the idea that marginalised groups 
speak of their experience on the margins from a place of epistemic privilege. 
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 The importance of foregrounding lived experience in the development of theory 
has since been taken up by post-colonial theorists writing about the ontological 
positioning of black and colonised peoples, such as Frantz Fanon (1967), Stuart 
Hall (1990) and Gayatri Spivak (1988). In Chapter Two of this thesis, I outlined 
Fanon’s description of how the lived, bodily and material experience of race (in 
his case blackness) is determined via the operation of two schemas that act as a 
dialectic between the body and the world, and as crucial components of 
racialisation. Experience – the encounter between the body and the outside 
world – corroborates the existence of these schemas and the process of 
racialisation they contribute to. Fanon contends that “the black man on his 
home territory is oblivious of the moment when his inferiority is determined by 
the Other” (1967, p. 90) and that the experience of blackness can only be 
understood through interactions with the white imagination and the white 
gaze. Rather than dismissing experience as simply ‘anecdotal,’ a Fanonian 
approach elevates the role of experience in theory by proposing that 
understanding the experience of marginalised peoples is fundamental to 
understanding the workings of entrenched racialised power structures that 
have been established through colonialism. The work of Dutch sociologist 
Philomena Essed is instructive here in elaborating the centrality of experience to 
the study of racism, which is one of the manifestations of racialisation examined 
in this thesis. Similar to the approach of this thesis, Essed’s book 
“Understanding Everyday Racism” focuses on micro-level interactions and 
formulates a theoretical understanding of everyday racism by analysing over 
2000 experiences of black women. Essed suggests that experience is the “best 
basis for the analysis of the simultaneous impact of racism in different sites and 
in different social relations” (1991, p. 4) because of its multidimensional nature 
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and ability to position the person recounting the experience in a particular 
social context and social location, which is vital to understanding the structural 
settings that allowed the experience to occur. Importantly, Essed states that 
experience as she utilises the concept does not refer simply to personal 
experiences, but also describes “the impact of knowledge of general (structural) 
phenomena on one’s definition of reality” (p. 58). This thesis takes a similar 
approach to Essed by relating the experience of white Muslim converts 
(personal, vicarious and cognitive) to the dominant social structures which 
shape their perspective of their reality. 
 
3.3 Evaluating the Quality of Qualitative Research 
Given that the epistemological basis of qualitative research is anti-positivist in 
nature, there has been considerable debate amongst social researchers about 
how to measure the quality of a qualitative study, and indeed whether it is even 
fruitful to do so (Guba and Lincoln 1986; Hope and Waterman 2003; Morse et al 
2002; Sandelowski 1993; Silverman 2006). Hope and Waterman (2003) identify 
and outline three key positions within the literature on how to effectively gauge 
the quality of qualitative data:  
1. Using the same criteria as is used by studies underpinned by 
positivism, namely validity and reliability;  
2. Developing a new set of criteria for qualitative research that takes into 
account the distinct epistemological and methodological frameworks 
that it occurs in; and  
3. Doing away with the idea of criteria altogether (p. 121).  
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Based on his research in the field of nursing, Gary Rolfe suggests that the 
reason that qualitative researchers continue to hold such divergent positions on 
how to assess the quality of data in qualitative research is due to the fact that 
“there is no unified body of theory, methodology or method that can 
collectively be described as qualitative research; indeed, that the very idea of 
qualitative research is open to question” (2006, p. 305). He goes on to explain 
why consensus on the definition of qualitative research is virtually impossible – 
while some make the distinction based on the type of data that is collected (i.e. 
numerical vs textual), others refer to the ontological or epistemological 
differences that underpin quantitative and qualitative data. This in turns creates 
more challenges and confusion as researchers debate how a distinction rooted 
at the ontological or epistemological level applies when it comes to studies that 
use mixed methods (Rolfe 2006).  
Rolfe argues that a unified and coherent qualitative research paradigm is thus 
only found in research textbooks. Given the reality of a multiplicity of 
qualitative paradigms, the question of gauging the quality of any one 
qualitative study becomes ever more difficult to answer.  Scholars such as 
Morse et al. (2002) argue that it is possible to achieve validity and reliability 
within a qualitative project, two of the traditional criteria for measuring the 
quality of research in the positivist tradition.  They contend that the researcher 
can instil rigor into their research simply by employing a series of ‘verification 
strategies’ throughout every stage of the process, for “Without rigor, research is 
worthless, becomes fiction, and loses its utility” (Morse et al 2002, p. 2). The 
strategies they suggest include “ensuring methodological coherence, sampling 
sufficiency, developing a dynamic relationship between sampling, data 
collection and analysis, thinking theoretically, and theory development” (Morse 
et al. 2002, p. 11). Morse et al posit that by implementing each of these strategies 
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consistently and iteratively – that is, moving between design and 
implementation – it is entirely possible to maintain rigor throughout as the 
researcher can modify the process as necessary to ensure congruence between 
the research question, literature, data collection and analysis. The outcome of 
this investigator responsiveness is that the results of the study will constitute 
valid scientific evidence. 
The central premise of Morse et al’s argument is that validity and reliability are 
necessary qualities of all research projects, whether quantitative or qualitative, 
and need not challenge the philosophical underpinnings of qualitative research. 
Authors like Silverman (2006) have made similar arguments for the 
appropriateness of validity and reliability as criteria of quality regardless of the 
researcher’s theoretical or methodological positioning. Silverman suggests a 
variety of methods to ensure validity and reliability, such as analytic induction, 
deviant case-analysis and using appropriate tabulations (2006 p. 236). This is 
contrary to the current dominant view amongst qualitative researchers at least 
in North America, which insists that qualitative research is substantially 
different from quantitative research insofar as qualitative research does not seek 
to find ‘the truth,’ and thus must employ different measures of quality and 
different terminology (Rolfe 2006).  According to health researcher Margaret 
Sandelowski (1993), drawing on seminal work by Guba and Lincoln (1981), 
qualitative research should be evaluated with regards to its ‘trustworthiness,’ 
which is gauged by the reader of the article or report after the research is 
complete. The researcher is responsible for making their research practices 
transparent and in Sandelowski’s words, “auditable” by “leaving a decision 
trail” (1993 p. 2).  Morse et al (2002) strongly disagree with the concept of post-
hoc evaluation by the consumers of the end results of the research, which is 
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why they stress that the responsibility must be on the researcher to establish 
their study’s validity every step of the way. 
Some scholars have appropriated the framework of ‘trustworthiness’ created by 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) for qualitative research instead of the traditional 
markers of validity and reliability.  Lincoln and Guba split trustworthiness into 
four criteria which are now used by many researchers in the social sciences and 
other disciplines: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.  
In their model, credibility loosely corresponds with internal validity, 
transferability with external validity or generalisability, dependability with 
reliability and confirmability with objectivity. Shenton (2004) summarises the 
work of Lincoln and Guba (1985) to highlight the key strategies they suggest for 
researchers to use to meet these criteria.  For example, to ensure credibility 
Lincoln and Guba suggest using established research methods, developing an 
early relationship or familiarity with participating social groups/organisations, 
random sampling, triangulation, peer scrutiny, negative case analysis, reflective 
commentary by the researcher and member checks, also known as respondent 
validation, which Lincoln and Guba believe to be the most useful and 
significant way to bolster the credibility of a research study (1985).  
Indeed, some of the strategies proposed by Morse et al (2002) and Silverman 
(2006) appear to mirror those in Lincoln and Guba (2002). There are some 
exceptions, however, such as Silverman’s critique of triangulation and Morse et 
al’s problematisation of member checks, for example. The greatest issue though 
appears to be in the post-hoc nature of some of the strategies proposed by 
Lincoln and Guba, particularly those which go to the authenticity of the data 
collected, which authors like Morse et al and Silverman state are neither useful 
nor establish validity. Still, it is debatable whether or not some of the 
differences in terminology between those who continue to use reliability and 
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validity as measures of the quality of a research and those who prefer to use 
Lincoln and Guba’s criteria is just that – a difference in the terms used, rather 
than a distinction in the concepts themselves. 
Alternative criteria have also been proposed by other scholars engaged in 
qualitative research. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) contend that research is valid if: 
“It is sufficiently grounded, triangulated, based on naturalistic indicators, 
carefully fitted to a theory, comprehensive in scope, credible in terms of 
member checks, logical and truthful in terms of its reflection of the phenomena 
in question” (p. 579). Additionally, they outline two key issues that they believe 
researchers need to address and that their peers should consider when 
assessing the quality of their work: how the manifestation of power and 
political viewpoints are articulated, and verisimilitude, or how persuasive the 
text is in its representation of the truth (whilst acknowledging that gauging 
truth is an interpretive process). Similarly, to this last point, Koch and 
Harrington (1998) maintain that the plausibility of the narrative offered by the 
researcher is key to determining the credibility of the findings, suggesting that 
this can be achieved by reflexive, articulate writing that situates the researcher 
within the research. Both of these approaches suggest “that there is an inherent 
articulate component to good qualitative research” (Hope and Waterman 2003). 
Critics of the model proposed by Guba and Lincoln (1985) do not always fall on 
the side of those who prefer a positivist approach to evaluating research – there 
are also those researchers who contend that the purposes of qualitative research 
are still not accurately captured by their model. For example, Margaret 
Sandelowski (1993) claims that reliability or dependability is not necessary for 
qualitative inquiry because its premise relies on “the notion of reality as 
external, consensual, corroboratory, and repeatable” (p. 3), all things that are 
not assumed in interpretivist or naturalistic paradigms. She goes on to argue 
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that an emphasis on reliability actually threatens research validity because it 
forces conformity to the data at the expense of the meaningfulness of the data, 
and that validity is more important to maintaining the integrity of the data than 
its reliability.  Sandelowski is also critical of the emphasis that positivists place 
on the necessity for ‘rigour’ to obtain validity in a research project. She states 
that a preoccupation on the technical aspects of the research places us in 
“danger of succumbing to the ‘illusion of technique’ (Sandelowski 1993 p. 1). 
This is problematic for qualitative research because “there is an inflexibility and 
an uncompromising harshness and rigidity implied in the term ‘rigor’ that 
threatens to take us too far from the artfulness, versatility, and sensitivity to 
meaning and context that marks qualitative works of distinction” (Sandelowski 
1993 p. 1).  
Sandelowski’s argument is both compelling and evocative. She conceptualises 
qualitative research as a bridge between science and art, and thus the artfulness 
of a study is just as important to measuring its quality as the validity of the 
data: “good qualitative data reduction grabs the ‘essence’ of a phenomenon.” 
Sandelowski falls into the third category proposed by Hope and Waterman 
(2003) - that of the researcher who proposes that no pre-determined criteria 
should be set to gauge the quality of qualitative research and that each study 
should be judged on its individual merits by the people that read its findings.  
The onus is placed on this community of readers – often a community of peers – 
to assess the quality of the research based on the auditability of the “decision 
trail” left by the researcher. The ability of readers to assess the quality of the 
work is of course reliant on the research process being both transparent and 
accessible. 
This thesis adopts an approach closest to that of Sandelowski. In line with the 
debates in the literature already discussed in this section, my research project is 
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implicitly tied to the ontological and epistemological foundations of qualitative 
research, explained earlier, which then serve to operationalise my research 
aims. Rather than using the data from the interviews I conducted to make truth 
claims about the nature of race or whiteness, I am more interested in the 
narratives that my participants create to explain or interpret their experiences 
and the impact that these experiences have on their perception of their racial 
identity. I have also grounded my analysis firmly in the theoretical frameworks 
provided by scholarship on whiteness and racialisation, and have attempted to 
ensure congruence between the theoretical and methodological claims of my 
research question. The following sections explain the methods used in more 
depth, and the research decisions that were made to ensure that the participants 
were given the opportunity to share their stories in a manner that would 
capture the authenticity of their narratives.  In order to make my research 
process as transparent and auditable as possible, I also discuss the key 
limitations of my research and how I navigated the challenges they presented, 
particularly with regard to my own positionality. 
 
3.4 Research Method 
As mentioned earlier, this research project utilised in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews to foreground the nuances and complexities of the experiences of 
white converts to Islam.  Using this research method allowed the participants to 
be a central and integral part of the research project, and gave them the 
opportunity to tell their stories of race and racialisation in their own words, 
guided by open-ended questions. This section details the specific research 
design that I employed and outlines the various stages of my fieldwork, from 
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my recruitment strategy, to the data collection and transcription, through to the 
analysis of the interview transcripts. 
3.4.1 Participant recruitment 
When I began the recruitment process for this project, I employed three key 
sampling criteria in my advertising: participants must be Muslim, they must 
have converted to Islam from another faith position, and they must identify as 
white. While all three criteria relied on participants’ self-identification, the third 
criterion specified that along with participants identifying as white themselves, 
they should also reasonably believe that they are generally perceptible as white 
to others in the broader Australian community. A final criterion limiting 
recruitment to the geographical area of Sydney was introduced later on, due to 
the funding and time limitations of the PhD project. I initially intended to 
interview thirty participants who met all four criteria. 
A criterion based on race was both crucial for the aims of the project, and also 
problematic because of the very nature of race as a socio-culturally defined 
category, as I illustrated in Chapter Two. During my Honours year in which I 
did a similar study, I relied solely on self-identification, and encountered some 
issues in two cases where participants self-identified as white (at least partly) 
but due to their physical appearance were not treated as white by others. In 
both of these cases, the participants switched between referring to themselves 
as being white and being Aboriginal in one case, and being white and being 
Jamaican in another. This complicated the data analysis process somewhat, and 
exposed a significant limitation in my recruitment strategy which had not 
accounted for mixed-descent or bicultural participants. It is for this reason that I 
added a second criterion as well as that of self-identification to the criterion that 
participants must be white. While problems still exist within this model, the 
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addition of the extra qualification appears to have had the intended effect, as 
the same complications did not arise during the current project. 
Three strategies for recruiting white Muslim converts to the study were used in 
this research project; snowball sampling, communication platforms such as 
Facebook and online forums, and approaching key people within relevant 
community organisations and mosques to advertise my project verbally and 
through printed advertisements placed around their premises. Initially, 
participants were recruited using non-probability purposive sampling methods. 
After the first seventeen participants had been interviewed, my sampling 
strategy necessarily became more targeted and selective. I identified 
demographic gaps within the participant sample that I had already recruited 
that I felt would be detrimental to the overall research aims of the project, and 
altered my recruitment methods to address the identified gaps. 
The most successful of the three strategies was snowball sampling, whereby I 
utilised my pre-existing social and community networks within Sydney by 
receiving referrals from respondents and other key people within the Muslim 
community. Snowball sampling originally emerged as a strategy to recruit 
hidden or hard-to-reach population groups, often when studying phenomena 
that may be sensitive, criminal or otherwise difficult to observe (Hendricks & 
Blanken 1992). Using chain-referrals from a smaller group of identified 
participants utilises the social networks of those participants to widen the pool 
of participants which the researcher has access to. While white Muslim converts 
were not necessarily “hidden” in the way Hendricks and Blanken envisioned, 
snowball sampling allowed me to find participants who didn’t visibly identify 
as Muslim through their clothes, such as the ḥijāb for women or kufi or thawb for 
men, and who retained their birth names rather than changing their names to a 
more “Muslim” sounding names – typically, Arabic names.  It also allowed me 
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to recruit participants who did not engage very much with the mainstream 
Sydney Muslim community and did not use popular communication platforms 
or have contacts with religious organisations. 
While this strategy was effective, the initial group that emerged was not as 
diverse as I had hoped. There were a wide range of ages and geographical 
locations represented in the group, ranging from 21 to 73 years of age, living in 
areas of Sydney that included Greater Western Sydney, the Northern Beaches, 
Sutherland Shire and the Inner West. Men and women were fairly equally 
represented, and the ancestries of the participants varied, from British and Irish 
to French, Italian and Swedish. Where the heterogeneity was lacking was in the 
class and education backgrounds of the participants. In the initial group of 
seventeen participants, most were educated to a tertiary level, and besides two, 
all were employed and identified as middle-class. It was difficult to ascertain 
whether or not this reflected the demographic of the larger Muslim convert 
population, due to the lack of empirical data about Muslim converts in 
Australia. 
The lack of diversity in the initial group of participants was expected, as the 
selection bias that can result when using snowball sampling is well documented 
in the literature (Atkinson and Flint 2001, Van Meter 1990, Kaplan et al 1987), 
and it is likely that the nature of the initial participant group explains this 
sampling. People within similar social classes and with similar educational 
backgrounds are more likely to develop social networks with one another, and 
so the referrals received from participants are weighted towards those 
demographics. Another issue identified by Griffiths et al (1993) and Van Meter 
(1990) is that the participant group will reflect those who have relationships 
with other members of the group, and not those who are excluded or more on 
the fringes, or “isolates” (Van Meter 1990). Griffiths et al (1993) argue that this 
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process can thus over-emphasise group cohesiveness, because of its reliance on 
chains and networks. 
These challenges required me to adopt new and varied strategies to identify 
participants of different socio-economic status. At the same time as sampling 
through the social networks of people I knew within the community, I 
approached community organisations that I knew to work specifically with 
Muslim converts to enlist their help by placing fliers around their premises and 
informing their members about my project. In Sydney, the key organisations I 
identified were the Islamic Sciences and Research Association (ISRA), 
Australian New Muslim Association (ANMA), and Australian Muslim 
Women’s Association (AMWA), as organisations that worked primarily with 
converts or had dedicated classes or programs for converts. ISRA and AMWA 
were receptive to my project, but I was unsuccessful in developing a research 
relationship with ANMA, despite a number of emails and phone calls over a 
period of several months in 2013-2014. The lack of response from ANMA 
appeared to be due primarily to a shortage of staff and volunteers involved in 
the organisation during that period, but may also have been due to my inability 
to make contact with a senior person within the organisation who may have 
acted as a gatekeeper. While the people I spoke to allowed me to send copies of 
my recruitment flyers, I was unable to establish if they had been distributed, 
and none of the participants I interviewed stated that they had been referred to 
me from ANMA. 
Overall, however, only a very small number of participants were recruited 
through these and other organisations. Referrals from social networks were 
more effective than advertisements placed in the organisations’ offices. In order 
to avoid the suggestion of coercion, I asked the staff at these community 
organisations to tell their members about their project, but to avoid encouraging 
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them to attend, in case their members felt pressured to participate in order to 
maintain a good relationship with the organisation. It is debatable whether their 
lack of encouragement or enthusiasm about the project may have had the 
opposite effect; in dissuading members to participate as they may have 
assumed that the staff did not think it worthwhile for them. It is also important 
to note that the converts that attended the classes or were members of the 
organisations targeted were not all white. For example, a representative of ISRA 
related to me that most of the converts that came to their classes were of 
Chinese background.  
The demographic data of the participants recruited through organisations did 
not deviate significantly from the overall demographic data of the initial group 
of seventeen, and so in this way it was ineffective in counteracting the selection 
bias of the snowball sampling method. The class and education backgrounds of 
participants recruited through organisations were by and large the same as 
those recruited through snowball sampling. After discussing my frustration 
with other researchers and community members, I found that anecdotally, 
ANMA was the best organisation to go to recruit converts from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds due to the counselling, financial support and 
emergency accommodation they offer. For this reason, I continued to try and 
build a relationship with ANMA, albeit unsuccessfully. 
The third strategy was to utilise Internet communication platforms such as 
Twitter, Facebook, websites and online forums, as the Internet can be an 
attractive avenue to access Islam for new Muslims who may not have many 
other ties to the community due to barriers such as geographical distance or a 
lack of networks. Brazilian scholars Vitória Peres de Oliveira and Cecília Mariz 
found that a significant number of the converts in their study first found Islam 
through the internet, and only later attended a mosque or met Muslims in 
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person (2006, p. 109).  De Oliveira and Mariz also posit that many of their 
participants found a greater sense of community and belonging online than 
they did in their local areas, because their local mosques and religious scholars 
often promoted more orthodox readings of Islam than they were comfortable 
with, compared to online spaces that they believed to be more inclusive. De 
Oliveira and Mariz state:  
The internet has not only diffused Islam, but it seems to be also supporting 
converted people maintain their new faith [sic]. Conversion is a process which 
requires a community supports [sic] and mechanism to maintain it. A 
converted woman declared she prefers to go to the Islamic site than to the 
mosque. A virtual community widely known amongst the Brazilian Muslim 
women is a site organized by Maria Amoreira. She lives in a Muslim country, 
but her site is in Portuguese (2006, p. 109). 
 
Karin van Nieuwkerk’s chapter on women converts in the West includes 
similar findings to that of de Oliveira and Mariz, indicating that American 
Muslim converts used the Internet both to find out information about Islam in 
the initial stages of their conversion journey, and to consolidate and strengthen 
their newfound Muslim identity after conversion (2006, p. 113).  
The findings of my own research project share several similarities with that of 
de Oliveira and Mariz (2006) and van Nieurwerk (2006), with several 
participants stating that the Internet was instrumental in their conversion. 
Despite the fact that online message boards were often referred to in interviews 
as being a key space of engagement for converts, only one of the participants I 
recruited for my project had discovered the project through my advertisement 
on an Internet forum on Muslimvillage.com. This could perhaps be explained 
by suggestions from some participants that the use of online message boards is 
in decline following the advent of social media platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter, as well as smartphones. Twitter was not useful in my recruitment 
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strategy, partly because of the character limit placed on tweets (140 characters) 
which restricts how much you can adequately convey, and also because of the 
specificity of the group I was trying to recruit, which may not have been 
represented in my own followers or the followers of my followers. Facebook 
was much more fruitful. I targeted active Facebook groups dedicated to 
Australian Muslim converts and Sydney Muslims, and received a number of 
emails from converts or people who knew converts who had seen my post, 
some of which eventuated into interviews.  
A fourth and unintended method of recruitment was through attending 
community events, conferences and other large-scale gatherings. At these 
events, I found myself networking and discussing my project with people, and 
if anyone expressed an interest in participating or referred a friend or relative, I 
shared my business card. As an ethical requirement, additional information 
about the project, what participation would involve, and how the results would 
be disseminated was emailed to anyone who contacted me via any of the above 
recruitment strategies. 
The recruitment phase of the project was successful overall. The twenty-nine 
interviews that were conducted were rich in data and precluded the need for 
more interviews.  The major limitation of the recruitment phase and the 
participant sample that emerged from it was in the lack of socioeconomic 
diversity amongst the participants. It is possible that with more time spent 
developing a relationship of trust with particular organisations in Sydney, this 
could have been overcome, but as the significance of the limitation was only 
discovered in the later stages of fieldwork, the time frame proved to be 
prohibitive. Additionally, it has not been confirmed that the lack of 
socioeconomic diversity in fact does constitute a limitation of the data. In the 
absence of a reliable quantitative data set containing demographic information 
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about Muslim converts in Australia, it is also plausible that the socioeconomic 
homogeneity of my participant group may simply reflect the characteristics of 
the broader group of Australian Muslim converts. 
3.4.2 The interview process 
Once participants read and agreed to the participant information sheet 
(Appendix B) and understood what was expected of them, we arranged a 
suitable time and place for the interview. The final choice of location was left to 
the participant, but I offered a range of options for them including booking a 
room at Western Sydney University (WSU) or the University of Technology, 
Sydney (UTS) where I had access to rooms as teaching staff, their homes or 
workplaces, or a local library or quiet café.  I emphasised to participants that I 
was able to travel to wherever was most convenient for them, at a time that 
suited them. Most of the interviews took place in participants’ homes or at UTS, 
but cafes, private rooms in libraries, WSU, Macquarie University and 
workplaces were also utilised. Women were more likely to invite me to their 
homes. Organising interviews with men required more thought and 
deliberation due to the restrictions that some may have felt with regards to 
being alone in a closed room with me for reasons of faith, but proved to be easy 
to navigate. While none of the male participants stated that they felt it might be 
a problem or asked specifically to meet in a public space, I made sure to offer 
options that were largely public or semi-public; for example, the rooms I used 
at UTS all had glass walls and were soundproof. In the one instance where an 
interview took place at a male participant’s home, his wife was also present in 
another part of the apartment. When conducting the interviews at a person’s 
house, I would offer a small gift in the way of biscuits or a gift for their house or 
their child, as is customary amongst Muslims. If the interview took part in 
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another place, I offered to buy them a coffee or other beverage, which was 
usually accepted by the participant. 
The interviews were audio-recorded and lasted between one to three hours, 
with the majority of interviews ranging from 60 to 90 minutes.  The interviews 
were in-depth and semi-structured, and questions focused on the participants’ 
personal histories, introduction to Islam and circumstances surrounding their 
conversion, experiences within Muslim and non-Muslim communities, 
understandings and experiences of race and whiteness, and racism and 
discrimination.  The interview questions were designed to operationalise the 
research aims using a combination of primary and secondary questions, 
structural questions, probing questions and interpreting questions (Kvale 1996). 
The interview schedule (Appendix D) was used as a guide to help ensure that I 
covered the areas I had identified as being most pertinent to the research aims. 
By developing an interview schedule and including it in my thesis, the process 
of operationalising my aims and generating my data is made transparent and 
auditable. 
The semi-structured nature of the interview allowed me to deviate from the 
schedule to pursue a line of questioning further, to clarify responses and to 
explore aspects of participants’ narratives that I had not anticipated or were 
unique or interesting. The semi-structured interview strategy enabled me to 
capture the nuance and complexity of their narratives using a conversational 
and fluid tone, whilst also giving participants a sense of structure, which was 
appreciated by those participants who were unsure about what to expect from 
an interview or where to begin. The interviews began with general introductory 
and descriptive questions, moving on to more targeted and personal questions 
later on in the interview, using the ‘funnelling’ or ‘pyramid’ technique 
described by Dunn (2000). These initial questions served their purpose, and 
70 
 
allowed the participants to slowly relax and feel a sense of ease, trust and 
confidence in telling me their story, even though they did not provide much 
pertinent data, with the exception of one or two participants. It was important 
to build this initial rapport as some of the questions I asked later on were of a 
personal nature, and I was aware that they may give rise to feelings of 
discomfort. 
It is important to note here again that the project was not concerned with 
reasons for why participants converted, but their experiences following their 
conversion as they related to race and racialisation. As illustrated by the review 
of the literature found in Chapter Two, this is an area that is currently under-
researched. Thus, I avoided asking participants explicitly about the motivations 
behind their conversion, although most participants did offer explanations 
when describing how they came to find out about and convert to Islam. This 
strategy was undertaken in light of my analysis of the literature about Muslim 
converts (found in Chapter Four), which I believed already contained a 
thorough review of the motivators for conversion amongst Muslim converts. 
My primary concern was ensuring that my interview schedule operationalised 
my research aims as effectively and efficiently as possible.  
In retrospect, I believe that I should have asked explicit questions about 
participants’ reasons for converting to Islam. Although there is substantial 
research on the topic in many parts of the world, there is very little in the way 
of comprehensive academic research that has emerged from Australia.  By the 
time that I decided that it was important to include a chapter on participants’ 
conversion narratives in this thesis to further address the paucity of literature 
on Australian Muslim converts and establish a context for their later 
experiences, I had almost finished collecting my data and had conducted a 
sizeable portion of the analysis. While I was able to collect a significant amount 
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of data, my lack of explicit emphasis on that subject during the interviews 
meant that the data was more limited than it may have been if I had begun the 
interviews with the intention of finding out participants’ motivations for 
conversion. 
Instead, questions about when and how participants first heard about Islam, 
what piqued their interest in the religion and what steps they took prior to and 
after converting to learn more about Islam were introduced early in the 
interview for the primary purpose of simply gaining some contextual 
knowledge about the participant. The background questions were followed by 
questions about how the participants’ family and friends responded to their 
conversion. This was a topic area that needed to be dealt with carefully as for 
some participants it was a sensitive issue and brought up negative emotions 
and memories. As well as posing an ethical risk given the amount of discomfort 
it could elicit amongst participants, it was also likely that some participants 
may try to avoid the question, or give a dismissive answer, and so it required 
some negotiation on my part to find a balance between encouraging 
participants to find a way to tell their story in their own time, with some 
delicate probing questions, and not pressuring them to answer if they looked 
uncomfortable or upset. Initially, I was concerned that questions around racism 
and discrimination would elicit distress, a risk that I flagged in my ethics 
application, but those questions ultimately had a lesser impact on participants 
than questions about familial reactions to their conversion. 
Another important ethical consideration for this project was anonymity, 
although the significance that the participants themselves placed on it varied 
from person to person. Each participant was instructed that a pseudonym 
would be used in place of their real name, and so they could speak freely and 
openly about their experiences. Some participants stated that they did not mind 
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if their real names were used, but for the purposes of consistency each 
participant was given a pseudonym. Others were cautious about revealing too 
much information until they verified that their real names or other identifying 
information such as their workplaces would not be exposed in the thesis, after 
which time they became much more open about their experiences. Some 
participants revealed information about themselves during the interview that 
could have easily identified them to others even if their real names were not 
used, as they were prominent members of the Sydney Muslim community.  
Examples included their professions or workplaces, involvement in projects or 
the establishment of facilities such as mosques and educational centres. In these 
cases I asked the participants what they would prefer I do if identifiable 
information from their transcripts appeared in a quotation that was later used 
in the thesis. All the participants stated that they did not mind if it was used, 
but they were still given the option to review the transcripts and remove the 
information if desired. 
I began to transcribe the recorded interviews during the interview stage of my 
project. Transcribing all the interviews myself helped me to identify these and 
similar issues and flag them with participants early on, as well as allowing me 
to develop strategies to manage these issues in later interviews. As well as 
funding limitations, this was one of the key reasons that I chose to undertake 
the transcription process myself rather than hiring someone external to the 
project. By transcribing interviews in between conducting interviews, I could 
also identify gaps and errors in my questioning style and adjust for the next 
interviews accordingly. It allowed me to gauge whether the data I received 
from the questions I asked was helping me to operationalise my research aims, 
or whether I needed to rephrase questions or take a different line of 
questioning.   
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Participants were given the option to review the transcripts and make 
amendments if they felt any were necessary prior to the analysis stage. These 
‘member checks’ as they are known are often used by qualitative researchers as 
a strategy to improve the credibility and overall trustworthiness of a research 
project, by allowing participants the option to verify whether their stories were 
accurately  and ‘authentically’ represented by the researcher (Lincoln and Guba 
1985). Telling participants that it was an option before the interview began also 
helped to dispel unease among some people who stated that they had 
previously had problems where they had been misquoted or misrepresented in 
the news media as well as in academic work. Even among those who did not 
have concerns about being misrepresented, being given the option to read their 
transcripts appeared to help some people relax and become more open as a 
result, as it signalled to them that it was important to me to record their stories 
accurately, and I believe that they felt more able to trust me as a result.  
Member checks are not without controversy, however. Sandelowski (1993, p. 4) 
vigorously rejects member checking, positing it as a “threat to validity” due to 
the “deeply theoretical and ethical difficulties involved in this technique that 
may serve paradoxically to undermine the trustworthiness of a project.” The 
reasons for this, she states, lie in the fact that both researchers and their 
participants have an interest in representing certain versions of reality, and so 
their ideas of what constitutes a “fair account” may differ widely, meaning that 
the accuracy of a person’s experiences becomes deeply contested territory. 
Additionally, participants may forget things that they said during an interview 
and later challenge the transcript, which is arguably more ‘accurate’ than the 
participant’s recollection of the interview as it captured the participant’s 
emotions or recollections at that moment in time. Sandelowski raises salient 
issues regarding the nature and role that member checks take. In my own 
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research, participants were provided with the option of reviewing their 
transcripts, rather than being required to, and only four participants did ask to 
see their transcripts afterwards. Participants were only given the option to 
check the transcripts – they were not given the analysed transcripts, or copies of 
pages from the thesis where their interview data was used. This meant that 
participants only had the chance to review their own words and how they 
represented their stories, not how that data was then analysed, coded and 
converted into a new narrative constructed by me.  Out of the four who were 
sent their transcripts, only one made changes, and they were of a clarifying 
nature. 
 
 
3.4.3 Analysis of data 
After the twenty-nine interviews were transcribed, they underwent a process of 
thematic analysis. Thematic analysis attempts to identify patterns within the 
data and categorise or ‘code’ the data according to these patterns or themes, 
thereby looking to uncover the layers of meaning embedded within each 
transcript. An initial coding framework was developed using a combination of 
theory-driven codes that reflected my research aims and inductive codes 
stemming from the transcripts themselves. This coding framework did change 
over time and incorporate emerging themes throughout the coding process. The 
final coding framework consisted of 9 parent categories with a number of sub-
codes that ultimately formed the basis of the discussion chapters of this thesis. 
The coding framework can be found in Appendix E.  
The analysis itself was conducted with the help of the qualitative coding 
software Dedoose. The coding framework was created within the program and 
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the interview data imported, then coded manually. Several excerpts from the 
interview transcripts were categorised under multiple codes, highlighting the 
depth and richness of the data and the diverse meanings that could be found in 
each segment of interview. The process of coding and categorising the 
interview data allowed me to become became familiar with the interview data, 
which made the latter processes of analysis and writing more efficient and 
allowed for greater consistency in coding. Additionally, by utilising a coding 
framework and providing it with this thesis, I am able to leave an auditable 
research trail, leading to more transparent and trustworthy research.  
 
3.5 Researcher Positionality 
As a researcher engaged in qualitative research, I begin with the premise that 
the researcher is central to the research process, and thus reflexive and critical 
thinking about my positionality as a researcher was a necessary and important 
aspect of my research practice. Denzin (1986, p. 12) states that "Interpretive 
research begins and ends with the biography and self of the researcher”; in 
other words, the culmination of the lived experiences of a researcher shape his 
or her ontological, epistemological and methodological philosophies and 
research choices. This is significant not just with regards to the trustworthiness 
of my findings, but also to understand and explain the personal and political 
aspects of knowledge production. Taking up Daly’s call to critically reflect “on 
the ways that we bring to the research our own position of privilege, our 
vulnerabilities, and ideological commitments” (2007, p. 201), this section is 
dedicated to interrogating how the fluid and contingent nature of both mine 
and my participants’ subjectivities saw my status shift from “insider” to 
76 
 
“outsider” from one interview to the next, and indeed from one minute to the 
next within an interview.  
There has been considerable discussion amongst researchers, particularly 
ethnographers, about the relative importance of the researcher’s position as 
insider or outsider to the field in question (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Dwyer 
and Buckle 2009; Merton 1972; Rose 1997; Serrant-Green 2002). Increasingly, 
research is carried out by people who are already part of the group they are 
studying, compared to 'outsiders' who are non-members of the group being 
researched prior to the start of the study. This shift from traditional modes of 
ethnography can be attributed to the work of feminist and post-colonial 
standpoint theorists, who contend that because knowledge is socially situated, 
members of the (often marginalised) groups that are being studied are best 
placed to undertake the research in question (Alcoff 1991; Collins 1990; Harding 
1991; Hartsock 2004). They argue that outsiders do not have the necessary 
cultural understanding or empathy needed to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of social groups that they are not part of, particularly in cases of 
advantaged researchers studying minority social groups, where there is 
significant power differential. On the flipside, insiders face the challenge of 
needing to sufficiently distance themselves from the phenomena and social 
groups they are embedded within, to avoid “the corrupting influences of group 
loyalties upon the human understanding” (Merton 1972, p. 122).  
The so-called insider/outsider dichotomy is challenged by scholars such as 
Dwyer and Buckle (2009), who suggest that qualitative research has seen a 
blurring of the lines between 'insider' and 'outsider’. They argue that the 
establishment of a dichotomy fails to acknowledge that people can occupy 
multiple subjectivities at any given time, influenced by the prevailing social, 
political and cultural context in which the interaction is taking place. Those who 
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reject the insider/outsider dichotomy emphasise what Dwyer and Buckle (2009) 
call “the space between,” creating a framework in which all researchers fall 
somewhere in between complete insiders and complete outsiders, depending 
on the context of the research project. Researchers assume a responsibility to 
understand where they are positioned within this space and to explore how 
their status may affect the research process and its outcomes (Serrant-Green 
2002).   
During the process of recruitment and conducting my interviews, I had a strong 
sense of occupying this “space between.” As a Muslim with relatively strong 
ties within the Sydney community, I knew that I would likely have greater 
access to a diverse range of participants than an outsider – and probably inspire 
more trust as well. However, I was also acutely aware of being an outsider with 
regards to the target group in many respects. I was raised Muslim in a Muslim 
family, and so I understood that there would be significant differences between 
my own experiences and those of my participants who had adopted Islam at a 
later age, sometimes well into their 40s. I had an idea what some of these 
differences might be in advance – my husband is a Muslim convert, and 
because I met him six months after he converted I shared in much of his now 
almost ten year journey.  
More compelling however was the fact that I am a non-white researcher 
interviewing white participants about their whiteness and racial identity. When 
discussing issues of race with white people in non-research settings before, I 
had encountered a spectrum of reactions: from guilt and shame to acceptance to 
defensiveness, anger and denial. I was therefore anxious about how the topics 
of race, whiteness and white privilege would be received by my participants.  It 
was clear that for the majority of my participants, the topic made them 
uncomfortable. Questions about whiteness or race saw many respondents 
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avoiding eye contact or looking down at their hands or the table, others would 
laugh nervously. Most of them spoke hesitantly and did not seem confident 
about answering questions about race.  While all of them attempted to answer 
my questions about race and whiteness, three of them stopped midway through 
their sentences when responding to explicit questions about race and their own 
racial identity, and stated that they did not know how to answer. Of those that 
did answer, their answers were often short or jumbled, as though they were 
unsure how to respond or worried about offending me.  
The participants did not explicitly express that my presence as a non-white 
interviewer was the cause of their discomfort, and it is possible that they would 
have struggled with the questions regardless of who was interviewing them. 
However, it is salient to note my positionality at these junctures because of how 
I interpreted their response, which may have impacted on the interview 
dynamic more general. At those times, I felt very much like an outsider, 
someone who the participants did not quite know how to interact with and 
tiptoed around. This was jarring given that at other times they would freely use 
Arabic words, talk about Islamic concepts or practices or refer to things that had 
happened within or to the community very openly and without hesitation. As a 
dark-skinned researcher who wears a headscarf, it was visibly apparent that I 
was both Muslim and non-white, which influenced how participants responded 
to me at different parts of the interview. My status constantly shifted between 
insider and outsider between and within interviews as participants revealed 
more about themselves to me - and I revealed more about myself to them - 
through the questions I asked and the conversation we had in the midst of the 
formal interview.  
Ultimately, working in that in-between space was the inevitable outcome of 
occupying multiple subject positions. My experience was supported by the 
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theories of Serrant-Green (2002) and Dwyer and Buckle (2009) who emphasise 
the relational and dynamic aspects of researchers’ positionalities, noting that 
“the question of identity of the researcher in relation to the subject and group 
under study is constantly changing and not fixed” (Serrant-Green 2002, p. 42). 
After the interviews, I wondered if my participants’ responses to questions 
about race would have been different had I been white; perhaps they wouldn't 
have felt as uneasy or constrained by political correctness. I wonder too if the 
ones that expressed guilt would have felt such a strong need to explain how 
much they resented their whiteness.  
In attempting to find out how other researchers dealt with this issue, I came to 
discover that the area of minority researchers studying dominant groups is 
under-theorised; with the vast majority of literature on ‘outsider’ research being 
about members of dominant groups studying members of less privileged 
groups. This phenomenon was termed 'studying up' by anthropologist Laura 
Nader in her book “Up the Anthropologist” where she called upon researchers 
to undertake the “study of the colonizers rather than the colonized, the culture 
of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather 
than the culture of poverty” (1972 p. 289). Studying up is not without its 
challenges: in her research on class and race in Jamaica, Lisa Anderson-Levy 
discusses experiencing suspicion about why a black woman would want to 
study whiteness (2010). Anderson-Levy opines that she “definitely occupied the 
position of lesser status in the majority of field exchanges” (2010, p. 185): 
I was younger than many of the people I interviewed, had less financial 
resources, less social status, did not live in Jamaica, and am Black. This meant 
that it was a struggle to get people to agree to talk with me and when they did, 
they were often hostile… When people agreed to talk with me, in the vast 
majority of exchanges, I was the subordinate partner; the one with less status 
(Anderson-Levy 2010, p. 185) 
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My own experience was not as loaded as Anderson-Levy’s, likely because there 
were fewer major differences between my own subjectivities and my 
participants, or perhaps they weren’t as apparent during the interviews because 
our shared experiences of being part of a Muslim minority in Australia 
overrode other considerations. Additionally, I could also easily frame my 
research as “studying down” as much as “studying up,” as a non-convert 
interviewing a convert in a community where converts are in the minority. I 
was aware that despite attempts to diversify my participant base as mentioned 
previously, many of my participants had completed higher education and were 
similarly placed to me with regards to class.  One participant, Liam, made a 
number of references to his socio-economic background throughout the 
interview, specifically to his lack of employment and residence in a low-rent 
area. He referred to his class to support his argument that his race did not 
privilege him in any way. I was acutely aware of my own class privilege in 
relationship to his during this part of the interview, while simultaneously 
analysing his refusal to acknowledge that his whiteness afforded him any 
privilege relative to me. The interview with Liam was one in which I felt most 
like an outsider, and had the interesting experience of concurrently studying 
up, sideways and down. The added distance from the subject of the interview 
had its benefits; when transcribing his interview, I realised that I had asked 
more questions, and much more probing questions, in order to better 
understand his experiences.  
Other times that I was positioned as an outsider were when participants 
discussed challenges that they faced as a convert, particularly when they talked 
about issues that they had had with ‘born’ Muslims – Muslims who were born 
into a Muslim family and were raised Muslim - or Muslims from particular 
cultural groups. Some participants would hesitate before bringing these issues 
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up, gloss over them or qualify their statements, perhaps presuming that I was 
not a convert or that I was from one of those cultural groups and wanting to 
avoid offending me. I found myself mentioning that I was married to a white 
convert myself during interviews to counteract their hesitance - while this did 
not shift me into the insider category, it did seem to put them more at ease and 
more comfortable to talk about their negative experiences within the 
community more openly. 
As an insider, I felt that I was well-placed to identify an appropriate research 
question, and had ready access to research participants through already-
established networks and pre-existing relationships with community 
organisations that assisted me in reaching out to participants. I also felt that my 
insider status emboldened participants to trust me and open up to me more 
than they may have an outsider, particularly around questions of racism and 
discrimination and elements of practice.  As a Muslim researcher, they may 
have assumed that I would not use their stories to perpetuate negative 
stereotypes about Muslims or push an agenda that might harm Muslims.   
However, there are also some risks and disadvantages to being an insider, 
which have been less comprehensively explored in the literature (Hurd and 
McIntyre 1996, p. 78). Being part of the community meant that I already knew a 
number of the participants I interviewed in some capacity or other, having seen 
them at community events or interacted with them online on a message board 
or Facebook group. I wondered to what extent they may stifle or adapt their 
narratives to account for the fact that we had had contact in the past and may 
again in the future. I also found that sometimes participants left things unsaid 
as they assumed that they would be obvious to an insider, and I was not always 
able to think quickly enough to ask them for clarification or to explain further. If 
I were an outsider, however, they may have explained their point more clearly 
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and comprehensively, and this is a risk that Dwyer and Buckle (2009) discuss in 
their work on qualitative research. 
One salient challenge presented by ‘insider status’ is the potential to allow the 
‘sameness’ of researcher and participant to obscure the research process, as 
insider researchers are perceived as “being innately biased and unable to raise 
provocative questions because of their closeness to the culture and subjects of 
study” (Bilecen 2013, p. 53). Hurd and McIntyre (1996) suggest that where the 
researcher and the participant share common experiences and understandings, 
the researcher may be less inclined to critically examine the participants’ stories 
during the interview or focus group itself, and may even add credence to the 
participant’s worldview either implicitly or by referring to their own, similar, 
experiences. When listening to recordings of my interviews in the days and 
weeks following the interview, I occasionally felt frustrated with myself for not 
questioning participants more thoroughly about particular topics or challenging 
their assumptions, realising that it was often due to complacency on my part 
that I was familiar enough with their arguments to not probe any deeper. Hurd 
and McIntyre argue that this becomes problematic in research because 
“sameness distances the participants (researcher and researched) from a critical 
reflexive research process” and that “the stillness of sameness is an illusion that 
conceals inherent disparities in social science research” (1996, p. 78). In such 
circumstances, there is a risk that researchers can tacitly endorse privileged 
experiences and perspectives that they themselves share, something that I may 
have contributed to through my insider status and similarities with 
participants.  
 
I also found that I was anxious to prove myself as not just any insider but an 
“authentic insider.” In one of the very first interviews I did, I found myself 
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dressing much more conservatively than I normally would, as I had no prior 
knowledge about the participant. In that scenario, I decided that taking the 
most conservative option would garner the most favourable response. The 
pressure of the interview was heightened because not only did I want her to 
open up to me, she was a person who ran convert classes at a local Islamic 
organisation, and so would potentially be able to refer more people to me if she 
felt I was trustworthy and worth talking to.  If she had not held a position at an 
Islamic organisation, I may not have felt as much of a need to dress more 
conservatively. 
The biggest challenges of being an insider, however, are the expectations that 
community members may have of the researcher, including the expectation that 
the researcher will represent the community in a favourable light. Abdi Kusow 
(2003) found this in his ethnography of Somali immigrants in Canada. Referring 
to one man he approached, he states: “He started to advise me about the proper 
things to write about the Somali community in Canada. He said that I should 
write about the good things, about how the Somali community in Canada is 
very clean and not involved in criminal activities like selling drugs, about our 
beautiful culture, about how Somalia before the war was a great country...” 
(Kusow 2003, p. 595). When the man read the questions and thought they were 
too 'negative', he declined the offer to participate. In my own research, the 
results were mixed. Some participants were hesitant to say anything negative 
about the community, or were quick to qualify anything negative they did say.  
However, many were also very open in condemning specific practices or 
attitudes within the community. Still others were quiet about negative 
experiences during their interviews, but 'off the record' told me stories that they 
had heard about converts being exploited, or discussed with me politics within 
the community. Again, my positionality as an insider was both beneficial in 
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some ways and a hindrance in others, and the findings of this research project 
need to be read in this light.  
In this section, I have detailed the ways in which I felt my researcher 
positionality and movement between insider and outsider status may have 
influenced the research process, particularly during the data collection stage. In 
doing so, I have highlighted possible limitations of this research project, and 
specific concerns for researchers who are studying communities ‘from the 
inside.’ By elucidating my positionality and articulating the risks and benefits it 
poses to the research, I have aimed to make my research more transparent, 
auditable and ultimately, more trustworthy. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In line with the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of my research 
question, aims and objectives, this study utilised the qualitative method of in-
depth interviews to foreground the experiences, words, attitudes and beliefs of 
white converts to Islam. My approach to the data privileges and draws out the 
nuance, depth and complexity of their narratives, rather than attempting to 
present a more generalised or overarching ‘big picture’ of the experiences of 
white Muslim converts. This is illustrated in the remainder of the thesis, which 
aspires to the ‘artfulness’ model proposed by Sandelowski (2005); it seeks to 
achieve verisimilitude of their stories in a respectful way and one that 
maintains the integrity of those stories, while acknowledging that a completely 
‘true’ representation of reality is not possible. 
This chapter detailed the research method used from participant recruitment 
through to data analysis, in an attempt to make the research process as 
transparent and ‘auditable’ as possible. It also explained why this transparency 
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is particularly important in qualitative research where the concepts of validity 
and reliability are not so readily testable. Instead, it is the trustworthiness of the 
project which is at stake, and to be assessed by those who read the findings 
produced and disseminated from the research. A key part of this process was to 
explain my own positionality as a researcher and how this affected the research 
process; the ethical quandaries it posed and the limitations and challenges, as 
well as advantages, which arose as a result of my fluctuating insider/outsider 
status. It is hoped that my detailed and transparent account of the research 
design and my candid discussion of the limitations, flaws and problems of the 
research project will allow my peers to effectively assess the quality of my 
qualitative research findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NARRATIVES OF CONVERSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The people I interviewed during the course of this study all had two things in 
common, despite the diversity in their ages, locations and socioeconomic 
backgrounds that I outlined in Chapter Three. Firstly, all of the participants 
identified with the racial identity of ‘white,’ insofar as they responded to 
recruitment material that explicitly sought white Muslims for the research 
project. As following chapters will illustrate, however, this category was 
sometimes rejected, often contested, and always complicated by the 
participants. Less controversially, though not without its own nuances and 
contradictions, each participant also found resonance in the category of 
‘Muslim convert’: a person who had adopted Islam as their religion of choice 
and in doing so had left another religion or a position of non-belief in religion. 
For many of those interviewed, the label of convert was purely an academic 
one; having been Muslim for enough time to feel that the label no longer had 
any practical application to their lives except in how other Muslims responded 
to them. For others, often newer Muslims, it remained a prominent part of their 
identity. 
This chapter details the key conversion narratives that emerged from the 
interviews, as well as the circumstances surrounding participants’ conversion. 
As the first of four chapters that analyses the lived experiences of the 
participants of this project, the following pages provide the contextual 
background needed to thoroughly and holistically understand their post-
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conversion experiences. Participants’ descriptions of their experiences leading 
up to their conversion reveals additional information about their worldviews at 
the time they entered Islam, their perception of self and identity, and their pre-
existing knowledge of Islam and Muslims in general, and Muslim communities 
in Australia specifically.  In this chapter, I focus on three key elements of 
participants’ pre-conversion lives that I argue are illustrative of these beliefs 
and understandings: participants’ religious identities prior to becoming 
Muslim, their contact with Muslims and knowledge of Islam, and their 
motivations or reasons for converting to Islam.  These elements are preceded by 
a review of the literature on Muslim converts, particularly in Western nations 
such as Australia. Thus, this chapter serves as an introduction to their lives, to 
be built upon in later chapters which analyse their experiences as Muslims in 
greater depth. 
It must be emphasised early on that the motivations for why participants 
converted was not the focus of this research project. As I will demonstrate 
through my summary of the literature, there is already an abundance of 
sociological, psychological and historical research on the reasons why people 
convert to Islam, and far less literature on the experiences of new Muslims after 
their conversion. The imbalance I discovered is to some extent reflected in the 
experiences of the participants of this project, some of whom expressed 
frustration at being asked about their conversion story whenever they met a 
Muslim for the first time.  I also witnessed this asymmetry when I spoke to non-
Muslims about my research. Although I would always stress that my thesis was 
about converts’ post-conversion lives, in nine out of ten cases the first question I 
was asked was, “But, tell me, why did they convert?” Oftentimes, their 
questioning appeared to stem from an almost Orientalist fascination seeking to 
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determine why a white person would join a religion that was perceived to be so 
culturally disparate and ‘exotic’ as Islam. 
It became clear to me very early on that the academic literature reflected this 
trend, and that there was a general ambivalence about the joys, struggles and 
banality of converts’ lives after their conversion. In an attempt to avoid 
legitimising a voyeuristic Orientalist interest in why white people convert to 
Islam, and to address the gap in the literature and avoid repetition of existing 
scholarship, I chose to focus on the post-conversion experiences of the converts, 
and placed less emphasis on the actual conversion process and reasons for 
conversion. This research decision not only enabled me to make an empirical 
contribution to the literature on religious conversion, it also allowed for the 
furtherance and development of new conceptual frames through which to 
understand conversion to Islam, outside of Orientalist paradigms.  
I ensured however that the interview schedule I designed still allowed 
conversion narratives to emerge throughout the interviews, and they did, 
though perhaps not as explicitly as they would have had I asked participants 
directly about their ‘reasons’ for converting. It is these stories that are detailed 
in this chapter. Despite my reservations, I believe that it is important to include 
the narratives provided by converts about the circumstances surrounding their 
conversion in this thesis, not to indulge Orientalist curiosity but to help to 
provide a foundational framework for understanding their post-conversion 
realities. The following section details the existing literature on Muslim 
converts, demonstrating that much of the focus of previous literature has been 
on the motivations for conversion, with less emphasis on post-conversion lives.  
Through a thorough review of the literature, I demonstrate that there is a 
significant lack of published research about Muslim converts in Australia, and 
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argue that this thesis helps to fill that absence by contributing convert voices to 
the literature about Muslims in Australia more generally. 
 
4.2 Muslim Converts in the Literature 
Academic research on conversion to Islam has traditionally taken one of two 
approaches, with some outliers. The first approach takes a historical perspective 
by focusing on the 'Islamisation' of geographical regions across the Eurasian 
and African continents, as its peoples came into contact with Muslim empires 
including, but not limited to, the Umayyad, Mughal, Songhai and Ottoman 
empires (Baer 2004, Levtzion 1979, Mathew 1982, Mazur 2009, Talbot 2009).  In 
his summary of theories of religious conversion, American theologian, 
sociologist and psychologist Lewis Rambo notes that studies of this nature 
highlight the “creation of social, cultural, religious and political environments 
in which individuals, families, communities, and societies flourish as Islamic” 
(1999, p. 268).  In other words, the focus is less on individual psychological or 
spiritual motivators to convert to Islam, but on the socio-political context in 
which the conversion takes place. Factors such as increased political and social 
capital, tax benefits, expediency in trade through marriage and better 
treatment for slaves are emphasised in this conversion framework, which is 
more concerned with the material benefits that the group as a whole accrues, 
rather than the motivations of individuals within the community.  
William Bulliet refers to this type of conversion as ‘adhesion’ or pragmatic 
communal conversion (Bulliet 1979) that signalled a “change in fellowship” 
that marked a socio-political shift as much as a religious one (Hardy 1977). The 
body of literature on communal conversion makes up the majority of the 
scholarship on conversion to Islam, but while historically and sociologically 
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significant, it is only marginally relevant to my research project. Although 
there is no reliable quantitative dataset on the exact numbers of Muslim 
converts in Australia, the minimal growth of Muslims in Australia 
documented in the 2011 Census (ABS 2011) indicates that conversion to Islam 
in Australia does not constitute the wide-scale, mass conversion that occurs 
through Islamisation through empire. Indeed, communal conversions are by 
now relegated to history, as previously collective institutions such as religion 
become increasingly individualised in line with the dominant ideologies of the 
modern era. The ‘adhesion’ framework is clearly ill-equipped to examine the 
phenomenon of conversion to Islam in Australia. 
The second, far more germane, body of literature seeks to understand 
individual religious conversion, with a large proportion of scholarly 
publications on the topic focusing on conversion to Islam in countries where 
Islam is a minority religion. These publications are often underpinned by 
quantitative or qualitative research that attempts to determine the personal 
reasons informing an individual’s decision to convert through an examination 
of their life histories.  Studies of this kind have spanned a number of countries, 
including but not limited to Britain (Köse 1996; Zebiri 2008), France (Lakhdar et 
al 2007), Nigeria (de Montclose 2008), the Netherlands (Van Nieuwkerk 2008), 
Côte d'Ivoire (Miran-Guyon 2012), Ghana (King 2010), the United States of 
America (Bowen 2015), Brazil (De Oliveira & Mariz 2006) and India (Eaton 
1993). Such studies draw from several disciplines including theology, 
anthropology, sociology and psychology, and engage a wide range of 
theoretical paradigms developed by the sociology of contemporary religions, 
such as cross-cultural theory, post-colonial theory and psychoanalytical theory 
(Rambo 1999).  While my own research is rooted in the sociology of race and the 
sociology of religion, this chapter follows the cross-disciplinary trend exhibited 
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in previous literature on religious conversion by drawing from psychology and 
anthropology as well. 
Before looking more closely at the literature on conversion to Islam, it is first 
necessary to develop a common understanding of what religious conversion is 
and how it is formulated. This research project adopts Lewis Rambo’s definition 
of conversion, beginning with the premise that “Conversion is a process of 
religious change that takes place in a dynamic field of people, events, 
ideologies, institutions, expectations, and orientations” (1993 p. 5). Rambo 
expands on this definition to emphasise the ‘process’ element of conversion. He 
contends that conversion takes place over a period of time which varies from 
person to person, the process necessarily differs depending on the context in 
which conversion occurs, and that there are a number of factors that could 
impact a person’s decision to convert.  It is important to note that Rambo’s 
approach is reflective of his disciplinary groundings in psychology, with an 
emphasis on the individual motivations and processes that lead to religious 
conversion. His work is distinct from that of sociologists of religious conversion 
such as Snow and Machalek (1984) and Marzouki and Roy (2013) who are less 
concerned about individual life events and trajectories and more concerned 
with the social and cultural aspects of converts’ lives, and it is these sociological 
elements that are the focus of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, Rambo’s research has had a highly influential role in conversion 
studies. Indeed, much of the existing literature on conversion to Islam relies 
heavily on Rambo’s substantial and multi-faceted work in the area of 
conversion, which he argues necessarily draws from several diverse disciplines 
precisely because conversion experiences are so varied and complex.  This is no 
less evident in the literature on conversion to Islam. As previously mentioned, 
scholarship on conversion to Islam in the modern world is still emerging, and 
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while a number of studies have emerged from different disciplines and 
geographical locations, a solid, comprehensive body of scholarship has yet to be 
fully developed. Ali Köse’s monograph published in 1996 remains one of the 
most comprehensive studies on the experiences of Muslim converts prior to 
their conversion, relying on participant observation and in-depth interviews 
with an impressive sample of 70 British converts to provide ethnographic 
analyses of their lives before and after conversion. Of this sample, Köse finds 
that: 
…their conversions are based on the cognitive or intellectual dynamics of their 
life. Their major motivation for adopting Islam is to give meaning to their life in 
the cosmos and to identify with a community that is less secularised and less 
willing to restrict religion to the level of individual consciousness. Thus, 
conversion has meant for them not only a shift from Christianity to Islam, but a 
shift from the secular to the sacred (1996, p. 310). 
 
Amongst Köse’s sample, then, conversion to Islam is predominantly 
characterised as an intellectual journey to a religion that is more collective in its 
experience and less secular in its practice than Christianity, with Christianity 
selected as a comparison here because 66 of his 70 participants were from 
various Christian churches. Rather than being singularly motivated, however, 
Köse suggests that “religious conversion does not emerge out of a single 
influence, but out of the mutual interaction of various forces that make a person 
sensitive to conversion” (1996, p. 123). Much of Köse’s book focuses on the 
histories and religious backgrounds of the participants in order to further 
unpack their motivations. While a section of the book does look at their 
experiences after conversion, it is a much shorter and less detailed section, with 
the largest section of the book devoted to the conversion process itself. This may 
in part reflect the fact that ethnographic studies about conversion to Islam had 
only recently begun to emerge, and researchers of the time Köse was writing 
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were more concerned with converts’ reasons for becoming Muslim than with 
their experiences as Muslims. Converts’ motivations were of particular interest 
given that Islam held a minority position within the religious landscape of the 
United Kingdom in the 1990s. Köse takes a macro approach to conversion by 
emphasising the importance of historical migration patterns to the United 
Kingdom from Muslim majority countries and the corresponding increase in 
Islamic organisations, to the growth in conversion that he observed.  
As a result of his focus on the wider social contexts in which conversion to Islam 
takes place, Köse pays less attention to the sociological characteristics of 
individual converts such as age and gender, a gap that has been addressed by 
later scholars (Sultán Sjöqvist 1999; Mansson McGinty 2006). Since the time of 
Köse’s research, the literature has expressed a special interest in the motivations 
of women converting to Islam. Swedish sociologist of religion Madeleine Sultán 
Sjöqvist was one of the earliest scholars to research the experiences of female 
converts to Islam, prompting more research in later years. Her article “Choosing 
Islam” (1999) focuses on the motivations and experiences of Swedish female 
converts - in particular, their thoughts about family models within Islam.  
Sultán Sjöqvist identifies two key stages of the conversion process: attraction to 
particular lifestyles and modes of thinking, and later, ‘reformulation,’ or a 
reappraisal of the attitudes, values and beliefs that were idealised in the first 
phase. One of the key attractions to Islam as highlighted amongst her sample 
was the way that gender was constructed and performed, namely “the 
conception of an essential womanhood and manhood as well as of the 
patriarchal nuclear family” (1999 p. 325). These ideas, while instrumental in 
drawing the participants to the religion in the first place, are later contested and 
reformulated by the women as they move through the process of conversion. 
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Another scholar particularly concerned with the experiences of women is Anna 
Mansson McGinty, whose research is based on interviews with both Swedish 
and American women. In her book Becoming Muslim: Western Women’s 
Conversion to Islam (2006), Mansson McGinty stresses the concept of continuity – 
that rather than being a break from their previous lives, the women in her study 
expressed that their conversion was to them a necessary and even natural 
progression in the religious journeys. Her findings confirm previous scholarship 
on religious conversion, which is that importantly, conversion is “a ‘turning 
from to’ that is neither syncretism nor absolute breach” (Sakelleriou 2012, p. 64) 
– even where the religion that is converted into may be perceived by outsiders 
as being completely contrary to the individual’s previous religious orientation. 
Mansson McGinty demonstrates this again in a later article in which she 
examines the life histories of two Swedish feminists who convert to Islam, and 
who use their faith as a space in which to resist patriarchal traditions and norms 
in a continuity of their feminist beliefs (2007, p. 478). 
The preoccupation with the motivations of converts to Islam, particularly by 
non-Muslims and particularly with regards to women, is underlined by a sense 
of bewilderment in many of the aforementioned texts and the interest converts 
to Islam more generally, which I drew attention to in the introduction of this 
chapter.  It is clear in the reading of these books and articles that for some, the 
choice to convert is seen as a strange one.  Indeed, this can be said of any 
conversion. Writing about conversion to Islam in contemporary Greek society, 
Alexandros Sakellariou points out that religious conversion has long been of 
interest to social scientists: 
Conversion captures popular imagination and scholarly attention, because at 
the individual level we want to know how people change and changing one’s 
religion is all the more perplexing, because religion is believed to be deeply 
rooted in family connections, cultural tradition, ingrained customs and 
ideologies (2012, p. 64). 
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This excerpt captures the core of why conversion to Islam is considered to be 
uniquely odd, particularly amongst women: the sense of bewilderment and 
confusion that underlies this response can be attributed to the idea that Islam is 
viewed as foreign and culturally distant from the dominant ideology of 
European and North American societies, particularly in regards to its 
perception and treatment of women.  Accordingly, the scholarship reviewed so 
far can be perhaps viewed as a response to an overarching social desire within 
the West to understand why a person would convert to the religion of Islam. 
This idea will be examined in more detail later in this chapter, and indeed 
throughout this entire thesis. 
As noted earlier, however, not all conversion to Islam in minority contexts 
occurs in the West. Writing of conversion to Islam in Nigeria, de Montclos 
(2008) suggests that the ‘strangeness’ of it could also be attributed to the 
hegemonic power of the clash of civilisations narrative which pits Islam against 
Christianity. Additionally, de Montclos notes that not only are Muslim converts 
considered an enigma, they are also viewed as a possible threat, stating that 
“the pattern [of conversion to Islam] worries strategists, as neophytes are 
usually feared to be more extremist than traditional Muslims” (2008, p. 72). De 
Montclos’s analysis adds yet another framework through which to approach the 
fascination with Muslim converts, by suggesting that the interest in conversion 
to Islam in recent years is highly influenced by a state-led fear of terrorist 
attacks committed by Muslim converts, or those who are raised Muslim but 
develop a new zeal for the religion later on in life. This concept will be 
unpacked further in following chapters that focus more extensively on 
whiteness, and the role that the fear of a racialised Other plays in this 
perception of Muslim converts. 
While the above studies are centred on motivations for conversion to Islam, 
96 
 
more recently the scholarship has gradually shifted its focus from the 
conversion process to the post-conversion period – specifically examining how 
converts experience and make meaning from their lives following their 
conversion. Studies that take this approach are often qualitative in nature, 
exploring the lived experiences of converts through in-depth interviews and 
focus groups. While predominantly concerned with motivations for conversion, 
Sultán Sjöqvist’s research was one of the earliest studies to hint at this shift in 
focus in 1999. Since then, studies on converts’ post-conversion experiences have 
become increasingly popular, particularly over the past decade.  More often 
than not, the research centres on the lives of “native” converts in Western 
nations where Islam is a minority religion (Moosavi 2015, Sultán Sjöqvist 1999, 
Zebiri 2008). While there is still much to research within the field, the existing 
academic literature has already attended to a diverse range of aspects of 
converts' lives, such as loss of social status (Ibrahim 1995), feminist ideals 
(Mannson McGinty 2007) and the creation of self-image and identity (Mansson 
McGinty 2002). 
An aspect of converts’ post-conversion lives that is of considerable interest to 
this thesis is the relationship between the ethnic, national, and religious 
identities of converts.  Tina Jensen's (2008) work with Danish converts 
highlights the tensions between a Danish national identity and Muslim religious 
identity and how converts negotiate the conflict.  Jensen suggests that Muslims 
are the “ultimate other” within Danish society (2008, p. 389), which shapes the 
ways in which Danish Muslim converts construct and perform their Muslim 
identities and their religiosity. She further argues that the conflict that Danish 
converts are faced with also shapes their engagements with the broader non-
Muslim Danish community – particularly family members and close friends - 
and the Muslim immigrant communities that they seek out.  The converts' 
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uneasiness with their identity and place within Danish society “expresses a 
submission to and an integration of the polarisation between ‘Danish’ and 
‘Muslim’ identity but also a questioning of this polarisation” (2008, p. 406).  
Jensen's research highlights the internal struggle for converts as they attempt to 
reconcile their national and religious identities within a political context in 
which the two are viewed by many as incompatible. Converts not only 
problematise the polarisation, their very existence creates new spaces for 
integration of both identities to occur.   
Jensen's study is closely aligned with the research focus of this thesis, which 
seeks to determine how white Muslim converts experience race following their 
conversion, within an Australian context.  While Jensen focuses on the ethnic 
and national identities of the Muslim converts, however, this thesis is 
concerned with the nexus of race and religion, a topic that she chooses to avoid. 
An area which is not investigated by Jensen is the experience of religious 
discrimination or racism by converts. Indeed, this is a lack in the literature on 
converts more generally, with some exceptions (see Moosavi 2015, discussed in 
section 2.3). 
While not specific to converts, Myfanwy Franks' article “Crossing the Borders 
of Whiteness? White Muslim women who wear the ḥijāb in Britain today” 
centres on the experiences of white British ḥijābis, many of whom are converts. 
Franks posits that the experiences of white ḥijābis in Britain, particularly in 
reference to the reactions of people around them to the previously “invisible” 
women becoming “conspicuous”, demonstrates the shifting nature of race and 
racism, and that white Muslims provide a “test” case for further exploration of 
the intersection of racism and religious discrimination (Franks 2000, p. 926).  
Her participants refer to being on the receiving end of racist abuse from white 
non-Muslims - “'white Paki being the cleanest so far'” (Franks 2000, p. 922) – 
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while British non-white Muslims struggle to come to terms with the idea of a 
white Muslim. Franks attributes these reactions to British society's association of 
whiteness with Christianity, by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  Given that 
her research consists of only 5 survey questionnaires and 6 semi-structured 
interviews with white Muslim women, the data Franks relies on is relatively 
thin, and she refrains from making a definitive statement about whether or not 
she believes that white Muslim women who wear the ḥijāb are indeed seen to 
cross the boundaries of whiteness. She states, however, that it is clear that 
racism can shift and change over time and location, and she urges that there be 
more research done on the intersection between religious and racial 
discrimination, a call taken up by this thesis. 
As demonstrated in this section thus far, much of the research on Muslim 
converts has taken place in Europe. In Australia, academic studies specifically 
focusing on the experiences of Muslim converts are still a relatively new 
phenomenon. Very little has been written about Australian Muslim converts, 
with Peta Stephenson's book Islam Dreaming (2010) being one of the few 
substantive texts to include the stories of contemporary Australian Muslim 
converts, in this case Indigenous converts.  Islam Dreaming is not solely about 
Indigenous converts, but rather about Indigenous encounters with Islam, 
including the experiences of non-Muslim Aboriginal women married to 
Muslim men and Aboriginal Muslims who were raised Muslim from birth.  
Stephenson’s chapter on Aboriginal converts is similar to many of the 
aforementioned texts in that much of the focus of the chapter is on motivations 
for conversion, some of which are informed by a desire for a faith in which 
they can see themselves (as opposed to a white-centric Christianity) and which 
they feel gives them space to continue to practice their culture and connection 
to country (2010, p. 190-194). While Stephenson does touch on her participants’ 
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post-conversion lives, it is a peripheral point of interest in the chapter itself.  
One other academic text about Muslim converts to emerge from Australia 
besides my own article is that of Rachel Woodlock's, who writes about convert 
women and the barriers they face when trying to access their local mosques. 
“Praying Where They Don't Belong” (Woodlock 2010) analyses the 
engagements of female convert women from Melbourne with the (at least 
theoretically) communal space provided by mosques, arguing that gender 
discrimination and cultural prejudice limits convert women's access to mosques 
which are seen to belong to one ethnic group only, into which category most 
mosques in Melbourne – and indeed, Australia – fall. Woodlock boldly asserts 
that because most mosques are dominated by a singular immigrant ethnic 
group who claim ownership over the mosque (typically because it was built 
through funds collected from that immigrant ethnic community) means that 
“there is no place for the culture of the Australian convert to operate” (2010, p. 
276).  The Australian converts she refers to are Australian Muslims from ethnic 
backgrounds that have historically not been represented within Muslim 
communities in Australia, predominantly those of Anglo-Saxon and Celtic 
heritage. Woodlock suggests that it is precisely because of their small numbers 
that they feel compelled to adopt another ethnic group's cultural values or 
practices. Her interviews indicate that white female converts may find it 
difficult to find a public place of worship that is not dominated by one 
particular ethnicity and that they feel they can actively participate in. However, 
her pessimistic conclusion that there is no place for an 'Australian' Islam 
whatsoever is perhaps too definitive a statement to make based on her 
research, particularly as she goes on to concede Jensen's argument that there is 
the potential for converts to “'Indigenise' Islam as much as their identity is 
'Islamised'” (2010, p. 277). Woodlock is largely pessimistic about opportunities 
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for female Australian converts to participate in the Muslim community without 
first accessing the mosque. 
As demonstrated in this literature review, academic research globally is limited 
in scope and to some extent volume, although this set of circumstances has 
been changing rapidly over the last decade. Much of the research that does exist 
focuses on the motivations or pre-conversion life biographies of converts. Less 
is known about their lives following their conversion with regards to their 
experiences and interactions within the Muslim and broader community,   
particularly as relates to how they negotiate their racial identity, experiences of 
racism and discrimination, and feelings of belonging and identity - gaps that 
need to be addressed in order to provide a more rounded understanding of the 
Muslim experience in Australia.  This thesis seeks to offer a nuanced, complex 
and largely optimistic picture of how white converts negotiate and integrate 
their racial and religious identity. The following sections of this chapter 
examine how participants describe their pre-conversion lives and introduction 
to Islam, to provide a context through which to understand their post-
conversion experiences.  
 
4.3 Religious Background of Participants Prior to Conversion 
Participants in this study fell into three categories of religious orientation 
prior to converting to Islam, which can loosely be characterised as religious 
and/or practising Christians, nominal Christians, and agnostics and atheists. 
The majority of participants explained that they were Christian before 
conversion; of the nineteen who cited Christianity, nine were Roman 
Catholic, with a smaller number identifying as Seventh Day Adventist, 
Anglican, Pentecostal or stating broadly that they had been born again, 
evangelical or charismatic Christians. Of these nineteen, only a handful 
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described themselves as being somewhat or very religious and invested in 
their faith up until a few months or years of converting to Islam, both in 
terms of practice and doctrinal knowledge and understanding. Most 
described themselves as nominally or culturally Christian. Some participants 
alternated between referring to themselves as having previously been 
Christian, and at other times as agnostic or secular in terms of actual belief. It 
was also common for participants to state that they had been Christian, but 
that religion meant nothing to them and did not have a practical impact on 
their lives. In total, four participants explicitly identified themselves as 
having been agnostic prior to conversion. Only three of the people I 
interviewed characterised themselves as being atheist before becoming 
Muslim.  No other faith groups were represented in this study. 
For some of the participants who stated that they had been religious prior to 
becoming Muslim, their commitment to the Christian faith had developed 
over their lifetime, having received religious education and training from 
their parents or their schooling, and occasionally both.  Xander explains that 
with a minister for a father, religion was an integral and omnipresent part of 
his childhood: 
I didn’t know how to be anything but a Catholic. I was baptised, confirmed; 
always went to Church, received Communion often. Did Lent – Lent was 
always hard for me growing up… It always seemed a bit unfair that all my 
Catholic school friends had it so much easier than me, but I never questioned it. 
I was 100% committed to Jesus and I am still committed to him, I just don’t 
think he’s the son of God anymore. 
Xander explains that he had always believed in Jesus and God, even when he 
was an “irrepressibly curious” adolescent. Unlike many of his peers, his 
religious education both at home and at school had simply heightened his 
interest in Christianity. He acknowledges that his case is contrary to the 
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experiences of many other people who had had a similar religious upbringing, 
and adds that his high school friends teased him for being “brainwashed.” 
Xander disagrees with this assessment, opining that the more educated and 
invested he became in the Catholic doctrine, the more critical and intellectually 
engaged he became. His questioning mind eventually leading him to reject the 
concept of the Trinity and ultimately convert to Islam, a narrative that was not 
uncommon amongst the people interviewed in this study. Xander’s conversion 
to Islam symbolised for him a continuity of his religious journey, rather than a 
break. 
Unlike Xander who had grown up with the Christian religion since he was a 
young child, Liam found Christianity on his own, as a homeless teenager 
“searching for meaning”.  Liam described his childhood as being largely non-
religious, having a “baby boomer mother” who, like many in her generation, 
“just threw off the shackles of religion.” He adds however that she did have her 
own “quiet faith” despite her disillusionment with the church. Liam left school 
at a young age and ran away from home, and it was after he had spent some 
time as a “street kid,” as he expresses it, that Liam turned to Christianity. 
Religion became the means through which he sought a space where he felt he 
belonged and could gain a sense of community.  Liam describes himself as a 
born again Christian from the ages of 14 to 20, and states that in those six years 
he was “quite evangelical”: 
I was full of missionary zeal. I felt that I was blessed, that I’d had a blessed 
change in my life from being a street kid. I really felt like God had done 
something wonderful in my life and put me on the straight path. And I felt I 
wanted to share with others. And I had this zeal for the truth. 
 
Liam’s quest to find the truth is what brought him to eventually study Islam. 
For Xander, the process had occurred slowly as he questioned more and more 
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of the Catholic doctrines that he had been taught. In Liam’s case, he came across 
Islam as he sought to confirm his own beliefs in his evangelical Christian faith. 
Liam stated that he originally studied Islam and a range of other religions in an 
attempt to find some common ground with which to debate other people 
interested in theology. He acknowledges that his intentions were not merely of 
an impartial observer, and that “[he] wanted to learn it so - in a way to 
undermine it.” Liam’s eventual conversion to Islam was a result of him 
educating himself thoroughly about Islamic theology in order to debate 
Muslims, which led to an internal conflict about his own religious beliefs. 
A third participant who described being a religious Christian prior to her 
conversion to Islam was Cassie. Cassie’s interest in religion came much later in 
life, but it also began with an interest in Christianity, which her family had 
practised nominally throughout her life. She recollects: 
I did kind of become a little bit more religious before converting, before even 
kind of getting to that point where I think I was just trying to get more religious 
and did my Confirmation into the church when I was like 21. Which was really 
random, but I guess not random. Cos that’s usually something you do as a kid 
and I just hadn’t done it. 
Cassie frames her time within the Catholic faith as a stepping stone rather than 
a formative stage. Speaking about her experiences as a Christian, she explains: 
“It was just kind of a step towards becoming more religious and thinking about 
it more seriously.” Despite her characterisation of this period of her life as a 
“step,” she describes a wholehearted participation in Catholic practices such as 
taking communion, attending Church regularly, being confirmed, proselytising 
to others, practising Lent, and viewing holidays such as Easter and Christmas 
as religious rather than purely cultural holiday. For Cassie, “becoming more 
religious” meant participating in the rituals and practices of her Catholic faith, a 
step that she felt was vital to preparing her for the ritualistic elements of Islamic 
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practice later on in life. 
Despite the differences in their religious backgrounds, Xander, Liam and Cassie 
share a commonality in their conversion narratives - all of them represent their 
conversion to Islam as being a continuity of their spiritual journey, rather than a 
break or a crisis of faith. None of the three participants describe their 
conversion to Islam as exceptional. Instead, they report it simply as the 
progression of their robust interest in religion more generally. The experience of 
Xander, Liam and Cassie reflects a trend amongst participants who considered 
themselves to already be religious before their conversion to Islam – none of 
them stated that they had felt surprised when they came to start believing in the 
Islamic God or the teachings of Islam, as they believed it to be a natural course 
of events in their religious lives. 
Among this group of already religious participants, there was no identifiable 
personal, social or religious “crisis” that triggered their conversion. This 
appears to be contrary to Rambo’s integrative model of religious conversion, 
which outlines the seven stages of religious conversion as context, crisis, quest, 
encounter, interaction, commitment and consequences.  Rambo’s seven stage 
model has been adopted by scholars working in the field of religious conversion 
studies, but has also drawn criticism from those who suggest that his matrix is 
more applicable to Christianity than other religions, and does not differentiate 
between conversions that take place in a minority-faith context versus 
conversions to a religion which is the dominant one of that area (Roald 2004). 
Writing about Scandinavian converts to Islam, theologian and sociologist of 
religion Anne Roald suggests that while some of Rambo’s stages “might be 
suitable for analytic purposes… Rambo’s in-depth description of these stages is 
perhaps more suitable to the Christian than the Islamic context” (2004, p. 79). 
Roald goes on to argue that this is because many of the contemporary studies 
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on conversion to Islam takes place in contexts where Islam is a minority 
religion, and thus the social aspect of conversion is more significant than the 
psychological or religious elements (2004, p. 79).  
It is the crisis stage of Rambo’s model that draws the most criticism from Roald, 
who contends that the “crisis” stage of Rambo’s model as a triggering element 
in the pre-conversion period does not fit the empirical data she herself has 
collected on Muslim converts (2004, p. 94). She convincingly argues that the 
reason for this is because Muslim converts in contexts where Muslims are the 
minority experience this crisis after conversion; in other words, Muslim converts 
experience crisis as a consequence of conversion rather than a trigger for 
conversion (2004, p. 95). A pre-conversion crisis is more suitable to describing a 
stage in conversion to Christianity than to Islam in the West, she claims, 
because of the dominance of Christianity in Western society. Roald explains: 
As a crisis occurs, it is more feasible for a person to look for a solution within 
the established frame of references which means either an intensifying of one’s 
religion or a change in denomination within the same religion, than it would be 
to turn to a religion which would cause more problems for the person in terms 
of the Islamophobic expressions in Western society (2004, p. 95). 
 
In other words, Roald posits that Islam’s status as a minority religion in the 
West makes it unlikely that people would convert to Islam as a result of a 
personal or social crisis in their life, but makes it very probable that they may 
face a personal or social crisis as a result of their conversion, a subject that will 
be examined in later chapters. 
 
Cassie, Liam and Xander were not the only participants to express that they 
were practising Christians prior to their conversion to Islam, however, 
participants who claimed to take a nominal approach to the Christian faith were 
far more common. Many participants described their upbringing as Christian, 
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or stated that they had had varying levels of religious education, but qualified 
their statements by explaining that their attachment to Christianity had been 
one of cultural or familial tradition rather than religious belief.  Ben was one 
such participant. When asked about the religious environment in his household 
growing up in Scotland in the 1990s, Ben explained that his family was not 
“religiously literate” despite partaking in Christian activities: 
I’d say generically Christian but non-practising. I think I was baptised, I 
honestly can’t remember. And it wasn’t a big deal at all in my family. We 
celebrated Christmas as a family tradition rather than a religious one, and 
weddings and funerals of course but that was about it. It was really non-
religious – I mean we say Christian in the loosest meaning of that term, because 
my family were not religiously literate really… it wasn’t a very serious thing. 
 
It is clear from his description of his childhood that Ben’s attitude to religion 
growing up was one of apathy and disinterest, and that Christian practices in 
his family were viewed as a matter of culture and community rather than as 
belief. The influence of this on his decision to convert becomes apparent later 
on, as he states that he developed a fascination with ‘Eastern’ religions as a 
teenager – but as intellectual traditions that related to his interests of martial 
arts and history, rather than as faith orientations. 
Ben’s characterisation of the role of religion in his life was shared by many 
participants. Salwa’s memories of religion growing up centred more on 
community than belief or strict practice.  When asked if her upbringing as a 
child in 1950s Australia was religious, Salwa laughed out loud: 
Goodness no. Religion was not mentioned. Actually, my father’s uncle was an 
Anglican minister. We didn’t see a lot of him. So there wasn’t ever any 
discussion of religion or politics, you know all the things that it was sort of 
polite not to mention in company. And two of my brothers are atheists. My 
mother used to go to a Presbyterian church. My father used to say she really 
went there to socialise because she met her friends and they had scones and tea 
after service. And yeah, that was it. 
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 Participants like Salwa and Ben formed the largest cohort within the sample 
group. For them, religion was only significant insofar as it had a cultural 
influence on their lives. Very few of the participants who identified as 
previously nominal Christians reflected on their belief at that stage in their 
lives, with most of them stating that although they knew they were Christian, 
they rarely talked about religion and were even less likely to participate in 
Christian rituals. If they did, it was purely for the social and cultural functions 
that the rituals played, as indicated by Salwa, rather than because they felt the 
practices had any sacred value. Out of those who did discuss the belief or ‘faith’ 
aspect of their religion, they tended to describe either being agnostic or drifting 
in and out of belief and disbelief. Overwhelmingly, however, participants who 
were nominally Christian prior to their conversion to Islam expressed a feeling 
of apathy about religion. 
The final, and smallest, group amongst the participant sample were those who 
explicitly identified as agnostic or atheist. One participant, Fatima, stated that 
she had been agnostic for most of her life; although her mother was Seventh 
Day Adventist and her father was raised Anglican, “religion didn’t really play a 
very big role in [her] life growing up.” Only two people interviewed expressed 
having a strong atheist identity – Ahmed and Edward. Interestingly, both also 
characterised themselves as being politically active anarchists at the time. 
Ahmed and Edward were quick to clarify that their atheism had been different 
to the “new atheism” espoused by people such as Richard Dawkins, which they 
viewed as being distinctly anti-Islam. Ahmed opined that when he was a young 
atheist in the 1990s, atheism was predominantly antagonistic towards 
Christianity: 
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Unlike the atheism of today the contempt was mainly directed at Christianity, 
because of its connection to imperialism and power and the oppression of the 
poor. And other religions were dismissed as an atheist, but they weren’t 
subjected to the same kinds of contemptuous scrutiny. They were more just 
cultural oddities rather than political enemies. 
In the above excerpt, Ahmed explains the connection between his religious and 
political identity at the time, and why he felt that his interest in Islam did not 
conflict with his anarchist and atheist ideals. Ahmed goes on to state that his 
atheism had never specifically sought out Islam as a target, in line with the 
dominant atheist thought of the time. Ahmed’s characterisation of the form that 
atheism took at the time of the 1990s supports the argument of Australian 
historian of religion William Emilsen, who contends that the emergence of the 
anti-theist, anti-religious movement known as New Atheism - associated with 
critics like Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens - has only 
emerged in the beginning of twenty-first century (2012, p. 521). By this stage, 
Ahmed had converted to Islam and no longer identified as an atheist. Emilsen 
(2012) documents why he believes that the New Atheism espoused by the 
above authors is distinctly anti-Islam, citing not only their works but also the 
arguments of their ex-Muslim proponents such as Ibn Warraq and Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali. While he shies away from labelling their work as Islamophobic, he argues 
that “it is clear that the new atheists’ strategy of attacking all religions, or 
expressions of religion, as a cover for criticising not only militant Islam but 
Islam itself has contributed to anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments 
throughout the Western world” (2012 p. 528). This is in stark contrast to the 
form that the “old” atheism took, which was distinctly and primarily anti-
Christian in its outlook, as noted by Ahmed. 
There is surprisingly little in the literature about Muslims who convert from 
atheism. This is perhaps reflective of the small number of people who fit this 
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category; the academic texts examined in the first section of this chapter identify 
that it is far more common for converts from Western countries to come from 
Christian backgrounds than atheist or agnostic ones.  This is a logical finding 
given that in Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia, as examples of 
Western countries, Christianity continues to be the dominant religion, with far 
fewer people subscribing to no religion (Pew Research Centre 2012). Although 
there is a trend towards the decline of Christianity and the rise of atheism and 
agnosticism, the continued dominance of Christianity in countries like Australia 
can explain the numerical discrepancy between those who convert to Islam 
from Christianity and those who convert from an atheist or agnostic belief 
system. Another potential explanation can also be found in the argument 
offered by one participant that converting from atheism meant they had 
‘greater distance’ to cover, so to speak – having an existing belief in a 
monotheistic God meant that one of the greatest hurdles was already crossed. 
Other commonalities between Islam and Christianity also assisted in this 
transition. Participants named angels, the afterlife, and sharing prophets such 
as Jesus, Moses and Noah as elements of Islam that they were already familiar 
with and believed in as a result of their Christian upbringing. Additionally, for 
some participants, their previous Christian faith directly fed into their eventual 
conversion to Islam, which is demonstrated in the final section of this chapter. 
This section has identified that the majority of participants in this study came 
from either a practising or nominal Christian background, with a very small 
number of participants identifying as agnostic or atheist prior to their 
conversion. The following section examines the level of knowledge about Islam 
and contact with Muslims that participants had before they became Muslim, to 
provide more background to their post-conversion stories, explored in later 
chapters. 
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 4.4 Contact with Muslims 
The nature of participants’ encounters with Muslims prior to their conversion 
varied significantly, with some commonalities in narrative based upon the time 
of their conversion and where they resided in Sydney. Salwa describes growing 
up in the Blue Mountains 1950s as living in “the Dark Ages”: “There were no 
Asians. There were a few Greeks and Italians who were regarded with great 
suspicion. But it was very much a white, Anglo Protestant kind of 
environment.” Salwa’s initial contact with Muslims came after marrying her 
Muslim husband in 1962, after which time she started interacting with Muslims 
in Sydney from time to time. She notes that in the early stages, Muslims were 
still few and far between: “When I first got married there were about 6 Muslims 
in Sydney. Eid prayers, we would all go to the Pakistani consulate and there 
would be one row of guys and that was it. And it was very, very small – this 
was still in the days of the White Australia policy.” Salwa’s contact with 
Muslims was limited both due to the size of the Muslim community and her 
distance from them. 
While Salwa’s contact with the Sydney Muslim community was largely a 
product of the era in which she converted, Katherine’s lack of exposure to 
Muslims was entirely due to her location. Katherine converted to Islam in 2012, 
when the Muslim population of Sydney was 208 000 or almost 5% of Sydney 
(ABS 2011). However, she states that after moving to the Northern Beaches from 
Manchester in the United Kingdom she had almost zero contact with Muslims 
in Australia until she started university. She states, “In terms of Muslims, there 
were no Muslims. I knew one Arab guy at all on the Northern Beaches ‘til I was 
about 18.” She concedes however that the school environment was such that it 
is possible there were more but they just didn’t feel comfortable admitting it to 
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anyone, which could well be likely given that the 2011 Census data indicates 
that 0.47% of the close to 238 000 residents of the Northern Beaches in NSW, or 
1126 residents, identified themselves as Muslim on the Census form (ABS 2011). 
While this figure is less than a quarter of the national average in 2011 which 
found that 2.2% of Australians subscribe to Islam, it is still far from a complete 
absence of Muslims in the region. 
Regardless of where they lived, most participants – Katherine included – stated 
that they came into more contact with Muslims or became more conscious of 
their contact with Muslims in their late teens and 20s. Amongst those who were 
tertiary educated, university was often cited as a space where participants were 
more exposed to Muslims and also had an opportunity to engage with them 
more. Cassie offers an explanation for this phenomenon based on her own 
experiences: 
I had friends who were Muslim in like a mixed kind of religious and ethnic 
background social kind of situation… So I think that was really positive cos we 
were all really accepting of each other and didn’t really kind of – go into 
criticising each other’s religions or anything. So it was a safe environment to get 
exposed. It was good. And I guess university more generally is I dunno, 
generally a little bit more accepting and open-minded and flexible and you’re 
open to interacting with different types of people. I think that was kind of a 
good environment to be in early on. 
 
Cassie’s recollections of her time as an undergraduate at university include long 
discussions about religion and theology with her new friends and classmates, 
which she claims was pertinent to the development of her interest in religion; 
firstly Catholicism, and later Islam. Having lived in northern New South Wales 
for the majority of her life, Cassie had had little contact with Muslims before 
befriending some at university, and it is likely that without this contact her 
conversion to Islam may have come at a much later date, if at all. Cassie’s 
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sentiments about the impact of her exposure to Muslims and Islam at 
University are echoed by Edward, who had regular but limited contact with 
Muslims through his job at the postgraduate association at his university: 
I say this to people all the time, university is probably one of the most life-
changing experiences you’ll ever have because you come into contact with 
people from such different walks of life. Ethnic backgrounds, religions and it 
really is a mind-opening experience. 
Edward’s first “proper” conversation with a Muslim was at a barbecue that the 
postgraduate association organised in conjunction with the Muslim Students 
Association at the university. Edward states that at the barbecue he met a 
student who was “just very nice,” something Edward stressed multiple times 
during the interview: “I really respected him as a person. He was just a lovely 
guy, and lovely people are quite rare in our society so it’s not something that 
you find very often. He really had an impact on me, and to this day, whilst I 
met a lot of other really nice Muslims, he’s probably one of the nicer Muslims 
I’ve ever met.” 
As evidenced by Cassie’s and Edward’s stories, for some participants their 
contact with Muslims was a positive experience that provided something of a 
catalyst for their eventual conversion. At the very least, their exposure to 
Muslims was not a deterrent to them learning about Islam, even if the level of 
contact itself did not encourage them to discover more about Islam. Romantic 
relationships were also a catalyst for some participants, which is explored in 
depth in the following section that outlines reasons for conversion that emerged 
in the interview data. These participants viewed their interactions with 
Muslims as positive prior to their conversions, and they also described their 
view of Muslims as being neutral or generally positive.  
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Conversely, a small number of participants described having explicitly 
Islamophobic views, which they attributed to negative interactions with 
Muslims. Ali describes himself as being “very racist” when he was younger, 
and that he “grew up believing that white people were superior to everyone 
else and everyone else was just trying to catch up.” Ali states that he did not 
have much interaction with Muslims or know anything about Islam at the time 
of his conversion in the 1990s, but if he had not converted he would now be 
“one of those people out protesting Islamic schools, ḥalāl, all of that stuff. I’m 
ashamed to say it but I would be.” He notes that although he had always had 
racist views towards a range of minority groups, it was while he was working 
at a service station as a teenager that his Islamophobia peaked. Ali states that 
his workplace was at the end of a street populated by Muslims, many of whom 
would visit the service station and in Ali’s words, “were generally louts… 
would harass women.” Ali attributed their attitude to their faith, and it was 
through his interactions with them that he started to develop Islamophobic 
attitudes. 
Despite his embarrassment about his attitudes as a young man, Ali reflects that 
it was ultimately his racism against Muslims that led him to Islam. In his 
interview, he says that whenever the young Muslim men entered the service 
station, they would try and start arguments with him about religion, which Ali 
felt ill-equipped to partake in. After one such occasion, Ali decided to learn 
about Islam to equip himself to combat their arguments, and bought a second-
hand copy of the Qur’an to accompany his online research. It was through this 
reading and search for fallacies within the Qur’an that he unexpectedly became 
attracted to the religion: 
I started reading with a highlighter pen, because in the Bible they’re easy to 
find. I thought it would be even easier to find in this book, so I’ll highlight 
them and keep it in the shop. So next time they start to talk religion, I’ll bring 
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it out and we’ll talk religion. My intentions weren’t good. They were to be a 
troll, to be an Islamophobe, essentially. But in looking for mistakes, I found 
that there weren’t any that I could see.  
 
Like Liam in an earlier section, Ali initially sought to teach himself about Islam 
in order to debate with Muslims about their faith and to undermine their 
arguments, but ultimately found himself attracted to Islam because he felt that 
it was “more true” than his current belief system. 
Bridget was another participant who expressed that she had Islamophobic 
views prior to conversion. Like Ali, much of her ire towards Muslims stemmed 
from how she perceived Muslim men treat women. Bridget says that her first 
interactions with Muslims occurred when she was 18 and worked in the city, 
and that her experiences with the Lebanese men she met through her work 
were “not good.” She explains that her interactions with Muslim men through 
her work occurred around the time of the 2001 gang rapes in and around 
Bankstown, and that “being an Aussie girl, hearing on the news that these guys 
were doing these things to women just based on their nationality, it was 
disturbing to me. I also had a girlfriend who was sexually abused by four 
Lebanese guys, and it was pretty horrific what they did to her.” Bridget notes 
that she thought that Muslim was interchangeable with Lebanese and Arab at 
the time, and that by the time the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred she 
was very anti-Muslim. Speaking about herself in her late teens, Bridget 
recollects: 
You know, I was a bit of a racist. I hated Muslim people at that stage in my life. 
I remember once getting on a train and seeing a Muslim guy all dressed in 
white and really telling him to get the hell out of my country and we don’t 
want you here, and if you hate Australian people then why are you here for. 
Just ranting the most stupidest stuff you know. And when I look back at that 
time… actually after I started yelling at him, māshā’Allāh he just sat there and 
looked at me. He looked like he was sad, he was sad for me. He didn’t retaliate, 
he didn’t say anything. And I ended up feeling like an idiot. I felt like an idiot 
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cos I was yelling at him, and everyone was just looking at me, and he didn’t 
retaliate so what the hell was the point of that? So I just got up out of that train 
carriage and went and sat in another one feeling stupid. 
Although her initial attitude towards Muslims was largely negative, things 
changed for Bridget when she met her Lebanese boyfriend, later husband, and 
his family. She suggests that it was her exposure to practising Muslims, 
particularly around holy periods such as Ramadan when her now-husband 
would take her to spend time with his family and she was immersed in the 
religious atmosphere in their home. She also emphasises the hospitality and 
generosity which she experienced in their home, which she attributes to their 
faith.  
A significant number of participants stated that their conversion had come 
about despite a lack of contact with Muslims. Of these, many expressed relief 
about this fact, paraphrasing renowned convert Yusuf Islam (formerly musician 
Cat Stevens) by stating, “I’m glad I found Islam before I found Muslims.” 
Through this sentiment, participants suggested that unlike those who felt that 
the character of the Muslims they had met inspired them to research the 
religion further, such as Edward and Bridget, their experience with Muslims 
post-conversion were so negative that they would have been “turned off” the 
religion had they encountered those Muslims prior to conversion.  This refrain 
was a common one, encapsulated in this quote from Jason: 
 
I think in the beginning, I was enamoured by it all. I threw myself into Islam, I 
went to all the classes I could, went to the mosque when I could, read 
everything. Everything. Even all the wacky stuff. I was enamoured by my 
teachers and the people I would see at the mosque. Of course, through all of 
this I eventually started to get exposed to the wider Muslim community, and 
the shine wore off very quickly… I’m glad I got a chance to really learn about 
the true spirit of Islam before I met Muslims, because if I’d met them first I 
probably would never have converted. And I know more than a few people 
who left Islam precisely because of the Muslims that they met.  
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 Details of participants’ post-conversion interactions with Muslims are discussed 
in depth in Chapter Six, but it is useful to note here that the experiences 
discussed involved pressure to conform to particular practices posited as 
Islamic, harassment in public spaces such as the mosque and exposure to 
extremist views or views that participants found particularly confronting. 
Incidents such as these were cited by participants as having seriously 
challenged their faith, and like Jason, many of them suggested that if they had 
not already developed a strong belief in the religion, such events would have 
been enough to force them away from Islam for good. 
 
4.5 Reasons for Conversion 
As demonstrated in the review of the literature at the beginning of this chapter, 
there is a substantial body of research on the reasons why people convert to 
Islam, reflecting the amount of interest that the question of religious conversion 
elicits.  Given the comprehensive nature of the literature, this section does not 
introduce any novel reasons for conversion; it does, however, provide a context 
for participants’ post-conversion experiences, and explain some of the specific 
circumstances surrounding their conversion processes. 
Although participants were not asked specifically about their reasons for 
conversion, most participants revealed their reasons throughout the telling of 
their experiences leading up to and after their conversion. The reasons given 
were varied and diverse. For some, it was for practical reasons; they wanted to 
get married to their Muslim partner, and had to convert to Islam to do so. For 
many participants, their conversion came after a period of searching; for many 
more still, it was an unexpected turn of events and as surprising to themselves 
as it was to people who knew them. This section details some of the more 
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common conversion narratives offered by participants throughout the course of 
their in-depth interviews. 
4.5.1 Relationships with Muslims 
As noted previously, marriage is a commonly cited reason for conversion to 
Islam. In the orthodox Islamic tradition, Muslim women are only allowed to 
marry Muslim men; marriage to a non-Muslim man is considered invalid. 
Muslim men are permitted to marry Muslim women and other women ‘of the 
Book’ if they are ‘chaste’; namely, Christian and Jewish women who strictly 
adhere to their scriptures. It is thus unsurprising that a number of converts to 
Islam in Australia became Muslim solely for the purposes of marrying their 
Muslim partners, but are otherwise non-religious. This is particularly 
understandable given that the act of conversion to Islam is a relatively easy and 
straightforward task. There are no compulsory courses to be taken or lengthy 
rituals to be performed - a simple recitation of the testament of faith, or 
Shahādah, in front of a witness is sufficient (Al-Misri & Keller 1997). Only two 
participants in this study fall into this category, but it should be stressed that of 
the participants who did initially convert to Islam for the purposes of marriage, 
all of them did ultimately adopt the religion more fully, and believe in it as a 
faith. This is an unsurprising outcome given the recruitment process, as those 
who did not identify with Islam as a faith position are unlikely to have 
volunteered to be a part of the research project. This is further reflected in the 
very small number of participants who explicitly stated that they converted 
purely for the purposes of marriage. Thus, the cases examined here encompass 
a range of conversion narratives related to romantic relationships with Muslims 
that do at times overlap with other motivations for conversion, depending on 
when their interest in Islam developed. 
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James’s story is perhaps one of the more straightforward stories of the group. 
As a teenager attending a multicultural high school, several of his friends were 
Muslim and he dated a Muslim girl for over a year at the age of 15. James states 
that despite the contact he had with Muslims, he had never been interested in 
Islam himself. To him, his Muslim friends’ religion was only important to him 
insofar as how it impacted him and his relationships with them. Speaking of his 
Muslim girlfriend, he states that while she was not particularly religiously 
practising herself, her parents’ prohibitions on her dating and on her 
movements in the evenings meant that it was one of his most challenging 
relationships during that period. James reminisces:  
In retrospect, her parents weren’t awfully strict or repressive at all, but as a 
teenage boy who just wanted to spend time with his girlfriend, it felt that way. 
And I blamed it entirely on her religion. Also her culture – she was Pakistani – 
but to me at the time I guess they were interchangeable. So I didn’t actually 
know anything much about Islam at the time, cos my girlfriend never talked 
about it, but I did know that I didn’t like it because it stopped me from doing 
normal things with her like go to parties... It seemed very restrictive, 
particularly to girls. 
James admits with some obvious embarrassment that when he started dating 
his now wife almost 10 years later at the age of 25, he knew almost as little 
about Islam as he had in high school, and did not feel a need to learn. He says, 
“I met Asma at a night club. I knew she was Muslim, but she was like a lot of 
the other Muslims I knew – she drank, she was into partying.” They got 
married after dating for two and a half years, and he converted directly before 
the nikāḥ, or marriage contract. He reflects that for him it was purely a 
formality; neither he nor his wife had any interest in Islam and he had no 
intention of ever becoming a practising Muslim. His family and some close 
friends knew he had converted, but like him, they also saw it as a nominal 
performance rather than a real testament of faith. When asked what the turning 
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point for him was, he states that it was a gradual process which came about 
through his wife’s family. 
Asma wasn’t practising, but her family was, and so we’d go to their house for 
Eid or during Ramadan and they’d invite me to pray with them, and at first, I 
dunno, I just went along because they were my in-laws and I wanted a good 
relationship with them, as you do. But pretty soon I found it gave me 
something beyond that… it’s not easy to describe, but it felt… praying just felt 
right? And when I started fasting occasionally, that felt right. And that’s when I 
thought, maybe I should learn a bit about this religion that I am apparently a 
part of. It was very slow though. I’d say I became a Muslim about three years 
after my conversion. 
Unlike James, who started to learn about Islam after marriage, Penny became 
interested in Islam during the course of her relationship with her now husband, 
Tariq. Tariq was the first Muslim that Penny had met, and was non-practising 
at the time. Penny adds that she was also non-practising, and while she 
believed in God, she did not subscribe to any religion and “considered herself 
to be something different.” Penny describes her interest in Islam as a gradual 
one that was self-initiated, since Tariq was not invested in the religion himself 
and only became interested in practising after she did. She states: 
So I met him and he wasn’t practising, and he told me he was a Muslim, right 
up, from the front. But it didn’t really – I just thought oh yeah, that’s nice. It 
didn’t really click with me. But I started slowly researching myself, and the 
more and more I read the more I thought, oh, well, this is a really good religion 
and it wasn’t until we decided to get married that I started looking into it even 
more. So it was sort of on and off for the few years that we were seeing each 
other. Reading into it slowly, getting a feel for it, and then I reverted just before 
we got married… About two months after we got married, I really started 
practising. And he ended up coming back as well, and we started practising 
together. 
Penny’s narrative differs to that of James because she began to believe in Islam 
during the process of learning about the religion while she and Tariq dated. Her 
genuine interest in the religion inspired her non-practising husband to embrace 
Islam more fully as well. Given this context, Penny did not frame her 
120 
 
conversion as one that was done ‘for marriage,’ but instead represents that she 
was introduced to Islam through her then boyfriend. This was common 
amongst the participants, although not all of them ended up marrying the 
person they were introduced to Islam through. For example, Belinda recounts 
how her Turkish boyfriend promised to teach her about Islam, but never did; 
and so she started learning about it through books, the Internet, and eventually 
Islamic classes. Her relationship with him ended after a year, but she still felt 
strongly enough about Islam to convert. Belinda narrates: 
I asked him a lot of questions about it but he didn’t know the answers. So I was 
scared to look on the internet or go to books. Cos you don’t know – there’s so 
much terrorism out there and you don’t know what’s trustworthy. So yeah for 
years he was like “I’ll teach you everything you need to know” but he didn’t, so 
eventually I did end up going to a class at Auburn mosque. And I did that 
because I lived close to the area and it was the biggest mosque so I thought it 
would be the most trustworthy. 
Salwa’s journey to conversion differed again, as her conversion took place 
decades after her 1962 marriage to Yahya, a Chinese Muslim man she met at 
university. She explains that the question of conversion never really arose, 
because neither she nor her husband were very concerned about religion: 
…He wasn’t a very well-educated Muslim. There were lots of things he didn’t 
know because he’d grown up in Hong Kong during the Second World War 
during the Japanese occupation. And there were no madrasas and his father 
was in a prisoner of war camp. The Japanese imprisoned Chinese men. So he 
didn’t actually know very much. He knew he was a Muslim, he knew he should 
do salat, and he knew quite a few things but he certainly wasn’t educated 
Islamically. So we got married and I didn’t convert and he wasn’t particularly 
worried about it. His father was. 
Salwa ended up converting to Islam close to 28 years after her marriage to 
Yahya. When asked why she decided to convert to Islam after so long, she 
answered that there had been a family crisis and she did not feel that her 
husband could cope on his own, and she felt that she could support him better 
by “join[ing] the gang.” She adds, “I didn’t really expect it to do me any good at 
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all and I was quite surprised when it did have some benefits.” Salwa’s decision 
to convert in her late 40s was to better support her husband emotionally, after 
almost 28 years of marriage. 
While marrying or dating a Muslim was a common entry point to conversion, 
some participants expressed that other Muslims were more likely to question 
your commitment to the faith if they found out that you came to Islam through 
another person. Paul met his now-wife when he was in high school, and 
converted some years later after developing a belief in the religion. When Paul 
was asked what he thinks Muslims want to hear when they ask him why he 
converted, he replied:  
Probably not the answer I give. I'm comfortable with telling people that 
basically I was dating a Muslim. And I only say that because so much of that 
happens but people don't acknowledge that. I feel like I'm doing that – 
although it's a bit uncomfortable to actually say that now as a Muslim and I 
want to protect my wife's name or whatever, but at the same time I want to look 
out for all the huge amounts of Muslims in their teens or early 20s who are 
trying to get married but there's nothing supporting them. 
 
It is clear throughout Paul’s interview that he feels able to tell the truth about 
his entry point into Islam because he feels that he has now ‘proven’ himself as a 
Muslim, over a decade on, particularly given his professional commitment to 
the global Muslim community through his work. Despite his credentials as a 
fixture in the Muslim community, Paul indicates that people are still surprised 
and somewhat disappointed that his conversion story is relatively 
commonplace. 
Female participants were more likely to encounter the assumption that they had 
converted solely for marriage amongst non-Muslim family and friends than 
their male counterparts, particularly if they chose to wear ḥijāb. This attitude 
frustrated some of the participants who felt that the assumption was based on 
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the idea that the women were weak, submissive, and had little agency in 
deciding both their faith and what they wore. Penny stated: 
A lot of people just think I converted because I married a Muslim, which 
annoys me sometimes because that’s just so not the case and I don’t want to 
make that representation of Islam, that just because you marry a Muslim man 
that you have to be a Muslim. Because it was completely my choice and so I try 
and explain that but some people don’t want to listen, they just take it as you 
just converted because of your husband. 
Similarly, Cassie expressed disgust at people who found it easier to understand 
her conversion as the outcome of her relationship than of an independent 
decision she made: 
And they find it a lot easier to, like, for me conversion wise they were like 
‘Ohhh, you're married to a Muslim, got it’. It's so much easier and it really 
disgusts me, it's so much easier for them to accept that you've chosen a religion, 
you've chosen a whole way of life, belief system, everything, to fit into your 
relationship rather than vice versa? I dunno, and because they're so against the 
idea of actively being involved in religion that it's like, it can't, it has to be the 
means to an end rather than the other way round. It's kind of disturbing. 
 
She adds that this attitude was heightened when she started wearing the ḥijāb. 
She recounts some of her friends’ reactions to her decision to take off her 
headscarf nine months later: “I remember when I stopped wearing it a few 
people were like, oh so did you like break up with your boyfriend, like are you 
not together anymore? And I was like, I'm still Muslim! And we're engaged. So 
leave it at that.”  
Cassie and Penny both took umbrage at the assumption that they had 
converted to Islam solely to marry a Muslim, which they felt suggested that 
they were weak-willed and could not make decisions on their own. Cassie adds 
that the assumption that she must have taken off her scarf because she was no 
longer with her Muslim boyfriend could also have stemmed from a belief that 
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she had only worn it because he was “oppressing [her] and making [her] wear 
it.” Such a line of questioning is presumably driven by a desire to rationalise 
why a person would convert to a religion with as much perceived cultural 
distance from whiteness as Islam, and particularly to understand why a woman 
would convert to Islam given the popular Orientalist construction of Islam as a 
misogynistic religion. Female converts thus elicit even more bewilderment, 
once again reflecting an Orientalist fascination with converts to Islam that 
aligns perfectly with popular Western notions of Islamic misogyny and ethnic 
patriarchy (Dunn et. al. 2007; Ho 2007). The operation of the trope of Islamic 
misogyny in white converts’ post-conversion lives is further explored in section 
5.3.4. 
This section has illustrated that even though only two of the participants in this 
study explicitly identified their conversion as being ‘for marriage,’ many more 
participants were introduced to Islam through dating or marrying a Muslim. 
However, even those who were introduced to Islam through other means 
sometimes found that their peers assumed that they had converted for 
marriage, as they found it hard to understand why a person would convert to 
Islam, particularly if they were female. By focusing on the post-conversion 
experiences of converts to Islam instead of their reasons for conversion, this 
thesis goes beyond Orientalist fascinations with motivations for conversion, and 
instead draws attention to how converts experience race and racialisation after 
their conversion. 
4.5.2 Intellectual decision 
One of the most common explanations for conversion offered by participants 
was that their decision to convert to Islam was what they termed an 
‘intellectual’ one. Intellectual, in this context, is presented as an alternative to an 
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emotionally or spiritually ordained experience. American sociologists of 
religion John Lofland and Norman Skonovd’s popular typology of conversion 
(1981) describes intellectual conversions as coming about through a desire to 
learn about alternative belief systems and answers to questions of religion and 
God. Lofland and Skovond state: 
The "intellectual" mode of conversion commences with individual, private 
investigation of possible "new grounds of being," alternate theodicies, 
personal fulfillment, etc. by reading books, watching television, attending 
lectures, and other impersonal or "disembodied" ways in which it is 
increasingly possible sans social involvement to become acquainted with 
alternative ideologies and ways of life (1981, p. 376). 
Liam’s telling of his conversion narrative fits this profile. Having become a born 
again Christian at the age of 14, Liam explains that he had developed a 
“missionary zeal” which manifested in a desire to learn all he could about 
Christianity so that he could prove to people of other religions why Christianity 
was correct. This zeal led him to study comparative religions as an 
undergraduate student at university, where he became introduced to the 
concept of Sufism in Islam for the first time.  He explains that it was through 
this secular study that he started to think more deeply about the concept of 
strict monotheism, and that it was this concept that attracted him to Islam and 
made him begin to question Christianity. Over the next few months, he started 
to learn more about Islam, but stresses in his interview that he always 
approached it with a “critical thinking, academic kind of analytical” approach.  
Liam is also very careful to emphasise that he viewed his conversion to Islam as 
an extension of his religious journey which was necessarily brought about 
through his sceptical worldview. 
I always get this question of, so how did you feel when you became a Muslim? 
And I’m always like, I didn’t feel anything different. Well what do you mean? 
But we hear all these stories about people who cry… and I’m like well they 
might, but I had a relationship with God long before. This has been an addition, 
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a development, a moving further onward and upward in my journey, my 
spiritual journey, but it didn’t begin here. I didn’t have some sort of magic 
change. It was more of an intellectual shift. 
Unlike Liam, Ben’s intellectual interest did not stem from an interest in religion, 
but in history. Ben states that he had been reading about a number of religions 
from the Middle East to Far East for some years prior to his eventual conversion 
to Islam, but at the time characterised them as “intellectual traditions” rather 
than as faith positions. He reflected that he had what he terms a “bookish” 
interest in Islam, but that it slowly changed as he began to meet more Muslims 
and started to understand the overall teachings and messages of Islam. He was 
not seeking knowledge of other religions to understand or interrogate the 
contradictions he saw within Christianity, as he was not religious prior to is 
conversion; his intellectual interest was more in the history of different religions 
rather than in the specificity of their teaching. He emphasises that as he grew to 
learn more about Islam, he discovered: 
There was no real divide between them… The historical information and the 
corresponding teachings of the religion that came from that just resonated with 
me. That’s why I decided to convert, because I had a deep resonance with the 
overarching teachings of the religion. And I understood from the historical 
background that they were good. 
For Ben, the ideological and intellectual tradition that constituted Islam for him 
as a historian was no different from the religious tradition that he later learnt 
about – or at the very least, he found no inconsistencies between them. Riley 
expressed a similar discovery - like Ben, her initial interest in religion was a 
historical one, but after she started university and met people of different faith 
backgrounds she became curious about religions as belief systems as well as 
historical intellectual traditions.  
I think at that point in my life, I was just searching for some kind of meaning to 
life… I wasn’t an atheist exactly but I was a skeptic, so I wanted to find out the 
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‘truth’, and Christianity just had too many internal logical fallacies and 
inconsistencies. At that time I knew a lot about Islamic history and empires but I 
knew nothing about the tenets of the religion itself…. It wasn’t until I was in my 
second year [of university] I started reading about Islam as an actual religion. It 
wasn’t long before I decided that Islam was the true religion, because everything 
within it was internally consistent. 
Although Riley did not describe the intellectual and religious traditions of Islam 
as being inseparable, as Ben did, she too identified her conversion as an 
“intellectual conversion,” as opposed to what she called an “irrational 
conversion.” She emphasises that she does not view “irrational” or emotional 
conversions as being any less significant or powerful, but states that for her, 
conversion to Islam was a “purely rational, purely logical decision.” 
For Florian, the conversion process itself was one that emerged from intellectual 
inquiry, but he adds that he did not fully grasp the practices associated with 
Islam until much later on. Florian states that for him, converting to Islam was 
like “solving an intellectual puzzle,” because Islam answered many of the 
questions and critiques that he had had of Christianity as a young adult.  The 
actual practice of Islam came much later for him: 
From an intellectual point of view I was sort of already convinced that Islam 
was the right way. So I converted to Islam quite naturally because of that 
intellectual attachment to Islam. I would say that it's not until later that I 
realised... much later actually, ‘til I arrived in Australia, that Islam was actually 
much broader than what I thought it was. So you know, the concept of 
submitting to Allah was... I realised it much later, and what it meant you know, 
the way it has to change your life. 
Florian’s discovery of the practical and ritualistic elements of the religion was in 
large part influenced by his exposure to Muslim communities in Sydney. Up 
until that point, Florian had been Muslim in belief alone, and had not changed 
his lifestyle. 
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In the interviews with Ben, Riley and Florian, it was clear that they considered 
it very important that I knew that their conversion was an intellectually 
determined one, which may have been in order to maintain their own concept 
of themselves as being rational, cognitively aware actors. While many other 
participants also had what can be deemed intellectual motifs for conversion, the 
ones documented in this section were the strongest in naming their conversions 
as intellectual conversions. Many other participants also emphasised the role of 
reading and researching in their conversion journeys, conforming to Lofland 
and Skonovd’s profile. Some stated that they were searching for inconsistencies, 
mistakes, and internal fallacies, and it was only after this process that they felt 
able to convert.  
Participants that cited intellectual motifs were also more likely to state that they 
felt their conversion stories disappointed Muslims who they felt wanted to hear 
about spiritual revelations; as Omar states, “They want to hear about the flash-
of-light, revelatory moment, like Prophet Muhammad in the cave hearing Jibrail 
for the first time. They never say anything, but I can see the disappointment 
behind their smiles.” This topic of disappointment about conversion stories will 
be explored further in Chapter Six. The following section deals with these 
‘spiritual’ motifs, or in the nomenclature of Lofland and Skonovd, ‘mystical’ 
motifs and ‘experimental’ motifs. 
4.5.3 Spiritual or emotional conversions 
While the narratives discussed in the previous section can best be described as 
intellectual conversions, some participants described their conversion 
experiences as being spiritual, emotional or metaphysical. Of the small number 
of participants who used such descriptors, the motifs in the model presented by 
Lofland and Skonovd that are most suitable are the mystical and experimental 
128 
 
motifs. Mystical conversions, which Lofland and Skonovd describe as being 
“historically speaking, the best known” (1981, p. 377) occur without social 
pressure from members of the religious group in question, but unlike 
intellectual conversions, involve feelings or experiences that converts find 
difficult to explain.   
Köse and Lowenthal’s summary of Lofland and Skovond’s model describes 
mystical motifs as “an affectively intense, brief, ineffable experience and often 
occurs when a person is alone. Social pressure is low; affective content involves 
awe, love, or fear; and the experience is followed by an active intensification of 
belief” (2000, p. 101). The small number of participants who fit this category 
often used words such as emotion or spiritual to describe their conversions. 
Tasneem explained that she had been religiously and spiritually inclined since 
she was 15 and considered herself a practising born again Christian, but had 
little knowledge about Islam until she went backpacking in Indonesia with her 
husband in her early 20s during the 1970s, at a time when very few Australians 
were traveling to Indonesia. She described meeting a Sufi group in Bandung 
made up of a club manager, a barber, a brain surgeon, a sailor and a boxer, and 
talking to them about philosophy, the meaning of life, religion and spirituality 
from sunset to dawn every night for two weeks. After two weeks they asked 
her to join them to visit their spiritual teacher who lived in the mountains of 
south-west Java. On their way to see him, they stopped at a barn which was 
filled with locals making dhikr, and it was in that room that she “just realised 
that [she] had to become Muslim:” 
So I prayed and asked for a sign, and there was a fly going around the food. 
Cos I had to have a sign. And I knew that when God called it didn’t happen 
that often, and when he wanted something I wasn’t about to turn my back on 
him after 9 years [of being a born again Christian]… So I said, if you want me 
to become Muslim, get the fly to leave the food and land on my middle finger 
and walk up my arm. And it did. So I cried again, and everybody’s looking at 
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me and my husband’s like, what is she doing now? So I prayed and prayed 
and cried and I said, ‘Look, you know, it’s a big thing, my family is nuts 
enough as it is being a born again Christian but becoming a Muslim is going 
to kill them. So make the fly do it again.’ So it was just one big hall and all this 
food, and I could only see one fly. So it went all around the food and it came 
back and landed on my middle finger and walked up my arm again. And 
that’s when I said the shahādah. 
Stories such as Tasneem’s were rare amongst participants, with most 
participants stating that they did not have a single ‘revelation’ that inspired 
them to convert to Islam. Some, such as Belinda, described a series of small 
‘wonders’ that worked in tandem to confirm their growing belief in Islam. 
Belinda had started to attend classes about Islam before converting, because 
while she found some aspects of Islam compelling, she was not entirely 
convinced. She states that the first few classes were about confirming a belief in 
God, rather than in Islam specifically. Referring to the content of the classes, 
Belinda comments: 
Just look around us, you can see the signs of God, how could all of this be in 
creation if God didn’t exist? …And a few weeks later we learnt about the 
Qur’an and that’s what made me believe that the Qur’an is the word of God, 
cos of all its wonders. So after that I believed, it was quite simple. And then 
everything after I started doing, I started praying, even though I thought it 
was outrageous, fasting, even though I thought there’s no way this could be 
good for you, everything you do, it helps you. So it just kept getting 
confirmed. 
Here, Belinda expresses a mix of both mystical and experimental motifs. 
Experimental conversions are described by Lofland and Skovond as 
conversions where participants take part in the practices of the religion before 
they convert (1981, p. 378). These conversions usually take longer than mystical 
conversions, and are underpinned by curiosity. Although Lofland and Skovand 
state that these conversions are usually more common amongst “’new age,’ 
metaphysical groups” (1981, p. 378), they acknowledge that they can also take 
part in conversions to more structured religions. In Belinda’s case, she started 
130 
 
taking part in some of the ritualistic elements of the religion before she 
converted, and even though intellectually she found it hard to grasp, despite 
her better judgement she “felt” that it was good for her. This motif also 
emerged in other participants’ stories, such as James, who stated that he felt a 
great peace when he prayed with his wife’s family, even though at the time he 
did not believe in Islam.  
Interestingly, of the participants who expressly stated that their conversions 
were “intellectual ones,” some also conceded that there were emotional 
elements to their conversions, but downplayed these elements during the 
interview. Liam was one such participant who described an emotional 
“experimental” experience in the midst of his otherwise intellectual journey. 
Early on in Liam’s study of Islam, he began to visit his local mosque, Gallipoli 
mosque in Auburn, where he met a Turkish Sufi shaykh. Liam reminisces: 
He taught me dhikr, some meditative practices, and I really felt peace during 
that engagement, and I really felt this connection with the Oneness of God. And 
it was a time in my life when I’d been through a lot of pain, a lot of hurt and it 
was quite a healing experience. So it was a taste, it was an h’ors d’oeuvres if you 
like, it was a very positive and peaceful experience. But it was not long after 
when I started to explore things a bit more deeply… because although 
emotionally that was what I needed at the time, I very quickly came back to my 
critical thinking, academic kind of analytical way of looking at things.   
Like Belinda, it was through an act of Islamic worship – in Liam’s case, dhikr – 
that he started to consider converting to Islam, as well as through his academic 
pursuits.  Another participant, Florian, was careful to frame his conversion as 
an intellectual one, but describes two incidents which resonated with him on a 
deeper, more spiritual level. The first was during his confirmation as a teenager, 
a rite of passage in the Christian faith, when Florian’s Christian paternal 
grandmother offered his mother a book about Islam as a gift. Reflecting on it, 
Florian states: “I only learnt about it after that, and I was like, puzzling me how, 
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why would she ever offer a book about Islam on the day - to my mother as a 
present for me having another step in the Christian faith. There was something 
that was puzzling me a lot after that. Which I took later to be as a sign of God, 
you know.” The second incident occurred after he had started to think about 
the possibility of converting to Islam, while he was traveling through a highly 
religious area of Malaysia close to the border of Thailand: 
One day I was walking in the market and there was this man in sort of a white 
dress that comes to me and tells me Islam is great, you know tells me in 
English. And I remember telling him, well I don't know if it's great, but I'm very 
happy to be Christian. So he said to me, Islam is great. He repeated it another 
time. And then, I was a bit uncomfortable because he was sort of following me 
when I was walking. So I was going away and then he said to me a third time, 
Islam is great. And then he sort of disappeared and went away. So that stayed 
in my mind my whole life. It stayed very deeply. 
These incidents did not have the dramatic and almost instantaneous effect on 
Florian that a mystical motif is characterised to have in Lofland and Skovond’s 
model, as they did not immediately and directly cause him to convert; 
nonetheless, it still resonated with him and he later viewed them as possible, 
inexplicable ‘signs.’ From the above excerpts, it is clear that unusual or intense 
feelings accompanying ‘signs’ or the practice of Islamic rituals were a 
significant element of spiritual or emotional conversions amongst the 
participants in this study, but that wholly spiritual or emotional conversions 
were by and large uncommon. Oftentimes, however, otherwise ‘intellectual’ 
conversions did overlap with spiritual and emotional conversions. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide a necessary introduction to understanding 
the experiences of participants in their study after their conversion, by detailing 
their pre-conversion religious histories, contact with Muslims and reasons for 
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conversion. Through the illuminating stories and descriptions provided by 
Muslim converts in their interviews, Chapter Four has illustrated the diversity 
of convert experiences throughout the entire conversion process, from the initial 
catalyst for learning about the religion through to the convert’s utterance of the 
significant and weighty shahādah or testament of faith, that demarcates the 
speaker as a believer in the religion of Islam.  
The data captured in the interviews reflects the pre-existing literature on 
conversion: while some participants were driven by intellectual motivators, a 
number converted to Islam after developing a spiritual or emotional connection 
to the religion. Still others described what Tourage (2012, p. 211) calls an “on 
the road to Damascus” event, a Biblical reference to the sudden and 
transformative conversion of the Apostle Paul. This chapter highlighted that the 
vast majority of participants identified as having a Christian background, and 
that they had varying levels and modes of contact with Muslims prior to 
conversion – from wholly positive to wholly negative experiences, and 
everything in between. This chapter has also shown that the conversion 
narratives collected in this study were most often accompanied by intellectual, 
mystical or experimental motifs, with very few participants converting to Islam 
purely for the sake of marriage.  
The conversion narratives offered by the participants not only provide a 
contextual basis on which to found a further exploration of their experiences as 
white Muslim converts, they also contribute rich empirical data to a field which 
is demonstrably lacking in Australian voices. The following chapters will 
explore the post-conversion experiences of participants in greater detail, as 
relates to whiteness and their racial identity. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NAVIGATING WHITE AUSTRALIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter (Chapter Four) detailed key elements of participants’ 
journeys to conversion, and highlighted the commonalities and differences 
between their conversion narratives. Central to the narratives offered by 
participants were descriptions of their childhood, family life, religious 
education and religious beliefs prior to their conversion to Islam, their contact 
with and perception of Muslims during this time, and the motivations that led 
them to convert to Islam. Chapter Four demonstrated that many of the converts 
viewed the process or act of conversion as being unremarkable in some 
respects; even in cases where it may have come as a surprise to them.  
This chapter is the first of three to examine more fully the experiences of 
participants after their conversion, with particular attention to the role of 
racialisation and the centrality of whiteness in shaping their interactions with 
both Muslims and non-Muslims in Australia. Through a comprehensive 
documentation and analysis of participants’ stories, the following chapters will 
illustrate how whiteness is operationalised in Australian nation-building as a 
normative and discursively unmarked cultural space. Significantly, as I 
discussed in section 2.3, the Australian national identity has not just been 
constructed around the cultural space of whiteness (Hage 1998; Moreton-
Robinson 2004, 2005; Schech and Haggis 2001; Osuri and Banerjee 2004), but 
around a specific, localised whiteness that is articulated through the lens of a 
Christian-coded secularism, a concept that I explored in depth in section 2.4 
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(Randell-Moon 2006; Sunderland 2007; Anidjar 2006; Imtoual 2004). Just as 
whiteness functions as a powerful yet unspoken cultural space and strategic 
rhetoric, central to the historical establishment of Australia as a settler colony 
and the current workings of Australian nationalism, so too does Australia’s 
Christian heritage and culture, disguised behind a mask of loose secularism. In 
this arrangement, ‘white’ and ‘Christian’ are simultaneously coded as 
Australian, and are actively deployed as co-constitutive elements of the 
Australian nation. Interviews with white converts to Islam reveal that many 
participants’ experiences of “Australianness” prior to becoming Muslim are 
racially and religiously inflected as white and Christian respectively, even if 
they did not previously subscribe to the Christian faith. As the following 
chapters will illustrate, participants’ whiteness came under question once their 
religious identity changed to Islam, a religion racialised as non-white in 
Western nations generally, and often specifically as Arab or Middle Eastern in 
Australia (Poynting et al 2004). 
In this chapter, I focus on participants’ interactions with their non-Muslim 
family, friends, colleagues and strangers, to demonstrate that ‘Muslim’ is 
constructed by many non-Muslim Australians as a highly racialised category 
that is incongruent with whiteness. In a country where Christianity and 
secularism are coded white and Islam is coded non-white, the perceived 
differences between Australia’s flexibly secular yet Christian-centric religious 
identity and Islam are deemed to be not just of theological origin, but of a racial 
one. In this characterisation, the cultural distance between Islam and whiteness 
is viewed as so vast as to be impassable, or at the very least, too challenging to 
dare try. My interviews revealed that several participants felt that this view was 
shared by some Muslims as well. However, Muslim expressions of the 
perception that Islam and whiteness are mutually exclusive took a significantly 
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different form to those conveyed by non-Muslims, and I have addressed 
participants’ experiences with Muslims in Chapter Six. In this chapter, I further 
demonstrate that rather than being confined to specific settings, exchanges 
which locate white Muslim converts as outside or on the margins of the cultural 
space of whiteness due to their decision to take on a highly racialised identity 
occur in a number of different settings: from intimate discussions with family 
members, to navigating social gatherings with friends and colleagues, to 
racialised harassment and abuse from strangers in public places. 
Through the examination of diverse interactions between participants and the 
groups identified above, I identify seven interconnected expressions of the idea 
that Islam and whiteness are incompatible and dedicate a subsection to 
examining each one. Section 5.2 deals with the idea that white Muslim converts 
have actively ‘left’ whiteness through the process of their conversion, most 
commonly expressed in participant testimonies through descriptions of direct 
exchanges with non-Muslims both known and unknown to them. In these 
interactions, it is clear that Islam is perceived as a race, not a religion. Amongst 
the converts interviewed, the participants who described such exchanges were 
most often ones who at the time adopted physical indicators of their Muslim 
identity, such as the ḥijāb for women or the beard and kufi for men. This section 
is further split into three subsections, each of which analyses a particular 
manifestation of the idea that white Muslims to Islam leave, relocate to the 
borders of, or betray whiteness after their conversion. Specifically, the three 
subsections analyse experiences where participants have been told that they are 
no longer white, are racially abused, and charged with race treason.  
Section 5.3 builds on the experiences of converts addressed in 5.2 by extracting 
and analysing perceptions of Islam highlighted in their narratives that indicate 
that some non-Muslims situate Islam outside the scope of “Australianness,” a 
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racially and religiously coded category. In this section, I focus on interactions 
where Muslims are portrayed as being situated outside the dominant and 
normative model of what it means to be Australian, which contribute to the 
racialisation of white converts in more subtle and covert ways. Rather than 
invoking racial categories that position white converts outside of whiteness, the 
interactions and exchanges highlighted in section 5.3 rely on the 
problematisation of Islamic culture instead. These exchanges evoke a form of 
racialisation that attaches to what has been termed by Barker (1981) as “new 
racism,” as described and mapped in the literature review on Islamophobia and 
new racism detailed in section 2.3. Section 5.3 is thus broken down into four 
subsections, each highlighting a particular aspect of Islam that is viewed by 
some non-Muslims as a barrier to its assimilation into Australian culture. 
Namely, my thematic analysis of the interview data uncovered that some non-
Muslims perceived Islam to be rigid, oppositional to secularism, and a national 
security threat. The analysis indicated that Islam’s disavowal of alcohol and 
drinking culture was viewed as a problem by some non-Muslims. Finally, the 
operationalisation of the trope of Islamic misogyny - tied closely to 
constructions of (non-white) ethnic patriarchy – was also a recurring theme in 
the interview data. 
 
5.2 Islam as a Non-White Race 
The idea that Muslims are a racialised group in Australia and indeed, many 
other parts of the Western world, is not a new one. In sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this 
thesis, I reviewed a section of scholarship on race and racialisation to detail how 
the processes of racialisation can effectively render previously racially 
unclassified groups, such as religious communities, as raced. The Muslim 
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experience of racialisation in Western countries was explored further in section 
2.3, where I contended that the racialisation of Muslims as non-white, and 
specifically as Arab and Middle Eastern in Australia, and South Asian in 
Britain, has led to the construction of a specific form of cultural racism against 
Muslims. For Muslims who are already racialised as ‘non-white’ due to their 
appearance, it is near impossible to separate the racism they experience as 
Muslims from that which they experience due to their non-white ethnic identity 
– these dual racialisation processes not only act simultaneously, but also in 
tandem. In contrast, white converts to Islam start from a position of being 
'unraced' and invisible within the culturally neutral experience of whiteness, to 
becoming acutely racialised as non-white through the act of conversion. This 
section focuses on experiences of converts in which they were told that they 
were no longer white, race traitors (to the white race) or otherwise made to feel 
that they had adopted a new racial, as well as religious, identity. 
 
5.2.1 No longer white 
Qualitative information gathered from the interviews revealed a number of 
curious instances where participants were told directly, both by close relatives 
and complete strangers, that they were no longer white. Michelle related one 
such exchange with a co-worker “Joanne”, which occurred when she was 
working at a popular department store in Sydney CBD. She had never met 
Joanne before, and Joanne only knew that she was expecting a “Michelle.” 
Joanne’s visceral reaction upon meeting Michelle led Michelle to surmise that 
her co-worker had not expected a blue-eyed, ḥijāb-wearing white woman. 
Reflecting on the incident, Michelle relates: 
I've been called a traitor before. I was told that I was no longer Australian 'cos I 
used to wear the scarf, by a co-worker when I worked at David Jones. She goes, 
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what nationality are you and I was like I'm Australian, I'm Caucasian. She's like 
– but you're Muslim. She's like, when you became Muslim, you became an 
Arab. You're not Australian. 
Within this brief exchange lies a wealth of data about the conflation between 
race, national identity and religion. In Michelle’s own words, ‘Australian’ and 
‘Caucasian’ become synonymous with one another, and Caucasian – usually 
used as a racial classifier – is employed as a descriptor of nationality. In rebuttal 
to Michelle’s response, Joanne seeks to revoke Michelle’s self-identified racial 
and national identity simultaneously, by positioning whiteness and 
Australianness as unable to cohabit with a Muslim religious identity.  
Stephanie describes a similar event that took place when she was volunteering 
at a charity event, although in her example it was the combination of both her 
ḥijāb and her “Aussie name” which caused confusion. She recollects that after 
noticing that a middle-aged man had been staring at her for a very long time, 
she finally decided to approach him: 
He barely looked at my face, he was staring at my name tag. He said, 
‘Stephanie… that’s an Aussie name innit?’ and I said yes, I was Australian. And 
he said, ‘Why you wearing that thing on your head for, then?’ and I explained 
that I’m Muslim yadda yadda… before I could even finish my sentence he said, 
‘Well, how come you have an Aussie name then?’ By this stage I was yeah just a 
bit sick of it so I said that I’d converted to Islam, and he got very annoyed and 
said, ‘Well if you’re going to become an Arab and wear Arab gear you might as 
well get an Arab name, you shouldn’t pretend to be an Aussie.’ 
Stephanie relates the event with laughter, but later expresses the unsettling 
discomfort she had felt later at home when unpacking the interaction in her 
mind, stating: “You kind of wonder you know, do they think you’ve actually 
transformed into another, a different race? Is it just a symbolic thing?” In both 
Michelle’s and Stephanie’s examples, the ḥijāb is identified as the instigator for 
the accusation that white Muslim converts had relinquished both their right to a 
white racial identity and an Australian national identity. A preliminary reading 
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of these interactions indicates that the ḥijāb itself is racialised, and by proxy, so 
are the bodies of the women who choose to wear it. The process occurs despite 
the fact that their bodies may not otherwise be available for racialisation, with 
their fair skin and light coloured eyes; the ḥijāb thus appears to replace the need 
for traditionally understood markers of race. Indeed, the hypervisibility of the 
ḥijāb renders invisible biological markers of race such as skin colour or facial 
features; or at the very least it renders obsolete the wearer’s whiteness. The 
power of the ḥijāb to racialise white Muslim converts in this way can be 
understood through its close connection to the body. Unlike more abstract, 
metaphysical or otherwise visibly absent cultural inscriptions such as personal 
belief or private prayer, the ḥijāb is not only on the body, it becomes of the body, 
it comes to represent the totality of the body.  As a result, the racialisation of the 
ḥijāb is closely tied to the racialisation of bodies that occurs against non-white 
peoples who are racialised for their skin colour, facial features, hair type and 
eye shape.  
French philosopher Alia Al-Saji offers valuable insights about the mechanisms 
through which the ḥijāb becomes racialised. Writing about the 2004 French ban 
on ḥijāb, Al-Saji contends that attitudes towards the ḥijāb are a form of cultural 
racism which operates as a continuation of ‘biological’ racism precisely because 
of the role that “bodily difference” plays in both types of racism (2010, p. 889). 
She explains, “Cultural racism is not merely intolerance of the ‘spirit’ of another 
culture, it is directed at bodies, which this racist vision materially inscribes and 
perceives as culturally different. This racism naturalises cultural difference to 
visible features of the body, including clothing” (Al-Saji 2010, p. 889). Although 
al-Saji’s focus is on the female headscarf, a similar argument can be made for 
other forms of clothing associated with Islam, such as the niqāb (face veil) worn 
by some Muslim women, and the kufi, turban, and/or thawb that some Muslim 
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men wear. These pieces of clothing fall under the category of “observable 
elements of culture” which Dunn et. al. suggest are one of the key mechanisms 
for the contemporary racialisation of Muslims in Australia and worldwide 
(2007, p. 567).  
Al-Saji’s suggestion that visible markers of culture on the body in the form of 
clothing act as an extension of the body is a compelling one, and invites greater 
discussion in light of the examples highlighted in this chapter so far. Although 
she firmly places the racism that the ḥijāb and other Islamic clothing attracts in 
the “cultural” racism camp, she adds that it acts as a continuation of “colour” 
racism because “In the cases of both skin color and veiling, racialisation 
functions largely through a visual register (although different perceptual, 
imaginary and discursive dimensions are also implicated)” (2010, p. 884). The 
act of seeing is thus not neutral, but draws on racial repertoires in a process that 
we are not even aware of participating in (2010, p. 885). Al-Saji’s argument 
becomes even more persuasive when we examine the lineage of the concept of 
racialisation, a task that I undertook in Chapter Two.  
Since then, other scholars writing about racialisation have highlighted the 
importance of the body to the experience of racialisation; in the words of Didier 
Fassin, “the body is the site of the racial experience” (2011, p. 419).  Not, as he 
warns, because there is a self-evident or inherent relationship between race and 
the body in a biological sense, as promoted by the pseudo-scientific race 
theories of the modern era, but because processes of racialisation ascribe 
difference to bodies and called the categorisation of that difference, ‘race.’ Homi 
Bhabha supports Fanon’s suggestion that skin is integral to racialisation and the 
creation of colonial stereotypes, stating, “Skin, as the key signifier of racial and 
cultural difference in the stereotype, is the most visible of fetishes, recognised as 
common knowledge in a range of cultural, political, historical discourses, and 
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plays a public part in the racial drama that is enacted every day in colonial 
societies” (1990, p. 30).  
Bhabha goes on to argue that it is this very visibility and physicality of skin that 
attracts and even “authorises” discrimination: “The difference of the object of 
discrimination is at once visible and natural - colour as the cultural/political 
sign of inferiority or degeneracy, skin as its natural 'identity'” (1990, p. 32).  
Linda Martin Alcoff has also convincingly situated race in the site of the visual, 
noting the very real and very material consequences of race while 
simultaneously maintaining that the concept of race is “socially constructed, 
historically malleable, culturally contextual and produced through learned 
perceptual practice” (1999, p. 17). Like Homi Bhabha, Alcoff draws attention to 
the centrality of the physicality and visibility of race, suggesting that our 
learned perceptual practices lead us to seek out cultural meaning in people’s 
physical attributes and place them into racial categories. She states, “Because 
race works through the domain of the visible, the experience of race is 
predicated first and foremost on the perception of race” (1999, p. 20). 
Additionally, the racial differences that are read into features of the body are 
not simply constituted through the active perception of those features in the 
moment, but are built into our perceptual practices from a young age. When 
Alcoff states that “there is no perception of the visible that is not already 
imbued with value” (1999, p. 19), she reminds us that the act of perceiving is an 
epistemic practice that relies on pre-existing conceptual repertoires about race 
that are transmitted socially and culturally. In other words, two people may 
look at a third person and both place him or her in a different racial category, 
prioritise certain visible features over others in their assessment of the person, 
or read different meanings into the same features.  
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In this light, it is not improbable that markers of Islam like the ḥijāb can be 
viewed by some as extensions of the body: as a visually discernible feature that 
contribute to a particular perception of race because of the racial meanings and 
values ascribed to it in a given sociocultural context.  The argument can be 
extended to other forms of clothing as well, such as kufis. Omar describes an 
incident where a parent from his son’s school mistook him for a fair-skinned 
Pakistani man:  
She couldn’t see past the kufi… I don’t really wear it much anymore, well if I go 
to the mosque but in those days I wore it every, almost every day… It didn’t 
strike me until much later in the conversation that she didn’t realise I was 
white. And then it all came clear, why she’d gone on and on about traveling 
through India. Of course I told her, quite directly, that my mother was from 
Scotland and my father was sixth generation Australian and she looked 
affronted and said, “But I don’t understand, I thought you were Muslim.” 
Omar qualifies his retelling of the story by explaining that he had a thick beard 
at the time, and reflects that his dark hair and dark eyes could have contributed 
to her assumption that he was from Pakistan. He finishes by saying, “At the end 
of the day though I still have white skin so I don’t know.” Omar’s search for 
phenotypical features to explain her confusion over his racial identity proves 
fruitless, and so he surmises that it must have been his kufi: “She couldn’t see 
past the kufi.” As to why the parent racialised him as South Asian, rather than 
Middle Eastern which is more typical in Australia, he explained that she had 
told him she travelled extensively through India, which may have led her to 
associate Muslims, particularly kufi-wearing Muslims, with South Asia. Omar’s 
suggestion is supported by Khyati Joshi’s work on the racialisation of Muslims, 
Hindus and Sikhs in the United States of America, where she states that “Many 
of the cultural markers of South Asian identity are actually religious markers as 
well” (2006, p. 215).  Joshi goes on to list examples of these cultural markers:  
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…they may include traditional garb such as the sari and salwaar kameez; the 
bindi or forehead “dot” worn by many Hindu women and some Hindu men; 
the ḥijāb (headscarf or “veil”) traditional among Muslim women or the kufi 
(skullcap) worn by some observant Muslim men; and the dastaar, uncut hair, 
and other religious accoutrements worn by many Sikhs (2005, p. 215). 
Omar’s experience of being “read” as South Asian was unique amongst 
interview participants, as the vast majority of them related stories of being 
mistaken for Arab, Middle Eastern, or far less commonly, North African. This 
was true even for other men who sometimes wore the kufi, like Omar. If we take 
the position that the male kufi functions in a similar fashion to the ḥijāb and by 
extension, skin colour and other phenotypical features, it is very possible that 
Alcoff’s principles apply to the kufi as well. That is to say, the way two different 
people perceive the kufi and read its wearer racially will necessarily be imbued 
with the values and assumptions that they hold, based on their individual 
experiences, and will affect how they categorise and classify the person wearing 
the kufi. Omar’s story highlights that while Muslims in Australia are often 
racialised as Arab or Middle Eastern, as argued by Dunn et al (2007) and 
Poynting et al (2006), this need not be the case in all situations. 
Joshi also offers another possible reason why Muslims in the US are often 
racialised as South Asian despite the fact that in popular American discourses, 
Islam is more commonly associated with Arabs. She states that “The answer lies 
at the intersection of Orientalist thought and the phenotypical similarity of 
South Asians to Arabs” (2006, p. 218), making the contention that most 
Americans know so little about the geographical region between Greece and 
Japan that they view the Middle East and South Asia as a monolith. Given that 
racialisation relies on the essentialisation of entire groups of diverse and 
heterogeneous peoples based on facial features and cultural markers, Joshi’s 
proposal is arguably just as applicable in Australia. As this chapter will 
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demonstrate, the racialisation of Muslims in Australia is not always a specific or 
targeted process, and often constructs Muslims as “anything other than white.” 
Al-Saji’s pertinent insights helps to explain how the wearer of visible signifiers 
of Islam such as the ḥijāb and the kufi can come to be racialised as broadly ‘non-
white.’ My interviews with white converts to Islam who had experience of 
wearing such clothing indicated that it was not an uncommon experience, 
amongst my participant group, although often expressed in more subtle or 
indirect ways. Many of them expressed that they were surprised or even 
shocked when they realised that others now viewed them as non-white, and 
had never even thought of themselves as being raced (even as white).  
However, what of religious practices that are not visually perceptible? Is it 
possible to speak of the racialisation of religious practices, or even of entire 
religious communities?  
It is clear from the interview data that at least some people do perceive Islam to 
be a ‘race,’ or at least, synonymous with ‘the Arab race.’ In the narratives of 
Stephanie and Michelle, their conversion to Islam was seen as congruent with 
them ‘becoming Arab.’ Without speaking to the people who accused them of 
‘becoming Arab,’ however, it is impossible to know whether it was solely the 
ḥijāb that caused them to be racialised in that way, or whether it was because 
they had joined a community of faith that is typically associated with non-white 
people. One participant, Daniel, relates how his father told him that he was not 
white very soon after his conversion, despite the fact that he did not wear 
anything that would identify him as a Muslim to anyone else: “He said, 'You're 
not white, Daniel.' The implication was unlike himself, who was white. And I 
kind of made a joke about it, like, 'How can you be more white than [the 
Muslim] Bosnians who have blonde hair and blue eyes?'” Daniel explains that 
he was not surprised by the statement, stating: “In Bulgaria we have this saying 
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for a person converting to Islam which is called, translated of course, 'He 
became a Turk.'” Conversion to Islam thus becomes a conversion to a new 
ethnic identity as well, and in Bulgaria, this ethnic identity is always Turkish.  
The reason for this can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire’s rule of Bulgaria, 
and historical Bulgarian Christian anxieties about the Islamisation of the region. 
In Rossitsa Gradeva’s chapter on the historiography of conversion to Islam in 
Bulgaria, Gradeva contends that the existence of Muslim communities in 
Bulgaria “is regarded as one the most negative Ottoman legacies in the region” 
(Gradeva 2011, p. 188) and nation building in Bulgarian in contemporary times 
relies on efforts to “neutralise” its impacts. She goes on to explain the impact of 
this on Bulgarian converts to Islam: “Over time the narrower notion of 
‘conversion to Islam’ of local people was integrated into the wider ones of 
‘spread of Islam’ and ‘Islamisation,’ both of which take into account the 
colonization and migration of Muslims, the establishment of the Islamic 
institutions, the construction of Muslim cult buildings and generally the 
appropriation of the Balkan space by the Ottoman authority” (Gradeva 2011, p. 
188). The racialisation of Muslim converts in Bulgaria is thus inextricably tied to 
the Ottoman Empire, which led to the spread of Islam in the region and 
contributes to fears of continuing Islamisation today, despite census statistics 
indicating that affiliation to Islam is on the decline (Pamporov 2013, p. 188). 
Daniel’s father’s assertion that Daniel was no longer white by virtue of his 
conversion to Islam has parallels to the notion that in Bulgaria, whiteness is 
associated with Orthodox Christianity – conversion to Islam is effectively 
conversion into a Turk. 
Gradeva’s description of Bulgarian anxieties about Muslims is strikingly similar 
to fears of Islamisation in modern day Australia. In Australia, these fears are 
expressed through the increasing popularity of movements such as the anti-
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ḥalāl and anti-Shariah movements, Reclaim Australia, and opposition to Islamic 
schools (Al-Natour 2010; Laforteza 2015) and mosque developments (Dunn 
2001). It is clear that racialisation reflects the predominant social and political 
anxieties of the time. In their book ‘Framing Islam’ (2011), Peter Morey and 
Amina Yaqin write that cultural anxieties about the ‘Other’ have been 
expressed through Islamophobic and anti-Arab representations and stereotypes 
in the media, which in Australia instigate moral panics about people of Middle 
Eastern ancestry. In other countries, the racialisation revolves around other 
groups; for example, in Britain Muslims are racialised as South Asian (Moosavi 
2015), in France, Muslims are racialised as North African (Allen 2005) and in 
Germany and Bulgaria, Muslims are racialised as Turkish (Allen 2005; Gradeva 
2011). In section 5.3, I analyse in more depth the specific anxieties that non-
Muslims expressed about Islam to the white Muslim converts I interviewed. 
 
The findings highlighted in this section demonstrate how racialisation on a 
macro-level can manifest in micro-level interactions with white converts to 
Islam, in which they are told that they are no longer white, or perceived to be 
non-white, by virtue of their conversion to Islam. While this was not a 
commonly expressed view, at least within the stories of participants in this 
research project, the direct articulation of the idea that white converts to Islam 
have left whiteness behind is a useful starting point to consider the racialisation 
of Muslims in Australia. The following section explores how this same idea – 
that white converts have left whiteness and become non-white – is manifested 
through racialised abuse directed towards white Muslims. 
 
5.2.2 Racialised abuse 
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Experiences of racism featured frequently in some participants’ stories, and 
were particularly prominent in the interviews of those who were visibly 
identifiable through clothing and other religious markers discussed in section 
5.2.1. The racism encountered by the white Muslim converts I interviewed 
spans a range of different forms: from institutional racism encountered when 
attempting to build a mosque or an Islamic school, or being denied 
opportunities at work, to interpersonal racism, including over the internet. In 
this section I specifically focus on interpersonal abuse, discrimination and 
harassment that designates the target as non-white - in other words, racism that 
identifies the target as not just Muslim, as say, the yelling of ‘terrorist’ or 
‘Osama’ might signify, but as Muslim and of a different ‘race’. This form of 
racism is dealt with here separate to more veiled forms of racism that 
participants experienced where they were cast as the cultural ‘Other’ through 
the use of metaphors and stereotypes that do not directly evoke the concept of 
‘biological’ race. These experiences will be discussed in section 5.3. 
It must be stated from the outset that the experiences of racism considered in 
this section – that is to say, those that are more aligned to the notions of race 
associated with biological racism – were far less common in the interview data 
than the more subtle cultural racism experienced by participants. The paucity of 
racial abuse identified in the interview data I collected supports the findings of 
Leon Moosavi, whose research on Muslim converts in Britain found that in the 
experience of his participants, “Islamophobia only rarely materializes in the 
form of violent attacks or transparent animosity, but surfaces more frequently 
on a mundane and discreet level” (Moosavi 2015, p. 48). This could in part be 
due to the fact that explicit references to race and ethnicity are now largely 
frowned upon, leading to the creation of alternate discourses that rely on 
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marginalisation and dehumanisation on the basis of culture and values instead 
(van Dijk 1993).  
This is not to say that manifestations of contemporary Islamophobia never 
evoke race as a reified and essential aspect of a person’s being, but simply that 
in the interviews I conducted, situations of race-based abuse were rarer. 
Examples of the latter were also more likely to be carried out by strangers in a 
public space or often from a passing car. Saffiah relates one such instance, 
which occurred when she was out shopping with her two young daughters 
after school. Although Saffiah does not wear ḥijāb herself, her daughters were 
wearing headscarves as part of their school uniform. She explains that she had 
noticed a woman walking very closely behind her for some time, but it was not 
until she identified herself as the children’s mother that the women attacked 
them: 
She started swearing at me and calling me names, accusing me of all sorts of 
things, she called me the n-word a few times, a sand-n-word *laughs* I 
shouldn’t laugh but it was just mental, absolutely mental and I didn’t know 
what to do.  
Here, the profoundly racist and historically loaded “n-word” is used to place 
Saffiah and her daughters outside of whiteness. Saffiah notes later that she 
thinks it was significant that the stranger did not begin her tirade until she 
overheard Saffiah identify herself as the girls’ mother, as though to confirm that 
Saffiah was actually Muslim herself given that Saffiah did not wear a headscarf 
like her daughters. Once she had, she felt emboldened to racially abuse Saffiah 
and her daughters. When asked whether she thought that the woman knew she 
was white and it was the fact that Saffiah was Muslim that caused the woman 
to react the way she did, Saffiah immediately answers in the affirmative: 
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Oh yeah. 100 percent. I mean, look at me. I have blue eyes… It was winter so I 
didn’t even have a tan. She definitely knew I was white, yeah.  I’m obviously 
white. That’s why she was so mad. 
Saffiah’s reference to her “obvious” whiteness mirrors the qualitative 
information gathered from an earlier project I conducted in 2010, in which two 
female participants expressed comparable sentiments (Alam 2012). The first 
woman, Tara, described a time when a man called her a “black slut.” Recalling 
this incident, she exclaimed, “To me! Like dude, obviously I’m white!” and 
added, “I wear ḥijāb but I have Anglo features” (2012, p. 130).  Similarly, 
referring to incidents of racism she faced, Alinta stated: “I put on the ḥijāb and 
look in the mirror, I still see me, I still look so white to me. With my blue eyes, 
and even though you can’t see my hair, my skin was white… I look so Aussie!” 
(2012, p. 131).  
In these three situations, the women themselves were confident in their own 
whiteness via their facial features, but felt that the perpetrators of the racism 
could not or refused to accept these features as ‘proof’ of their whiteness due to 
their wearing of the ḥijāb, and in Saffiah’s case, her daughters’ ḥijāb.  
Participants asserted their whiteness in an attempt to highlight the comicality of 
the interaction, and emphasise their belief that wearing the ḥijāb did not 
preclude them from the domain of whiteness. Importantly, both Tara and 
Alinta expressed that the racial abuse they experienced when they wore ḥijāb 
was a stark reminder of the fact that they had never previously been exposed to 
racial abuse prior to wearing ḥijāb. Tara recognised that she significant racial 
privilege over non-white Muslim women who are racialised regardless of 
whether they wear the ḥijāb or not, stating that she was “cognisant of the fact 
that if [she] ever wanted to take off my headscarf and walk down the street, all 
white privileges would ultimately, instantly return” (Tara quoted in Alam 2012, 
p. 135).  
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A number of other participants also described situations where they were at the 
receiving end of racial slurs. Xander stated that when he wore a thawb and kufi 
or turban, he has been called “wog, gyppo, Arab bastard, dune coon, raghead… 
I’ve been called a Paki by Brits in Australia. Anything you can think of.” Xander 
adds: 
Usually they’re just some idiots yelling from cars, it doesn’t bother me 
anymore, they’re cowards. I had one guy at work who kept calling me Iraqi 
Pete… I didn’t even know who that was, I had to Google it. I’d say to him, “You 
know I’m not Iraqi right, Tim?” …He just ignored me, kept on going. 
The slurs that Xander recounts are all markers of race, ethnicity and far off 
Middle Eastern deserts. None of them carry an explicit religious connotation - 
save perhaps for raghead, referring to a turban or keffiyeh, which are both types 
of headgear that are often associated with Islam. Other participants such as 
Maria and Jonathon described similar terms, the most common of which were 
‘wog’ and ‘Arab’ followed by an expletive.   
A popular phrase used to nominate the target of the racism as a foreigner was, 
“Go back to where you came from.” The majority of participants described at 
least one incident that they experienced involving this phrase, or a variation of 
it such as “Go back to Baghdad,” “Go back to Lebanon,” or “Get back on your 
camel.” When relaying these stories, Australian-born participants often 
expressed amusement at the fact that they were not seen as legitimately 
Australian because of their religious identity. It is not clear whether in such 
situations - which often took place in a fleeting moment as a car drove past or a 
person rode past them on the escalator – the perpetrator thought the target was 
white or not, though it is likely that both scenarios are possible given the 
nature of other exchanges described within this section. Importantly, the 
majority of the slurs locate the targets as being Middle Eastern, or in some 
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rarer situations South Asian, highlighting that in Australia, Islam is most often 
racialised as Arab or Middle Eastern. 
The findings in this section highlight that direct interpersonal Islamophobic 
abuse and harassment in Australia is often operationalised through the 
racialisation of Muslims and Islam, through the use of racist and xenophobic 
slurs that mark the target as being ‘non-white’. In these attacks, markers of a 
Muslim religious identity such as the ḥijāb and kufi are imbued with racial 
meaning that serve to essentialise and stigmatise the wearers of these markers. 
As I demonstrated through my review of academic scholarship about 
Islamophobia in section 2.3, it has been suggested that Islamophobia is a form 
of cultural racism that is enacted through references to cultural practices and 
markers, such as clothing. I argue that cultural racism operates through the 
racialisation of such practices and markers, which is highlighted by the 
experiences of white converts to Islam who are subject to racial slurs that 
designate them as being non-white due to their clothing. My interviews with 
white Muslim converts suggests that in Australia, Islamophobia is 
operationalised through the racialisation of Muslims and Islam. 
5.2.3 Race treason 
Though only very rarely mentioned in the interview data, race treason 
nonetheless emerged as a concept that was used by some non-Muslims in 
relation to white Muslim converts.  The label of the ‘race traitor’ is often used 
pejoratively to describe a person who acts against or betrays his or her own 
perceived race. In modern day usage, a cursory glance at articles, books and 
websites that contain the term indicates that there are two main groups who use 
‘race traitor’ as part of their ordinary discourse – white nationalists, such as 
those who frequent websites like Stormfront.com, and white critical race 
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theorists like Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey (1996), who call for the abolition of 
the white race and all races as a social construct. While the former group uses 
the term to refer to other white people who they believe act to the detriment of 
the white race, the latter use the term race traitor to describe themselves. White 
nationalists look to uphold the boundaries of race, and enforce it through strict 
racial segregation; race traitors thus include people who are in inter-racial 
relationships, have mixed children or promote multiculturalism or the interests 
of non-white groups through social policy, political means, and so on. In 
contrast, white abolitionists call for the eradication of the concept of race 
altogether, claiming that “treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity” 
(racetraitor.org, 2015). In the context of the experiences recounted by 
participants, it is unlikely that people who apply the term ‘race traitor’ to white 
Muslim converts are implying that the target is a white abolitionist. It is far 
more feasible that in such situations, they are using race traitor to denote the 
original meaning of the term - a derogatory name for someone who has 
committed treason against the white race. White Muslims are perceived to have 
betrayed other white people by converting to a religion that has been racialised 
as non-white. 
Curiously little has been written about the concept of race treason as used by 
white nationalists, and even less literature has examined the notion with 
regards to white converts to non-Christian religions. Two exceptions to this rule 
can be found in the works of historians Margaret Denike and Martha Ertman, 
both writing on Mormonism in America in the 19th and 20th centuries – a 
religion which adherents consider to be a part of Christianity, but is rejected by 
other Christians. Denike (2010) and Ertman (2010) argue that the polygamous 
practices of Mormons in America were vilified not just because they were an 
alternate form of cohabitation and marriage to the heterosexual and 
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monogamous cultural norms in America, but specifically because polygamy 
was a racialised practice that was associated with Muslims and non-white 
cultures. Polygamy was viewed as a primitive and savage tradition, common 
for people of colour but unnatural for white people. In some cases, Mormons’ 
polygamous practices saw them cast as being non-white themselves. Drawing 
attention to the numerous mediums engaged during the anti-polygamous 
movement, Ertman claims that “Again and again, commentators from high 
culture (media and legal experts mainly) and popular culture (cartoonists and 
authors of magazine articles) portray Mormons as barbaric, lascivious, despotic, 
disorderly, foreign, Black, Asian, and/or childish” (Ertman 2010, p. 308). 
Importantly, as Denike and Ertman both illustrate, polygamy as a religious act 
was also alternatingly constituted as a form of race treason. In other words, in 
addition to the representations of Mormons as Black and Asian in both high 
and popular culture (Ertman 2010), Mormons were still sometimes portrayed as 
white, but as white race traitors. 
Denike’s and Ertman’s research has implications for this thesis for two reasons. 
Firstly, it indicates that historically, non-normative and racialised religious 
practices have been viewed as race treason in some contexts. But secondly, and 
even more significantly, polygamy is specifically racialised as non-white 
because of its connection with Islam. As Denike notes, anti-polygamous 
discourses which cast Mormons as race traitors were rooted in Orientalism and 
Islamophobia, as polygamy was represented as a barbaric Islamic practice, far 
removed from the sexual morality of Christianity (2010, p. 863). She draws on a 
number of historical sources to make her argument, including an excerpt from 
the first Supreme Court decision to rule in favour of upholding anti-bigamy 
laws, which stated that “‘[p]olygamy has always been odious among the 
northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the 
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Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of 
African people” (Denike 2010, p. 855). In her article, Denike paints a compelling 
image of the way in which xenophobia and racism intertwine with 
Islamophobia in the anti-polygamy movement in America: 
From the moment that the exclusively white members of the Church came to 
the defense of polygamy, it was incessantly analogized to ‘‘Mohamedism’’ (as a 
form of false prophecy that has led entire races astray), as it was to the sexual 
excesses of Middle Eastern ‘‘harems.’’ The emergent anti-Mormon stereotypes 
drew their critical force from a Christian sexual morality of monogamous 
restraint, which was made righteous by way of its difference from the sexual 
excesses of uncivilized and barbaric others, the evil of whom has been 
historically metaphorized through sexual transgression (Denike 2010, p. 863). 
 
 
Although Denike and Ertman focus on Mormons in America, the root of the 
sentiment that Mormons are race traitors lies in the conceptualisation of Islam 
as a highly racialised religion, a conceptualisation that is infused with 
Orientalist fantasies of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. It is perhaps 
appropriate then that their work should inform this section, which looks at 
three incidents where participants were called race traitors, emerging from the 
qualitative data. One exchange has already been discussed earlier in this 
section, in relation to Michelle who was called a traitor by a work colleague. 
Although the colleague did not call her a “race traitor” specifically, her 
accusations that Michelle was no longer white or Australian indicates that the 
perpetrator felt that Michelle had reneged on her allegiance to both her race and 
her country. In an interaction related by Jason in his interview, the charge was 
made more obscurely, and Jason was reluctant to relate it to race treason: 
My friend that took it the hardest was probably Pat. He’s not a bad bloke, but 
he’s very… sheltered is probably too kind a word. Living in the Shire, you 
know, he didn’t take my converting well. Probably the last time I saw him, I 
mean I saw him around but the last time he spoke to me, he’d had a bit to drink 
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and he called me a traitor, you know, Muslims are this and this and now you’re 
one of them, you’re a traitor. 
When I asked Jason if his friend Pat meant a traitor to the white race, he 
hesitated for a moment before answering: 
No, I don’t think he meant like… Nah, Pat wouldn’t… he talked a lot of this 
and that you know, but he wasn’t like that. Race traitor sounds a bit Nazi, like. 
Pat isn’t… I don’t think he’s like that. He was just pissed off. Maybe a traitor to 
the Shire is what he meant, because of the Cronulla Riots. 
Jason’s equivocation with regards to his friend’s behaviour is likely partly out 
of loyalty and partly due to the ambiguity of Pat’s statement, and Jason’s 
reluctance to draw more meaning from it than was intended. It is also possible 
that Pat may have meant to suggest that Jason was a traitor to the Australian 
nation, or even to Cronulla. Without speaking to Pat himself, we can only guess 
at his intended meaning. What is illuminating, however, is Jason’s response to 
Pat’s words, and his reaction to my suggestion that Pat may have meant that 
Jason was a race traitor. Jason’s dismissal of Pat’s words and hesitance to 
entertain my suggestion was representative of his more general unwillingness 
throughout the interview to talk about race or acknowledge racism. For 
example, despite evoking the Cronulla Riots in his interview himself, Jason did 
not acknowledge the racialised nature of the events that led to the riots and the 
riots themselves, instead framing them as an issue of territory and geography 
free of any racial connotations.  
The denial of racism as an operative factor in these and other situations is a 
persistent theme of Jason’s interview. Indeed, the denial of racism was a 
common theme in the interview data more generally, most often appearing 
when participants described the responses of their close friends and family 
members to their conversion. The pervasiveness of racism denial in the 
interviews is unsurprising given that the denial of racism is an element of 
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modern racism (Nelson 2013, van Dijk 1992) and even “one of the defining 
aspects of contemporary racism in settler societies like Australia” (Dunn & 
Nelson 2011, p. 589). The denial of racism on an individual level can emanate 
from the desire to protect oneself against a charge of racism, and this desire can 
arguably be extended to relatives and close friends as well, as is suggested by 
the interview data. However, as Nelson points out, the denial or downplaying 
of racism can also occur in members of groups who are often targeted by racism 
as a form of self-protection. It is thus possible that for some participants, their 
denial of anti-Muslim sentiments expressed by people close to them could not 
simply be an attempt to protect those friends and relatives from the charge of 
racism, but could also emanate from a need to protect themselves against the 
belief that the people around them hated or feared a central part of their 
identity. 
Potentially, the inclination to protect one’s ‘self’ or others from the charge of 
racism can extend even to a ‘place’, in situations where people feel very 
strongly connected to their local area. Nelson suggests that this phenomenon 
occurred around the Cronulla Riots in Sydney, stating that while some people 
may avoid associating themselves with a stigmatised area, others “associate so 
strongly with their local area that the distinction between self and place 
identities becomes blurred.” This blurring of self and place is arguably 
identifiable in Jason’s interview. For example, Jason’s denial that the Cronulla 
riots were informed by racism extended to his denial of racism in the area as a 
whole, as he states, “the Shire gets a bad rap, but people who live here, it’s 
usually people from outside of the Shire who say it’s racist, but we’re actually 
very open to multiculturalism down here.” Jason’s quotation provides us with 
an exemplar of what Nelson refers to as a process of “place-defending,” in 
which “attachments to place, or the desire to protect one’s local area from being 
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branded a racist space, can lead to the denial of racism or a reluctance to 
acknowledge racism within a particular place” (Nelson 2014, p. 68). Jason’s 
denial that racism exists in Cronulla or the Sutherland Shire is demonstrative of 
his broader avoidance of any discussion about race or racism during his 
interview.  
In contrast to Jason’s reticence to consider the connotations of the word ‘traitor,’ 
Riley indicated that the intended meaning of the term traitor to describe her 
was exceedingly clear. Like Michelle, she was wearing a ḥijāb at the time of the 
incident, which took place during a soccer match. During a refereeing 
disagreement, one of the other team’s players called her a race traitor under her 
breath. Riley explains that she used to play soccer with the perpetrator years 
earlier, before Riley moved suburbs and changed teams. Although they did not 
know each other well, seeing each other only occasionally at matches and 
training, Riley stated that the other player had expressed mild disapproval 
when she discovered that Riley had converted.  Despite this, Riley indicates that 
she had not expected the attitude at all: 
I was speechless, I didn’t know what to say. At first I thought I’d misheard her 
but you don’t mishear something like that. It’s not exactly a common thing to 
say right, ‘race traitor,’ what does that even mean?  
Whilst in Michelle’s narrative, the charge of race traitor is followed with an 
explicit statement that Michelle is no longer white, Jason and Riley did not 
describe otherwise racialising language during the exchange. Instead, the 
charge of race traitor implies that while they are still considered white, white 
Muslim converts are perceived to have switched allegiances, to have joined the 
‘other side’ – unlike non-white converts who were always there. The concept of 
‘race treason’ constructs race in the same way that the modern nation state is 
constructed: an entity that one can defend, pledge allegiance to, or wage war 
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against. Indeed, the articulation of race as a nation was central to 19th century 
ideas of race, and is at the heart of fascist and white nationalist ideology and 
political movements that seek to restrict national identity and even state 
citizenship to specific groups on the grounds of race (Conversi 2004, Leonard 
2009).  
As I outlined in Chapter Two, whiteness underpinned the formation and 
maintenance of the Australian nation state itself through the genocide and 
forced expulsion of Aboriginal peoples from their land. Later, after its 
federation in 1901, the idea of Australia as a white nation was maintained 
through policies such as the White Australia Policy, operationalised primarily 
through the Immigration Restriction Act as well as other laws and policies that 
had to conform to the ideals of the White Australia Policy (Ganley 2006, p. 13). 
It is clear from parliamentary records that the Immigration Restriction Act was 
formulated with the intention of creating a racially pure nation, in light of 
anxieties about Chinese and other non-white immigration. The perceived 
superiority of ‘the white race’ is virtually unchallenged in the debates that took 
place; for example, the then Prime Minister Edmund Barton stated in 
Parliament that: 
I do not think either that the doctrine of the equality of man was really ever 
intended to include racial equality. There is no racial equality. There is that 
basic inequality. These races are, in comparison with white races - I think no 
one wants convincing of this fact - unequal and inferior. The doctrine of the 
equality of man was never intended to apply to the equality of the Englishman 
and the Chinaman. There is a deep-set difference, and we see no prospect and 
no promise of its ever being effaced. Nothing in this world can put these two 
races upon an equality [sic]. Nothing we can do by cultivation, by refinement, 
or by anything else will make some races equal to others (Barton quoted in 
Cooper 2012). 
 
In his characterisation of the superiority of the white race, Barton, and indeed 
many members of Parliament, relied heavily on the work of historian Charles 
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Pearson, and his 1894 book “National Life and Character: A Forecast.” In it, 
Pearson argued that Australia was the last remaining nation in which ‘the 
higher races’ could flourish: 
The day will come, and perhaps is not far distant, when the European observer 
will look round to see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and 
yellow races... We shall wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and 
perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile, 
and thought of as bound always to minister to our needs... Is that not 
something to guard against? We are guarding the last part of the world in 
which the higher races can live and increase freely for the higher civilization 
(Pearson 1894, p. 16-17). 
 
Pearson uses the phrase “higher races” to refer to “Aryan races” rather than one 
“race,” which he distinguishes along the lines of nation. He highlights the 
significance of Christianity and cultural mores to maintaining white supremacy, 
stating: “We were struggling among ourselves for supremacy in a world which 
we thought of as destined to belong to the Aryan races and to the Christian 
faith; to the letters and arts and charms of social manners which we have 
inherited from the best times of the past” (1894, p. 89-90). Pearson’s work was 
highly influential in the development of the Immigration Restriction Act, 
driving already existing fears about the impact of non-white immigration on 
white Australia’s religious, cultural and social values. 
The impact of terra nullius and the White Australia Policy in naturalising 
whiteness as a central component of Australianness cannot be understated, and 
the legacy of Australia’s formative years as a nation state is perceptible in 
virtually all aspects of society today. Writing in the aftermath of the official 
abolition of the White Australia Policy in 1973, Peter Corris noted that racialism, 
articulated through the privileging of whiteness, found expression in Australian 
public life through “the constitutions of exclusive clubs, in political rhetoric 
from trade union minutes to ministerial speeches; in literature from bush 
ballads to novels; in the courts and the justice they dispense; in the press and in 
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sport” (1973, p. 750). Ransley and Marchetti have identified the “hidden 
whiteness of Australian law” as a procedural barrier for Indigenous people in 
the Australian courts, because of the cultural bias of Australian legal systems 
that privileges the ontological positioning of whiteness (2000, p. 139). More 
recently, Mary O’Dowd has pointed to the national mythology surrounding the 
‘Aussie bushman’ and the ANZAC soldier to assert that whiteness and 
maleness are both central to the notion of what it means to be Australian. 
Speaking about the image of the Australian bushman, she remarks: 
The national man in the narrative of Australian identity was a somewhat 
conceited image in terms of its portrayal of Australian manhood physically… 
and somewhat conceited in its image of Australian male psychology with 
relationships characterized by mateship, friendliness, larrikinism and 
egalitarianism as evidenced in the Australian literature of poetry and stories by 
men such as Lawson and Patterson (2009, p. 807). 
These same characteristics are also raised in Moreton-Robinson’s critique of 
former Prime Minister John Howard’s reification of Australian ‘diggers’ (2005). 
Moreton-Robinson states that during his leadership, Howard deployed the 
figure of the Australian soldier in nationalist rhetoric to implicitly associated 
‘Australianness’ with the “white heterosexual male” who “represents the core 
national values of mateship, egalitarianism and the fair go” (2005, p. 22). She 
goes on to argue that this framing of Australianness excludes a number of 
groups from the category of “Australian” while attempting to obscure the role 
of Australian soldiers in securing Australia as a white possession, stating: “Such 
an embodiment implicitly excludes non-white migrants and Indigenous people 
from holding such core values… The core values which were displayed by the 
diggers on the battle fields were never linked to their colonial origins and the 
part they played in claiming the nation as a white possession” (2005, p. 22). 
Thus, while whiteness is no longer explicitly stated in official discourse, its 
legacy is still apparent in Australian public and social institutions, media, arts 
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and cultural life, and remains central to Australian nation itself. We 
increasingly find that the discourse is shifting from simply situating Muslims as 
threats to the Australian culture to calling into question their loyalty to the 
Australian nation and their commitment to their Australian citizenship. Joshi 
suggests that Muslims and other non-Christian people in America who are 
mistaken for Muslim come to represent not just a culturally inferior group, but 
a “fifth column,” asserting that “brown-skinned, non-Christian Americans 
become more (or less) than just an other within the society; they become an 
other who is associated with a foreign enemy. They go from merely being a 
minority to being viewed as a potential ‘fifth column’ due to their presumed 
connection with and loyalty to this enemy” (Joshi 2006, p. 217).  
Indeed, as Akbarzadeh and Roose (2011) contend, the construction of Muslims 
living in the West as a ‘fifth column’ – a term for traitors or spies that first came 
into usage during the Second World War – has gained significant traction 
amongst extremist right wing authors. Akbarzadeh and Roose state that “In 
recent years, a great deal of literature has been published in Western nations 
that has sought to portray Western Muslims as a “fifth column”—that is, as an 
“enemy within,” collectively seeking to destabilize Western nations’ identity 
and values for the benefit of an international Islamic movement intent on the 
establishment of a caliphate” (2011, p. 310).  Fethi Mansouri’s article on the 
racialisation of Muslims in the West supports the conclusions of Joshi and 
Akbarzadeh and Roose, contending that since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, Muslim Australians “have had their personal 'integrity and loyalty as 
citizens' questioned (Mansouri 2010, p. 254). The analysis offered by the 
aforementioned scholars is startlingly similar to Ertman’s description of the 
castigation of Mormons as race traitors, where she surmises: “While Mormons' 
distinctive theology and social organization were politically unsettling in many 
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ways, the practice of polygamy justified the larger culture's demotion of 
Mormons from full citizenship on the grounds of racial inferiority” (2010, p. 
288). White converts to Islam are thus viewed as doubly suspicious – not only 
are they cast as potential traitors to their country, as Muslims, but where the 
Australian nation is also constructed as white and Christian, white converts are 
also viewed as traitors to whiteness. This is the case even if they have not 
engaged in any specific acts of treason against Australia – their conversion is 
evidence enough of that treason.  
 
5.3 Islam as Un-Australian 
In the previous section, I examined interview data that highlighted that Islam is 
constructed by some non-Muslims as a racialised identity that is perceived to be 
far removed from whiteness, through examples that evoked long-established 
racial categories. Here, I will build on my discussion of the centrality of 
whiteness to the Australian nation to explore how the same understanding of 
Islam is manifest in more indirect forms of racialisation that rely on the 
construction of Islam as culturally distinct and even deviant from 
Australianness. Integral to the characterisation of white Muslim converts as 
having ‘left’ whiteness through their conversion is the fear that converts are no 
longer able to be truly Australian, because of the perceived cultural distance 
between what it means to be Muslim and what it means to be Australian. My 
detailed review of the literature on the relationship between whiteness and 
national identity in Australia in Chapter Two (section 2.3) demonstrates that 
there is a continuing conflation between race and nation in what it means to be 
considered Australian. Indeed, as Aileen Moreton-Robinson points out, the 
discursive construction of Australia as a white possession has been an ongoing 
project of nation building in Australia since invasion. In this section, I assert 
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that the juxtaposition of Islam as oppositional to Australian culture and the 
Australian ‘way of life’ is reliant on two premises: firstly, that Muslim is a 
racialised identity, unlike whiteness which is normative, and secondly, the 
more cultural capital a person accrues from their whiteness, the larger their 
claim to being Australian. I draw on the extensive historical and sociological 
literature that maps the way the Australian nation is constructed around the 
identity of whiteness to argue that for white Muslim converts, their changed 
relationship with aspects of Australian culture does not just present a challenge 
for their Australianness, but also their whiteness. 
The interview data reveals a number of key elements of Australian culture 
which are evoked in these exchanges. The first of these to be examined in this 
section is religion, and in particular a Christian-coded secularism which allows 
for the public vocalisation or performance of certain faiths only in very 
particular circumstances. Religion is tolerated in Australia with the 
understanding that people of non-Christian faith are not to display their 
religion too much: in the Australian practice of secularism, religion is to be 
private and hidden, with the exception of Christianity which is accepted 
because of its association with whiteness and Australianness. Alcohol was also 
commonly raised as an Australian cultural element, with participants stating 
that they felt their decision not to drink was often highlighted by peers and 
colleagues in social situations. Clothing featured significantly in the qualitative 
data gathered from female converts, and is explored in detail in section 5.3.4 on 
the gendered nature of the racialisation that white converts experience. Many of 
these anxieties about Islam and its incompatibility with Australianness 
contribute to the constructions of whiteness that were explored in the previous 
section.  
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5.3.1. Islam as a departure from Christian-coded secularism 
Conversion to a religion necessarily requires a conversion out of another faith 
position, whether that is a religion, agnosticism or atheism. In the case of white 
Australians converting to Islam, it can also signal a conversion out of both 
whiteness and Australianness, where ‘Australianness’ is coded as white. As I 
indicated in Chapter Four, the majority of the participants in this study 
identified as being nominal or practising Christians prior to their conversion, 
and also described Australia’s religious identity as being secular and 
simultaneously Christian. In this section, I will draw on interview data to 
demonstrate the view that not only is the Australian nation constructed around 
whiteness, but also a modern secular order that operates as a manifestation of 
Christianity. The relationship between Australianness and Christianity is 
detailed in depth in section 2.4 through a comprehensive review of the 
literature that highlights that not only is the identity of ‘Australian’ dependent 
on whiteness and Christianity to sustain itself - but that whiteness and 
Christianity share a discursive link beyond their association with the white 
nation. In this section, I extend my previous argument by positing that the 
religious identity of Australia is not wholly Christian, but that the concept of 
‘Australian’ relies on a secularism which is founded by and upon Christianity, 
and tries to mask the importance of Christianity in public life while 
simultaneously amplifying it. In other words, while I agree with the arguments 
made by the Australian scholars whose work I detailed in section 2.4, who 
contend that the Australian nation is underpinned by a Christian religious 
identity, I argue that the racialisation of Muslims in Australia relies upon the 
construction of Islam as antithetical to secularism just as much as it is 
oppositional to Christianity.  
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To demonstrate this argument, I rely on the work of sociologists Gil Anidjar, 
Graeme Smith, Holly Randell-Moon and Talal Asad. Anidjar and Smith 
contend that the modern secular order in Western countries can best be 
understood as the latest public manifestation of Christianity, rather than a 
repudiation of Christianity. According to Smith, secularity is simply “Christian 
ethics shorn of its doctrine (2007, p. 2).” Through his historical analysis of 
Western secularism, Smith demonstrates how secularism and Christianity can 
and do operate simultaneously in the cultural space of the West, stating, “It 
would not be possible to describe Western society as only secular without 
ignoring the significant religious indicators picked up regularly in surveys. Nor, 
however, can we describe the West as Christian – the picture is far more 
complex than that.” Smith contends that the secularisation of Western societies 
that accompanied the Enlightenment inhibited the discussion of Christian 
doctrine in the public sphere, but that Christian ethics and ‘values’ remained 
central to the workings of public life in Western modernity. The findings that I 
analyse in this chapter speak to the “complexity” that Smith identifies. 
Anidjar has provided a more detailed and thorough theoretical discussion of 
how Christianity and secularism are mutually operative in the West in his 
article ‘Secularism,’ where he proclaims:  
I propose to take for granted that the religious and the secular are terms that, 
hopelessly codependent, continue to inform each other and have persisted 
historically, institutionally in masking (to invoke Asad’s term) the one pertinent 
religion, the one and diverse Christianity and Western Christendom… Like that 
unmarked race, which, in the related discourse of racism, became invisible or 
white, Christianity invented the distinction between religious and secular and 
thus made religion” (2006, p. 62). 
Anidjar goes on to argue that Christianity rebranded – or in Anidjar’s word, 
“reincarnated” itself as secularism, and that it is not so much that secularism 
masks Christianity, but that they are in and of themselves the same thing. In 
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the face of increasing criticism about Christianity and the possibility of losing 
its institutional power, Anidjar contends, Christianity recreated itself as 
secularism in order to retain its power, stating that “secularism is a name 
Christianity gave itself when it invented religion, when it named its other or 
others as religions. And the question now remaining is whether there was a 
specific religion that was particularly targeted with this name” (2006, p. 62). 
Anidjar makes clear in his article that a specific religion has been targeted with 
the name of religion in the creation of secularism in the West, and that religion 
is Islam. While Islam is a ‘religion’ and ‘non-white’ and ‘foreign’, Christianity 
is ‘secularism,’ ‘white’ and ‘Western’ in the way it functions as a normative 
and invisible part of Western nation states. He adds that “secularism and 
secular criticism are unified practices that continue to function in the way 
Christianity has for centuries… Secularism is part of a discourse of power and 
of institutions that are bent on making us invest religion, making us cathect it” 
(2006, p. 62). In the secular nation, religion and the state are kept separate, and 
religion in this case does not include Christianity, having been absorbed into 
secularism. If we agree with Anidjar’s proposition, secularism does not simply 
mask the Christian history and values of a nation, but it is Christianity, 
reincarnated.  
Like Smith, Anidjar applies his theory to the entirety of the Western world, but 
it is useful to consider how his theory may apply to Australia specifically. Is it 
possible for a state to be both Christian and secular at the same time, and if so, 
what does it look like in practice? In my review of the literature in section 2.4, I 
drew attention to the work of several Australian scholars who have 
persuasively argued that Australian nationhood has been driven by 
Christianity, with reference to political discourse historically and in recent 
years. Commentators have also pointed to other indicators that Australia is not 
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a strictly secular state, such as the inclusion of the Lord’s Prayer in Parliament, 
tax breaks for religious institutions, public holidays based on Christian 
celebrations, and Christian references in statutory oaths and pledges (Chavura 
and Tregenza 2015). It is clear that in Australia, references to Christian doctrine 
do still exist in public discourse, acting contrarily to Smith’s suggestion that 
Christian doctrine has been banished from the public sphere in the West. Holly 
Randell-Moon has pointed out that this is possible because Australian 
constitutional law allows for the state to be neutral towards religious matters, 
rather than strictly divorced from them. She states that according to the 
wording of section 116 of the Constitution, “As long as there is no state 
established religion, the overt presence of religion in parliamentary 
arrangements, such as the Lord’s Prayer, is permitted constitutionally” (2013, p. 
353). In other words, as long as the government does not establish Christianity 
as a state-religion which all of its citizens must adhere to, references to 
Christianity or state-funded support for religious institutions such as religious 
schools and organisations are allowed by the constitution. 
Randell-Moon contends that rather than Australia being an exception to the 
‘rule’ of secularism, the very nature of the relationship between secularism and 
the state, which can exist only due to state sovereignty, means that it is 
impossible for a nation state to be completely secular (2013). To demonstrate 
her point, Randell-Moon draws on the work of prominent sociologist of religion 
Talal Asad, who in his chapter “Trying to Explain French Secularism” suggests 
that secularism is not about the strict separation of religion and state, but the 
sovereignty of a state which allows it to decide when and under which 
circumstances they should make exceptions to their general rule of 
neutrality/secularity. Asad uses the example of France and its ban of Muslim 
headscarves to argue that “it is not the commitment to or interdiction of a 
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particular religion that is most significant in this principle but the installation of 
a single absolute power - the sovereign state - drawn from a single abstract 
source and facing a single political task: the worldly care of its population 
regardless of its beliefs” (2006, p. 6). The same sovereignty that allows the 
French government to provide chaplains in the army, schools, and hospitals at 
the expense of the state also allows the French government to legislate against 
the wearing of ḥijābs in public schools. If secularism was truly about the 
separation of the state and religion, he remarks, secularism would look more or 
less the same around the world; the reason it does not is because of state 
sovereignty, as each nation state makes its own decisions about what religious 
exceptions they will allow for. 
Randell-Moon applies the insights derived from Asad’s discussion of French 
secularism to Australia, and extends his argument to assert that the ‘secular 
contract’ formed between Australian secularism and sovereignty is one that is 
inherently racialised, because Australian sovereignty itself is racialised (2013, p. 
360). Utilising Moreton-Robinson’s concept of the “possessive logic of 
patriarchal white sovereignty” (Moreton-Robinson 2004, para 7, as cited in 
Randell-Moon, p. 360), she contends that Australian sovereignty “is not just 
concerned with fostering a neutral and universal law, but also involves the 
exclusion of Indigenous sovereignty as a competing authority, so that 
Australian law is neither neutral nor universal” (2013, p. 360). Thus, any 
exceptions to the rule of secularism that the Australian state makes are 
specifically a demonstration of white sovereignty, rendering Australian 
secularism – and its exceptions to its own secularism – racially inflected as 
white. Using examples of Australian legislation and High Court rulings, she 
demonstrates that not only is the Australian state neither racially nor religiously 
neutral, but that if “the religious neutrality of the Australian state is 
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compromised by the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty, then the 
operation of this sovereignty affects which religions can be accommodated by 
the state” (2013, p. 361). The effect of this, as Randell-Moon has argued in a 
previous article, is that “Religious values that privilege specific forms of 
whiteness can be rendered invisible through the assumption of secularity” 
(2006, p. 4). In Australia, the religious values Randell-Moon refers to are 
Christian, which is apparent in the examples I provided earlier in this section 
such as Australian public holidays and the Lord’s Prayer in Parliament. 
Randell-Moon’s assessment allows us to conceptualise how Anidjar’s theory - 
that Christianity and secularism function in tandem – operates in an Australian 
context, enacted through the nation’s white sovereignty. She demonstrates that 
the ‘secular contract’ that is produced through the relationship between 
secularism and Australian sovereignty is racialised as white, and the religious 
exceptions authorised by the Australian state reflects the whiteness of the 
secular contract, visible in the fact that the majority of religious exceptions in 
the public sphere are granted to Christianity. In this way, Christianity maintains 
a powerful place in Australian society, but in a way that masks its doctrinal 
aspects. 
The work of Anidjar, Smith, Randell-Moon and Asad helps us to understand 
how Australian nationhood can be constructed as both secular and Christian at 
the same time, which is an important premise to understanding the experiences 
of participants in this research project. While a number of participants stated 
that it was their exit from Christianity that worried their family and close 
friends, for the majority of participants who came from nominally Christian or 
agnostic/atheist backgrounds, it was Islam’s perceived incompatibility with 
secularism that caused the greatest concern. Significantly, when asked what 
they thought Australia’s religious identity was, almost all of the participants 
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stated that it was secular, and the vast majority of those participants added that 
Australia had “Christian roots,” “Christian culture” or a “Christian core.” It is 
clear from the interview data that Christianity and secularism were both 
considered by participants to be important elements of what it meant to be 
‘Australian,’ in this context code for white. Additionally, as I will argue in this 
section, Islam was viewed as problematic by some people not just because it 
was not Christian but because Islam was not as ‘secular’ as Christianity was 
perceived to be; Islam is too ‘visible,’ ‘rigid’ and ‘dogmatic’ in comparison with 
the perception of Christianity in Australia. 
Most often, anxieties about participants’ deviation from Christianity came from 
parents and other close relatives of the converts. While sometimes these 
anxieties were theologically grounded – in the words of Omar, his parents were 
“concerned for the welfare of [his] soul” – at other times, they were based on a 
fear of what it would mean for the participant’s cultural engagement with 
Christianity. A small number of participants stated that their family’s reaction 
to their conversion was primarily out of concern for the fact that they had 
converted to a religion that was different to the one that they had been raised 
in. In these cases, their families – usually at least one parent - were significantly 
religious themselves, and that their childhoods had had a strong religious 
presence and Christian education. Conversion to Islam, then, was regarded in 
the same way that a conversion to any religion outside of Christianity would 
have been, at least insofar as participants narrated. Saffiah stated that her 
parents were initially upset by her conversion chiefly because she had left the 
religion that they had raised her in, Catholicism. She opined in words similar to 
Daniel’s that their reaction stemmed from the fact that they were particularly 
religious themselves: “They didn’t have anything against Islam at the time… 
they were worried about my soul.” 
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Both Daniel and Saffiah locate their parent’s concerns with their spiritual health 
and afterlife, rather than a specific anxiety about Islam. When asked whether 
she thought her parents would have a similar reaction had she converted to 
another religion such as Judaism or Buddhism, Saffiah is adamant that their 
response would have been the same. She attributes this partly to the time of her 
conversion, which took place in the late 1990s, observing that in those days her 
parents knew little of Islam and had neither positive nor negative impressions 
of it. Little in Daniel’s nor Saffiah’s interviews indicated otherwise. On the other 
hand, Xander’s interview indicated that there were multiple factors that 
contributed to his parents’ fears, though he himself accredits it solely to their 
faith position. 
No, because my parents, they were practising Roman Catholics. They were 
strict. More or less. There were some parts of the doctrine that they… ignored. 
But when I say they were strict, I mean they really, truly thought that if I 
stopped being Catholic, I’d go to hell. 
In the excerpt above, Xander centres his parents’ response on the doctrinal 
teachings of Catholicism, asserting that they would have been just as upset had 
he converted to a different denomination of Christianity. However, he later 
adds that they expressed anxiety about what his conversion would mean for his 
lifestyle and their relationship, giving examples like “drinking beer at the 
footy” and Christmas celebrations. Through these statements, Xander reveals 
that despite his earlier characterisation, his parents’ doubts about his 
conversion were also about a change in his cultural practice, which they feared 
would have an impact on their relationship. 
Another cause for reservation offered by converts was that the participant had 
actively taken on a faith at all, rather than because that faith was one that was 
different to that of the parents.  Stephanie recalls: 
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Mum and dad were completely blindsided. They’re both atheists and they’d 
raised me within an atheist belief system, and they just couldn’t understand 
why I’d rejected that. They’re not together, they split up ages ago. But they had 
almost the exact same reaction. I always found that funny. They eventually 
came around but it was a big shock for them, yeah. I don’t think it mattered that 
I’d become Muslim specifically… I mean I don’t know. But I think that if I had 
become a rigorous Christian they would have been just as upset. 
Stephanie remarks that her family’s adverse reaction to her conversion was due 
to their “patronising” attitude “towards all religions, even Christianity.” 
Although she states that her parents were “equal opportunity skeptics,” and 
maintains this narrative throughout the entire interview, she also acknowledges 
that there were certain elements of Islamic practice that her parents viewed as 
being culturally inferior. Despite this recognition, she insists that they 
approached all religions and spiritual orientations with the same critical eye, 
but states that Islam was simply the most explicitly “different” from the culture 
that they knew and lived.  
There are clear contradictions in Stephanie’s account of her parents’ attitudes 
toward Islam. The conflicting messages in her interview and Stephanie’s 
insistence that her parents are not prejudiced against Islam specifically are 
likely due to her desire to avoid portraying her parents as prejudiced against 
Islam. The denial of racism apparent in Stephanie’s interview mirrors similar 
denials in other participants’ stories, such as Jason’s experiences which were 
examined in subsection 5.3.1. Stephanie is careful to frame her parents’ 
opposition solely as a contention with Islam as a faith position, however her 
interview reveals that her parents had specific misgivings about Islam that were 
rooted in cultural anxieties rather than a disagreement with Islamic theology 
One of the misgivings is apparent in the above quotation from Stephanie, where 
she states that her parents would have been “just as upset” if she had become a 
“rigorous Christian.” “Rigorous Christian” is juxtaposed against “secular or 
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nominal Christian” in Stephanie’s narrative, which she views would be more 
acceptable to her parents. Her parents’ problem with rigorous Christianity and 
with Islam is that they view both as being too strict, and in the case of Islam, too 
visible. This is highlighted in Stephanie’s interview in a number of occasions, 
such as when she describes an incident in which her mother expressed 
disapproval at Stephanie’s refusal to have a sip of champagne to celebrate her 
brother’s wedding: 
She made such a big deal about it, I don’t even know why. My brother didn’t 
care, couldn’t care less, but she made it out like… I don’t even know. ‘Why do 
you have to be so serious, just have some fun, loosen up, relax’… they say, if 
I’m going to be religious why can’t I just be religious inside, why do I have to 
make it so hard on everyone else, everyone else has to be so careful. 
By reflecting on the above exchange, it becomes apparent that it is not 
Stephanie’s internal belief about Islam that her mother finds problematic, but 
the fact that she is not participating in the Australian ritual of drinking alcohol 
because her religion prohibits it. Not only is Stephanie’s refusal a refusal to 
participate in Australian culture through alcohol – a theme which will be 
examined further in section 5.3.3 – but she also fails to be a good secular citizen 
by refusing to hide her religion. 
The notion of Islam as being rigorous, rigid or otherwise onerous is central to 
its framing as being oppositional to a ‘laidback’ and relaxed Australian culture 
that places far less emphasis on rules and structure associated with dogmatic 
religion. Thus, Muslims commit two transgressions – firstly, for not being 
Christian, and secondly, for not being secular. Most often, this is demonstrated 
in the imagining of Islam as a rigid and visible religion – not simply visible by 
way of ‘foreign’ clothing, but also because of the importance it places on 
physical practices rather than only on inward belief. Belinda states that she 
takes her ḥijāb off when she goes to visit her parents because they find it 
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confronting, though for different reasons. Responses to ḥijāb will be discussed 
in greater depth in section 5.3.4 where I discuss the gendered component of 
racialisation, but it is pertinent to raise Belinda’s experiences here as well 
because of the very visible and recognisable nature of the ḥijāb which 
immediately indicates to onlookers that the wearer is Muslim. With regards to 
her mother’s disapproval of the ḥijāb, Belinda puts this down to the fact that 
ḥijāb is a signifier of the difference between her and her parents religiously but 
also culturally: “It’s just the fact that Islam is so different. She doesn’t like that 
you have to wear ḥijāb. It’s so visual. She thinks spirituality should be in your 
heart.” Belinda’s wearing of ḥijāb, a visible indicator of her religion, symbolises 
to her mother that she does not subscribe to the religious dimensions of 
whiteness, which is embedded in Christian and secular discourses that 
promote the concealment of religious identity.  
As well as Islam being a visible religion in a secular climate, participants 
commonly cited that their family’s negative response to their conversion was 
due to the fact that they believed Islam was too “rigid” and had “too many 
rules.” James recounted that his parents had been fine with his conversion until 
they realised that it was not a matter of belief for him, and that his lifestyle was 
going to change as well. One of the first incidents where this became apparent 
to both them was when he declined a roast chicken at a family lunch because it 
was not ḥalāl. 
Normally they’d have like a ham and they didn’t this time because they knew I 
couldn’t eat it but they hadn’t realised, cos they didn’t know about the whole 
ḥalāl meat thing, they just knew pork, ham, bacon, off the table. And so they 
were really upset about that, well my dad mostly, he cracked it because my 
mum had cooked it and he thought I was disrespecting her efforts. So every 
now and then he’ll have a grumble about how strict Islam is and how I’m such 
a fundamentalist and why can’t I be like the Muslims he works with who have 
a beer every now and then. That made it hard too, they see other Muslims 
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doing ḥarām things or whatever, and then they’d come home and berate me, 
why can’t I be moderate? Why do I have to make religion so hard?  
 
James suggests that Islam in particular was a challenge for his parents to accept 
because they saw Islam as being an especially rigid and “harsh” religion. These 
characteristics are often ascribed to Islam in Orientalist representations of Islam 
as “fanatical, intolerant, militant, fundamentalist, misogynist and alien” (Said 
1981). The Western stereotype of Islamic fanaticism has included portrayals of 
Muslims as mindless or dogmatic followers of faith” (Dunn 2001, p. 294).  
Important to this characterisation is the fact that James’s approach to his 
religion is criticised and compared to the approach of ‘moderate’ Muslims, in 
this case referring to Muslims who are more flexible in their interpretation and 
practice of the religion – in other words, who are perceived to have sufficiently 
assimilated into secular Australia. Belinda also brought up the issue of ‘rigidity’ 
in relation to her own family, including her siblings. 
When it’s your family, if we don’t participate in it [Christmas], then it just sends 
the wrong messages about Islam. How are they ever going to convert, like they 
already think it’s so strict, it’s so rigid. My sister believes that Islam is the one 
true religion, in her own words. But there’s so many things you have to do, 
praying, all this stuff, not drinking alcohol, she just sees it as so onerous. So if 
I’m going to be so rigid with them, then – it’s a constant battle, and I think that 
for a revert, it’s a constant jihād. 
For Belinda, this perceived rigidity was one of the key things that stood as a 
barrier between her mother and her acceptance of her choice in religion.  When 
asked what specifically her family took issue with, Belinda replied: 
Praying 5 times a day. Mum thinks it’s just too rigid. She’s like, ‘You can talk to 
them any time, why do you have these rigid – like you have to pray at this time, 
God doesn’t want you to be so rigid.’ Fasting, she thinks it’s bad for you. These 
are all things that I used to think too. Not eating pig – like why? ‘You’ve been 
eating pig your whole life, there’s nothing wrong with you, why are you 
suddenly not eating pig.’ Just all of it. It’s too rigid. You should be able to do 
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whatever you want, as long as you love people, as long as you treat people with 
respect, all of these rigid rules are ridiculous, that’s what she thinks. 
Here, rigidity speaks to three main concerns. The first is the fear that strict 
adherence to a religion that is seen to be so far removed from Australian culture 
necessarily entails distancing themselves from their families, who embody the 
Australian identity through their whiteness and secularism. This is evident in 
Belinda’s earlier statement that her mother viewed Belinda’s conversion to 
Islam and her choice to wear ḥijāb as a rejection of her mother and the way she 
had chosen to raise her. Secondly, the rigidity and ‘onerous’ nature of Islam is 
juxtaposed against what James describes as “laidback Aussie” culture, 
demonstrated in this example by the secular Muslims who choose to drink 
alcohol and are applauded for their assimilation into secularism and for making 
life easier for non-Muslims by not flaunting their religion.  
Finally, anxiety about Islam’s rigidity reflects a fear that adherents to Islam who 
are strict in their practice are more likely to become radicalised and violent 
extremists, and that they will manifest contempt for Australia and Australian 
culture into an act of violence against the Australian nation. This anxiety will be 
examined in the following section, which explores how the representation of 
Muslims as being culturally distant from whiteness posits them as also being 
security threats to the nation, as their allegiance to the nation is not a 
guaranteed extension of their whiteness given that Muslims are racialised. 
White converts to Islam, having in the eyes of some “left” their whiteness, thus 
also constitute a threat to the Australian nation – in some cases, an even bigger 
one than non-white Muslims. 
In this section, I have argued that participants’ experiences highlight that white 
people’s conversion to Islam is seen as transgressive not solely because it is a 
departure from Christianity, but also because Islam is perceived to be 
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antithetical to secularism. Through an analysis of the work of prominent 
sociologists of religion Anidjar, Smith, Randell-Moon and Asad, I demonstrated 
that it is possible for both contentions with Islam to operate simultaneously, as 
in an Australian context, Christianity works in tandem with secularism, and 
perhaps can even be construed as being manifested in secularism, as contended 
by Anidjar. Importantly, both secularism and Christianity are racially coded as 
white, due to the very nature of Australian nationalism, which exists through 
the denial and negation of Indigenous sovereignty. In this context, the (white) 
Australianness of white converts to Islam comes under question, and becomes a 
source of consternation for non-Muslim family members and friends.  In section 
5.3.2, I add to the argument I made in the previous paragraph to show how 
through the construction of Islam as oppositional to secularism, Islam is 
perceived to be a threat to Australia itself. 
5.3.2 Islam as a threat to the Australian nation 
In the last section, I drew on qualitative interview data to demonstrate that 
some participants’ non-Muslim relatives viewed Islam to be a rigid religion, 
contrasted to the Christian-coded secularism that underpins the Australian 
nation. In this section, I assert that this perceived rigidity adds to pre-existing 
anxieties that non-Muslims may have about the likelihood of Muslims – in this 
case of course, white converts specifically – to present a threat to the nation 
state. In part, this fear emerges from anxieties about Islam which posit it as a 
particularly violent, militant and fundamentalist religion, and I examine this 
idea later on in this section. As well, however, it is important to consider the 
anxieties that people within Western secular democracies may have about the 
potential threat that religious minorities pose to the nation state more generally. 
If we take Talal Asad’s genealogy of the secular as a starting point, we begin to 
understand that despite secularism’s attempts to characterise itself as a neutral 
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and normative structure, in much the same way that whiteness does, secularism 
in fact works to subsume differences of culture, ethnicity and faith within a 
nation state in order to procure the loyalty of all citizens to the state. Asad 
points out that nationalism can only be understood through the secular; that it 
“requires the concept of the secular in order to make sense” (2003, p. 193). Or, as 
explained in the words of Sherene Razack summarising Asad, “secularism is 
one way in which the modern state secures its own power and actively 
produces the citizen whose loyalty is first and foremost to the state” (Razack 
2007, p. 7). Muslims who flaunt secular norms by advertising a staunch 
commitment to their religion, demonstrate that their loyalty is not to the secular 
state, rendering them as subjects who should be viewed with suspicion as 
potential threats to the nation. In other words, the further removed Muslims are 
from secularism in their practice of their religion, the more likely they are to be 
perceived as radicalised and potential terrorists.   
Elaine Laforteza’s chapter on the relationship between whiteness and 
secularism with respect to Muslims in Australia and the Philippines supports 
this assertion, and she contends that “within normative secular 
governmentality, Islam is perceived as a religion that threatens national 
security” (2015, p. 79). Laforteza adds that the threat to the nation is also a 
threat to whiteness, stating that “While Muslim presence is relatively effaced 
from dominant portrayals of Australian history, Islam is hyper-visibilised as a 
contemporary threat that seeks to impinge on whiteness” (2015, p. 91).  In other 
words, as well as Islam posing a threat to the secular nation, it also poses a 
(highly racialised) threat to the white nation. In their article titled ‘Race, 
Surveillance and Empire,’ media theorists Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar 
explain that in the United States, threats to the nation’s security are almost 
always cast via racialized groups;  “the Brown terrorist, the Black and Brown 
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drug dealer and user, and the immigrant who threatens to steal jobs” 
(Kundnani and Kumar 2015, para 8).  To support their argument, Kundnani and 
Kumar give a detailed overview of the history of state surveillance in the 
United States, from settler-colonial times to the current era, and demonstrate 
how the collection of information through that surveillance was often informed 
by racial oppression. Kundnani and Kumar go on to conclude that “’security’ 
has become one of the primary means through which racism is ideologically 
reproduced in the ‘post-racial,’ neoliberal era” (2015, para 8); it is ‘politically 
correct’ to express concerns about your nation’s security, as long as you don’t 
talk explicitly about race. 
In this context, ‘newly racialised’ white Muslims are potentially even more 
dangerous than non-white Muslims – as traitors to their race (see section 5.2.3) 
they are even more susceptible to treason against their nation, as well. For 
converts, this fear is heightened, as they are perceived to undergo a period of 
‘fanaticism’ that some participants referred to experiencing early on in their 
Muslim lives, sometimes referred to as “convertitis” within the Muslim 
community (Roald 2004, p. 282). Roald (2004, p. 283) suggests that such a phase 
is a universal one amongst converts, and that it represents a desire for 
absolutism and clear guidelines. As discussed in the introduction (Chapter 
One), white converts are overrepresented in this characterisation. White 
converts' quest for absolutism is considered more intimidating than that of 
Muslims from non-white backgrounds precisely because their newly adopted 
Muslim identity is viewed as incongruous with the Western values that they 
were raised with. Conversion and the perceived rigidity of their practice 
afterwards are seen as an outright rejection of a ‘laid back’ white secular 
Australian identity, culture, and way of life, as addressed by the second concern 
about rigidity discussed at the end of the section 5.3.2. This is then further 
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extrapolated to conclude that white Muslim converts are more liable to attack 
Australians because they no longer feel a sense of connection to Australia and 
the Australian people, or even their family.  This perception of white converts 
and Muslims more generally reflect Ash's description of the two dominant 
prisms through which the West views Muslims: “the terrorism paradigm and 
the backwardness paradigm” (Ash 2006, p. 13).  
Responses from family members that reflected a concern about the potential of 
participants to become radicalised were usually expressed through their 
descriptions of converts’ practices as “extreme” or “rigid.”  Less common were 
explicit associations between Islam and terrorism or conflicts overseas, 
although these were sometimes raised in indirect ways. Participants were 
reluctant to name these incidents outright, perhaps out of a desire to avoid 
painting their family as Islamophobic or ignorant. For example, when asked 
about whether he had any concerns about his family’s reaction, Paul answered: 
Yeah, probably just because – knowing how little exposure my family and 
really my whole community and friends had to Islam and Muslims. And this 
was around the time of September 11. Any view they did have would be 
negative.  And that did come out later as I – the things that happened in their 
lives were little flags they started to associate negatively. They had formed 
those negative opinions. 
 
While Paul’s discussion of his family’s negative perceptions of Islam is rather 
vague, Belinda openly admitted that her father thought that Muslims were 
terrorists and that his view had been developed predominantly due to media 
representations of Islam. Although she discussed her mother’s views on her 
conversion in length, Belinda mentioned her father’s attitude only once, saying: 
“I don’t think it’s the negativity on the media, for mum. For dad, yeah. Dad still 
thinks we’re all terrorists. He’s – I’ve got a long way to go with Dad.” However, 
neither Paul nor Belinda stated that they felt the image of the ‘Muslim terrorist’ 
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was projected onto them by their parents. Instead, their parents’ reactions 
reflected a general association of Muslim with terrorist as a result of Australian 
media and politicians reinforcing the idea that Muslims are “the current 
enemy” since the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks (Kabir 2007, p. 1286).  
In the interview data collected in this project, comments about Muslims being 
terrorists were more likely to come from friends, colleagues and co-workers 
rather than family members. Max describes being bombarded with abusive 
messages from people who used to be his friends after his conversion, adding 
that those friends had demonstrated their Islamophobia even prior to his 
conversion. He recollects one incident that occurred in the car when he and his 
friends were driving back from a barbeque: 
We were driving back home and this was after I’d read Malcolm X’s book and I 
wanted to become a Muslim then. We drove past the Canberra Islamic Centre. 
And some people who were in the car with me, I was the only one who wasn’t 
drinking alcohol, they started going off about how there was terrorists in there 
and this and this. I just remember thinking, oh, jeez. If I convert you know... 
these are people who I’m really close with and you just drive past a mosque 
and they’re saying this. Looking back on it now that was probably the first time 
where I was like oh jeez, if people find out that I’m interested in Islam, this 
could get pretty difficult. 
In this excerpt, Max expresses fears that he had about how his friends would 
react after they found out that he was considering converting, a fear which was 
realised soon after he said his shahādah: 
Pretty much all my friends that I’d grown up with for years, they – I wouldn’t 
say they turned on me but I got lots of messages and stuff saying I was a 
terrorist. At the time it really caught me off guard a bit. I remember for about 
two or three days I was just getting messages from this one guy and he was just 
going on and on and on about me being a terrorist, to the point where he got a 
permanent marker and was writing stuff on a building site about me. Sending 
me photos of it. And these were all guys I was friends with since school… 
When you have a big group of friends and 90% of them start ripping into you 
and start treating you like you’re a terrorist and stuff. That was pretty hard 
initially.  
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It is clear from Max’s first testimony that many of his peers were already ill-
disposed towards Muslims and Islam, and had previously developed the view 
that Muslim was synonymous with terrorist.  As I discussed in section 5.2.3, 
Muslims living in the West are increasingly being portrayed as the “fifth 
column,” or possible traitors to the nations that they reside in. White Muslim 
converts are viewed by some as more threatening than non-white Muslims 
because they have actively chosen to convert to the religion, indicating greater 
purpose and presence of mind in their attachment to Islam. Their attachment is 
thus perceived by some to be stronger, and potentially more fundamentalist 
and dangerous, than non-white Western Muslims.  
While most participants expressed that they felt these views were largely 
unwarranted, Tasneem offered an alternative perspective by stating that non-
Muslim Australians had a “healthy scepticism” towards converts. Speaking 
about the perception of white converts in Australia, she states: 
If they had status in the community, then they’re the “others”. Especially if they 
are, you know the Rabeas [Hutchinson, from Jihad Sheilas]… the Muslim 
reverts who, David Hicks, John whatever his name was in the US - you know 
the Shoe Bomber. People who were led astray by other Muslims. There’s a 
healthy scepticism and a certain amount of fear amongst the Australian 
community towards Muslim reverts. And they sort of don’t really know how to 
place us. Are you a wacko? Are you brainwashed? Are you part of another 
power, fifth column type of stuff. They have no really have no idea how to deal 
with you. 
In the above excerpt, Tasneem suggests that the fear that non-Muslim 
Australians have about Muslim converts is not completely unfounded, as there 
are examples within the white Muslim convert community in Australia and 
other Western countries such as Britain and the United States to support 
concerns about converts becoming radicalised. In the quotation, Tasneem 
highlights that whiteness plays a role in the confusion that white Muslim 
converts create for non-Muslim Australians who are unsure about how to 
183 
 
“place” or “deal with” them. Tasneem’s description implies that in the absence 
of understanding about why a white Australian would “leave” their whiteness 
and Australianness for Islam, non-Muslims may revert to negative assumptions 
about white converts as being mentally unstable, mentally ill or brainwashed.  
This suggests that stereotypes about Muslim converts that are propagated 
through the news media as being easily radicalised due to a mental deficiency 
(the Daily Mail UK 2016, the Telegraph 2016, Time Magazine 2016) are 
operating effectively in the Australian national imaginary. 
5.3.3 Islam as culturally foreign  
Many of the anxieties expressed by friends, family members and colleagues of 
the converts interviewed centred on the fact that Islam was culturally foreign to 
them, sometimes coupled with the inference that as well as being foreign, Islam 
was also inferior to Australian culture. Indeed, the perception of Islam as 
‘foreign’ (and everything that attaches to that label) informs many of the 
exchanges already documented and analysed in previous sections of this 
chapter. Interactions with family members in particular indicated that part of 
their discomfort about the respective participant’s conversion was related to the 
idea that white Muslim converts would become distant from them as a result of 
them distancing themselves from – and sometimes, outright rejecting - the 
lifestyle that they had been raised in. Interestingly, in these exchanges with 
family members Islam is often described by relatives of the participant as being 
a culture, or cultural, while whiteness is very rarely named – instead, it is 
evoked through the language of individual or familial expectations and hopes, 
or sometimes Australia generally, highlighting the normative nature of 
whiteness and its role in defining the Australian nation. In these situations, the 
racialisation of Islam occurs through far more subtle and indirect ways that  
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One example of the idea that Islam is particularly problematic for some people 
because of its perceived cultural distance from the Australian way of life is 
found in Belinda’s interactions with her mother. Belinda explains that mother’s 
response to her conversion and particularly her adoption of the ḥijāb 
demonstrated that her mother feels like her adoption of Islam is not just a 
rejection of her Christian religion, but of her culture and ultimately of her – 
however, Belinda’s mother does not herself use culture except when talking 
about Islam: 
But she says it’s because – she feels like it’s a stab in her heart. Mum and dad 
are always like, “We’ve given you such a good education and we’ve paid for 
you to do things like – and you’ve thrown this in our face.” It’s a rejection, and 
she said it’s a rejection of how I’ve been brought up, and how I’ve been brought 
up Christian. But Mum just felt like I was rejecting her. That was the biggest 
thing… It’s just a rejection. I’ve taken what I’ve been brought up, and I’ve 
thrown it all in their face. Cos she thinks it’s cultural. She thinks ḥijāb is cultural. 
She thinks I’ve joined this other culture. She said to me before, “Don’t go and 
adopt a Muslim family just cos we’re Christian.” So she just is scared of the 
Other. It’s just scary. 
It is clear from Belinda’s interview that her mother did not take issue with the 
ḥijāb just because it was a visible marker of religion, but that it represented a 
religion that to her seemed to be irreconcilable with her own culture – 
explaining why she feared her daughter was joining another, foreign culture. 
While the ‘visibility’ aspect of Islam was almost entirely restricted to female 
experiences, due to Muslim women being far more likely to wear visual 
markers of Muslim identity than men, the notion of Islam as being foreign, 
unfamiliar and different was a common one, raised by male and female 
participants alike. In the words of Jason, Islam was “the final frontier” for his 
family and many of his friends.  He explains that they knew very little about 
Islam except what they heard on television, and that this was partly due to their 
geographical location: 
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I can’t blame them, though. How can I blame what I was? Back then, the Shire 
was even whiter than it is now, and by white I mean 100% Anglo, basically, 
very few Italians or Greeks out that way either. Let alone Muslims. If there 
were, we didn’t know them. So when I told my parents I’d become Muslim, 
they were like – “Muzzo-what?!” *laughs* I shouldn’t laugh, it’s funny now but 
at the time it was, yeah it was a pretty traumatic period for me. I was still at uni 
and my parents basically kicked me out. They didn’t throw me out but they put 
me into a position where I had to leave. 
When asked what he meant by that, Jason explains: 
They didn’t tell me I had to leave but they basically said if I was living under 
their roof, their house their rules basically, this is Australia, blah blah blah.  I 
had to pretend I wasn’t Muslim. If I didn’t eat their food or drink with them 
they would make a big deal about it. I wasn’t allowed to pray in the house. I 
couldn’t keep any of my books, like the Qur’an and some other books I was 
studying at the time in the house, I kept them in my car. It got to the point 
where I was avoiding being at home anyway so basically I figured I may as well 
move out. 
Jason uses a discourse of absence about Muslims in the Sutherland Shire to 
explain his parents’ antipathy towards Islam, although census data shows that 
1648 residents or 0.8% of the total population of the Sutherland Shire chose 
“Islam” on the census form in 2011. Jason suggests these elements of practice – 
prayer, food, religious books, and alcohol – were rejected by his parents 
precisely because they found the foreignness confronting, unfamiliar and even 
threatening. By framing their objection to his Islamic practice in reference to the 
fact that they lived in Australia, Jason’s parents asserted that the practice of 
Islam has no place in Australian cultural life. Through statements such as these, 
Islam is characterised not as a benign foreign culture that can be assimilated 
into Australia under the auspice of tolerant multiculturalism, but as one whose 
difference is both problematic and potentially dangerous.  
The threat that Islam and Muslims are perceived to present “becomes evident 
along the lines of new racist discourse where ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ are seen to 
be incompatible with the dominant or perceived overriding culture and its 
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heritage: that is, being ‘British’ and being ‘us’” (Allen 2007, p. 130).  While 
sociologist Chris Allen is writing from a British context, the same can be said of 
Australia, where Islam is discursively framed as culturally disparate from 
Australianness and implicitly, whiteness. This is apparent also in interactions 
that participants described where they were expected to be exceptionally 
familiar with or involved in events taking place overseas, most often in the form 
of conflicts in the Middle East. Ben expresses frustration at the idea that as a 
Muslim he is automatically connected to overseas events, stating: “Somehow, 
amazingly, I’m supposed to know everything that happens in the Middle East, 
like being Muslim gives you a magic 8 ball into that!” Saffiah remarks that at 
her workplace she has become the “go-to girl” for “anything involving Muslims 
anywhere in the world,” and hesitatingly submits that she finds the assumption 
racist: “Not that they intend to, you understand, but it’s an assumption they 
have. I can’t get rid of it now.” Tasneem recounts that while she is very rarely 
on the end of interpersonal racism, which she attributes to her confidence, 
assertiveness, and upper class Australian accent, she has encountered 
institutional racism which presupposes that her allegiance is overseas rather 
than in Australia. Speaking about her attempts to set up Islamic schools in 
Sydney, she says: 
The biggest issues were all the battles that I had with setting up schools. The first 
school, we had to move the school nine times. [The Council member] didn’t want 
to meet with me, he didn’t want to see me, he didn’t want to be seen with me. He 
said, I respect what you’re trying to do but don’t do it here. People think you’re 
building Palestinian bombs. It was always tied to something that happened 
overseas. 
The above examples offer an insight into how Muslims are perceived to have a 
unique connection to other countries and far off lands. The inverse was also 
apparent in the interview data - participants cited a number of specific cultural 
elements that they felt were viewed by family and friends to be in distinct 
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contrast to the Australian way of life, and that they felt contributed to their 
overall impression of Islam as a foreign culture. In a number of diverse settings, 
which include interactions with family as well as colleagues and friends, 
alcohol, the beach, food, clothing and events such as Christmas all become 
highly contested and culturally inscribed, and in the context of conversion to 
Islam come to be viewed as representative of what it means to be Australian. 
These elements of Australian culture were never expressed in terms of 
whiteness or race. Instead, I argue that these elements become racialised as 
white vis-a-vis their positioning as normative and naturalised aspects of 
Australianness, an identity which is underpinned by whiteness. 
Drinking culture and alcohol was brought up in almost every interview, with 
male converts were far more likely to nominate it as a barrier to their working 
and social lives. The primacy of drinking in Australian culture was raised by a 
number of participants; as Max succinctly expressed it: “Finish work, you have 
a beer. Go to a birthday party, you have a beer. Everything is ‘have a beer.’ You 
go play cricket or something, have a beer. It’s like have a beer is like – what are 
we – people say you drink to celebrate but you celebrate 3-4 times a week. What 
are you celebrating?” Like Max, Paul described alcohol as being fundamental 
and indeed “sacred” to the Australian way of life, and one that Paul felt was a 
negative aspect of Australian culture that went unchallenged: 
And drinking culture as well. Like if you were to start going to pubs and 
really asking someone, ‘why are you drinking?’ They'd just go along with it 
you know. So I guess there's things like that that I question and I associate 
with my culture and my heritage in Australia, that they just go unquestioned. 
They're just part of the fabric of who we are. But some of them are really silly, 
like this binge drinking culture that goes, permeates right into adulthood. It's 
stupid, it's really stupid. But it won't change. It's so sacred to the Australian 
psyche. A bit of that larrikinism and that – oh we'll all go and get drunk. And 
some of it needs to be questioned. 
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For some participants, the decision to quit alcohol was a difficult one precisely 
because they knew that it would present a challenge for their existing lifestyles. 
Florian articulated his hesitation to stop drinking alcohol as a result of his 
intellectual conversion to Islam, which meant that his practice of it was taken 
up in stages. When asked about any concerns he had about converting, Florian 
replied, “Yeah, I mean frankly I was concerned about alcohol. Not so much 
about pork, because pork I didn't really enjoy, but I enjoyed alcohol so... yes, 
that was an issue. It took me a while to stop.“ Florian describes the change in 
his social life after he stopped drinking alcohol as an organic one. While he 
states that it “complicated” his social life and lifestyle, which up until that point 
had not undergone significant changes, he took it in stride: 
At first I was still drinking alcohol so there wasn't too many, too much 
changes… So I was pretty much going to the same places and doing the same 
things. And so when I stopped drinking alcohol and started eating ḥalāl meat, 
suddenly things became more complicated. And then you realise that your 
lifestyle is just different you know. When the lifestyle is too different you just 
sort of drift away from friends. Without a big clash, it was just life... So I could 
say that now from that time I don't have too much friends. 
Florian notes that growing up in France, alcohol was a large part of the 
national culture. Referring to one exchange he had with a waiter in a 
restaurant where the waiter made jokes about the fact that Florian was not 
drinking, he adds that in many settings drinking alcohol was a requirement, 
and the abstention from it was liable to see you mocked and your masculinity 
questioned. Comments from other participants expressed that they felt the 
same was true for them in Australia. Max stated that he had never liked 
drinking alcohol, and that he had been teased for it a lot during high school, 
laughingly adding that “it was probably good preparation for becoming 
Muslim.” While Max found it easy to resist social pressure to drink, other 
participants found it had a negative impact on their lives. Speaking of his job 
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in the corporate sphere, Xander states that his “end to drinking basically 
signalled the end of [his] career”: 
It sounds a bit melodramatic but if you’ve ever seen the corporate world, you’ll 
know what I mean. I hate it, it’s vicious. I never liked alcohol too much to begin 
with but at least I could have a sip of wine or nurse a beer for the whole 
evening if I had to. Obviously before I became Muslim. But now, it’s like I’ve 
been edged out of everything. I’m not saying it’s just the drinking because 
there’s other things too but if you don’t join in, go out for drinks Friday night – 
you murder your career, you do. 
From Xander’s interview, it is clear that he feels that alcohol is a fundamental 
part of work culture because of the corporate sphere’s reliance on (masculine-
centric) mateship to build cultural capital, which Xander expresses through 
references to his workplace as being a “boys club.” Drinking alcohol in such a 
space becomes a performance of masculinity as well as of whiteness through 
Australianness, and Xander’s refusal to drink alcohol calls into question his 
right to be present in the gendered and raced club of the corporate world. In 
the past Xander was able to “integrate with alcohol” – what Fry calls a 
“protective strategy” that “implies infrequent drinkers find it easier to 
integrate within the drinking culture, rather than opposing the dominant 
norm. Being seen to be involved has implications for conforming to group 
norms where acceptance is implicit” (2010, p. 1289). While previously Xander 
was able to engage in practices that rendered invisible the fact that he did not 
drink much, his conversion to Islam and decision to halt drinking entirely for 
religious reasons meant he could no longer use those measures to blend in. His 
inability to accrue cultural capital by drinking thus limited his potential to fit 
into his workplace and ultimately progress his career. 
Fatima also expressed frustration at the role that alcohol played in the social 
life of her workplace. Speaking of her experiences after conversion, she states: 
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I knew that there were certain things that I would not be doing. Like drinking 
alcohol, I think drinking alcohol is actually a big thing because in Australia it is 
very much a part of social life. I get invited all the time to go to the pub with my 
workmates. I come up with excuses every week. Between the beginning of my 
conversion and now, it has not really changed because at the beginning I think I 
sort of realised just how much these un-Islamic practices are part of Australian 
culture. 
Fatima feels the need to make excuses to colleagues because she feels that they 
would not understand her reasons, even though they know she is Muslim 
because she wears the ḥijāb. Many participants expressed a similar viewpoint, 
stating that non-Muslims often found it impossible to believe that someone 
would voluntarily choose to not drink alcohol. Speaking about her relatives, 
Penny contends that “it almost offends them, like how can you reject my 
culture?” Xander relates a similar reaction from his co-workers, stating, “I could 
tell them that I trained poodles to pole dance and their jaws would hit the floor 
slower than they do when they find out I don’t drink. Most of the time they 
don’t believe me and kind of, they try to, like, egg me on. And when I don’t 
budge they get almost, indignant.” In these interactions, both Xander and 
Penny suggest that the refusal to drink alcohol is viewed by some non-Muslims 
as contempt for the Australian culture. In other cases, the idea that someone 
would not drink alcohol or that alcohol would not be present in a social 
situation was mostly cause for confusion. Edward describes a conversation with 
his father just before he got married, in which Edward explained that they were 
not going to have any alcohol at the wedding: 
So for example, he was insistent that we would have alcohol at our wedding 
*laughs*. And trying to explain to him that that’s definitely a no-no, that we 
couldn’t have alcohol at the wedding. “Oh, could we have a little room at the 
back where we could go and have alcohol.” “No, no, we’re not having alcohol 
at the wedding.” And I think, a lot of it is denial and when it comes to a point 
where you actually have to deal with it, it’s not knowing how to deal with that. 
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In Edward’s explanation of his father’s response, he suggests that it was mostly 
motivated by denial about Edward’s conversion, and what it meant in terms of 
practical lifestyle changes. This is supported by a comment he makes earlier in 
the interview, where he states that his father was very supportive of Edward’s 
conversion but that: “again, I’m sensing now that a period of time has passed, 
I’m sensing now that he’s realised what the full implications are, that there 
certainly are – he has some problems with it.” When asked to clarify what these 
problems were, Edward stated that one of the problems his father had with his 
conversion was that it did not fit his expectations of what his son’s life would 
look like, expectations that were culturally-informed and mediated. The 
cultural differences between Islam and Australian whiteness, symbolised 
through such things as alcohol, proves to be a stumbling block for parents 
striving to understand their children’s decision to convert to Islam. The decision 
to forego what is perceived to be an important element of Australian culture for 
the sake of one’s religion is seen to be contrary to the construction of 
‘Australianness’ as laidback and secular. 
Beach culture was also raised by participants as an example of ‘Australianness’ 
that was perceived by some non-Muslims as a potential barrier for Muslims 
integrating into Australian culture.  Although it was only mentioned by a small 
number of participants, the beach is a meaningful concept to consider given the 
centrality of the beach to Australian mythology. There is a large body of 
literature that documents how the beach is understood to be a significant aspect 
of the way that Australians understand themselves (Fiske, Hodge & Turner 
1987, Johns 2008, Moreton-Robinson & Nicoll 2006) and has “long been accepted 
as a crucial arena for the performance of Australian national identity” (Lems et 
al 2016). Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll point to the pervasive presence of the 
beach in Australian books, TV shows, films and even music clips to state that, 
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“The beach has maintained a persistent status as icon, site of memory and 
backdrop for teenage rites of passage in Australian culture.” In their 1987 book, 
‘Myths of OZ: Reading Australian Popular Culture,’ Australian scholars John 
Fiske, Bob Hodge and Graeme Turner devote an entire chapter to 
deconstructing what the beach means to Australians, claiming for many 
Australians, the beach acts as the symbolic extension of the mythology of 
Australia as a country that is “classless, matey, basic, natural” (1987, p. 58). 
Fiske, Hodge and Turner focus on key figures like the Australian lifesaver and 
the Australian surfer – often represented as bronzed, strong and 
overwhelmingly male – as demonstrative of an Australian mythos that 
conceptualises the beach as the meeting point of all that Australia is and can be, 
as the site of the “urban and natural, civilized and primitive, spiritual and 
physical, culture and nature” (1987, p. 54). 
Significantly, ‘the beach’ as it stands in Australia’s national imaginary is also 
decidedly racialised. The beach was the first site of contact between Indigenous 
peoples and white colonisers, and where the first flag of Great Britain was 
placed in 1788 in Sydney Cove after claiming terra nullius – ‘the land belongs to 
no one.’ The beach was also the site of the infamous Cronulla Riots in Sydney in 
December 2005, in which 5000 white Australians converged in the southern 
Sydney suburb of Cronulla to protest the presence of young Lebanese 
(predominantly Muslim) men on ‘their’ beach, leading to violent riots, 
vandalism and attacks on anyone who looked ‘non-white’. Some beaches do not 
even need to be in Australia for it to feature prominently in the Australian 
national imaginary. The Gallipoli Campaign of World War One - one of the 
defining moments for securing white Australian nationhood in Australia’s 
history - was fought and lost by Australian and New Zealander soldiers against 
armies of the Muslim Ottoman Empire on a beach in Turkey far away from 
193 
 
Australian shores, but is still an integral part of Australia’s national identity. 
Although Gallipoli was an undeniable defeat, it is often through that campaign 
on a Turkish beach that the figure of the courageous, matey, white (and male) 
ANZAC soldier is constructed and reified as the quintessential Australian hero. 
As Suvendrini Perera poignantly points out, in stark contrast to romanticised 
notions of the beach held by those inside and outside of Australia: 
…in Australia the beach is a site that cannot be sequestered from the political 
life of the state. It encompasses the full weight of politico-historical experience 
as an arena where vital contests for power, possession, and sovereignty are 
staged. This beach is both the original scene of invasion and the ultimate 
border, a site of ongoing racial demarcation and exclusion, as of endless 
vigilance and fear (2009, p. 138). 
Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll contend that the significance of the beach in 
Australian history and culture is underscored by its construction as a white 
possession (2006). In their article ‘We Shall Fight Them on the Beaches: 
Protesting Cultures of White Possession,’ they posit that although the idea that 
the beach is a collectively-owned space dominates the Australian mythos, in 
reality the beach operates as a site of patriarchal white possession that is 
founded on Indigenous dispossession and “stages the performance and 
reproduction of the hierarchy of gendered and raced identities in Australia” 
(2006, p. 151). I have summarised Moreton-Robinson’s work on the white 
possessive logic of Australian nationhood in section 2.4 of this thesis, but it is 
useful to reiterate Moreton-Robinson’s key thesis that Australia is constructed 
by white people as a white possession through the continual dispossession of 
Indigenous land from Indigenous peoples, and immigration policies that 
privilege whiteness. For Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll, the beach is one of the 
prominent sites in which the logic of white possession is operationalised, as 
they illustrate through their analysis of the Cronulla Riots. Moreton-Robinson 
and Nicoll draw upon examples from the riots to highlight that far from an 
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anomaly, the riots were symbolic of a racialisation of space that has been 
occurring in Australia since invasion, crudely illustrated by the large “100% 
Aussie Pride” sign drawn into the sand on the beach for the camera crews in the 
helicopters circling above. 
The idea that the beach is constructed through the possessive logic of white 
racial structures poses salient questions for white converts who at one time had 
proprietary ownership over the beach, before their entry into a religion 
racialised as non-white. When queried about the major challenges she faced 
with her family as a white convert, Belinda immediately identified the beach: 
So when you first convert, you don’t feel like you fit in with your family and 
your friends anymore, because you’re a little bit different from them. It could be 
anything. It could be because you pray five times a day, it could be because you 
want to dress more modestly, you don’t want to go to the beach – like my 
family is a massive beach family, we lived at the beach. Bodysurfing was my 
favourite thing to do, dad taught us when we were five. It’s such a part of the 
Aussie culture and it was for me. Or it could be that you no longer want to 
drink, or you just don’t want to have pork, or it could be anything.  
Belinda highlights the centrality of the beach to ‘Aussie culture,’ which she 
suggests is as important to Australian culture as alcohol or pork.  When asked 
to clarify, Belinda implies that it is not the beach itself that is the problem, but 
the ways in which people use the beach and the clothes that are viewed as 
acceptable beach attire in Australian culture: 
The beach – the beach is a big problem. Big, big problem. I don’t even want to 
go home now, Mum’s still like, why don’t you wear your shorts? It was such a 
drama when I started wearing tracksuit pants to hockey. She was so angry. 
Beach is just – and I think that’s one reason why I’ve struggled with ḥijāb with 
my parents. Because it’s such a part of our culture. We go on family holidays to 
the beach all the time. We’re going to Tasmania so I’m praying it’s going to be 
cold. It’s ridiculous. Whereas if I could just wear my burqini and they would 
have no problem with it. But they’d die. 
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In this quotation, Belinda reveals that she owns a burqini, a swimsuit designed 
with Muslim women in mind that covers up to the hands and feet, with an 
attached hood to cover one’s hair. However, she does not feel comfortable to 
wear it at the beach around her family, because of their antipathy towards the 
ḥijāb and other visible aspects of Islam. A similar statement was made by 
Stephanie, who commented that “the beach is not for people like us… I go with 
my kids sometimes but, I’m not, it’s not comfortable for us.” For Stephanie, 
going to the beach was something that she did for her children to enjoy, but that 
she did not get any pleasure out of, adding later that “it’s awkward, the stares 
you get… there are some beaches that are okay ‘cause a lot of Muslims go there 
and others who don’t mind going full clothed, so we tend to stick to those 
beaches even though they’re further, we don’t go to the Aussie beaches 
anymore.” Here, Stephanie suggests that beaches in Sydney are informally 
segregated and that there are certain expectations of dress that attach to the 
‘Aussie’ beach which nominate a specific cultural norm that she feels cannot be 
accommodated by Islam. The racial demarcation of beaches occurs through 
‘cultural’ lines – of what is and what isn’t appropriately ‘Aussie’ attire, which in 
the contemporary Australian imaginary is the two-piece bikini for women. 
Writing about the presence of the burqini on the Australian beach, Susie Khamis 
points out that the unease about the perceived dichotomy between the bikini 
and ḥijāb was highlighted in conversations around the Cronulla riots, where it 
was suggested that the ‘un-Australian’ behaviour of Lebanese Muslim men 
towards ‘Aussie’ white women was due to the men’s opinions on modesty and 
clothing (2010, p. 383). Through such discursive constructions, she argues, 
‘Islam’ and ‘Australian’ are pitted against one another, with their dichotomous 
relationship fully visible on the site of the beach. Khamis posits that this line of 
thinking signals that: 
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…a clash exists in the semiotic space between the bikini and the veil: where the 
former bespeaks a liberal, open-minded, and progressive Australia, the later 
hints at a regressive, inflexible, and sexist Islam. Construed thus, the difference 
is between the blithe hedonism of the modern beach setting, and the buttoned-
up mores of a medieval theocracy (2010, p. 383). 
Khamis recognises the challenges for Muslims within Australian beach culture, 
but unlike Belinda she is optimistic about opportunities for Muslims to 
participate in the beach, heavily promoting the potential of the burqini to 
advancing intercultural dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
Australia. In contrast to Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll, Khamis contends that 
the beach can be an inclusive space, stating that the burqini “shows just how 
malleable the concept of an ‘Australian way of life’ is” (2010, p. 386) and “makes 
the Australian beach a far more inclusive, accommodating space” (2010, p. 387). 
While Khamis’s optimism is contagious, her lack of engagement with the 
scholarship purporting the Australian beach as a racialised space leaves it 
unclear whether or not the burqini can help to subvert or challenge the 
dominant racial structures of the beach, or whether the additional dialogue 
comes about through greater participation of Muslim women in the beach. 
As well as clothing, the activities that the beach was used for was raised by 
participants as examples of ways in which the beach could be hostile for 
Muslims. Xander recalled an incident where he and his friends were abused by 
an older woman at the beach: 
We were having a BBQ and that’s what they’re there for, yeah? And there were 
a big group of us maybe around… 15 families and we all have kids, mostly 
young little kids. And so we were a big group, our kids were running around 
playing, screaming, one of my friends kid stacked it near this group of old 
Aussie women and one of them just lost it at us, it was kind of funny actually 
cos we were so big and loud we just ignored her but yeah, I forgot about that 
actually. 
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Xander’s story is reminiscent of some of the complaints of Cronulla residents 
who expressed ire at the way that young Lebanese men used the beach, which 
they felt was too noisy, boisterous and active. Greg Noble suggests that this 
perceived breach of multicultural manners was one of the key catalysts for the 
Cronulla riots (2009). Lebanese young men were viewed as having broken 
Cronulla’s Aussie beach etiquette by arriving in large groups, being loud and 
demonstrative, especially to women, playing soccer on the sand rather than 
sunbaking, and wearing jeans or football shorts rather than board shorts. Noble 
argues that these behaviours were racialised by Cronulla residents, which 
emanated from a lack of understanding of cultural difference: “If our daily lives 
are punctuated by cultural differences which we don’t understand, then the 
confluence of moral order and an ethnic imaginary becomes compelling” 
(Noble 2009, p. 15). Arguably, cultural differences in how people use the beach 
– whether it is having large barbecues with over sixty people or quietly 
sunbathing by yourself – become readily racialised because the space of the 
beach itself is racialised to begin with and constructed as a white possession. 
Racialised groups such as Muslims are expected to conform to ‘Australian’ 
modes of beach culture, or they are excluded. 
This section focused on two elements of Australian culture, alcohol and the 
beach, to highlight that Islam is often racialised through more subtle and 
indirect references to ‘Australian culture’. Although race may not be explicitly 
evoked in such contexts, the concept of ‘Australianness’ operates as a metonym 
for white. I chose to examine this concept through alcohol and beach culture 
partly because of their prevalence in the stories of white Muslim converts, but 
also because they both feature prominently in the Australian national 
imaginary. However, while there is a significant amount of literature about the 
racial inflection of beach culture in Australia, as highlighted earlier in this 
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section, there is a noticeable absence of literature on the racialised aspects of 
alcohol, which is curious given how often it was mentioned by participants of 
this project. This thesis is ill-equipped to address the gap in the scholarship; 
however, it does indicate a potential area for further research. 
5.3.4 Islam as oppressive to women 
One of the key tropes used to advance the idea that Islam and Muslims are 
culturally deviant from the space of whiteness and Australianness is that of 
Islamic misogyny. The fear of Muslim men’s oppression of Muslim women was 
introduced in a number of interviews as being a key concern for non-Muslim 
families of converts. While the concern for Muslim women is expressed towards 
non-white women as well, often via colonial and neo-colonial feminist 
narratives (Ho 2007), white convert women are viewed with particular horror 
because it is felt that they should “know better” due to the liberties and 
superior intellect afforded to them by their whiteness. This is in contrast to non-
white Muslim women who are looked at with pity and condescension for not 
knowing any better beyond their perceived cultural indoctrination. It is not 
surprising then that female participants in particular raised this as being one of 
the prime anxieties for their families, and stated that many of their relatives 
expressed horror and concern about their conversion to a religion that they 
believed denied women rights. As Stephanie explains: 
 
There is nothing that I could have done that would have made my feminist, 
hippy parents, my mother especially, more worried and, and, scared… for me 
than becoming Muslim. Nothing. If I became a prostitute, or a drug addict, they 
would have been far more supportive of any of those things than they were of 
me being Muslim. Being Muslim was anathema to them. I told them that I had 
planned to convert about four, five months before I actually took the plunge, 
and they spent most of that time trying to convince me out of it.  
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When asked how exactly her parents tried to persuade her not to convert, 
Stephanie responds: 
They’d say things like, don’t you know how they treat their women? You have 
so much potential, do you really want to spend the rest of your life married to a 
man who has three other wives, popping out babies for him, never leaving the 
house, not working, wearing a tent outside, etcetera. Just… ridiculous things. 
Didn’t you hear about the Lebanese gang rapes last year? That’s what they’re 
like, they have no respect for women. I’m making them sound really hateful 
and racist but they’re not, not really, they were just really scared for me. All 
they knew about Islam was from Not Without My Daughter and the Princess 
books about the Saudi princesses. This was back in the early 2000s, and they 
were, yeah they were just scared. 
This excerpt from Stephanie captures many of the concerns and messages raised 
by other female participants. Stephanie is reluctant to name her parents’ 
perceptions as racist, an issue that I have drawn attention to earlier in this thesis 
in chapter it is clear from her words that they, like the relatives of other 
participants, feared that their daughter would be oppressed and subjugated as a 
Muslim. Female participants highlighted that attitudes towards women in 
Islam were a source of anxiety and fear for some of their relatives and friends. 
Riley recounted that her parents were convinced that she had been 
“brainwashed” by a man who would force her to wear a face veil and stop her 
education: “Nothing could be further from the truth. I actually knew very few 
Muslim men, and none of the ones I did know were very religious. I was kind 
of offended to be honest, that my parents thought I would relinquish my 
feminist principles so easily.” Imogen, who initially converted to marry her 
Muslim boyfriend, had a similar experience when she told her mother that she 
was planning to become Muslim: 
When my husband and I split up she was so relieved, she thought she would 
get her daughter back. Even though I never left, I hadn’t changed. So imagine 
how distraught she was when not only did I not give up the religion, I even 
started wearing ḥijāb. It’s been 7 years now since I converted and she’s only just 
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started to come around. But she’s still not happy, not by a long shot. She’s a big 
feminist and she took my conversion as a slap in the face. 
Through the characterisation of Islam and inherently misogynistic, 
Islamophobia is operationalised through a gendered construction of Muslims 
and Islamic practices – of Muslim men as the oppressors of Muslim women, 
who must be ‘saved’. Islamophobic attitudes and white anxieties about cultural 
difference and cohesion are thus reframed as a concern for women’s rights, 
which ironically serve to themselves contribute to a paternalistic and 
patriarchal desire to protect and save women. Christina Ho (2007, p. 292) 
criticises the 'colonial feminist' attitudes implicit in the victim narratives 
perpetuated about Muslim women in nationalist discourses that seek to 'save 
brown women from brown men' (2007, p. 294), and use women's rights as a 
justification for conceptualising Islam as culturally inferior. Embedded in such 
nationalist discourses is the notion that Australia is a gender-equal society in 
which Islamic beliefs and attitudes do not belong, thereby situating Islam as 
outside of and indeed oppositional to Australian culture. Far from being unique 
to Australia, these attitudes are rife throughout the West: Sonya Fernandez 
states that what she terms the “savages-victims-saviours prism” (2009, p. 272) 
and Sherene Razack describes as the “eternal triangle between the imperilled 
Muslim woman, the dangerous Muslim man and the civilized European” (2007, 
p. 5) has been enacted in Islamophobia since the times of the Crusades. 
Fernandez argues that “The crusade to save Muslim women from Muslim men 
obscures the racist binaries that inform polemics about the oppression of 
Muslim women, and instead plays on some inherent sense of equality and 
freedom that is perceived as the sole preserve of the West and the (sufficiently) 
westernized” (2009, p. 271). White women who choose to convert to Islam thus 
need to be saved from a decision that takes them out of the space of West 
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imbued with equality and freedom, and into the cultural space of Islam, 
characterised by the oppression of women. 
The construction of Islam as an exceptionally patriarchal and misogynistic 
culture is illustrated by the national level findings of the Challenging Racism 
project (Dunn et. al. 2004), and demonstrates that racialisation is experienced in 
gendered ways (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993, p. 125).  Respondents were 
asked about their level of concern for a family member who chose to marry a 
Muslim, a Jew, an Aboriginal person, an Asian person, a Christian, a British 
person and an Italian person - the first four groups used as examples of 'out-
groups.' Half of the participants stated that they would be concerned about a 
family member marrying a Muslim, almost twice as many as reported concern 
for the next highest group, Aboriginal people at 28.9% (2004, p. 415). In another 
article, Dunn et. al. suggests that the disparity “suggests that the stereotype of 
Islamic misogyny is an important component of the racialisation of Islam in 
Australia” (2007, p. 574), due to the implication that those who expressed 
concern were worried about the treatment that a female family member would 
suffer at the hands of her Muslim husband. Dunn et al note that this stereotype 
exists in Europe as well as Australia, and extends to 'ethnic Others' in general. 
This impression of Islamic misogyny is remarkably evident in the narratives of 
Riley, Stephanie and Imogen earlier in this section, where they describe the fear 
that their parents – often mothers – expressed about how they would be treated 
by their Muslim husbands or boyfriends. 
Crucial to this characterisation of Islam as inherently misogynistic is a 
fascination with Muslim women’s clothing, and in particular head coverings 
such as the ḥijāb and niqāb. Indeed, these forms of dress represent “a static 
colonial image that symbolizes Western superiority over Eastern 
backwardness” (Razack 2008, p. 120). The perception that the ḥijāb is a symbol 
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of female oppression and Muslim patriarchy was present in a number of 
interviews with female converts. For some participants, the trigger for their 
parents’ disapproval or concern was not their conversion itself, but their 
decision to wear the ḥijāb. In Imogen’s interview, she explains that she felt her 
conversion was not “real” to her parents until she started wearing the ḥijāb 
three years after her conversion. Prior to that decision, Imogen observes, her 
parents had purported to be fine with her conversion, and she herself had not 
noticed any compelling change in their behaviour towards her. After she stared 
wearing the ḥijāb on a regular basis, however, her parents began to talk to her 
about current affairs and world news as it related to Muslims overseas, 
particularly in relation to women. In her interview, Imogen describes their 
steadily increasing desire to discuss issues such as forced ḥijāb, forced marriage, 
child marriages and female genital mutilation in the Muslim world, which she 
interpreted as an implicit condemnation of Islam’s treatment of women. Imogen 
clarifies that their disapproval about her wearing of ḥijāb was never explicitly 
stated, nor did they ever outright condemn Islam as being a religion that 
oppressed women. Nevertheless, she was able to gauge their feelings about her 
wearing of ḥijāb based on the aforementioned discussions, as well as other 
subtle behavioural cues such as sighing or shaking their heads when she 
reached for or adjusting her ḥijāb when they were about to leave the house. 
Their change in behaviour, Imogen suggests, is indicative of their perception 
that the ḥijāb is representative of a general strain of misogyny within Islam. 
Other female participants described similar experiences, where the opposition 
was not explicitly stated but rather apparent in their parents’ non-verbal 
attitudes towards them. In relation to her adoption of the ḥijāb, Katherine states: 
“My dad was really, really, really opposed to it. And me and my dad have 
always been really close, and it was the first time in my life that I did something 
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that upset my dad and made him disappointed in me. And that was really hard. 
Of my close friends – they didn’t really care, non-Muslims they didn’t really 
care, but my dad really, really did care.” When asked why the ḥijāb specifically 
was so difficult for her dad to accept, Katherine attributes it to its stark visibility 
as an identifier of her religion: 
It changes so dramatically how you look. For me it was nothing. You put it on 
and everything you see is exactly the same. Nothing has changed for you. It’s 
everyone who’s looking at you, you look so dramatically different. Especially as 
someone who grew up on the Northern Beaches who grew up wearing short 
shorts and a bikini and that kind of thing. 
The ḥijāb is not simply another piece of clothing in this scenario, it is a racialised 
marker of difference in their worlds, which are in this quote delineated both 
geographically (Northern Beaches) and culturally (reference to dress). The 
reference to the Northern Beaches is particularly relevant in this context, given 
that it is an area of Sydney described by the participant as “so completely white, 
like the whitest place in the world”: “short shorts and bikinis” are a form of 
attire associated with this whiteness. The exclusion of ḥijāb from this cultural 
space is further emphasised in her interview when Katherine describes the 
lengths that the few Muslims who lived on the Northern Beaches would go to 
in order to be accepted into that space: “I knew one Muslim girl who would 
leave school wearing a headscarf, take it off, roll up her skirt so it was the 
shortest skirt in the place, go to every party and that kind of thing.” She adds 
that these actions reaffirmed the “oppressiveness” of the ḥijāb to their peers: 
“And that kind of confirmed to the people on the Northern Beaches, oh look 
how oppressive it is, she has to hide from her family that she acts like we do, 
and that kind of thing.” 
Belinda’s analysis of her situation with her parents is similar to that of 
Katherine’s. She explains that while she wears ḥijāb everywhere else, she has yet 
204 
 
to wear her ḥijāb in front of her parents, because she knows it would upset 
them. Part of her reasoning for her decision is discussed in section 5.3.1, where 
Belinda explains that the ḥijāb represents a visual marker of difference to her 
parents’ culture. She further identifies that her mother felt that ḥijāb was 
something oppressive: “She thinks it’s really cultural and obviously degrading. 
I did too. People feel sorry for us. I hate that. I hate it. That’s my ego I think, 
because I think that people think I’m degraded or whatever.” 
The interviews with Belinda, Imogen and Katherine indicate that 
nonconformity to 'normal' Australian modes of dress constitutes the wearer of 
the ḥijāb as a non-white, racialised Other. This is articulated by Fatima in her 
interview as well, where she remarks that her rejection of particular Australian 
cultural traits, such as dress, alcohol, and food meant that others saw her as less 
white than she was previously: 
When I put on the ḥijāb I was worried about strangers giving me dirty looks 
and strangers saying stuff to me. But in some cases it was people I already 
knew who gave me more trouble. For the people who knew I was going to 
convert to Islam, that was probably the biggest thing. For the people who 
didn’t know or they weren’t aware, when I put on the ḥijāb that was a big 
thing as well. That was also seen as a move away from being white. When you 
think about it, I think I was to a large extent judged on more superficial things 
like how I dressed, what I do or what I don’t do. I was judged on those things.  
Like Belinda, Katherine and Imogen, Fatima specified that she felt that people 
who knew her “judged” her closeness with whiteness through more visual 
and easily perceptible elements of her changed lifestyle. Fatima indicates that 
she believes there is a patronising element to their judgement, in that they feel 
that as a white person she should have known better. She stated that this 
paternalism is one end of a spectrum which culminates in white converts 
being viewed as traitors to their race: 
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And the thing is that we do have solidarity with them in that we are from the 
same race, whereas it is so easy, just what the workings of racism are like, it's 
so easy for them to dismiss another race and dismiss another culture and 
dismiss the religion along with it, but when someone of your own race comes 
into that religion, it kind of throws things off balance for them. And I think to 
a large extent there is the expectation that we should know better and we're 
not like them and when you extrapolate that it becomes even worse, oh well 
you're traitors. 
In Fatima’s testimony, the ḥijāb becomes a racialised object, and becomes 
particularly unsettling for people when the wearer is white – inhabiting a 
previously unracialised identity.  As this concept was covered in section 5.2.1 it 
is unnecessary to recap it here, except to reaffirm the words of Al-Saji where she 
poignantly states, “…while the veil is hypervisible as oppressive and repressive 
barrier, Muslim women ‘behind the veil’ are not merely invisible to the western 
gaze, but are made invisible as subjects” (2006, p. 886). In other words, Muslim 
women’s complex personhoods and humanity are erased in favour of the 
hypervisible and racialised marker of the ḥijāb.  The above quotations from the 
interview data support the suggestion that the ḥijāb continues to dominate 
much of the language and discourse around women’s rights in Australia and in 
the West more generally, and is used to situate the wearers of ḥijāb as being 
outside of the cultural framework of what it means to be Australian. Here, the 
concern about ḥijāb is symbolic of a broader preoccupation with the idea that 
Islam is a misogynistic religion, and that white Muslim converts need to be 
‘rescued’ from Islam through a return to white Australian modes of dress and 
culture. 
Participants’ experiences in this section highlighted the ways in which Islam is 
conceptualised as un-Australian, specifically through its positioning as an anti-
secular religion, a security threat to the Australian nation and as culturally 
foreign to the Australian way of life. Unlike section 5.2, which discussed 
examples of interactions between participants and non-Muslims that explicitly 
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evoked ‘race’ and racialising discourses to locate Islam as a ‘non-white race’, 
this section examines the more subtle ways that Islam is located as the antithesis 
to whiteness. In the examples in this section, whiteness is evoked through 
references to Australian nationhood, wherein Australia is perceived as a “white 
possession,” to use the language of Moreton-Robinson. In contemporary 
Australia, the dominant racial expression of the nation is whiteness (as is 
demonstrated in the literature I reviewed in Chapter Two and at the beginning 
of this section), and so positioning Islam as oppositional to Australian 
simultaneously positions it as oppositional to whiteness. Thus, white people 
who convert to Islam are not only viewed as being un-Australian, but may also 
be perceived as being “un-white,” or less white than before. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the experiences and interactions of participants with their 
non-Muslim family, friends, colleagues and strangers. In doing so, it found that 
that “Muslim” is perceived by some non-Muslim Australians through racialised 
frames that views ‘Muslim’ as incompatible with whiteness. This chapter 
contributes to the existing literature about the racialisation of Muslims by 
theorising racialisation in juxtaposition with whiteness, arguing that within a 
national imaginary underpinned by a white racial identity and secular-yet-
Christian religious identity, the cultural distance between Islam and whiteness 
is considered to be too vast to fully overcome without relinquishing some of 
their whiteness.   
These attitudes were expressed in the interview data I collected through seven 
interrelated codes that all positioned Muslims on the ‘outer’ of Australia’s 
national, racial and religious core identity. These seven expressions can be 
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sorted across three categories. The first viewed Islam as a different ‘race’ to 
whiteness, the second positioned Islam against Australia, and the third 
constructed Islam as a foreign and inferior culture.  Isolating the different ways 
in which Muslims are racialised through empirical research can help us to build 
on the emerging literature about the racialisation of Islam. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ENTERING THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Five, I began to analyse the post-conversion experiences of white 
Muslim converts, as detailed in the qualitative data collected via in-depth 
interviews. Chapter Five focused on interactions between white converts and 
their non-Muslim family, friends, colleagues and strangers, and drew attention 
to the way these exchanges conveyed the notion that white converts had either 
‘left’ the cultural space of whiteness, been repositioned to the margins of 
whiteness, or been classified into a different ‘racial’ category, often as ‘Arab’ or 
‘Middle Eastern’. My analysis of the interview data suggests that racialising 
macro-level discourses about Muslims in Australia that position Muslims as 
being ‘un-Australian’ or ‘non-white’ may contribute to the racialisation of 
Muslims by non-Muslims in everyday settings. In Australian national 
discourse, a ‘Muslim’ identity has been established as one of ‘Other’ in contrast 
to the (white and Christian) Australian ‘Self’. In this paradigm, Muslims are not 
only constituted as a religious Other, but a racial Other as well (Daulatzai 2012). 
Of course, the assertion that Muslims are viewed as a racial Other in Western 
nations like Australia is not a new one. As I outlined in section 2.2, prior 
research has already demonstrated that Muslims are racialised in Australia 
through such discursive mechanisms (Poynting et al 2004; Dunn et al 2007; 
Humphrey 2007) and in other Western, white dominant nation states like the 
United Kingdom (Kyriakides et al 2009; Meer & Modood 2009), Canada (Nagra 
2011) and the United States (Joshi 2006; Selod and Embrick 2013). What is 
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original about the research I have undertaken is that it illustrates how 
racialisation is felt and experienced by Muslims from the perspective of a group 
who were previously ‘unraced’ within Australia’s national context, based on 
their interactions and exchanges with those non-Muslims who view Islam as 
incompatible with whiteness. These findings unsettle and destabilise traditional 
understandings of race by highlighting its tenuous foundations. 
Even more unsettling are my findings relating to white converts’ interactions 
with other Muslims, which are the focus of this chapter. My thematic analysis of 
the interview transcripts suggests that the perceived relationship between 
whiteness and Christianity, and the converse association between Islam and 
being non-white, is far from monodirectional – it was not simply non-Muslims 
who deemed Islam a ‘non-white religion,’ and imposed that understanding 
onto Muslims. Participant narratives indicate that for many of the converts 
interviewed, their experiences with Muslims raised questions in their mind 
about their own racial identity and what their whiteness denoted in the context 
of the Muslim community. Interactions within the Muslim community revealed 
to the participants that just as some non-Muslims viewed whiteness and Islam 
as incongruent, so too did some Muslims believe that a convert’s whiteness was 
something that needed to be overcome or even erased in order to be a true and 
authentic Muslim. This idea was made manifest predominantly in one of two 
ways: either rendering white converts as being lesser or inferior Muslims 
because of their whiteness; or attempting to assimilate converts into their own 
ethnic cultures and communities. Conversely, some participants expressed the 
sense that their whiteness was seen as a positive attribute, as white converts 
were perceived to be more observant, devout and spiritually elevated than non-
white Muslims (including other converts) because of the religious conviction 
required to ‘overpower’ their whiteness. 
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In this chapter, I document the diverse range of interactions that participants 
had with non-white Muslims that made them become cognisant or self-
conscious of their whiteness and how it was viewed in relationship to their 
Muslim identity. I draw on participants’ interpretations and recollections of 
these events to suggest that for some Muslims, whiteness and Islam are 
perceived to be so divergent that meeting white converts to Islam is at once 
unsettling, confusing and validating. I begin this chapter by offering two 
different but related theories for my argument that some Muslims in Australia 
view Islam and whiteness to be incompatible, just as some non-Muslims do. 
The first is a continuation of the theory advanced in the previous chapter, 
Chapter Five – that the subject identity of ‘Muslim’ in the Australian context is a 
highly racialised and reified identity (Poynting et al 2004). I suggest that this 
construction of Muslim as Other is first inculcated, then internalised and 
reproduced by Australian Muslims themselves, in response to regular 
reminders that they are not ‘truly’ Australian by virtue of their perceived racial 
and religious estrangement from the nation. Duderija (2010) explains this 
phenomenon amongst Muslims living in Western countries through a 
paradigm that he terms the 'self-other civilisational boundary impermissible 
mutual identity construction dialectic,' in which the Self constructs its self-
identity in reference to how it is perceived by the Other, and also how it thinks 
it is perceived by the Other. In this framework, the 'Self' is Islam as a 
civilisational 'ummah' or community, and the Other is the West, a civilisational 
entity historically informed by Christianity. His position is supported by 
Randell-Moon, who contends that “the Orientalist assumption that constructs 
the West in opposition to Islam works to homogenise differences within each 
binary term and link the West and Islam to a corresponding set of essentialised 
representations” (2006, p. 8). 
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The second theory suggests that a view of whiteness that positions it as 
oppositional to Islam has less to do with Muslims internalising an Orientalist 
view of Islam than it does with the development of Muslim thought about the 
West, modernity, colonialism, secularism, Christianity and American 
imperialism over the last several hundred years (Waardenburg 2003; Esposito 
and Mogahed 2007; Kull 2011). Although there is little doubt that Muslim 
perceptions of the West are influenced by the West’s own reading and 
portrayal of itself, the second theory I advance decentres the West and assigns 
Muslims more agency in their identity formation and interpretation of social 
and political affairs that take place around them. In acknowledging Muslim 
agency, the theory also recognises that Muslim conceptualisations of the West 
can and in some cases does reify the Self/Other dichotomy. It is this second 
theory which I will focus on in section 6.2, and that I contend significantly 
informs white converts’ engagements with the Muslim community in Sydney, 
Australia, as illustrated in later sections. As section 6.2 and later sections will 
illustrate, whiteness is often articulated by Muslims in juxtaposition with Islam 
and as a site of superficiality, immorality and privilege gained through 
colonialism and foreign interventions; a social location marked by alienation 
and the absence of culture. 
Following the theoretical orientation offered in sections 6.2, section 6.3 
documents the most common reactions to white converts from other Muslims, 
which range from glorifying white converts as exceptional and special to 
deriding them as ‘fake’ Muslims. In this section, I argue that just as participants 
indicated that some non-Muslims had reified perceptions of Muslims, so too do 
some Muslims have essentialised views of white people, which they view to be 
at odds with a Muslim identity. In section 6.4 I extend this analysis to examine 
the expectations that some Muslims have of white converts, which indicate that 
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they felt that white converts needed to adopt a new cultural identity that was a 
better fit to their new religious identity. I draw out a number of expectations 
that Muslims had of participants, which they felt are rooted in cultural 
traditions and practices of various ethnic groups rather than in religion, 
including an expectation that they change their name, get married quickly, and 
change the way they dress. I contend that the reasons for this are partly because 
white converts are expected to “prove” themselves as exceptionally pious 
Muslims in order to demonstrate that they have left behind their white ways, 
but also because some Muslims themselves view Islam to be a racialised 
identity that needs to be visually demarcated from what is often seen as the 
cultural void of whiteness. 
 
6.2 Muslim Constructions of ‘The White West’ 
Much has been written about Western constructions of Muslims and Islam, 
with particular focus on how representations of the Muslim world that 
originate in the West are often Orientalist in nature (Morey and Yaqin 2011), 
and portray Muslims as alternatingly uncivilised, barbaric, exotic and irrational. 
There is less in the academic literature about the inverse relationship, or 
perceptions that Muslims hold about the West. This section draws on interview 
data to explore how Muslims construct the West, which in turn influences their 
perception of white converts to Islam. In agreement with both Alistair Bonnett 
and Sohail Daulatzai that ‘the West’ has come to be a stand-in for whiteness in 
recent times, as detailed in section 2.4, in this section I contend that for Muslims 
and non-Muslims living in the West, ‘Western’ has come to mean ‘white’ in 
most contexts, with some minor exceptions. Muslim constructions of the West, 
then, are by and large equivalent to Muslim constructions of whiteness; and 
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indeed, as this chapter will show, many Muslims in Australia do not 
distinguish between the one and the other, and use the terms interchangeably.  
A broad empirical introduction to the question of how Muslims perceive the 
West can be found in the results of the 2011 Pew Research Centre Global 
Attitudes survey. The survey, which set out to explore the tensions between 
Muslim and Western publics, found that high percentages of the seven Muslim 
publics surveyed had very negative perceptions of the West, and considered 
Westerners to be selfish, arrogant, violent, greedy and immoral. Jordan had the 
highest percentages of people agreeing with the suggestion that Westerners are 
selfish, arrogant, violent, greedy, immoral and fanatical, with Lebanon 
producing much smaller numbers. While Indonesians had a more positive view 
of Westerners in 2011 than they had in 2006, as documented by the previous 
survey, Pakistanis surveyed expressed that their views had become more 
negative towards the West in the five years since they had last been surveyed 
(Pew Research Centre 2011). The percentages of Pakistani Muslims attributing 
negative characteristics to Westerners increased by double digits for every 
characteristic, sometimes by as much as twenty percent. It is likely that the 
growing ill will towards Westerners in Pakistan in the years between the two 
surveys was a result of the increased number of US drone attacks in Pakistan in 
those five years. This hypothesis seems particularly feasible when we consider 
that 2010 and 2011 saw a monumental increase in US drone attacks with 122 in 
2010 and 73 in 2011, resulting in 1366 casualties (New America Foundation 
2013). This is in comparison to the number of drone strikes in the years 2004-
2006, of which there were only six.  
The percentages of Muslims ascribing the stated negative characteristics to 
Westerners is slightly higher than that of the percentages of non-Muslims 
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attributing the same negative characteristics to Muslims, indicating that 
Muslims in the publics surveyed had more negative perceptions of the West 
than Westerners had of Muslims.  In addition, the results of the 2006 Pew 
Global Attitudes Survey which surveyed Muslims in Western countries as well 
as Muslims in Muslim-majority countries indicated that Muslims living in 
Muslim majority countries are more likely to ascribe these negative 
characteristics to non-Muslim Westerners, with lower percentages of Spanish, 
French and German Muslims ascribing the same character traits to non-
Muslims. Conversely, European Muslims were more likely to state that they 
found non-Muslim Westerners to be generous and honest, compared to that of 
Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries (Pew Research Centre 2007). 
Interestingly, British Muslims had the most negative views of Westerners 
amongst the European publics surveyed, with between half to two thirds of 
those surveyed in Britain agreeing with the negative characteristics cited (Pew 
Research Centre 2007). Without conducting further research, it is unclear what 
reasons might account for these discrepancies. One possible hypothesis for why 
Muslims living in Europe are generally more favourable to ‘Westerners’ could 
be due to greater interaction with non-Muslim Westerners. Another explanation 
could very well be that the European Muslims surveyed see themselves as 
Westerners as well as Muslims and so include themselves and other Muslims in 
the category of “Westerners”.  Thus, European Muslims may approached the 
issue in a more nuanced way than through the binary lens of “the West versus 
Muslims” that the survey appears to promote. 
The results of a Gallup poll conducted in 2002 amongst Muslims in nine 
Muslim majority countries document similar results. Gallup found that the 
majority of residents in all nine countries, which included Morocco, Pakistan, 
Iran, Kuwait and Lebanon, felt that the West did not care about poorer nations, 
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treated minority groups in their own countries unfairly, and had high rates of 
alcohol and drug abuse, crime and corruption. In Gallup’s analysis of the 
results, they stated: 
The image that dominates respondents' negative perceptions of the West is 
clear-cut: the immoral lifestyles, a weakening of family structure, a decline in 
social courtesy, and the loss of traditional deference to elders in Western 
nations… Completing the list of the most frequently volunteered sources of 
resentment of the West are perceptions that Westerners are arrogant and 
believe their societies and civilization are more superior and advanced; are 
excessively prone to interfere in the internal and political affairs of other 
nations; are insufficiently attached to their own religion, religious beliefs, and 
ethnicity (Gallup 2002, para 8). 
The empirical data provided by the Pew Research Centre and Gallup is both 
informative and illuminating, highlighting that negative relations between 
Muslims and the West are by no means unilateral. Just as non-Muslims living 
in the West have stereotypical perceptions of a monolithic “Islam,” so too do 
many Muslims have reified views of the West. However, the findings of the 
surveys also raise additional specific questions about how race (whiteness) and 
religion (Christianity) might influence the perception of the West as greedy, 
immoral, violent, selfish and arrogant. While the interview data I have 
collected can and does provide some insights here, there is room for further 
research in this topic area, particularly through qualitative research with non-
white Muslims. 
In this section, I will highlight three of the common associations that were 
related by non-white Muslims to the white converts that I interviewed: that of 
whiteness and power, whiteness as immoral and white culture as a weak 
culture, with reference to academic literature.  While these are not the only 
associations that were raised in the interview, they are the ones that 
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participants themselves most frequently attributed as reasons for why some 
Muslims felt that whiteness and Islam were incompatible.   
6.2.1 Whiteness and power 
While the Pew Research Centre and Gallup surveys offer some insight into 
current Muslim attitudes about the West and whiteness, we must look to 
sources of information with a greater historical focus or longitudinal 
methodology to uncover why such attitudes exist. Dutch sociologist of religion 
Jacques Waardenburg is one of the few scholars to comprehensively examine 
Muslim constructions of the West from a sociological perspective, having spent 
a number of decades studying Islam and in particular examining relationships 
between Christians and Muslims. In his book “Muslims and Others: Relations 
in Context,” Waardenburg maps relationships between Muslims and the West, 
and Islam and other religions, through pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
periods. Waardenburg also gives careful consideration to different 
geographical contexts within these time periods to illustrate that in the history 
of Muslim thought, there have been multiple “Wests” throughout the ages and 
across empires and continents. He begins his section on Muslim Reflections in 
the West with the observation that “the West traditionally suggested to 
Muslims the land of the setting sun (if not death). While for a younger 
generation it raised the hope of a new kind of life and future, during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became increasingly associated with 
power and riches and with the corresponding aggression and greed” (2003, p. 
241).  
Waardenburg is of course referring here to colonialism, and in particular the 
economic, political and social impacts of colonialism on lands with large 
Muslim populations. Not only did the West represent the exploitation of both 
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natural resources and human labour, apparent in the use of indentured labour 
and slavery in European colonies, but colonialism also signalled the end of the 
final Islamic Caliphate in the Ottoman Empire.  The defeat and subsequent 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 left what was seen as a spiritual and 
political void in the Muslim world (Mozaffari 2009).  According to Mehdi 
Mozaffari, the impact of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire on Muslim 
society and political thought cannot be understated, and he states that just as 
the end of the First World War led to widespread disenchantment amongst 
Europeans, “the demise of the Ottoman Empire deeply affected the Muslim 
world and gave birth to longings to restore the golden age of Islam (2009, p. 1). 
Since then, numerous Islamist political movements have mobilised to fill the 
Caliphate’s absence and return Islam to its former glory, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Jamaat-e-Islami throughout Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan, the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Hizb-ut-
Tahrir in several Central Asian and Western countries. Given that Islamist 
movements have only risen over the last century (Alam 2009; Cepoi 2013; Jones 
and Smith 2002), it is clear that anti-West sentiments that originated at the time 
of colonialism continue to exist, and arguably contribute to negative attitudes 
about the West. The association between the negative characteristics attributed 
to Westerners as highlighted by Pew Research Centre and Gallup and the 
historical positioning of negative attitudes made by Waardenburg are thus 
highly apparent. 
The association between whiteness and colonialism and the exploitation of 
Muslim-majority countries commonly arose in interviews, particularly when 
participants were asked what whiteness represented for them. Paul initially 
218 
 
responded to the question with reference to skin colour and ancestry, but 
when prompted further he added: 
There's some more – I guess a little more darker, sinister heart which is kind of 
linked to our colonial past where basically the European nation would basically 
go and just assume that they are God's gift to the world or whatever. And they 
would go and colonise non-whites, so that was the done thing a couple of 
centuries ago… So there's that sinister white heart where, I dunno – I don't even 
like using the word whiteness but just for want of a better description, it's 
convenient, that I think of that British colonial arrogance and I think of the 
Union Jack with its many negative connotations. And I don't associate that at all 
with non-white cultures.    
Paul’s explanation of the “sinister heart” of whiteness centres colonialism and 
European arrogance, the ramifications of which, he later states, are still evident 
today. It is possible that the arrogance he refers to is the same kind of 
‘arrogance’ that features in the Pew Research Centre’s findings, given that the 
Muslim publics surveyed were all colonised by European countries. Katherine 
also raises the issue of colonialism in her interview, observing that the history 
of colonialism is often treated in a denialist or dismissive fashion amongst 
white people:  
Especially being English, coming from the colonial legacy of having an Empire, 
ruling the rest of the world, and therefore having these weird Orientalist 
assumptions about other people. We still call our colonisers our adventurers, 
and we say they adventured all over the world and that’s what we tell our 
children rather than we stole societies and committed genocides. Not so nice. 
Michelle notes that non-white Muslims occasionally intimate that she could 
never fully shed her whiteness precisely because of her colonial heritage as a 
white person, and that she carries that legacy around with her at all times: 
In some circles I’ve heard comments like, ‘Oh okay you’re not Arab then you 
don’t really know that much about Islam, because it’s not really your 
heritage.’ And that your heritage is kind of – I don’t know, to colonise other 
people’s countries, or whatever it might be that white people have done in the 
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past. So there’s a lot of thought that you can never really get out of the habit of 
being white, of being a non-Muslim. 
In these situations, Michelle felt that being white was to some Muslims 
synonymous with being non-Muslim, an identity that she finds hard to shake 
precisely because her heritage is tied to an experience of colonialism in which 
her ancestors were ostensibly the colonisers, rather than the colonised. 
In addition to colonialism, some participants referenced the more recent “War 
on Islam” and foreign interventions by the West into countries like Iraq and 
Afghanistan as being the reason for negative attitudes towards the West. 
Andrew offered Western interventions as an explanation for why he felt that 
some non-white Muslims did not “fully trust” him, observing that “when it’s 
their country that we’re bombing, why should they trust us? As far as they 
know, I support that kind of thing, cos I’m white.” Similarly, Anna reflected 
that she finds it hard to know how to act around Muslims sometimes because 
she constantly feels guilty about her whiteness due to current events: “It’s silly, 
probably. As a Muslim I feel outraged about these wars overseas and drone 
attacks but then I feel guilty and think, do I even have a right to feel that, when 
it’s your people, you know. You’re kind of in two camps.” Andrew, Anna and 
Michelle all acknowledge and to some extent even agree with the context for 
anti-Western sentiments they occasionally encounter. Despite their recognition 
of the validity of these sentiments, they express that they still find it difficult to 
negotiate their white identity in Muslim spaces as a result, because they feel 
that they are never fully accepted or full trusted by non-white Muslims. 
Some participants also linked whiteness to power and dominance more 
generally. Ahmed suggests that this perception is sometimes raised in 
objections to white men marrying Indonesian women, as it is characterised as a 
form of neo-colonialism: 
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One person who was hostile to the idea of our marriage beforehand said that 
it’s just a new form of colonialism. White people coming and marrying 
Indonesian women, you know, before they took our resources and now they 
want to take Indonesian women as well. Through having access because of 
wealth and so on. There’s a lot of mistrust of foreigners when it comes to 
marriage. One of the first questions my wife gets asked is “Does he treat you 
well?” Because there is a perception that foreigners, although they are attractive 
and have wealth and have ability and so on, basically don’t respect Indonesian 
people. 
Ahmed’s explanation supports analysis provided by the Gallup survey, which 
states that one perception that Muslims have of Westerners is that they simply 
exploit poorer nations rather than assisting them; in this case, through indirect 
means as well as via economic exploitation. If we adopt Waardenburg’s 
approach, it can be argued that this viewpoint is not simply espoused by a 
minority of non-white Muslims, but that it plays a significant role in informing 
global political discourse amongst Muslim societies. As Waardenburg states:  
The Muslim political discourse on the West is based on the experience of the 
West as a power, and its main concern is how to respond to that power.  In its 
critical form, it perceives the West as the origin of forces destructive of the 
Muslim world. In the past, colonialism was the most obvious form of the 
imperialist policies of the West. Nowadays, the latter imposes itself through 
economic, political, and cultural imperialism (2003, p. 254). 
 
The Pew Research Centre and Gallup surveys indicate that rather than being a 
marginal standpoint, the association of the West with colonialism, neo-
colonialism, imperialism and capitalist exploitation has come to form a 
normative and hegemonic discourse about the West in Muslim majority 
countries and even Muslim minorities within the West. This discourse 
undoubtedly influences the approach taken by some non-white Muslims that 
white converts are embedded in these systems of domination by virtue of their 
whiteness, casting doubt on the authenticity of their Muslim identity. 
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6.2.2 Whiteness and immorality 
A thematic analysis of the qualitative data revealed that many participants were 
told by non-white Muslims, directly or indirectly, that white people were 
immoral, depraved and/or lacking in spirituality. Stephanie indicated that it 
was primarily for this reason that she sometimes felt that some non-white 
Muslims questioned her ability to adhere to the faith. She referred to one 
incident which took place at her friend’s birthday party. The party was for 
women only, and so many of the women attending took off their scarves and 
wore more revealing clothes. Stephanie recalled: 
Some of the girls, they were just joking but they were making jokes like… Oh I 
bet you used to wear these kind of dresses all the time, you probably hooked up 
with heaps of guys… And it shouldn’t have upset me but it did ‘cause I’m just 
like, you’ve known me for almost 6 years ago, I’ve been Muslim for that long. I 
just think, will they ever just see me as someone like them or will I always be 
the girl that used to be non-Muslim. 
Stephanie emphasises that she had never been directly told by another Muslim 
that they thought she was not a real Muslim, but that it was simply a feeling 
that she got when her friends made jokes about her pre-Muslim life. Likewise, 
Fatima explained that she was often quizzed about her life pre-conversion by 
strangers as well as friends: 
I always get questions, ‘Did you used to have a boyfriend, have you had sex 
before, have you taken drugs.’ That was one of the main reasons that I 
stopped telling people I was white. They would just ask me all types of 
questions. And I just thought, well if God can forgive me for the sins I’ve 
committed beforehand and given me a fresh plate, why can’t you guys? 
Fatima’s descriptions of the types of question she was asked by some Muslim 
women indicates that in her case, other Muslims displayed an almost 
voyeuristic fascination with her life pre-Islam. In this scenario, Fatima is akin to 
an exotic zoo animal or the subject of an anthropological study. Her experiences 
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highlighted that for some non-white Muslims, white people are just as much an 
object of fascination for their perceived difference as Muslims in the West may 
be to non-Muslims, as suggested by Mohja Kahf in her monograph ‘Western 
Representations of Muslim Women’ (1997). Importantly, as well as whiteness 
being simply different to Islam, whiteness is specifically linked to immorality as 
understood in Islamic law; expressed through references to pre-marital sexual 
activity, drinking alcohol, taking drugs, and wearing clothing that is considered 
immodest according to Islamic codes of dress.  
While the Islamic concept of morality is one that is enforced through legal codes 
about what Muslims are allowed to wear, imbibe and otherwise do for the 
purposes of creating a functioning and stable society, the West is characterised 
as a place where “anything goes,” and people are driven by their own 
individual desires and whims. It is for this reason that the West and thus 
‘whiteness’ are so closely associated with immorality in the minds of some 
Muslims, which can then translate to a questioning of the faith and commitment 
of white converts to Islam: if whiteness is inextricably linked to the West, and 
the West is an immoral society incompatible with Islam, can white Muslims 
ever truly be rid of their immoral ways?  
Waardenburg provides a poetic description of the notion that the West is 
morally and spiritually deficient as it is deployed in Muslim intellectual 
traditions: 
Here, “the West” represents a world that may best be described as barbarian (a 
modern jāhilīyyah from an Islamist viewpoint). In this meaning, the West stands 
for a disintegrating society in which egoism and human solitude prevail. It is 
the land of loss of mind, where materialism reigns and where people are 
imprisoned by their desire for goods and money. It is the land of loss of soul, 
where secularity dominates and people drift without deeper norms and higher 
values. It is the land of loss of true feelings, where changing appetites are the 
norm and people fall victim to desire and lust. It is the land of loss of human 
dignity, with a value system based on economics, and where people 
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aggressively exploit each other. Finally, it is the land of metaphysical alienation 
and loss of God, with human-made idols and people who have no relationship 
to Being, nature, history, or each other (2003, p. 249). 
 
The prevailing notion of spiritual deficiency that Waardenburg alludes to can 
perhaps be theorised with reference to the operation of Christian-coded 
secularism as the dominant religious expression in Australia. It is worth noting 
that both Dede and Waardenburg do not reference whiteness in their 
discussions, but instead centre on “the West,” which I have argued previously 
is articulated through a white racial identity and Christian-centric secular 
religious identity. As I posited in section 5.3.1, Christianity in Australia works 
through secularism and “reincarnates” itself as secularism, to use the words of 
Gil Anidjar. In doing so, it positions itself as ‘the secular’, and Islam as 
‘religion.’ If we take Christianity to be racially coded as white, as I have argued 
throughout this thesis, then whiteness becomes synonymous with the secular, 
and correspondingly to a form of Christianity that intentionally masks its own 
theological core and spiritual substance and emphasises its economic and 
political functions. Anidjar highlights this when he says of Christianity, “It is 
rather a massively hegemonic - if divided, changing, and dynamic - corporate 
institution, a set of highly plastic institutions, and the sum total of philosophical 
and scientific, economic and political achievements, discursive, administrative, 
and institutional accomplishments” (2006, p. 58). The perception of a spiritual 
deficiency in the West and in whiteness can be attributed to the perception of 
spiritual deficiency in modern Christianity, which facilitates the acceptance of 
the ‘immorality’ I discussed in the previous section. 
In some extreme cases, this thinking is extrapolated to view the very presence 
of white converts as an affront to the purity of Muslim spaces. Kath described 
an incident which took place before she started wearing the headscarf: 
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I’ve had someone at the mosque scream at me and tell me I was najas and tell 
me to get out of the mosque because I was a filthy person… She just saw me as 
a convert and she saw that I had blonde hair. And I was working at another 
designer at a time, and I used to work at Kings Cross and so I’d walk down to 
Surry Hills mosque to pray jumuʿah. So she’d just seen me walking like an 
Aussie woman, and she came after me like, just saying that I was filthy. She 
told me to get out of the mosque, I couldn’t pray because I was najas. I was in 
tears, I couldn’t stop crying. I cried for four hours straight. I cried ‘til I was 
vomiting almost. She was like, pushing me out of the mosque and she was 
telling all the people at the mosque that I was dirty, that I was filthy, that I was 
a kāfir. She told me I could pray in the stairwell cos that’s where I belonged. 
 
Kath’s experience was one of the most violent and extreme of the negative 
experiences recounted by participants, and demonstrates that some non-white 
Muslims can view the very presence of a white person as a source of impurity 
and moral erosion. Kath posited that she believed it was her whiteness 
specifically which enraged the woman enough to force her out of the mosque. 
She noted that while she was not wearing a headscarf when she first entered, 
she was dressed modestly and donned one of the communal headscarves as 
soon as she walked in as many other Muslim women did, and so it was not an 
issue of her clothes but her skin colour. As well as underlining the tendency of 
some Muslims to associate whiteness with dirtiness and immorality, Kath’s 
story also supports the conclusions that Rachel Woodlock draws in her article 
on how female convert women from Melbourne engage with mosques, in 
which she argued that gendered and cultural prejudice work in tandem to limit 
convert women's access to mosques. Woodlock (2010, p. 276) posited that the 
domination of many mosques by different immigrant ethnic groups means that 
“there is no place for the culture of the Australian convert to operate” – here, 
the “Australian convert” is typically white, and is arguably restricted in her 
ability to participate in racialised religious spaces because of her whiteness. 
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It is interesting to note that the idea that whiteness is inextricably linked to 
sexual immorality only arose in my interviews with convert women. White 
men in this research project were far more likely to suggest that they were 
perceived as a threat (e.g. a potential spy) by non-white Muslims, whereas 
white women stated that they were viewed as sexually promiscuous and 
immoral. This suggests that the fear of immorality is a gendered one. Yen Le 
Espiritu’s work on Filipina Americans is illuminating in this regard, as her 
work indicates that this perception of white women is not limited to non-white 
Muslims in Australia. Le Esperitu states that the Filipina women she 
interviewed felt that “American” women (which she notes meant white 
women) were “sexually promiscuous,” and that Filipina women who were 
perceived to have “assumed the sexual mores of white women” were referred 
to as being “Americanised or Westernised” (2001, pp. 426-427). She explains 
that the denigration of white women through reference to their sexuality is a 
rejoinder to the hypersexualisation and demonisation of Filipina American 
women and Asian-American women by white Americans in general, stating 
that “racialised groups also criticise the morality of white women as a strategy 
of resistance – a means of asserting a morally superior public face to the 
dominant society” (2001, p. 416). Importantly, Le Espiritu notes that in the 
immigrant community’s attempt to “reaffirm to itself its self-worth in the face 
of economic, social, political and legal subordination” (2001, p. 436) they 
reinforce patriarchal norms and restrictions on women’s sexuality.  
Although Le Espiritu’s research occurs in a very different context to my own, it 
is possible that non-white Muslims who express curiosity or even contempt 
about women converts’ sexual histories may also have developed a negative 
view of white women’s “immoral” sexuality as a counterposition to Muslim 
women’s “pure” sexuality. This is difficult to establish based on my interview 
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data, as I only have the perspective of white converts themselves as to how 
non-white Muslims perceive them. My findings, coupled with the research of 
Le Espiritu, highlight the need for further research that addresses non-white 
Muslims themselves about how they view whiteness in relation to sexual 
morality. 
6.2.3 Whiteness as culturally void 
The final Muslim perception of the West that I wish to examine in this chapter 
is the idea that the West is culturally void, and that white people either lack in 
culture entirely or that their culture is a weak one. The idea that whiteness 
constitutes a “cultural void” is broached in Frankenberg’s ethnographic study 
of white women in the United States, where her participants described feeling 
a sense of “nothingness” and “having no people” (1993, p. 231). Frankenberg 
suggests the expression of whiteness as culturally barren is because whiteness 
is projected as “human,” and so any cultural specificity is perceived as a 
general thing that all humans do, whereas aspects of other cultures are clearly 
and racially marked as ‘different.’ Thus, the perception that whiteness exists in 
a cultural void is closely related to the idea that whiteness is considered by 
white people to be both normal and natural, a notion that has been explored in 
great depth in the whiteness studies literature, as I reviewed in section 2.4. 
There is far less literature that speaks to the question of whether people who 
are racialised as non-white also view whiteness as culturally void. As I have 
explained earlier in section 2.4, scholars such as bell hooks and W.E.B. Du Bois 
have stated that whiteness is invisible and racially neutral only to white 
people, and that members of racialised groups are acutely aware of the 
existence and operation of whiteness as a racial identity. In this literature, 
however, the question of whether white people are perceived to have a 
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‘culture’ is not addressed. Unfortunately, this question cannot be addressed by 
this research project either, as I did not interview non-white Muslims about 
their perception of whiteness and white people. What the interview data I 
collected does show is that at least one of the white converts in this study 
believed that non-white Muslims saw them as lacking culture by virtue of their 
whiteness, in comparison to non-white people who had strong cultural 
practices and values.  In contrast to the two previous constructions of the West 
which position whiteness as incompatible to Islam, the idea that whiteness is 
culturally deficient is one that works in favour for white Muslim converts, 
insofar as it can be argued that a ‘weaker’ culture is easier to assimilate into a 
‘strong’ culture that is underpinned by centuries of tradition, rituals and 
customs. Fatima raises this perspective in the interview, stating that people in 
the Pakistani community that she had married into generally felt it was easier 
for a white person to convert to Islam than someone from a non-white 
background who already had strong cultural ties to another culture or religion: 
In Pakistan there is this idea that East Asians have a strong culture, whereas 
lots of people don’t so much have a strong culture. That it is harder to marry an 
Asian convert because they’re already coming into with it these strong cultural 
values, whereas when you marry a Western convert they pretty much give up 
their Western culture at the door, they leave it at the door. It’s harder for an 
East Asian convert to leave their culture and come into an Islamic culture or be 
a part of Pakistani culture because those cultures will also be at odds.  
When asked why Western culture was seen as being easy to leave “at the door,” 
she clarified:  
I think to a large extent a lot of Pakistanis see the West as not really being a 
strong culture, they see it as a young culture, a culture that changes with every 
generation… I think there is the idea that the West is sort of fluid and sort of 
young and is very multicultural and heterogeneous and have people with all 
these different ideas, and that thereby makes it a weaker culture in a sense 
because you get all these different people with different views and often 
opposing views.  
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Fatima’s reflections suggest that for some Muslims, white converts may be 
seen as more malleable and impressionable than converts from non-white 
backgrounds because their culture is ‘young’ and heterogeneous. In this 
context, whiteness becomes a virtue rather than a barrier to fully accepting 
Islam and adopting racialised customs associated with the cultural practices of 
Islam. In Fatima’s quotation, the West is used synonymously with ‘white,’ as 
the Pakistani people she refers to also live in the West but do not associate 
themselves or East Asians with being Western. Fatima’s suggestion is 
illuminating in the light of my previous discussion of secularism in Chapter 
Five. There, I posited Anidjar’s theory that Christianity and secularism 
coalesce as one in Western societies; in Anidjar’s words, they “function 
together as covers, strategic devices and mechanisms of obfuscation and self-
blinding, doing so in such a way that it remains difficult, if not impossible, to 
extricate them from each other - or us from either of them - as if by fiat” 
(Anidjar 2006, p. 62). If we take the premise that Christianity is the religious 
articulation of whiteness, as I have argued in previous chapters, and we also 
agree with Anidjar that Christianity has successfully reincarnated itself as 
secularism in the modern era, then the culture of whiteness may indeed seem 
‘young’ and culturally vacuous, despite the fact that Christianity is several 
centuries older than Islam. This is further supported by the historical analysis 
of Christian and secularism offered by Smith, where he argues that 
“Christianity has always been a religion with a fluid, evolving identity – it has 
a history of changing shape” (2007, p. 7). Anidjar suggests that the current 
manifestation of Christianity was manufactured in an attempt to remain 
relevant in the wake of rapid social change and a decline in Church attendance 
in the West, and by its reinvention of itself as “new” secularism, successfully 
obscured its theological lineage.  
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The key change in the current reincarnation of Christianity – secularism - is, 
according to Smith, the separation of Christian doctrine from Christian ethics 
(2007, p. 7). Smith posits that Christian ethics is central to Western secularism, 
apparent in “the ongoing commitment to do good, understood in traditional 
Christian terms, without a concern for the technicalities of the teachings of the 
Church” (Smith 2007, p. 3). In the absence of Christian doctrine, what remains 
is somewhat vague and abstract – there is little in the way of practical 
guidelines for how one should “do good.” This alone goes a long way to 
explaining Fatima’s suggestion that some Muslims view the culture of the 
West/whiteness as culturally vacant or deficient. If customs, symbols, beliefs 
and norms of behaviour are as important to culture as values are, and the 
Christian West has largely discarded all but the latter (as suggested by Smith), 
then it is not surprising that adherents of a religion that places significant 
emphasis on day-to-day rituals and practices may find the West to be 
culturally deficient. The importance of Christian doctrine to the establishment 
of Western culture is also articulated by Smith later in his book when he states 
that the development of Christian doctrine as distinct from Judaism was in 
large part due to a desire to distinguish Christians culturally from Jews. He 
notes that the new religion of Christianity sought to distance itself from the 
Jewish identity of Jesus of Nazareth, because “many non-Jews were not 
prepared to become culturally Jewish” (2007, p. 73). It is clear from his analysis 
of early Christianity that Christian doctrine played a large role in shaping the 
culture of the West, and by association, whiteness. 
Fatima was the only participant who explicitly expressed that her interactions 
with other Muslims had indicated that white people were viewed as being 
culturally deficient. However, some participants described that non-white 
Muslims would often expect them to immediately drop their own cultural 
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traditions and traits, such as their name, in favour of another culture’s 
practices, as though their pre-existing culture did not have much tenacity. 
Some of these experiences are explored more thoroughly in section 6.4 where I 
discuss expectations of converts. Additionally, as I will illustrate in Chapter 
Seven, some of the participants described themselves as being acultural, and 
indicated that they were able to practice a more ‘pure’ Islam than non-white 
Muslims who are held back by cultural baggage. In contrast, other participants 
who expressed a feeling of cultural dearth adopted the cultural traditions, 
customs, and sometimes language of another ethnic group because they felt 
that it made their transition into the Muslim community smoother and less 
contested. 
 
6.3 Muslim Reactions to White Converts 
Participants in this research project spoke about encountering a diverse range of 
responses when other Muslims found out that they were Muslim converts and 
also white. The most common response was to be asked why they converted, 
but other reactions included disbelief, glorification, suspicion and scepticism 
about their religiosity. In this section, I contend that these different and in some 
cases even contradictory reactions all hinge on the idea that whiteness and 
Islam are if not diametrically opposed, then at the very least they are 
inconsonant. In the introduction to this chapter, I offered two theories for why 
this notion exists in the minds of Muslims, and suggested that it had less to do 
with Muslims internalising an Orientalist view of Islam than it did with Muslim 
perceptions of the West, developed over a number of centuries. This section will 
help illustrate this theory in the context of white converts’ engagements with 
the Muslim community in Sydney, Australia.  Rather than whiteness being 
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celebrated in the stories that participants recounted, whiteness is instead most 
often articulated as a site of superficiality, immorality and privilege gained 
through colonialism and foreign interventions; a social location lacking in 
culture and human connection. In the following sections, I will detail how this 
notion is expressed to white converts through non-white Muslims’ responses to 
finding out that they are Muslims. 
6.3.1 Questions about conversion 
A common experience amongst participants with regards to their contact with 
other Muslims was being asked about their reasons for converting. Many 
participants stated that as white Muslims, they felt that they “stood out” at 
mosques and other spaces and events that Muslims frequented, as they formed 
a clear and visible minority. These same participants suggested that because 
they were white, Muslims often assumed they were converts and thus the 
question of why they converted was one that they faced on a regular basis from 
Muslims. Two of the participants, Stephanie and Imogen, posited that it was 
only occasionally that they were asked about their conversion story, and that 
they were happy to share their story when asked. Stephanie expressed that she 
viewed it as her duty to both Muslims and non-Muslims; in her words, to 
“inspire” the former and “educate” the latter. Similarly, Imogen explained that 
she saw it as a form of da’wah, which literally translates from Arabic to mean 
“invitation” and is used in this context to refer to an invitation to Islam; in other 
words, a form of proselytising. Here, Imogen does not just mean preaching to 
non-Muslims, but also to Muslims, stating: “I think it’s important… other 
Muslims, sometimes people lose their way and when they meet someone like 
me who has taken this step, it’s inspiring. They tell me, I reminded them about 
what they love about their dīn. That’s a big responsibility, and an honour too.” 
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Importantly, both Imogen and Stephanie were relatively new Muslims at the 
time of interview, having converted less than a year earlier. It is very possible 
that they had yet to reach the saturation point described by converts who had 
been Muslim for some years. This latter group of participants were far more 
likely to find the abundance of questions they were asked about their 
“conversion stories” irritating.  Some of them, like Belinda, tolerated it as part 
and parcel of being a convert. Belinda suggested that other Muslims found the 
stories of converts inspiring, and that it motivated them to practice their 
religion with more consistency.  For this reason, she was willing to endure the 
constant stream of questions: 
We all hate when people ask us, how did you convert? Or, why did you 
convert? It’s such an annoying question. Like, we don’t care why anyone else 
converted. Islam speaks for itself. It makes sense... But I feel like we shouldn’t 
ever be anti- that. We should always use it as an opportunity to talk to people 
cos it inspires people that are brought up Muslims. 
Like Stephanie and Imogen, Belinda refers to the ‘inspirational’ aspect of 
conversion stories, and cites this as the reason she consents to the seemingly 
unceasing queries she receives from other Muslims.  While Belinda reluctantly 
accepts the questions because of a sense of duty to other Muslims, participants 
such as Ibrahim expressed frustration at what he called “the Muslim 
Inquisition”: being interrogated frequently about his reasons for converting, 
often by people he had only just met. Ibrahim, who had converted at the age of 
19 some sixteen years before the interview, stated that he disliked being asked 
about his conversion because it was a constant reminder to him that he was 
viewed as an outsider by other Muslims, and that his Muslim identity always 
had to be qualified by the term “convert.” When asked whether he is still 
questioned about his conversion story today, Ibrahim replied: 
Yes. All the time. Or at least it feels like that. Probably less than when I first 
converted. I’ve lived in Sydney for most of that time so I know a lot of people in 
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the community and they don’t ask anymore. But now and then I’ll meet 
someone new who’ll come in all eager and - “Brother, can I please ask, why did 
you convert?” And I just want to yell or something, I mean I’ve been Muslim 
almost half my life, probably for longer than these kids have been out of 
diapers. 
Ibrahim adds that if he was not white he would not have to endure these 
questions, and expressed frustration at the fact that his whiteness singles him 
out for special treatment. He noted that non-white friends of his who had 
converted to Islam far more recently were able to “fly under the radar,” while 
he “stick[s] out like a sore thumb.” Ibrahim recognised that his whiteness is 
constituted as different and Other in the context of Muslim communities, a 
realisation that makes him uncomfortable. His interview suggests that his 
irritation has less to do with the volume of questions he is asked about his 
conversion and more to do with the fact that such questions reinforce to him 
that he is a raced individual, and that amongst Muslims his whiteness does not 
afford him the racial invisibility he is accustomed to. Ibrahim finds this 
exposure confronting precisely because he had never considered himself to be 
white previously, which he alludes to later in the interview; in response to a 
question about how he articulates his white identity, Ibrahim responds: “I don’t 
know… I don’t, it’s not like I see myself as white. I’m just me. I still don’t. That 
doesn’t stop others from thinking I’m white though. I mean, I am white, I 
guess.” His hesitation about self-identifying as white is tempered in this 
quotation by his reluctant admission that he is in fact white, and that non-white 
Muslims view him as white, as evidenced by their assumption that Ibrahim is a 
convert and their continued references to him being a convert, a situation that 
frustrated Ibrahim. 
Questions about conversion function as a reminder to white converts that they 
are seen as different to other, non-white converts, and may even be perceived as 
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outsiders. For most of the white converts interviewed, this sense of “not 
belonging” comes as a surprise, and for some like Ibrahim, even an affront to 
their sense of how they should be treated. The unsettling feeling of being an 
outsider is heightened because their lived experience of whiteness prior to 
becoming Muslim was a racially invisible, normative one. When they realise 
that their whiteness marks them as different in the context of Muslim 
communities that are largely made up of non-white racialised groups and 
attracts extra attention as a result, some participants experience frustration and 
annoyance at being racially marked. 
6.3.2 ‘Always the convert’ 
As well as being asked about their conversion story, the participants of this 
research project were exposed to a range of other responses about their 
conversion, including surprise, joy, reverence, suspicion and dismissal.  For 
many participants, their conversion to Islam and subsequent engagement with 
the Sydney Muslim community emphasised to them that in some cultural 
spaces within Sydney, their whiteness acted like a neon sign identifying them 
as foreign, as Other, as raced where they had previously seen themselves as 
unraced. Some, like Katherine, posited that their whiteness meant that they 
would never be accepted as “just Muslim.” Katherine identified that her 
whiteness played a fundamental role in the immutability of her convert status, 
suggesting that as a white Muslim her convert identity is forever attached to 
her. When asked if she would ever stop being the convert, Katherine stated: 
No, not ever. Not in my whole life, no. In fact, I know kids of converts who 
are my age who have always been Muslim. Doesn’t matter, they are always 
the convert - even though they’re not the convert at all. 
Like other participants who expressed similar thoughts about their convert 
status, Katherine is resigned to the inevitability of always being “the convert.” 
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When questioned further as to what being a convert represents to other 
Muslims, Katherine contends that converts are more likely to be dismissed as 
ignorant, even if the opinions that they express are also expressed by born 
Muslims: 
Especially if you’re saying something which is different to what they’re saying 
– even though it might be still a mainstream Muslim opinion, the reason you 
hold it is ‘cause you’re a convert is the assumption made. And you know, you 
just don’t know and you can’t read Qur’an properly. And to be honest, I agree 
with the idea that the Qur’an is an Arabic text and in English you’ll never know 
it as well as if you were reading it in Arabic. But at the same time there is 
definitely the, “You don’t know as much, you’re a convert” kind of thing. 
Katherine’s thoughts are mirrored by a number of other participants who also 
suggest that to some Muslims, their whiteness and corresponding unshakeable 
convert status renders them as spiritually inferior and religiously naïve. Henry 
stated that he felt he was constantly being reminded by non-white Muslims that 
they expected him to know less than they did in matters of religion: 
I couldn’t tell you how many times people have asked me if I knew how to pray 
or that I need to wash myself with water after I’ve been to the loo or… I 
honestly couldn’t tell you. It would be a lot of times though, that’s for sure. It’s 
hard, being treated like a kid when you’re in your 30’s. I’m getting kind of sick 
of it. 
Henry’s quotation calls attention to what he views as a paternalistic attitude 
towards white converts like himself. Intrinsic to this approach to white converts 
is first the assumption that they are a convert to Islam, as well as an assumption 
of ignorance on the part of the convert. In Henry’s case, the assumption was 
made even before the other person had asked him how long he had been 
Muslim for. For Omar, it did not matter if they knew how long ago he had 
converted, it was still assumed that he was uneducated about the Islamic 
religion. Omar rattled off a long list of situations in which complete strangers 
such as taxi drivers, waiters and people that he met at parties asked him if he 
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was familiar with some of the most fundamental of Islamic beliefs and practices 
– even after he told them that he had been Muslim for over 18 years.  
They ask me if I know that alcohol is ḥarām, if I fast during Ramadan, if I have 
memorised al-Fātiḥah… It’s unbelievable. You may have been Muslim for 
longer than they have been an adult but it doesn’t matter, they will still 
question your knowledge of Islam. They ask if I pray at the mosque. They ask if 
I’m circumcised. It’s never-ending. 
Omar acknowledged that there was no ill intent behind the questions, but 
admitted that they still irritated him because of the assumptions that they 
revealed about converts – that converts are more ignorant than those raised 
Muslim, and that they will take far longer to learn about Islam.  
While most of the interviewees acknowledged that their understanding of Islam 
was more limited than the Muslims they knew when they first converted, with 
the exception of those who had spent a long time researching and studying 
Islam before they took shahādah, those who had been Muslim for some years 
questioned the patronising attitude which some Muslims took towards them, 
and expressed disapproval at the inference that they were Islamically ignorant.  
In reference to the phenomenon of white converts being assumed to be ignorant 
regardless of how long they had been Muslim, Daniel observed: “If you're a 
Turk from Turkey most people are not going to come up to you and be like, 'Do 
you know how to pray?' or 'Have you been on Ḥajj?'” Daniel added that the 
assumption was founded on the misconceived notion that someone from an 
“Islamised culture” was automatically a more knowledgeable and more pious 
Muslim. He recounted, “I've had Muslims tell me that Muslims have been able 
to assimilate other cultures into... like, Islamise other cultures, but this modern, 
Western, whitish culture is something different and it can never be 
assimilated.”  
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Other participants expressed similar views, suggesting that they felt that their 
whiteness was viewed by non-white Muslims to be a barrier to their full 
comprehension of Islam, regardless of the amount of religious education they 
received, as though the limits of their religiosity and religious knowledge was 
racially determined. The more a convert is able to “shed” their whiteness, 
presumably by adopting the customs and traditions of a culture that is 
racialised in Australia, the more they will be accepted and treated as real 
Muslims, and the less their knowledge of the faith will be questioned. Daniel 
also indicated that the inverse is true – that the more a convert demonstrates 
their commitment to the religion of Islam, the less likely they are to be viewed 
as white by other Muslims. He illustrated his point by recounting an incident in 
which a Muslim friend told him that he no longer saw Daniel as white. Daniel 
stated that his friend had intended the comment to be a compliment to Daniel, 
and testament to the fact that he had fully embraced Islam and had managed to 
offset or offload his whiteness. 
Connected to this notion of converts as inherently ignorant about Islam was the 
idea that converts did not have as much of a right to question or challenge 
things that they saw take place within the community amongst people who 
were raised Muslim. As Katherine stated in an earlier quotation in this section, 
it did not matter if she was simply citing a mainstream scholarly opinion – if it 
was contradictory to what a born Muslim opined, it was likely to be ignored or 
challenged.  Imogen stated that she had experienced this phenomenon time and 
time again, and added that she felt this was amplified because she was a 
woman:  
I’m more confident now to speak out about things I disagree with but especially 
when I was younger, I might question something that someone did or said and 
say, ‘but hang on, that’s not what Islam says about’ - whatever it might be, 
whether it’s polygamy or… and people would tell me that I didn’t understand 
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because I was a convert, I hadn’t been Muslim for long enough. No one said it 
was because I was a woman but I definitely felt the implication was there. A 
convert challenging something your community has been doing for years is bad 
enough but a female convert? That’s just not on. 
 
Like Imogen, Florian expressed frustration at not being able to question things 
amongst certain groups of Muslims, particularly as he felt that type of thinking 
was antithetical to the way he had been raised in France.  
The thing that I don't like is sometimes when you ask questions, people just tell 
you the answer, like take it or leave it. I'm not really used to that kind of 
thinking… the tone is more like, ‘Anyway you're just a convert so this is the 
answer, you better live with it. So that's some of the typical tone you know. 
And then in the end you start saying to yourself, yeah okay, then I won't ask 
questions. 
 
In the above examples, the presumed ignorance of the Muslim converts 
interviewed is arguably heightened by their whiteness. By that I mean that not 
only are they assumed to be uneducated about Islam because they are converts, 
but their whiteness is viewed as a barrier to them ever transcending their 
convert status. Non-white converts can blend in with other non-white Muslims 
in the Sydney community over time, and eventually no longer need to identify 
themselves as a convert unless they want to or some specific situation arises 
involving their family or previous faith community; in contrast, white converts 
are irrevocably identifiable as different by virtue of their appearance.  
Additionally, as exemplified in the quotations by Katherine, Imogen and 
Florian, contentions raised by white converts are automatically viewed as 
originating from a place of ignorance, or even Western arrogance – as 
highlighted in a story told by Imogen in which she questioned a particular 
Islamic ruling about women and was told by another Muslim woman to “leave 
[her] Western feminist ego at the door.” 
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In the above situations, the racial identity of white converts becomes 
essentialised; their whiteness is seen as fixed and immovable, and thus white 
converts become subjected to the same racialising processes that non-white 
people are. Rather than being racialised as non-white, as some of the 
experiences documented in Chapter Five related, white converts are made 
acutely aware of their white racial subjectivity through their engagement with 
non-white Muslims. For many participants, this is a disorientating and 
unsettling realisation, a phenomenon which several scholars of whiteness 
studies have documented through their own empirical research on the lived 
experience of whiteness (Durie 2003, Fasching-Varner et al 2012, Frankenberg 
1993) and which I will comment upon in detail in Chapter Seven. The 
engagements of white converts to Islam with non-white Muslims is particularly 
illuminating because their whiteness is seen as a barrier to their access to and 
knowledge of “authentic Islam,” indicating that not only do the non-white 
Muslims referred to in this section see white converts as being irrevocably 
white, but they also view Islam as being an inherently non-white religion. 
In addition to the ideas that white converts are ignorant about Islam and have 
less authority to question non-white Muslims about their religious practice or 
knowledge, another common perception of white converts related by 
participants was that white converts were potentially always just a step away 
from leaving the religion or falling into sin, and that they were more vulnerable 
as a result of their whiteness. Michelle commented that often the non-white 
Muslims she met implied that they didn’t believe that she and other white 
converts could ever be truly Muslim, or truly practising, because their culture 
was so far removed from that of Muslim cultures and was mired by immorality, 
a notion that I explored in section 6.2.2. As Michelle stated: 
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So there’s a lot of thought that you can never really get out of the habit of being 
white, of being a non-Muslim, such that people think that you’re always gonna 
want to drink, or that you’re gonna wanna eat pork, or do other things that 
non-Muslims supposedly do all the time. Or do immoral things, for example. 
Michelle suggests that this frame of thinking is divisive and harmful to relations 
between Muslims as it presupposes that religiosity can be determined through 
birthright rather than through an individuals’ actions and intentions.  A 
number of participants mentioned similar experiences with people who felt that 
because they were white, they were susceptible to lapsing into ḥarām acts at any 
moment. As one participant, James put it: “On one hand, they might say 
‘MāshāʾAllāh, subḥān’Allāh you are better than us!’ and kiss your feet. And 
then another group of people are just waiting for you to make one wrong move 
so they can say, ‘Aha! I told you he wasn’t a real Muslim.’” All of the 
participants who referenced such experiences linked the latter attitude 
specifically with the fact that they were white, which they thought some 
Muslims viewed as a barrier to being a ‘true Muslim’ because of the perceived 
cultural difference between Islam and whiteness. White converts were thus seen 
by some to be more likely to leave the religion than those who were raised in 
Muslim families. Oftentimes this arose in interviews in relation to discussions 
of marriage. Xander described the difficulties he faced when he approached his 
wife’s family about marriage as being “all about the fact that I was white”: 
I think her family would have had an issue with anyone who wasn’t Indonesian 
but it was like, ten times worse that I was white. They didn’t trust me. First they 
didn’t, they thought that I would be some kind of extreme zealot who would 
force Zeynab into a niqāb or something, then they thought I would, I don’t 
know, like… corrupt her or something. Turn her into an alcoholic, I don’t 
know… It was always the two extremes. And I’m over here like, well which is 
it, am I too religious or not religious enough? 
The responses that Xander identified arose frequently in the interview data. 
While Xander found that his whiteness was a barrier to marriage because non-
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white Muslims associated his whiteness and “Aussieness” with ḥarām activities, 
such as drinking alcohol, Michelle found that her whiteness attracted Muslims 
who wanted a wife who would participate in such activities. She uses the 
example of her ex-husband to demonstrate her point. She recalls that soon after 
they were married he told her to take off her scarf, and insisted that she had to 
listen to him because he was her husband. His demands escalated quickly; he 
began to try and persuade her to go to clubs with him, drink alcohol, and take 
drugs. When Michelle refused and told him that she had never taken drugs or 
drunk even before she became Muslim, he threatened to force her by putting 
ecstasy in her drink. Michelle suggests that he and other men like him choose to 
marry white converts because they think that white women will be more likely 
to condone and practise impermissible acts themselves, so the men can look 
respectable in front of their families whilst committing sins with the support of 
their wives. Michelle states that his expectations were completely misguided, as 
she had a relatively conservative, strict upbringing where no one drank in the 
house because her parents were both religious Christians. She observed 
however that even when she tells other people this, “Muslims still think I've 
had this wild upbringing where I've been allowed to do what I like... Because 
I'm Australian they have these ideas about you.” Michelle’s story highlights the 
assumption that many Muslims make about white converts and their 
perception that they have a predisposition to ḥarām activities, and thus must 
work harder and be more visibly religious to prove that they are not going to 
revert to un-Islamic practices. 
A less common, but more malicious response that arose in the interview data 
was suspicion that government spies were masquerading as converts to get 
information about Muslims. Florian framed this attitude as something that was 
not necessarily expressed directly, but was implicit in their language and 
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behaviour. He gives the example of a joke that was made amongst people at the 
mosque he frequents about Florian being a spy. Although he knew that it was a 
joke and told in good-humour, he felt that it revealed a subtle but pervasive 
belief that “there's two types of Muslims, there's the true one and the one that 
comes after.” Florian indicates here that as a white convert, his commitment to 
Islam will always be questioned, even as a “joke,” because he comes from a 
culture that does not have centuries of Islamic tradition behind it, and where 
Islam is still marginalised. 
Liam was accused of being a spy the most often out of the participants, which 
could be attributed to the fact that his multilingual skills drew attention. He 
recounted: 
You have some who are suspicious, who ask why. Particularly in Auburn, I had 
some Iraqis going around saying I was a Mossad spy. Like spreading rumours 
around that, ‘Who is this white guy?’ It was very suspicious. ‘Why has this 
white guy become a Muslim’ and ‘why does he speak this language, he must be 
working for ASIO’ and there were some Indonesians saying I was with ASIO. 
 
Liam’s story highlights the oftentimes deep-rooted suspicion that some 
Muslims have of government agencies in Australia and overseas. Here, Liam’s 
ability to speak multiple languages other than English, including Indonesian, 
Dari and Bengali, is viewed as dubious rather than praiseworthy. Liam’s 
exhibition of his knowledge of Islam and majority Muslim cultures contradicts 
the notion that some Muslims hold about white converts’ ignorance, which then 
casts suspicion on him as he seems too knowledgeable, even in comparison to 
born Muslims.  
6.3.3 Glorification of whiteness 
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Throughout the interviews, many participants expressed that they were subject 
to two extreme reactions from Muslims, summed up in this quote by James 
used in the previous section: “On one hand, they might say ‘Masha’Allah, 
subḥān’Allāh, you are better than us!’ and kiss your feet. And then another 
group of people are just waiting for you to make one wrong move so they can 
say, ‘Aha! I told you he wasn’t a real Muslim.’” These two sides of the spectrum 
are representative of two different but arguably related conceptualisations of 
whiteness that tenaciously position whiteness as oppositional to Islam. Put in 
another way, the idea that being a white Muslim is somehow a novel or 
particularly strange occurrence worthy of special praise effectively essentialises 
the concept of whiteness and constructs it as something indelibly unfamiliar to 
Islam and Muslims. However, while the construction of white converts as being 
inauthentic Muslims considers the barrier between whiteness and Muslimness 
to be insurmountable, the glorification of white converts indicates that the leap 
is achievable, it simply takes extraordinary levels of commitment and piety, 
which should be celebrated. 
 
Belinda stated that Muslims were overwhelmingly joyful and supportive when 
they found out that she was Muslim, and that she had never had a single bad 
reaction. 
Muslims loooove a convert! They just love us! *laughs* You don’t have to do 
anything, you don’t have to say anything, nothing. It’s just the fact that you’re a 
revert. It’s the fact that you’ve put aside a lot of your life to change into this 
religion. I find it’s very inspiring for people, because people always – like a lot 
of people have said to me, ‘Oh I’ve had a good hard look at myself’, or ‘I need 
to consider what I’m doing with my life, the fact that a born Aussie would 
choose this religion and now prays, fasts, loves it so much, has this passion for 
it.’ Man, they’re just so supportive. You can’t imagine anyone being more 
supportive of anything. 
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Katherine described a similar reaction, but added that she was not as patient as 
others may be. When asked how people reacted to her, she said:  
Firstly just overwhelmingly positive, generally. Everyone is like, ‘Oh that’s so 
great. People really want to know, really really want to hear about it, want to 
talk about it, that kind of thing, to a point where it’s quite frustrating. I know 
some converts who are really great with it, really patient, but I’m not and I kind 
of get sick of it really quickly and don’t want to talk about it, and just want to 
be a Muslim and not be the convert.  
Katherine added that she found that reaction problematic. Like Belinda, she 
recognised that she was a source of inspiration for other Muslims who felt that 
they should be doing more to practice their religion, in the face of someone who 
had taken the significant step of converting to Islam. Unlike Belinda, however, 
it made Katherine uncomfortable, because she felt that such a reaction assumed 
that converts were always going to be more pious and more devout, without 
examining the actual character of the person in question. While sometimes such 
a reaction was manifest through the implicit words and actions of the person in 
question, other participants discussed being directly told by other Muslims that 
they were “better” than them because they had changed religions. In the words 
of Michelle, “There’s a group of people who always, no matter what, when they 
meet you they’re like – ‘Wow, you’re a convert, that’s so amazing. You’re 
getting more rewards than us. You’re so much better than us as a Muslim.’ 
Which is kind of uncomfortable because it puts a lot of pressure to be the 
perfect Muslim and to be very devout.”  
A number of participants described feeling pressure to be very pious and adopt 
certain cultural customs, and these are explored in greater depth in section 6.4. 
Importantly, however, these expectations of converts are amplified due to their 
whiteness. They are not considered more pious simply for having chosen Islam 
as an adult despite being raised in another faith, but because whiteness is 
viewed as culturally incongruous with Islam. Participants were thus seen to 
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have made a larger leap, so to speak, than converts from non-white 
backgrounds, and were heralded as superior Muslims for that reason.  
Participants like Michelle and Katherine stated that the extra attention they 
received because of their whiteness made them uncomfortable, because they 
wanted to fit in and not be seen as the convert. In contrast, Paul remarked that 
he would “get a kick out of” telling people that he was Muslim, and did so 
often in order to witness their reactions: 
It's generally happy surprise. Sometimes real, generally real joy… And then 
other times it's like, “Really?” There's the full gamut of things.  Probably when 
you travel, that's the biggest one. Or when you take a taxi and the guy's from 
Tripoli or something. I used to take delight actually at that. Now I've realised 
it's kind of, just chill out. But I used to really be like, “Yeah I'm Muslim! Yeah 
you didn't know that, huh!” And surprise people. I'd try to show off how 
Muslim you are by saying “māshāʾAllāh” and... You know now I'm just like, 
whatever man. Alḥamdulillāh. Just try not to belittle them for not knowing or 
whatever. 
‘Joy’ and ‘excitement’ were two emotions that commonly arose in participants’ 
descriptions of born Muslims’ reactions to hearing of their conversion. When 
asked why they thought people responded with such joy at meeting a convert, 
participants identified validation as being one of the primary causes. Indeed, 
the hypothesis that Muslims enjoy hearing convert stories because they validate 
their own belief systems was one that arose time and time again throughout the 
interviews. While some participants viewed it as a positive thing, like Paul, 
others expressed that they felt that converts’ personal experiences were 
exploited in the process. Liam pointed out that the reaction he got when he first 
told another Muslim that he had converted to Islam was, “Oh great, you’re the 
new pin up boy,” a response that he actively challenged: 
I didn’t have a bar of it. I was like, ‘No, I’m not going up there saying all this 
stuff.’ I’m not going to be advertising that I’ve become a Muslim. Because this 
246 
 
has been a journey between me and Allah, and it’s an ongoing journey. I 
haven’t ‘arrived’. 
Liam explained that his reason for resisting the role of ‘pin up boy’ was because 
he felt that Muslims had particular expectations of conversion stories which he 
did not meet, and he did not want to perpetuate those expectations. 
I always get this question of, ‘So how did you feel when you became a 
Muslim?’ And I’m always like, I didn’t feel anything different. ‘Well, what do 
you mean? But we hear all these stories about people who cry’… and I’m like 
well they might, but I had a relationship with God long before. This has been an 
addition, a development, a moving further onward and upward in my journey, 
my spiritual journey, but it didn’t begin here. I didn’t have some sort of magic 
change. It was more of an intellectual shift. So I was like, I’m not going to be the 
pin up boy, I’m sorry. I felt like I was going to be exploited. 
In this quotation, Liam posits two reasons for his refusal to be a ‘pin up boy’. 
Firstly, Liam emphasised that his conversion narrative did not fit the model 
sought by born Muslims in which there was a sudden and fundamental shift in 
belief and worldview in the mentality of the convert. Writing about American 
converts, Canadian sociologist of religion Mahdi Tourage argued that despite 
the complexity of conversion narratives (which I have detailed in some depth in 
chapter 4), the “reproduced narratives of conversion often conform to a 
reductive predetermined script” (Tourage 2012, p. 211). Tourage contends that 
the popularised conversion narratives of prominent white American convert 
scholars often fit these scripts – or are moulded to fit these scripts – which I 
argue contribute to the same expectation of all converts. Speaking of the 
conversion narratives of some of the most popular and influential white male 
Muslim scholars in America, sometimes even nicknamed as “celebrity 
shaykhs,” Tourage (2012, p. 209) writes: 
The biographical details of Shaikh Hamza Yusuf traces the origins of his ‘search 
for meaning’ to a serious car accident and near-death head-on collision in 1977 
when he was just starting Junior College (Unauthorized Biography 2011). A 
similar older narrative circulating among Muslims is that of Cat Stevens, a.k.a. 
Yusuf Islam, whose search for ‘truth’ began in hospital when he was very ill 
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with TB at the height of his fame as a pop star (Amman 2008), or according to a 
YouTube video in a near-death experience of drowning in the ocean (Cat 
Stevens’ Transition to Yusuf Islam 2006). Another prominent white convert 
from the world of music, Imam Suhaib Webb, was introduced to Islam at the 
age of 19 while selling music tapes. He received a copy of the Qur’an from a 
Muslim man selling incense and handing out copies of the Qur’an. According to 
a recent article in the LA Times, his mother Mary Lynn Webb credits his 
conversion for saving him from the fate that awaited him in the rap world 
(Abdulrahim 2011). 
 
It is exactly this format of conversion narrative that Liam stated was expected of 
him, and which he actively resists. This brings me to the second point that Liam 
makes, which is that he feels that born Muslims want to exploit his story in 
order to validate their own belief in Islam. The expectation of particular 
conversion narratives and performances of piety from converts in order to 
validate born Muslims’ own commitment to Islam was a recurring theme in the 
interviews, and is discussed in detail in section 6.4.1. Liam additionally 
identified that whiteness plays a large role in the validation process: 
Every conversion is a validation. It’s a justification or validation that we’re 
right. Our community’s right. And of course there’s going to be a natural high 
or enthusiasm that a Muslim feels when they hear of someone who has – well 
it’s interpreted as okay you’ve entered the faith, they’ve accepted Islam, what 
that means is “We’re right.” They’re justifying, validating us even further…. 
And the first thing they wanna do is put you up there on a pulpit and preach to 
the world that I’m a Muslim and Islam is true. And the assumptions about 
white and power is that, ‘Well he’s white. Being a convert is a huge thing for 
this person to achieve, which again adds weight to our story.’ 
In his explanation, Liam observes that white converts are highly coveted for a 
variety of reasons. White people hold more power in a white supremacist 
society like Australia than non-white people (Hage 1998; Moreton-Robinson 
2009), and white converts are thus more likely to be listened to by non-Muslims 
and Muslims alike. He suggests that non-white Muslims leverage the power 
and privilege of whiteness in order to spread the message of Islam to a larger 
audience. In doing so, Liam places the blame on non-white Muslims for what 
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he perceives to be the exploitation of his white privilege. Non-white Muslims 
who see him as source of validation because of his whiteness are the target of 
his ire, rather than the racial schemas that extol whiteness to the exclusion of 
other racialised identities. Indeed, as is shown later on in Chapter Seven, Liam 
is insistent that he doesn’t have white privilege due to his low socio-economic 
background, while simultaneously claiming that non-white Muslims attempt to 
exploit the cultural capital whiteness affords him. 
As well as white converts fulfilling the role of ‘validators’ of the religion, the 
perceived cultural difference between Islam and whiteness adds credence to the 
stories of white converts because it is assumed that they would have had to 
make significant lifestyle and relationship changes in order to embrace Islam, 
which indicates a greater mental shift, greater commitment and ultimately 
greater faith than a convert from a non-white background. Katherine 
commented on this phenomenon as well, basing her observations on the fact 
that whiteness is dominant in Australia. She explained that reactions from 
Muslims towards her have been “overwhelmingly positive… just really 
positive. Too positive sometimes.” When asked why she thinks that is the case, 
she replies: 
Just validation. I think it all comes down to validation. As a vilified minority in 
a society, to see that someone from the dominant mainstream has rejected the 
dominant mainstream and come to it is kind of an affirmation of the choice to 
be a Muslim. And I get that. When I see other people who have converted who I 
really aspire to be like or think are really great, I get that. Like, “Yeah, they’re a 
Muslim! Hah!” 
Michelle was another participant who suggested that her conversion was 
validating for other Muslims. Michelle had been a convert for 12 years at the 
time of interview, and had in those 12 years been asked for her conversion story 
countless times by strangers. She spoke about the most recent time she had told 
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her conversion story in public, at an event for Islamic Awareness Week at a 
university: 
A lot of people came up to me afterwards to tell me that they were really 
inspired, and I could see people while I was talking nodding along with me and 
smiling, but I guess it was a much better experience for them than it was for me. 
And I’m happy that people got to hear my story but in a way I feel like it’s not 
my story anymore. It’s other people’s story and they benefit from it more than I 
do. It’s not something that I own anymore. It’s something that I feel I’m obliged 
to repeat, at will, whenever I meet people. I’m kind of detached from it now, I 
just kind of robotically tell people, I feel really detached from it now. I don’t 
really feel like it’s my story anymore even though it is. 
In this quote, Michelle explains that she had told her conversion story so many 
times for other Muslims’ validation, it was no longer truly her story.  Michelle 
did not frame her experiences as exploitation; however, it is this very outcome 
that Liam wanted to avoid when he stated that he “wanted to avoid being 
exploited” and avoid a situation where his personal experiences were packaged 
and sold to Muslims and non-Muslims alike as affirmation of the primacy and 
truth of Islam, precisely because it was coming from a white person. 
Each of the above incidents illustrates that many Muslims in Australia perceive 
the identity of ‘Muslim’ to be a racialised one which is culturally and politically 
distinct from whiteness. While responses to white converts vary wildly from 
joy, surprise and glorification to suspicion and condescension, each of the 
responses documented in this section demonstrate that white converts’ Muslim 
and convert identities are interpreted by other Muslims through the lens of 
their whiteness – or sometimes, perceived lack thereof. This leads Muslims that 
they come into contact with to view them as being ‘better’ Muslims for having 
‘left’ their whiteness or ‘lesser’ Muslims because the indelible taint of whiteness 
remains.  
In both situations, whether seen as ‘better’ or ‘lesser,’ their visible whiteness 
influences the way that Muslims respond to them, and the treatment they 
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receive hinges on the idea that whiteness – through its immorality, lack of 
culture and position of privilege in Australia – is highly detached from what it 
means to be Muslim in Australia. In the first scenario, white converts are 
viewed by Muslims as having adopted a racialised identity by converting to the 
racialised faith position of Muslim, and in the process having relinquished 
some or all of their whiteness. The extent to which they are considered 
racialised depends on how much they accept Islam as it is taught to them 
without question, and how readily they adopt certain practices, an issue which 
will be examined in the following section. Alternatively, other Muslims deny 
that white converts can ever truly be Muslim precisely because of their 
immersion in and attachment to whiteness, which they view as antithetical to 
Islam. The experiences of converts highlighted in this section thus demonstrate 
that just as some non-Muslims hold essentialised views of Muslims, so too do 
some Muslims of white Westerners; in both contexts a white convert to Islam 
troubles and problematizes these reified views of the Other and in turn, the Self. 
 
6.4 Expectations Regarding Converts’ Practice 
A common form of engagement with other Muslims described by participants 
was the pressure to conform to narrow modes or expressions of Islam which 
were determined by those who were raised Muslim and from non-white 
backgrounds. Most participants explained that following their introduction to 
the Muslim community, they soon encountered a number of expectations from 
Muslims with regards to their practice of the religion. These expectations were 
in keeping with the notion expressed in earlier sections that white converts 
were required to forego their whiteness in order to be an acceptable ‘Muslim,’ 
wherein ‘Muslim’ is a racialised category for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
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Experiences amongst participants differed with regards to what the 
expectations were and to the level of pressure they felt to adopt certain 
practices, however many participants mentioned that the expectations they 
encountered were “cultural” rather than “Islamic”; in other words, the 
expectations emerged from ethnocultural traditions or practices rather than 
being a religious imperative. 
Prior to analysing the expectations that converts faced from the Muslim 
community, it should be acknowledged that a handful of participants stated 
they had not felt any notable pressure from other Muslims. Belinda, for 
example, remarked that to the contrary, the Muslims she had met since her 
conversion had encouraged her to take her time and ease into the practice of 
Islam, stating:  
It was a very easy process for me and everyone was very supportive…. Thank 
God they were so supportive. They were – like nothing. When I said, ‘I’d like to 
learn to pray’ they were like, ‘Okay good, I’ll get someone to help you.’ I kept 
saying, ‘I should be putting on ḥijāb by now,’ they were like, ‘Take your time, 
do whatever, it’s a process.’  
Similarly, Katherine recalled in her interview that the first Muslim she 
contacted after she converted told her to start praying as soon as possible, as 
that was compulsory for her, but to take her time with everything else. These 
experiences were in the minority, however, with most participants relating at 
least one or two instances where they felt pressure to conform to particular 
standards. 
6.4.1 The performance of piety 
One of the key expectations revealed by my thematic analysis of the qualitative 
data was the expectation that converts would be exceptionally pious, practising 
and religious. Most of the participants who raised this as a common expectation 
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from born Muslims clarified that they felt the pressure was greater for white 
converts because they were viewed as having taken a bigger step in converting 
than someone from a non-white background.  Participants felt that they were 
subject to expectations that they would very quickly become knowledgeable 
about the religion, and some also expressed that they felt some Muslims would 
have liked them to become religious scholars. In Edward’s experience, he felt 
this pressure most with his wife’s family: 
Yeah, I think that’s true for most Muslims, that they have an expectation of how 
you will practise your religion, for sure. And more so for me because not soon 
after I converted I got married, and obviously my wife’s family then also had a 
very clear sort of perception in terms of how I should practise my religion as 
well… It’s – there’s a lot of information, like spiritual and religious information, 
and there was I think a real push for me to A) learn Arabic, and B) really 
immerse myself in the religious studies. To learn more about the religion. 
 
This same pressure was also felt by Liam, who recounted an incident involving 
his father-in-law in Indonesia: 
He said something like, you’re a revert, we expect you to do this 100% right. If I 
skip a daily prayer that’s one thing, but for you it’s not acceptable, okay. You’re 
a revert. Everyone expects you to do it properly. For me it doesn’t matter. I was 
like – you hypocrite. And I blasted him back. I said you hypocrite, don’t give 
me that. That’s rubbish.  
The double standards apparent in exchanges such as the one above illustrate 
once again that there is an added pressure on white converts to prove 
themselves as Muslim to other Muslims who are sceptical of their ability to 
fully shed their whiteness in favour of Islam. 
Other white converts who participated in this project also had their 
authenticity as Muslims challenged because they were not performing Islam to 
the standard expected of them.  Michelle was one of these participants, who 
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suggested that the way born Muslims responded to her changed depending on 
whether she was or was not wearing a headscarf. Michelle states: 
I met someone, like a friend of a friend, and he was like so, are you really 
Muslim? And I was really offended, cos I was thinking, well, I've been 
struggling in this for twelve years and I've been trying my best for twelve years, 
so I just felt like, who are you to ask me if I'm really Muslim? Are YOU really 
Muslim? How much do you practise your dīn? Just because I'm white and I 
don't wear the scarf doesn't mean anything, cos a lot of these people do a lot of 
other ḥarām in public and think it's ok. 
In this quotation, Michelle identifies two reasons for why the acquaintance 
questioned whether she was “really Muslim” – her whiteness, and the fact that 
she did not wear a headscarf. Michelle’s follow-up comment – “a lot of these 
people do a lot of other ḥarām in public and think it’s ok” indicates that Michelle 
believes that the two reasons are connected. It is not simply that Michelle does 
not wear a headscarf, but that she does not wear a headscarf and also is white. 
Michelle states that “these people” – non-white Muslims who question her 
authenticity as a Muslim – do the very same thing that they accuse her of doing, 
which is committing sin in public, but observes that their behaviour is viewed 
as acceptable by themselves and other non-white Muslims because their 
legitimacy as a Muslim is not in question. In order to prove herself as a Muslim, 
Michelle believes that she is expected to perform her Muslim identity to a 
greater extent, and demonstrate a higher level of piety, than her non-white 
counterparts. 
The excerpt from Michelle’s interview raises a number of issues pertinent to the 
aims of this thesis. Here, Michelle’s perceived non-performance of a Muslim 
identity is cause for some non-Muslims to query her commitment to the faith.  
In his article about the fetishisation of prominent white converts to Islam, 
Tourage explains that in Islamic theology, to become a Muslim simply requires 
one to recite the testament of faith, but that to be a “believer” requires more 
254 
 
than simply the “specific knowledge of God” (2012, p. 210) but also requires an 
outward expression of that same faith. Tourage cites Murata and Chittick to 
clarify further that ʾimān involves a “knowledge in the heart, a voicing with the 
tongue, and an activity with the limbs” (Murata and Chittick, cited in Tourage 
2012, p. 208). In other words, Islam or its closest translation in English, 
“submission to God,” requires submission not just in terms of acknowledging 
God, but also submission through speech and action. In this context, it could be 
argued that Michelle’s legitimacy as a Muslim is questioned solely because of 
the perceived lack of action, in this case specifically the donning of the 
headscarf, and that her whiteness has little to do with it. However, it is clear 
that Michelle attributes the special scrutiny of her actions to the fact that she is 
white, based on the fact that other, non-white Muslim’s performance or non-
performance of faith is not criticised like hers is. In other words, she feels that 
for non-white Muslims it is enough for them to say that they are Muslim and 
that their religion is Islam for them to be accepted by other non-white Muslims 
as Muslim, whereas white converts are held to a much higher standard.  
The experiences and observations of Michelle, Edward and Liam are supported 
by the work of Tourage, who writes about what he terms the “fetishisation” of 
white, predominantly male, American Muslim convert scholars (2012). Tourage 
persuasively argues that “immigrant Muslims” (which he uses here as a 
synonym for born Muslims) fetishise white converts’ performance of belief as a 
commodity which they harness to represent their (born Muslims) own belief. 
As noted above, Tourage acknowledges that it is not the performance of belief 
itself which is at issue here, given that in Islam performativity of faith is a 
precondition to belief. What Tourage does raise concerns about is the tendency 
of born Muslims to glorify the hyper-performativity of belief as practised by 
white converts, which then act as signifiers of belief for themselves. He 
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contends that this phenomenon is due to the effect of white supremacy and 
colonialism on the mentality of the immigrant Muslim who begins to see him or 
herself as inferior to white people, observing that: 
The whiteness of converts is fetishized as a commodity that circulates within 
the externalized system of the signification of belief. Presumably born-
Muslims could find externalized embodiments of belief in themselves or in 
any other pious Muslim, but social and historical factors such as racist and or 
colonial attitudes that immigrant Muslims have internalized contribute to the 
American converts’ function of being signifiers of Islamic belief in this specific 
context (Tourage 2012, p. 222). 
 
In light of Tourage’s conclusions, it is arguable that non-white born Muslims 
expect white converts like Michelle to hyper-perform their belief, in the hope 
that their performance will then act as a signifier and stand-in for the born 
Muslims’ own belief. In Michelle’s interview, she identifies the headscarf and 
modest clothing as one of the primary expectations that born Muslims have of 
her, a sentiment which was verbalised by other female participants as well and 
which is explored in detail in section 6.4.2. Tourage identifies a number of other 
examples as well, suggesting that “The prominent converts hyper-perform their 
belief when they display a superior knowledge of Islam and Arabic or when 
their scripted pre-Islamic background and conversion narratives along with 
outward signifiers of their ‘muslimness’ are routinely rehearsed” (2012, p. 222). 
He also borrows from the work of Marcia Hermansen, who writes about her 
experiences and observations of the forms of acceptable performance of Muslim 
identity within Muslim communities in America. Paraphrasing Hermansen, 
Tourage states: 
Examples include visibly ‘Muslim’ public appearances, pious gestures, ‘Islamic’ 
items of clothing, marrying ‘brown’ women and having many children, and the 
use of what Hermensen [sic] calls ‘Islam-speak’ (2004: 392). Commenting on 
Muslims’ ‘performing’ Islam Awareness Week on university campuses, 
Hermensen [sic] observes: ‘… non-verbal elements such as costume and gesture 
function as much to persuade as do actual verbal utterances’; and she adds: 
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‘one’s visible identity and actions warrant the acceptance of the claims to Islamic 
authority that are made through the performance’ (Tourage 2012, p. 212). 
 
In these examples, the greater the performance, the more secure born Muslims 
are that their belief is externalised through the converts’ practices and 
conversion narratives. According to Tourage, immigrant Muslims do not feel 
the same need to hyper-perform their belief because they are already confident 
that they belong in the cultural space of Islam, whereas white converts are 
required to prove their allegiance and in a sense “earn their keep” by acting as 
conduits for born Muslims when they are seeking a spiritual boost. White 
converts like Michelle are seen as a disappointment to these Muslims because 
they are not fulfilling the role that is expected of them by hyper-performing 
belief. 
While Tourage’s claims are persuasive, there is little in the interview data from 
the current research project that supports the argument that non-white ‘born’ 
Muslims demand the hyper-performativity of belief from white converts 
because of their internalised racism or colonial mindset. Of course, without 
interviewing non-white Muslims themselves it is difficult to make an 
assessment of Tourage’s argument one way or the other. However, based on the 
reports provided by the white converts I interviewed it seems more likely that 
white converts are expected to “prove themselves” far more regularly and more 
convincingly because of the perception that the cultural distance between 
whiteness and Islam is so great – perhaps almost insurmountable - that greater 
conviction and commitment to the faith needs to be demonstrated in order to be 
believable as legitimate Muslims.  This is linked to the notion that Islam is 
racialised as non-white, even by some non-white Muslims themselves. 
The expectation of performative piety is arguably even more potent when we 
look at the experiences of women converts specifically. In Michelle’s case, her 
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non-conformity to the expectations that born Muslims had of her as a convert 
woman meant that she opened herself up to scrutiny from members of the 
Muslim community who questioned her legitimacy as a Muslim. Michelle 
suggests that the scrutiny is gendered as well, with women held to a higher 
standard of devoutness in order to demonstrate their modesty and piety. 
Michelle explains that she feels this sentiment underlies her Muslim friends’ 
expectation of her to marry again: she distinctly feels a pressure to continually 
prove that she is a “good” Muslim woman: 
I think particularly for me as well, because I’m divorced and I have been 
married, people really expected me to get married again, to kind of prove that I 
was still a ‘good girl’ or whatever. Or to prove that I wasn’t going to run away 
or become a non-Muslim, or any of those things. So I think that there was an 
expectation that I would do that. 
An intersectional approach to the question of why this is the case suggests that 
the expectation that white converts consistently prove their commitment to 
Islam and corresponding disavowal of whiteness is compounded by an 
expectation that women be the “keepers of the culture” (Billson 1995) in 
marginalised communities, as has been argued by feminist scholars studying 
racialised minority communities in the United States, Malaysia and Britain 
(Gongaware 2003; Le Espiritu 2001; Mohammad 1999; Sankar 2015). Le Espiritu 
posits that the maintenance of culture amongst immigrant communities not 
only acts as “a lifeline to the home country and a basis for group identity in a 
new country, it is also a base from which immigrants stake their political and 
sociocultural claims on their new country” (2001, p. 415). Women, Le Espiritu 
and others argue, are conceptualised as the carriers of tradition within 
immigrant communities who attempt to maintain their cultural traditions and 
cultural ties in the face of assimilation and homogenisation. Forms of cultural 
maintenance in these circumstances range from roles in the domestic sphere 
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such as food preparation, to maintaining strong social ties with family in their 
homeland and other members of the immigrant community.  
Michelle’s case is of course significantly different to the stories described by Le 
Espiritu, as the women I interviewed weren’t from racialised minority 
backgrounds like the Filipina people Le Espiritu spoke to. However, the idea 
that in such minority communities women are often seen as the bearers of 
cultural tradition provides some insights to understanding the experiences of 
Michelle and other white convert women who described feeling that there was 
an expectation that white Muslim women in particular needed to prove 
themselves to be “good Muslims” through their performance of certain Islamic 
practices such as wearing ḥijāb. Women are expected to carry the extra burden 
of being responsible for the cultural maintenance of Islam in a context where 
Islam and Muslims are marginalised. This can be seen in the work of Robina 
Mohammad, a feminist geographer from Brunei. Through her research on 
Pakistani women living in Britain, Mohammad found that the marginalisation 
of Pakistani-British Muslims “strengthened the need for a ‘group’ identity, 
narratives of collective identity that make women central to the group, and 
regulatory practices that restrict women in a variety of ways” (1999, p. 236). In 
other words, women carry the responsibility for ensuring that their culture and 
faith is maintained and conserved, in the face of external forces seeking to 
assimilate them into the overarching British culture. This theory can also be 
applied to white converts in Australia; as demonstrated in this subsection, some 
Muslims may expect white converts to “carry” the faith. The burden falls 
mostly on female converts, as women in marginalised groups are given the 
responsibility of being the maintainers of the culture and faith. This is also 
evident in expectations of women’s clothing, explored earlier in section 6.2.2.  
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Similar arguments have been made by Marcia Hermansen for why the 
performance of piety is so integral to the construction of a religious Muslim 
identity in America, and she notes that marginalised people within the minority 
group (such as women) may feel greater pressure to assert their legitimacy in 
the “imagined Muslim space” through the performance of piety:  
I think the emphasis on performance in dialogue among Muslims in America is 
partly due to their need not only to assert some sort of authority over an 
imagined Muslim space but to claim both the authority and the space. This partly 
reflects how oppressed a minority tends to feel and also their need to assert a 
claim to a position. Other groups within the broader minority also, may feel 
oppressed, those whose claim to authority may be rejected or marginalized, such 
as women, non-Sunnis, women without ḥijāb, and so on, for as noted, many 
Islamist expressions of this authority are at the same time totalizing and 
exclusionary in nature (2004, p. 392). 
 
Michelle’s quotation also reinforces the idea explored in section 6.2.2 that Islam 
and whiteness are mutually exclusive because whiteness and Western culture 
are rooted in immorality. White converts thus need to prove themselves to be 
extra pious and religious in order to overcome this association. In this narrative, 
white Westerners – and particularly white convert women - are perceived to be 
inherently irreligious, and it is assumed that given the chance, they will revert 
to un-Islamic practices. Michelle’s story highlights the ways in which gender is 
implicated and utilised in the racialisation of Muslims by Muslims who view 
whiteness as being fundamentally oppositional to Islam. 
In this section, I have drawn attention to how the expectation of religious piety 
is deployed by born Muslims as a way to ascertain and measure white converts’ 
commitment to the religion. Tourage has argued that the expectation of white 
converts to hyper-perform their belief arises from the fetishisation of white 
converts by born Muslims who use the converts’ performance of the faith as a 
signifier for their own faith in specific contexts such as the United States of 
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America. My data cannot confirm Tourage’s claims, as like him, I have not 
interviewed non-white Muslims. Instead, my data suggests that the greater 
expectation of piety placed upon the white convert over the born Muslim 
emanates from the belief that whiteness is so disparate from Islam that white 
converts need to prove more strongly and with greater conviction that they 
have truly crossed over to “the other side.” The racialisation of Islam that this 
perspective relies upon is further compounded by gender – women are 
perceived to be the carriers of culture and so there is a specific emphasis on 
women “proving” that they are not immoral (as I explored in section 6.2.2) by 
wearing ḥijāb, marrying early or remarrying if they had gone through a divorce, 
or adopting another culture’s behaviours and practices as evidence of her 
disavowal of her white Australian culture.  
6.4.2 Clothing 
While Katherine and Belinda both indicated that they had never felt pressured 
by other Muslims to start wearing a headscarf, as stated in the introduction of 
this section, other participants, particularly women, stated that in some settings 
they felt judged and looked down upon for not dressing in a particular way. 
Lisa stated that after she stopped wearing ḥijāb, some of her Muslim 
acquaintances and colleagues didn’t know how to react around her, even 
though they themselves may not have worn ḥijāb or other visibly Muslim 
clothing. 
And when I took off my scarf, people were really careful with me and they 
almost treated me as if I wasn’t really Muslim anymore. That I’d just decided 
not to be Muslim. After a while it obviously became apparent that it wasn’t so, 
but a lot of people didn’t know how to react to that. 
Belinda, who works at an organisation that supports and educates other 
Muslim converts, remarked that although she did not feel pressure to adopt the 
headscarf herself, exposure to the community has changed her perception:  
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But now I realise, the community does have a big expectation. People go up to 
me and they say, for example, a month ago, “My sister-in-law reverted a week 
ago and she’s still wearing singlet tops,” as though it’s the worst thing in the 
world… Reverts come to me all the time and they say, “Oh I was with this 
crowd, and they told me ‘Why are you still wearing make up after three weeks? 
Why don’t you have ḥijāb on after three weeks?’” … Now I see that it is bad. It’s 
very bad. I think people prey on reverts. 
 
It is evident by these quotations that just as Muslim women’s dress is perceived 
to be an important and racialised marker of Muslim identity to non-Muslims, as 
discussed in section 5.2.1, so too is it considered an indicator of faith for 
Muslims. With regards to clothing, it is clear that women felt more pressure 
than men to adopt a different dress code. Most female participants who wore a 
headscarf stated that they did do so out of religious obligation, but some added 
that amongst some ethnocultural groups they felt it was a cultural expectation 
as well, and that as white women they felt more pressure to prove their loyalty 
to the faith. Indeed, the ḥijāb in particular (as opposed to loose, modest clothing 
in general) is imbued with racialised political overtones, which marks the 
wearer as someone who has given allegiance to Islam. In the case of white 
converts, this allegiance is constantly questioned by Muslims who perceive 
their whiteness to be a barrier to a full and complete conversion to Islam. Thus, 
whereas a non-white Muslim woman removing her ḥijāb may be negatively 
judged by other Muslims who perceive her to be breaking an important 
commandment of Islam, a white convert woman removing ḥijāb lays herself 
open to having her faith and commitment to Islam questioned. Again, this can 
partly be attributed to Mohammed’s assertion that “narratives of group identity 
make women central to the processes through which group identity is 
constructed” (1999, p. 222), leading to the expectation that women be 
responsible for the maintenance of culture and faith within a marginalised 
group. 
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This same expectation with regards to dress was not felt as strongly by male 
participants, although some of them did choose to start wearing particular 
articles of clothing such as the kufi or thawb without being asked to do so 
explicitly. Edward stated that while he did not feel substantial pressure himself, 
he did feel that there was a general expectation that was directed towards 
converts, especially in religious spaces: 
I think that there is an expectation more generally that you dress modestly. 
Certainly I had comments, you get comments from people randomly at 
mosques and whatever else in terms of the way that you dress. But as a general 
rule, no not really. Cos I generally think I dressed quite sensibly, so not 
particularly. 
In contrast, Daniel explains that the Muslim social groups he socialised with at 
the time took the contrary approach to Muslim clothing, and discouraged him 
from dressing in a visibly Muslim way.  
The particular religious group I was with during that time, they had the 
opposite in that they didn’t want to look too Muslim, in particular because their 
justification was that they saw beards and turbans and niqāb as an impediment 
towards da’wah, so leave that towards a later, not very articulated well point in 
the future, that will be fine. Going out, if I went out with my non-existent abaya 
and turban it would cause a problem with these guys, so they usually stopped 
me from doing that. In terms of clothing. 
The above excerpt indicates that while the Muslims Daniel socialised with 
acknowledged the importance of religious clothing, they eschewed this clothing 
in order to practise ‘da’wah’ or ‘invitation to Islam.’ These articles of clothing are 
seen as an impediment towards drawing people to Islam in the Australian 
context, precisely because they are viewed as foreign and alien to the Australian 
way of life and to whiteness.  At worst, observably Muslim items of clothing 
locate the wearer as a “threat” to this way of life; as noted by Humphrey (2007, 
p. 11), physical signs of religiosity such as ḥijāb, abayas, and beards are “readily 
politicised” and “suspected as being surface manifestations of a deeper hidden 
threat.” Humphrey describes these markers of religion as being ‘culturalised,’ a 
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term which he uses instead of ‘racialised,’ claiming that within the secular 
modernity of the West, Islam and Muslims are constructed as being culturally 
incompatible with and even oppositional to the West. 
 
The findings discussed in this section support the idea that the performance of 
Islamic piety – in this case, through clothing that identifies one as a Muslim - is 
considered by some Muslims to be a set of racialised behaviours that can 
ground the white converts more firmly in the category of ‘Muslim.’ 
Additionally, unlike non-white Muslims whose Muslimness can be more 
readily accepted because they ‘look’ Muslim simply as a result of their physical 
appearance, there is a greater expectation on white converts to use visible 
markers of clothing to identify themselves as Muslims despite their physical 
appearance. Visible markers of their Muslim identity reinforce the perception of 
their commitment not just to the faith, but to the community as a whole, and 
identify the wearer as a bearer of the Islamic tradition and a keeper of the 
Islamic culture – a responsibility that is most often placed on the shoulders of 
women, as I examined in the previous section. 
6.4.3 Name changes 
Another common expectation for participants was pressure to change their 
names from their birth names to a more “Muslim” sounding name, which in all 
cases meant an Arabic name. Interestingly, expectations around names differed 
drastically between participants, and seemed to largely be influenced by the 
time of their conversion. Participants who had converted more than twenty 
years ago all had Arabic names, whereas participants who converted more 
recently were likely to have kept their birth names. Salwa, for example, who 
converted in the 1980s, had taken on her husband’s Arabic surname at 
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marriage, and also changed her first name at her husband’s request. “He had a 
bit of a thing about - he didn’t like Anglo names, he didn’t think it went with 
his surname. So he wanted to change it so I said, ‘Okay, well change it.’ He 
chose my name. So that was it. So I changed it legally by registration.”  Salwa 
appears ambivalent about this fact in her interview, indicating that she did not 
feel strongly either way, but that she was happy to do so if it made her husband 
happy. 
Paul explains that there have been waves of opinion about this particular issue 
across geography and time. Although he converted ten years ago, at a time 
when in Australia it was much more acceptable to keep your birth name, the 
social groups that he moved in internationally had a different perspective and 
he felt pressured to change his name – and did, temporarily: 
But the convert culture was such that you should change your name. There was 
a big group of influential Muslims from the Norwich community in the UK, 
people like Abdullah Ze, Paul Sanders, Abdul Lateef Whiteman. So all these 
guys, they were all changing their names. That was I think the prevailing 
Western Muslim culture I think, for a lot of the sectors that I was involved in. 
Ali, who converted in the early 1990s, explained that at the time he was under 
immense pressure from the Muslim community to change his name. Unlike 
Salwa, who did not express any regrets about it, Ali is clearly resentful about 
the pressure he was under, and states that if he could go back in time he would 
not change it:  
And I think the underlying message that these people were trying to send was, 
your old self – nup, not good enough. And at the time I went along with it, 
because it was the done thing. Every time I think about it I get pissed off all 
over again. Cos now obviously I know there’s, Islam doesn’t say you have to 
change your name, but I’ve had this name for 20 years so. It’s too late to do 
anything about it. 
Similarly, Paul explained that he feels that the changing of name indicates a 
‘throwing away’ of what he once was, which for him was a negative and 
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inappropriate reaction. He explained that this started even before he had 
converted: 
The very first time I went to Lakemba Mosque, which was quite an intimidating 
experience. The very first time I walked in, the second person that spoke to me 
– this was a long way from when I actually became a Muslim and said shahada 
– this random brother goes, 'Brother have you thought of what your Muslim 
name will be?” Like that's what you want to say to me? Before I even know 
what the faith is about? It's the worst thing you can say. It's like saying, what 
you were was no good and you should khalas, throw that away.  
Both Paul and Ali articulated that they felt the pressure to change their names 
operated to construct their pre-Muslim lives, cultures, identities and histories as 
corrupt or valueless. In a post-conversion context, their birth names represented 
a white identity that Muslims felt were incompatible with Islam, and thus 
should be discarded after conversion. They commented that while they were 
uncomfortable with that characterisation, they felt that they did not have the 
understanding at the time to defend their decision not to change their name. 
Paul states that he did change his name temporarily due to the high levels of 
pressure he received from non-white Muslims, but that he changed it back soon 
after. 
Many of the converts who participated who had converted more recently stated 
that they did not feel notable pressure to change their names, and if they did 
they felt able to withstand the pressure easily. This could in part be related to 
the ability to easily and efficiently access information about Islam via the 
Internet, a quick search of which demonstrates that changing one’s name to an 
Arabic name is not required in the Islamic faith. Another possible factor is the 
growth in numbers of white converts to Islam in Sydney over the last two 
decades, which may mean that white converts feel more empowered and 
supported to insist on keeping their birth names in the face of pressure to adopt 
an “ethnic” culture. For example, when asked what expectations he 
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encountered as a convert, Daniel immediately responds with “changing my 
name,” but adds that he has only ever encountered this expectation once, when 
he met someone at a talk who asked him what his “quote unquote Islamic 
name” was. Daniel replied by repeating his name, after which the man “kind of 
got it.” Daniel’s refusal to change his name originates from a conscious decision 
to resist what he calls “assimilat[ing] other cultures”. Daniel takes a firm 
position to counter the notion that Islam and white are somehow mutually 
exclusive or incompatible. His rejection of the commonly expressed idea that 
white converts need to adopt certain cultural practices in order to be considered 
a ‘proper’ Muslim is explored in more depth in Chapter Seven. Omar also 
remarked upon the fact that it was something that was “recommended” to him 
as a religious requirement by “Tablighi uncles”, but he later found out that it 
was “something that Muslims did culturally… it’s not even recommended in 
Islam.” Omar adds, “They made it sound like, like you had to. That it was 
something so that Allah can speak to you on the Day of Judgement. What, so 
Allah can’t speak to me on the Day of Judgement if I have a white name?” Like 
Ali, Omar remarks that he would not encourage other converts to do the same, 
stating: “I accepted it at the time but having thought about it later, it’s quite a 
confronting thing and not something I agree with.” 
On the other hand, some converts choose to change their names of their own 
accord. The reasons they volunteered were contrary to the concerns expressed 
by Paul and Ali, who indicated that they felt their previous identities were 
viewed by others as being unable to coexist with their new Muslim identity 
because of the perceived distance between whiteness, exemplified in their birth 
names, and a racialised image of Islam. Instead, some converts explained that 
changing their name was a way for them to embrace their new identity 
precisely because they felt that their previous, birth name did not represent 
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their identity adequately anymore.  When asked why she had decided to 
change her name despite being informed by other Muslims that she did not 
need to for religious purposes, Fatima stated: “A lot of it was my new identity, I 
just felt like a different person. I felt like my last name just didn’t fit anymore. I 
wanted to change it especially to something Islamic because I thought that 
suited better, rather than my old ethnic name – Anglo name.” Fatima’s name 
change symbolised for her a fresh start with a new identity, which enabled her 
to be able to start to shed her “old” white identity faster. Her acknowledgement 
of the fact that her “old ethnic name” did not “fit” with her new identity 
reinforces the idea that whiteness and Muslimness are somehow incompatible 
and not quite “suited” to one another.   
In Moosavi’s article on British Muslim converts’ performance of “authentic 
Muslimness,” as he terms it, Moosavi indicates that many of the converts he 
interviewed expressed a similar view to Fatima. One of his participants stated 
that it was “like being born again;” others said they wanted to be a “new 
person” or a “different person” (2012, p. 112). Moosavi suggests that while 
some changed their names for the affective implications of it with regards to 
how they felt about themselves, for other converts, changing their name 
allowed them to eventually be accepted as a Muslim. Moosavi concludes that 
oftentimes changing their name to a non-English name was vital to converts 
being able to “pass” as authentic Muslims (2012). 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter makes important empirical contributions to the scholarship on 
conversion to Islam by focusing on the racialised experiences of white Muslim 
converts within the Muslim community. As I highlighted in Chapter Four, 
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much of the literature on Muslim converts fails to adequately attend to the issue 
of Muslim converts’ interactions with members of their local and sometimes 
extended Muslim community, focusing instead on their engagement with 
broader society. This chapter has not only centred the Muslim-Muslim 
relationship in these interactions, which is a notable absence in previous 
literature, but emphasises the racialised nature of these interactions, an aspect 
of conversion that has only very recently begun to attract consideration in the 
field (Moosavi 2014; 2015, Galonnier 2015). This thesis thus contributes an 
Australian perspective to the British experience studied by Moosavi, and the 
American and French experiences that Galonnier documents. 
While there is a growing body of literature about the racialisation of Muslims as 
a ‘non-white Other’ from the perspective of the West, as I have outlined in 
section 2.2, there have been far fewer studies about how Muslims perceive the 
West, and how they perceive and position themselves in relation to the West 
and to whiteness.  This chapter was unable to adequately address that gap, as 
my interviews were solely with white Muslims and not with Muslims who 
identified as non-white, leaving an avenue for further research. However, what 
this chapter has uncovered is that participants felt that their perceived racial 
identity had a substantial impact on how they were treated and responded to 
by non-white Muslims, an area that has not been attended to significantly by 
the works of Moosavi and Galonnier. Participants indicated that just as non-
Muslims struggled to make sense of the figure of the white Muslim because of 
the perceived dichotomy between whiteness and Islam, Muslims too reified the 
same binary by taking a narrow and racialised view of Islam which gave rise to 
specific expectations of performance. The realisation that their perceived 
whiteness influenced the response they received from other Muslims often 
made participants cognisant of the racialised frames that they and other 
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Muslims had to negotiate. However, the racialised frames that were identified 
in this chapter are distinct from those identified in Chapter Five: Leaving 
Whiteness, in which I examined how in interactions with non-Muslims, the 
racialisation of Muslims served to construct Muslims as a threat to the 
Australian nation, harsh and rigid, and oppressive to women. In contrast, in the 
interactions with Muslims documented in this chapter, it was whiteness that was 
instead often the focus of critique: alternatingly viewed as undeservedly 
powerful, exploitative and greedy, immoral, and culturally and spiritually 
bankrupt, in contradiction to Muslims’ views about Islam. 
This chapter has demonstrated that while a number of the interactions 
recounted by participants indicated that some Muslims viewed the disparity 
between whiteness and Islam as being virtually insurmountable and treated 
white converts with suspicion and distrust as a result, other stories illustrated 
that some Muslims felt that the divide between Islam and whiteness was great, 
but not indomitable, and enthusiastically celebrated converts for achieving the 
near impossible. Other interactions involved non-white Muslims attempting to 
assimilate the white convert into their own culture by strongly encouraging and 
sometimes pressuring them to adopt certain cultural traditions and customs – 
indicating that they too felt their whiteness was a barrier, but one that could be 
overcome by assuming racialised characteristics in the form of clothing and 
names. In the following chapter, I examine in more detail how the racialised 
encounters with Muslims and non-Muslims documented in Chapters Five and 
Six influenced participants’ conceptualisations of race, whiteness and their own 
racial identity. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
REFLECTIONS ON RACE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters of this thesis, I critically analysed a range of 
racialised exchanges related by participants to underscore the fact that race 
plays a direct and pivotal role in the lives of white converts to Islam. The 
interactions offered by participants in their interviews illustrate that the 
existence of white Muslim converts can both reinforce and disrupt the racialised 
frames through which non-Muslims and non-white Muslims view themselves 
and each other, sometimes simultaneously. In the context of a national 
imaginary in which Australianness, whiteness, Christianity and secularism 
coalesce into one amorphous and professedly culturally neutral identity, the 
decision of a white person to convert to the Islam is viewed as an acutely 
politicised and racialised act. Conversions to Islam by white people thus inspire 
a kaleidoscope of oftentimes visceral reactions from Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. While Chapters Five and Six focused on the expression of these reactions 
towards the white Muslim converts interviewed, as the participants themselves 
interpreted them, this chapter centres on how the recorded exchanges impacted 
on participants’ sense of belonging within Australia, and on their self-
characterisation of their whiteness and racial identity before and after their 
conversion to Islam.  
Chapter Seven thus endeavours to draw attention back onto the voices of white 
converts to Islam. At first glance, the suggestion to re-centre the voices of white 
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people may seem a strange task for a project that seeks to challenge the 
hegemony of whiteness and the trajectory of modernity that bound whiteness 
with Christian-coded secularism at the centre of European, and now Australian, 
visions of itself. Writing almost two decades ago, Ghassan Hage said of 
whiteness that, “Its new visibility is in a sense a mark of the decrease in its 
hegemonic power” (1998, p. x). It is yet to be seen whether the emergence of 
whiteness studies as a field of study in academia has indeed heralded the 
demise of white supremacy, or whether the attention on white people’s 
experiences of whiteness has simply reasserted the centrality of whiteness in 
studies of race.  It is my belief, however, that reversing the analytical gaze onto 
white people – by making them the object of study, taking the lead of writers 
and scholars such as W.E.B. Du Bois and bell hooks - can disrupt the 
normalisation and naturalisation of whiteness, thereby “making whiteness 
strange” (Dyer 1997).  
As the final discussion chapter, this chapter thus returns to the overarching 
research question that guides this thesis: how do white converts to Islam 
experience race and negotiate their racial identity after conversion? Chapter 
Seven begins by detailing participants’ perspectives on whiteness and the racial 
repertoires they employed when talking about their whiteness, drawing on the 
matrix of racial repertoires offered by American sociologist Ruth Frankenberg 
in her seminal work, “White Women; Race Matters” (1993). Although 
Frankenberg’s work is by now somewhat dated, it has nonetheless provided a 
useful foundation for the empirical study of white identities, and has informed 
studies of whiteness in Britain (Bonnett 1997; Clark & Garner 2009), the United 
States of America (Eichstedt 2001, Hartmann et al 2009; Lipsitz 2005; Roediger 
1999), Hong Kong (Leonard 2008; 2010) and Australia (Durie 2003; Lobo & 
Morgan 2012). Section 7.2 examines the diverse ways in which participants 
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talked about race, drawing on interview data to analyse the wide range of 
attitudes to whiteness and race expressed by participants. In the following 
section, I shift my attention to the narratives of participants who indicated that 
their conversion had an influence on how they perceived themselves racially. 
Finally, I closely examine two concepts that are raised in the interviews that 
reflect a change in participants’ racial identities: the notion of ‘belonging’ and 
the notion of ‘culture,’ both concepts which feature prominently in the 
interview data, and evoke race in less direct ways - often through the idea of 
nation and ‘Australianness’ instead. 
 
7.2 White Identities  
Until now, this thesis has focused on analysing how the white identities of 
participants’ shaped the way that other people responded to, talked to and 
otherwise treated them as Muslim converts. In this section, I examine how the 
white converts I interviewed conceptualised whiteness themselves, and the 
racial repertoires they employed when describing how they perceived their 
identities prior to and after conversion. In section 2.4 of this thesis, I introduced 
the work of Ruth Frankenberg, whose interviews with 30 white women in the 
United States led her to develop a model of three discursive repertoires that she 
believed encapsulated the forms that the narratives of her interview 
participants took (1993, p. 14), and which in this chapter I will refer to as racial 
repertoires. The first of these is what Frankenberg termed “essentialist racism.” 
Frankenberg defines essentialist racism as “a discourse that views race as a 
marker of ontological, essential, or biological difference” (1993, p. 139) and that 
positions race as being a biological determinant of not just difference, but of 
superiority and inferiority. Like the subjects of Frankenberg’s research, none of 
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my participants articulated their own understanding of race explicitly through 
this frame. Essentialist racist repertoires advanced through reference to 
immutable biological factors were largely absent from the interview data, 
except in some rare cases where participants related something that had been 
said to them by someone else. This is not an unusual finding given the marked 
decline of the use of the language of ‘race’ in public discourse in the United 
States, Australia and Europe in the ‘post-racial era’ (Bonilla-Silva 2014, 
Jayasuriya 1995, Lentin 2015), and an increase in the language of ‘culture’ 
(Lentin 2015). Indeed, this is a phenomenon that arose in the interviews, as 
though ‘race’ language was not employed, participants did allude to the idea 
that certain cultures may provide better platforms through which to practice 
Islam than others (explored in more detail in section 7.5). 
The second and third racial repertoires featured frequently, however. 
Frankenberg terms the second frame, “colour and power evasion,” describing 
the tendency of many of her interview subjects to claim that they did not see 
colour, or that they were colour blind – “colour dodging,” as Frankenberg 
names it (1993, p. 142). The “power” part of colour and power evasion arises 
when people selectively engage with colour; for example, they may refer to 
racial differences amongst groups in some contexts, but do not acknowledge the 
differences in power between those racial groups. The final repertoire that 
Frankenberg identifies is “race cognisance,” which entails an understanding of 
how difference has come to be racialised. Like racist essentialism, race 
cognisance looks to the racial differences between groups, but unlike racist 
essentialism, difference is characterised in “historical, political, social, or 
cultural terms rather than essentialist ones” (1993, p. 157). 
Consistent with the findings of Frankenberg’s research, the participants of this 
project employed the second and third discursive repertoires in their interviews 
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in almost equal proportions. Interview data demonstrates that the converts who 
participated in this project had varying levels of racial cognisance before their 
conversion. Most participants stated in their interviews that they were aware of 
being white prior to their conversion, however their descriptions of what it 
meant to be white varied widely. A third of these participants explained that 
whiteness to them was just about their skin colour, and that even though they 
knew they were white, it was not something that they thought about beyond 
how it was reflected in their appearance. Variations of statements like “it’s only 
a skin colour” and “it’s just about how I look” were common amongst these 
participants, often accompanied with statements such as “I’ve never really 
thought about it.” In the words of Florian, “It means to belong to a group of 
people who have fair skin colour, in comparison with others who have darker 
or different tone of skin colour, or different features. Basically, different from 
Asian, African, or Arabs.”  
The physical aspect of whiteness was emphasised in many of these interviews, 
but downplayed as an insignificant or superficial aspect of who they were, 
through the repeated use of the term “just” and “only” – “it’s just about how I 
look,” or “it’s only a skin colour.” Participants who confined whiteness to 
physical appearance were more likely to state that being white was not a 
significant part of their identity, or one that they reflected on or thought about. 
While not colour evasive, this approach demonstrated a form of power evasion, 
whereby perceptible racial differences were not linked in their minds to 
material and structural inequalities. 
A far smaller number of participants expressed that whiteness was related to 
their ethnic background, ancestral heritage and culture. In answer to the 
question “What does it mean to be white?” Michael answered with, “It’s who 
you are, who your parents are, how you look… maybe what kind of clothes you 
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wear, food, that sort of thing.” Stephanie explained that her knowledge of her 
whiteness stemmed from her German ethnicity, laughingly stating, “German is 
as white as you can get… our food is even whiter than English food, it is so 
bland.”  For Paul, white culture was “something you can’t really put your 
finger on,” but that was apparent through popular culture representations of 
whiteness: 
Me and my wife will watch Nazeem’s [Hussain] 'Legally Brown' [SBS comedy 
show] and you know the blog, Stuff White People Like, and I completely laugh 
at some of the things. Like that's so true - I dunno, like organic farmers’ 
markets, and driving through the Shire and you sometimes see some of the 
really white dudes with flags, and I'm not saying just the boganism but... there's 
that real, there's a certain spirit or love of the nation. I dunno, there's all these 
clichés like beach culture. It’s blurry but it makes me smile most of the time. I 
don't reject any of that. 
In the above quote, Paul acknowledges that the aspects of white culture that he 
finds endearing and “makes [him] smile” are also ones that are lampooned in 
the pop culture examples he gives, and that he himself can laugh at precisely 
because he recognised the kernels of truth in those representations. 
Additionally, he notes that in Australia, whiteness is also associated with a 
“love of the nation,” which he admitted he found gratifying. However, Paul 
was careful to distance himself from what he terms “the real nationalism,” later 
adding, “I reject obviously the boganism, and the jingoism of like – the real 
nationalism or whatever.” In doing so, Paul exhibited an understanding that 
expressions of love for white culture and white identity can and have had 
negative connotations and ramifications attached to them.  
Paul’s interview is illuminating because it demonstrates how participants such 
as Paul could simultaneously recognise racialised hierarchies of power while 
also evading an acknowledgement of the consequences of the imbalance. His 
attitudes towards nationalism are similarly mixed, expressing that whiteness 
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entails a “spirit or love of the nation” that he does not reject, but that he does 
reject “the real nationalism.” He distinguishes his own feelings of nationalism 
from “boganism,” referring to a derogatory Australian slang word for someone 
who is perceived to be from a working class background or of otherwise low 
social status. In Sydney, where this research was carried out, the term bogan 
often carries the implication that the person that the term is directed to is 
perceived as white, although this is not always the case. For example, Pini, 
McDonald, and Mayes (2012) remark that ‘bogan’ in Australia operates in a 
similar way to how ‘chav’ operates in Britain to denote the white working class. 
They note, “The identity of Bogan is not one afforded to Indigenous 
Australians; in this respect they remain outside of the nation’s symbolic 
hierarchy. The whiteness of the Bogan identity is, however, like that of the 
Chav, not pure or unsullied, for it is contaminated, dirtied and tainted by 
poverty” (2012, p. 145). In Paul’s interview transcript, he juxtaposes the ‘bad’ 
(and highly classed) nationalism of boganism with his own nationalism, which, 
as an expression of whiteness, is located in ”organic farmer’s markets” and as 
he states later, “local fetes where people are making jams.” These middle-upper 
class expressions of whiteness are in his eyes considered acceptable – he does 
not reject them, and they make him smile. It is clear that for Paul, ‘good’ versus 
‘bad’ expressions of whiteness through nationalism are effectively classed, and 
he distances himself from the lower/working class expressions of “real 
nationalism” in “boganism and jingoism.” Paul’s interview illustrates that in 
Australia, white identities are also mediated by class. 
Only a small number of participants use the language of race when asked about 
how they defined whiteness, which was perhaps to be expected given the 
“prevailing taboo on race-talk” in the post-racial moment (Mitchell 2012, p. 44). 
Florian referred to race in a roundabout way, stating that he tended to use the 
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word Caucasian – a racial descriptor – rather than white: “I think I would refer 
white people as Caucasian - a habit I got from the USA.” Belinda was the only 
one of the participants who explicitly used the term ‘race’ when talking about 
her own white identity. When asked what it meant for her to identify as white, 
she replied: 
It’s just your racial background. Both my parents are Caucasian. I would never 
use that term, white – never. I don’t associate as being white. I don’t even say it, 
but Caucasian yeah. Or Aussie I say, but Aussie’s not really – it’s only when 
people say, “What nationality are you?” or “What’s your background?” I say 
Aussie. They say “No, no, but country are you from?” Australian. “No but 
where are your parents from?” Australia and Canada. So it’s your race. 
Here, Belinda conflates race and nation, while also acknowledging the 
limitations of such a definition - “but Aussie’s not really…” It is not clear from 
her interview why Belinda opposes the use of the term white, however it is 
evident that she sees it as synonymous with ‘Caucasian’. This indicates that she 
does not have a problem with racial descriptors themselves, or even with ‘race,’ 
but may take issue with talking about race with reference to skin colour.   
Belinda was not the only participant to express uneasiness about the term 
‘white.’ A large number of converts interviewed enacted a colour evasive 
repertoire by stating that they did not use the term white, think of themselves 
as white, or think about the fact that they were white, despite the fact that the 
research advertisement requested participants who identified as “white 
converts to Islam.” Riley responded to the question about what she thought 
made her ‘white’ by passionately arguing that she did not “see colour” and that 
a person’s background was of no relevance to her: 
You get that a lot, in the Muslim community… Oh where are you from, where 
are your parents from, and I’m like, who gives a toss really? It makes me a bit, 
really irritated actually, cos it shouldn’t matter, that’s the beauty of Islam, it 
doesn’t matter where you’re from, it’s about your deeds. That’s one of the 
things that I liked about Islam, it’s colour blind, like me. It appealed to me. 
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In Riley’s interview, it is clear that she believed that her “colour blindness” 
placed her in a somewhat enlightened position compared to born Muslims who 
she believes are “stuck in old ways of thinking.” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva has 
convincingly argued that the claim from white people that they do not see race 
is a form of ‘colour-blind racism,’ which emerged in the post-civil rights era as 
one of the dominant forms of racial ideology in the United States of America 
(Bonilla-Silva 2002, 2013), and is central to the notion of ‘the post-racial’ 
(Bonilla-Silva 2015). Colour-blind racism dismisses the significance of race to 
the social world, often relegating ‘race’ to an issue of the past that is no longer 
relevant to contemporary life. If one believes that Australian society is now 
beyond race just like the United States, then born Muslims who acknowledge 
racialisation are “stuck in old ways,” as Riley states. Adopting a colour blind 
approach to questions of race and culture allows Riley to individualise Muslims 
experiences of Islam in Australia – “it doesn’t matter where you come from, it’s 
about your deeds”- thus avoiding reflecting on her own complicity in 
racialising structures that position Muslims as antithetical to whiteness. 
 
Michael also referred to being blind to colour insofar as it related to whiteness, 
stating that he simply sees himself “as a convert,” but demonstrated more self-
awareness about where his attitudes towards race may have emerged from. 
When he was asked whether he saw himself as white, he replied: 
Not really. I just see myself as a convert. I suppose probably because I’m in 
Australia and I just assume, naturally assume that the majority of us are white. 
So I’m sort of blind to it. So I just see myself as being a convert. I haven’t broken 
it down as to say, oh yeah they’re white or… this is the first time I’ve actually 
heard it. It’s interesting though to see whether Muslims actually, whether you 
guys actually break it down into white or dark or Anglo or whatever. 
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Unlike Riley, Michael’s quotation hints at the beginning of self-awareness of the 
normativity of whiteness, by recognising that his blindness could be due to the 
dominance of whiteness in Australia. Michael acknowledges that the fact that 
the majority of people in Australia are perceived as white has an impact on his 
own race-thinking, and indeed his race seeing, suggesting that those in more 
subordinate positions such as non-white Muslims may employ different 
perceptual practices in relation to race to himself. However, he also states that 
“this is the first time I’ve actually heard it,” indicating that his engagement with 
this research project was the first time that he thought of himself as being 
perceived as racially different to other Muslims. This can partly be attributed to 
the fact that whiteness is invisible to most white people, as I elaborated on in 
Chapter Two – in the words of hooks, “White people can 'safely' imagine that 
they are invisible to black people since the power they have historically 
asserted, and even now collectively assert over black people, accorded them the 
right to control the black gaze" (2015, p. 168). Michael’s interview suggests that 
he was not aware that non-white Muslims perceived his whiteness until I (a 
non-white Muslim) questioned him about it, indicating that hooks’ assessment 
of why whiteness is invisible to white people could also be applicable to other 
racialised groups. 
Interestingly, Michael’s interview transcript suggests that none of Michael’s 
experiences as a Muslim prior to our contact had intimated that he was 
perceived as white by non-white people, which is curious given that it was a 
recurring theme in most of the other participants’ narratives. It is possible that 
his lack of awareness about his whiteness, unlike other participants, was 
because he had only been Muslim for a short amount of time and did not 
interact with many other Muslims, and also because he did not visibly identify 
as Muslim through religious markers such as a beard or a kufi. However, it is 
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clear that through the process of the interview he began to understand that 
“Muslims” are racialised differently to white converts, to use the dualistic 
terminology that he himself employs, and as a result doesn’t quite place himself 
in the category of “Muslims.” “Muslims” are “you guys,” referring to non-
white Muslims such as myself, not “we.” 
In contrast, Edward stated that he was aware of being white, but admitted that 
he had never interrogated what that meant, positing: “To be honest I’ve never 
really thought of it, you know, being white and whatever else. So that’s a tough 
one, I really don’t know how to answer that. Um… Obviously I am white. I’ve 
never given it any thought.” Edward struggled to articulate what whiteness 
meant for him as an identity, and eventually framed his own whiteness with 
reference to how he believed that other people might view him: “I would say 
that obviously people would perceive me as both physically white and also in 
terms of a political sense, white. I guess that’s how people see me.” It was 
common for participants to struggle with questions about racial identity and 
white culture in the interviews. This could be explained in part by the fluidity 
of whiteness, and race in general: Australian whiteness studies scholar Jane 
Durie has argued that “there is no straightforward, singular relationship 
between whiteness as a signifier of dominance and authority and the lived 
experience of white people” (1999, p. 153). Another factor may be that while 
most participants were ultimately able to offer some description of what they 
felt their white identity meant to them and what it represented after some 
reflection, a small number of converts were not able to respond to the question, 
expressing discomfort at the questioning and stating that they did not know 
how to answer it. Previous empirical studies of whiteness and white identity 
have found a similar reticence and discomfort amongst white participants when 
talking about their whiteness (Adams 2015, Cooks 2003, Frankenberg 1993), 
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which some have suggested is an important pedagogical step for individuals to 
begin to confront their complicity in white supremacy (Cooks 2003). In these 
situations, if after some time the participant still appeared to be struggling, I did 
not pursue the line of enquiry further. 
Unlike participants who did not feel that their white identity was an important 
or significant part of their person, there were also a small number of people 
who indicated that they had given a significant amount of thought to what it 
meant to be white, and were more likely to utilise race cognisant repertoires in 
their interview. Ben’s definition was influenced by his academic study as a 
historian: 
Being of European descent. Because I understand it as a – I mean, I’m an 
academic so I understand it as a historical and politically contingent term based 
on being from Europe which is why until very recently someone who was 
Russian for example wasn’t actually considered white in that sense. But now 
they are. I identify as white, I don’t identify as Anglo because I’m Celtic, I’m 
Scottish. So there’s a difference. So maybe Anglo-Celtic instead of Anglo-Saxon. 
And a certain wider cultural and intellectual currents that you might digest 
organically, just growing up in the society that you’re raised in. So that would 
help you identify as white. 
 
Ben located his ability to discuss whiteness as a socially and politically defined 
identity with the fact that he is a historian and understood the historical lineage 
of race and whiteness. 
Throughout the interviews, it became evident that participants who had given 
some thought to what whiteness meant were more likely to describe whiteness 
as a position of power and privilege, regardless of whether they approached the 
question from an explicitly academic framework. James commented that he had 
been aware that he was white since he was very young because he had grown 
up in Blacktown, an area in Sydney’s Western suburbs which he described as 
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“extremely multicultural - I was the minority in my school.” James describes 
whiteness almost purely as a position of power, and something that he feels 
“almost ashamed of” despite acknowledging that he cannot change it. Early on 
in his interview, James explained that as a teenager, he had desperately wished 
he was not white: 
It’s normal to want to fit in, but most of the time it’s the other way, people want 
to fit into white Australia. Most of my friends weren’t white though… So every 
day or – maybe every week, one of my friends would have something kinda 
bad, like racist, happen to them, especially when we started going to the city to 
go to clubs and that. Or with police, security, altercations… And I felt guilty, 
and I still feel guilty… Sometimes I wish I could scrub my skin off, but I can’t 
and what good would that do anyway? It doesn’t change anything. 
James’s quotation highlights that his understanding of his whiteness stemmed 
predominantly from his interactions with his friends and peer groups, and the 
growing recognition that they received differential treatment from him both 
from individuals and from institutions like the police force, and as he states 
later in his interview, schools and places of employment. It is clear that he feels 
guilty about his whiteness and the benefits it affords him – “sometimes I wish I 
could scrub my skin off” - which is one of the affective responses of race 
cognisance identified by Frankenberg (1993). The political efficacy of ‘white 
guilt’ has been questioned by scholar of race and education Zeus Leonardo, 
who contends that: 
…white guilt can be a paralysing sentiment that helps neither whites nor 
people of colour. White guilt blocks critical reflection because whites end 
up feeling individually blameworthy. In fact, they become 
overconcerned with whether or not they ‘look racist’ and forsake the 
more central project of understanding the contours of structural racism 
(2004, p. 140). 
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The paralysis that Leonardo describes is apparent in James’ transcript, as he 
expresses frustration at feeling unable to do anything to dismantle racial 
structures as an individual. 
Like James, Katherine described whiteness in relation to privilege, but extended 
her analysis beyond that which was offered by James to situate the relationship 
between whiteness and power on a historical continuum. When asked what she 
meant when she said that she was white, she replied: 
I guess coming from the dominant society, coming from the powerful section in 
society, people who are more likely to get power, achieve power, have 
influence in society. Especially being English, coming from the colonial legacy 
of having an Empire, ruling the rest of the world, and therefore having these 
weird Orientalist assumptions about other people. We still call our colonisers 
our adventurers, and we say they adventured all over the world and that’s 
what we tell our children rather than we stole societies and committed 
genocides. Not so nice. 
James and Katherine both primarily view whiteness as negative, suggesting in 
their interviews that the privilege that they have as a result of their whiteness is 
unearned and unwanted. Similarly, although Paul pointed out positive aspects 
of what he viewed as white culture earlier in his interview when he discussed 
the “spirit or love of the nation” that he associated with white culture, he also 
somewhat tentatively acknowledged what he termed “a little more darker, 
sinister heart which is kind of linked to our colonial past.” Like James, Paul 
indicated that it was his contact with non-white people and cultures that helped 
him understand the advantage that whiteness affords white people: 
There's certainly that white privilege factor that comes in. I'm sure that kind of 
hidden racism at the job interview that will be done. The white guy, I dunno, if 
it's for certain companies the white guy has the advantage… So there's that 
sinister white heart where, I dunno – I don't even like using the word whiteness 
but just for want of a better description, it's convenient, that I think of that 
British colonial arrogance and I think of the Union Jack with its many negative 
connotations. And I don't associate that at all with non-white cultures. I always 
see them as the opposite, where they're usually being oppressed by some 
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arrogant white force. Or colonial history, how that plays out in colonial times is 
in those things. It's in the job interviews, in the judging that might go on – it's a 
broad thing, but that darker side is there. And I don't think I was ever aware of 
that until after I became Muslim. Not because I became Muslim but just because 
I started travelling and looking at the world and looking at the experiences of 
South Africa. 
In this quotation, Paul simultaneously employs colour evasive (“I don’t even 
like using the word whiteness”) and race cognisant (“they’re usually being 
oppressed by some arrogant white force”) repertoires to describe white 
privilege, demonstrating that rather than being two completely distinct 
discourses as indicated by Frankenberg (1993), they can and do sometimes 
work in tandem. Perhaps particularly significant to note about this interview is 
that Paul’s characterisation of white privilege is as something that is external to 
himself. While he does acknowledge that he is white in the interview, Paul is 
more likely to situate himself in whiteness when it is in reference to aspects of 
white culture that he finds endearing or humorous. He is less self-reflexive 
when it comes to talking about whiteness and power: these negative aspects of 
whiteness are, for Paul, located with bogans (as explored earlier in this section), 
in “certain companies,” “arrogant white forces,” “in colonial times,” and in 
apartheid South Africa.  
The dissonance in Paul’s quotation above can be explained through the work of 
Leonardo, who has suggested that the focus on white privilege in whiteness 
studies through the work of people like Peggy McIntosh has effectively masked 
and even minimised the function of white supremacy in the creation and 
maintenance of that white privilege (Leonardo 2004). He argues that centring 
the discussion on white privilege as something that is passively received by 
white people rather than something that is actively constructed through white 
racial domination, whiteness studies has not to date sufficiently addressed the 
root cause of racism, white supremacy. As Leonardo states, “Privilege is the 
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daily cognate of structural domination. Without securing the latter, the former 
is not activated” (2004, p. 148). The preoccupation with white privilege allows 
white people – including white scholars of race – to avoid the conversation on 
how they themselves may be complicit in the maintenance of white supremacy, 
beyond simply passively receiving white privilege. Similarly, people like Paul 
are able to acknowledge their white privilege while simultaneously relegating 
racism to specific places, people and times. 
This section has examined some of the different ways in which participants 
conceptualised their racial identities, with particular attention to how their 
racial repertoires might employ colour and power evasive or race cognisant 
discourses. The diversity and nuance in participants’ stories suggest that while 
Frankenberg’s model lays a strong foundation for understanding how white 
people understand their whiteness, there is scope to further delineate the racial 
repertoires Frankenberg employs. For example, amongst those who were 
seemingly race cognisant, participants varied in how they understood their 
white identities in relation to power and privilege. While some acknowledged 
that whiteness afforded them some privilege in Australia and globally, 
participants like Paul simultaneously distanced themselves from their own 
complicity in racial structures by relegating racial discrimination and prejudice 
to specific corporations, regimes, and groups of people. Still others suggested 
that their politics of anti-racism contributed to a lessening of their whiteness, as 
expressed by Daniel in section 7.3.2 later in this chapter. In the following 
section, I look at the concept of the “white Muslim” in greater detail, to 
demonstrate that while for some participants their conversion to Islam strongly 
challenged their racial knowledges and identities (as I have begun to map out in 
the current section), for others, their experiences as white Muslim converts 
simply reinforced their beliefs and attitudes about race. 
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 7.3 Being a White Muslim 
Previous chapters have established that Islam is a racialised religion in 
Australia, through analysis of interview data as well as reference to global 
literatures (Bayoumi 2008; 2009; 2015, Cainkar 2007, Dunn et al 2007, Jamal 
2008, Poynting et al 2004, Selod & Embrick 2013). Converts interviewed for this 
project responded to their entry into a religion racialised as ‘non-white’ in a 
number of different ways. In this section, I examine participant reflections on 
what it means to be a white Muslim, with particular focus on changes in how 
participants engaged with or thought about their whiteness after their 
conversion. Two key trajectories will be analysed and discussed with reference 
to the interview data. Some participants described becoming acutely aware of 
their whiteness only after they converted to Islam and their whiteness was 
either challenged by non-Muslims who viewed their conversion as a departure 
from whiteness (as documented in Chapter Five), or played a role in how they 
felt they were treated and received by some members of the Muslim 
communities that they engaged with (shown in Chapter Six). This theme will be 
examined in section 7.3.1. For some of these participants, becoming Muslim led 
to an increasing awareness of their relationship with power as a white person 
over time, often related to their exposure to non-white peoples. In other words, 
they became more conscious of their white privilege and the role it played in 
how others perceived and treated them. Secondly, it was common for 
participants to state that they felt that they had become less white after 
converting to Islam, some suggesting that becoming Muslim placed them on the 
borders of whiteness or even caused them to not be white anymore.  
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It is important to note that more than half of the participants did not express 
any change to how they perceived themselves racially. Many of these 
participants were among those who asserted whiteness to simply be a skin 
colour, or an ethnic identity that they did not place much significance in; 
however there were also some who were aware of their whiteness but simply 
felt that Islam was very much separate to their racial identity, regardless of 
what other people may say to them or how they may be treated. These themes 
are examined in sections 7.4 and 7.5 later in the chapter.  
7.3.1 Conversion to Islam reinforced their whiteness 
For some of the participants that I interviewed, becoming Muslim made them 
conscious of their whiteness in a way that they had not recognised before, or 
alternatively made them more aware of the privilege that their whiteness 
afforded them in mainstream society. In other words, the process of entering a 
religion racialised as ‘non-white’ and correspondingly, gaining access to 
racialised communities, gave them a greater insight into how their whiteness 
operated outside of their previously held normative understandings of their 
racial identity. The idea that whiteness is lived by white people as a neutral and 
unraced identity has been well-documented in the literature, and indeed forms 
one of the most significant and central theories offered by whiteness studies 
scholars, as outlined in section 2.4. 
The experiences recounted by some participants in this project are illustrative of 
a shift between the first and second stage of the psychosocial theory known as 
white racial development theory as first formulated by educational 
psychologist Janet Helm in the early 1990s, whereby white people move from 
thinking of themselves as being unraced and “normal” to becoming aware that 
they embody a white racial identity. Helm argues that it is necessary for white 
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people to become aware of their racial identity, and states that she developed 
the model because it is important to raise the awareness of white people about 
their role in creating and maintaining racism (1992). In Helm’s model, the first 
stage is contact, whereby white people may deny that they have a racial 
identity, and specifically may deny that they benefit from racial privilege. 
During this stage, white people may not refer to themselves as white, or refer to 
whiteness as being simply a skin colour, or may otherwise be uncomfortable 
with the use of the term or concept of whiteness. As illustrated in the previous 
section, this colour blind approach to whiteness was evident in some of the 
interviews with participants. 
The next stage of Helm’s white racial identity development model, 
disintegration, can emerge after sustained contact with racialised groups. In this 
phase, white people become exposed to interpersonal and institutional racism 
experienced by non-white people and correspondingly become more conscious 
of their own whiteness, and may experience dissonance and conflict as they 
come to terms with the idea that they benefit from racial oppression. Some of 
the converts interviewed in this project appeared to have entered or even 
passed this phase of Helm’s white racial identity development theory. Their 
shift from stage one to stage two often occurred gradually, over a period of 
years rather than instantaneously, which participants tended to attribute to 
increased exposure to non-white Muslim communities over time. Stephanie 
described it as a feeling of “difference… you just start to realise that, when 
you’re with Muslims, that you’re the odd one out. And until that moment, you 
have an epiphany then, because until that moment you had always been the 
same as everyone else.” Stephanie indicated that her awareness of it grew as 
she came into contact with more and more Muslims: 
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Everyone would just be so nice to you all the time. Like weirdly nice. I’m not 
complaining, because it was – there’s some comfort in that… But then it started 
to get weird, because everyone treated you like you were so special and I 
started to realise that hang on, it’s just cos I’m white… After a while it started to 
become uncomfortable for me. I think it was then that it started to occur to me 
that hang on, white Muslims get special treatment. Maybe white people in 
general get special treatment… I felt really dumb, like how did I not notice that 
before? 
Stephanie’s story emerges out of positive reactions to her whiteness, referring to 
the glorification of white converts that I discussed in section 6.3.3. During her 
interview, Stephanie was at first hesitant to talk about how the glorification of 
white converts made her feel about her whiteness, because she did not want to 
be ungrateful to the communities that “offered [her] a safe haven… they were 
so kind.”  
While Stephanie’s growing consciousness of the privilege that her whiteness 
afforded her emerged from her interactions within Muslim communities who 
venerated her whiteness, other participants indicated that their understanding 
of whiteness as a position of advantage in Australia became heightened after 
they became Muslim and had greater opportunity to observe how non-white 
Muslims and Muslims who visibly identified as Muslim were treated by the 
broader public. Cassie pointed to the example of her Pakistani-born husband, 
stating that over time she noticed how non-Muslims responded to him 
differently than they did to her: 
…but sometimes I feel in situations where I’m with him, in situations where 
he’s interacting with people that may not know him very well or might be 
unsure of him, I feel like my presence can help to legitimise him. Does that 
make sense? Cos they look at me and I’m like female and white and have a 
reasonably simple name. But I’m not threatening, they think they can easily 
understand me, in a superficial interaction.  
Here, Cassie notes that the perception of threat that attaches to her husband is 
as a result of a mixture of his racialised facial features and his non-English 
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name. His ‘difference’ is viewed as dangerous; Cassie’s ‘sameness’ – her 
visually perceptible ‘whiteness’ and familiar English name – mitigates the 
threat and contains it. Cassie noted that it was through her interactions with her 
husband and other Muslims that she started to understand the differential 
treatment that non-white Muslims received from non-Muslims. She reflected: 
Whereas maybe I just wasn’t aware of how easy it was for me until I kind of 
saw that it could be difficult or that people could kind of respond to you with 
uncertainty or distrust or those kinds of things? Maybe that has changed my 
perspective of my own experiences as a person who’s white? Growing up it 
was just kind of a non-issue. It was pretty… it was a white environment. So I 
was just like, yeah it just didn’t come up in my conscious mind anywhere, it just 
didn’t come up. 
Prior to that, Cassie stated, growing up in an almost entirely white community 
on the North Coast of NSW meant that she was not aware that her whiteness 
afforded her a certain advantage, precisely because everyone looked and acted 
in similar ways to her. As she started to notice that people treated her husband 
differently to her in certain situations, she became aware that the interactions 
were highly racialised. 
Like Cassie, Daniel felt that after his conversion to Islam he became more aware 
of the advantages that he had accrued in society due to his whiteness. However, 
Daniel differentiated his experiences from that of white Anglo converts like 
Cassie by emphasising that as a Bulgarian migrant, he is racialised differently to 
Western Europeans. Despite his insistence of this fact, he acknowledged that it 
was not until he became Muslim that he became more aware of what it was like 
to experience racialisation. After describing an incident he witnessed where his 
South Indian friend was abused on a train, he explained: 
Later on a couple of months later I asked him about it, and he didn’t even 
remember it. Which kind of alerted me that for him this is probably more usual 
than for me. Because I remembered it because it was a shock to the system. But 
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yeah, I think becoming Muslim definitely... If you have this understanding, 
kind of pushes you down a path which the only way to avoid it is to put your 
head in the sand.  Cos you kind of recognise certain things. 
In his interview, Daniel suggested that becoming Muslim made it harder for 
white people to ignore or dismiss racism against non-white people, partly 
because of the immersion into predominantly non-white Muslim communities 
that often followed conversion. Daniel posited that greater interaction with 
people of colour meant that converts could potentially became more exposed to 
racism and correspondingly, their own privilege in not experiencing racism. 
Importantly, he notes that some white converts purposefully ignore racism, 
thereby ignoring the ways in which they themselves may benefit from white 
privilege and racism; examples of the phenomenon Daniel described will be 
explored later in this chapter. 
It is clear from Daniel’s interview that he situates himself in the first group of 
white Muslims – the ones who, through their interactions with non-white 
Muslims, become race cognisant. Katherine was another participant who stated 
that her conversion to Islam made her more critical of her own positioning as a 
white person in the Muslim community, but remarked that it had less to do 
with the act of conversion or the religious practices of being a Muslim, and 
more to do with the people and ideas that she started engaging with after she 
became Muslim. Like Ahmed, whose story is shared later in this section, she 
located her growing criticality at a point well after her conversion. When asked 
whether her perceptions of whiteness had changed after she became Muslim, 
Katherine replied: 
I would like to think that I’ve become a lot more critical of whiteness and of 
myself as a white person and my assumptions and beliefs of other people. And 
where I might have before made assumptions about people that were either 
patronising or lazy assumptions, I think I’ve become a lot more aware of that 
kind of thing, and I’m able to challenge them a lot more now. 
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However, Katherine added that the change came slowly, and that it was “well 
after [she] became Muslim” that she began to develop a critical approach to her 
whiteness: 
It was – you know, reading a specific set of people, knowing particular people 
who studied that or focused on that in the Muslim community who really 
challenged how I think. When I became Muslim, I was still – so like, more than 
rejecting frameworks I had always believed in, I became Muslim and a deep 
part of becoming Muslim was that I felt like Islam fitted these frameworks. 
Such as human rights and feminism, how I understood them. In a specific way 
of understanding them. The universalism of human rights and Western 
feminism as the best feminism. And well after I became Muslim, like a couple 
of years later was I challenged on them… I feel like a lot of that is to do with 
whiteness and accepting the white narrative on these things.  
Through Katherine’s telling of her story, her conversion itself had minimal 
impact on her changing conceptualisation of whiteness and her own racial 
identity, except that it exposed her to new groups of people, some of whom 
challenged her existing worldview. There is little in her interview transcript to 
indicate that a similar outcome would not have been reached had she not 
converted to Islam, acting as a reminder that participants’ conversions are 
simply one aspect of their lives, and their Muslim identity just one social 
identity amongst many that they hold. 
A number of participants who recognised that their whiteness positioned them 
differentially to other Muslims remarked that their whiteness was used to 
ostracise them from sections of the community. Kim’s negative experiences in 
the mosque, for example, discussed in section 6.2.2, highlighted for her that 
some Muslims felt that her whiteness made her “filthy” and “najas”, and thus 
disallowed from entering religious spaces. Similarly, Henry suggests that his 
negative experiences of feeling patronised and viewed as inferior within the 
Muslim community were a constant reminder that he was white, and thus was 
considered to be less morally upright and religiously observant than other 
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Muslims. Unlike Stephanie from earlier in the section, who appreciated that her 
growing cognisance of her whiteness caused her to be more aware of racial 
inequalities and the relationality of power with regards to race, Henry took a 
colour evasive approach and argued that it went against the “spirit of Islam,” 
positing that “race shouldn’t, well - I mean it doesn’t matter in Islam, so why 
does it matter to Muslims?” 
While most participants described having their whiteness reinforced by their 
interactions with Muslims, Ahmed indicated that it was through engagements 
with non-Muslims, particularly Islamophobic people on the internet, that begun 
to highlight to him the significance of his racial identity. He stated: 
You know, like your Islamophobes really love latching onto that, not realising 
it’s something that I don’t actually care about. In terms of like, “you’re a race 
traitor” or “you’re not really white anymore”. And I’m like, I don’t care, you 
know, good…. But yes, it’s been challenged a few times, in ways that I see as 
being positive because it’s making visible the problem of whiteness rather than 
stripping away from me this privilege that I want to hang onto. So where I have 
been challenged it’s been more along those lines and I’ve thought was a good 
thing. 
Unlike participants who related that interactions in which they were told they 
were no longer white made them feel less white, a topic that is explored in 
section 7.3.3, Ahmed stated that his experiences as a white Muslim reinforced 
and extended his understanding of whiteness precisely because his whiteness 
was challenged by some non-Muslims. The reasoning provided by Ahmed was 
that when people called into question his whiteness because of his decision to 
become Muslim, it reinforced for him that if it were not for his religion, he 
would unconditionally be regarded as white by other white people, thereby 
reminding him of the privileges and advantages he accrues due to his 
whiteness. By characterising it in this way, Ahmed clearly identifies that he 
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views whiteness as a hegemonic racial identity in a hierarchy of racial identities, 
and not simply a cultural affiliation.  
In his interview, Ahmed explained that he had seen his whiteness as one 
identity amongst many, rather than as a privileged identity, for most of his life 
as a Muslim, but that his perception and analysis of whiteness had shifted 
significantly in the last four years: 
Whiteness is now something that I associate a lot more directly with a power 
system. It’s something that I don’t actually want to have in myself, but at the 
same time I can’t pretend it’s not there. Whereas before I just saw it as a 
difference in a range of others. I don’t see it that way anymore. I tie it directly to 
a global power system, a power system that I reject. So I call myself white now 
more than before because it’s something that I can’t remove, even though I 
reject whiteness itself. Whereas back then I wasn’t aware of those issues in the 
same way. 
Ahmed’s strategy of reasserting his whiteness and reminding himself and 
others of his whiteness in an attempt to highlight his racial privilege is in direct 
contradiction to the suggestions made by scholars such as Miles and Banton 
that racial terminology and references to race need to be abolished in order to 
also abolish racism. For Ahmed, his anti-racist identity requires him to 
acknowledge the benefits he accrues due to his racial identity, rather than 
avoiding the issue of race altogether. 
Ahmed’s changing ideas about his whiteness coincided to some extent with his 
move to Indonesia and marriage to an Indonesian wife, however when this was 
suggested to him as a potential reason for his shift in thinking, he rejected this 
explanation: 
No, it’s come through actually because of my continued ties with the Muslim 
community in Australia. And also because of my conscious expansion of links 
of solidarity with people of colour in different countries, like the United States 
and Canada. And of course in Australia. And so I’ve become aware of the ideas 
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connected to it. Through the Muslim community, but also through a broader 
community of solidarity and struggle, globally. 
In this quotation, Ahmed attributes his growing awareness of the discourse and 
positionality of whiteness in the Muslim community as a part of a “broader 
community of solidarity and struggle.” Like Katherine, Ahmed doesn’t link his 
changing views about whiteness directly to his conversion, but acknowledges a 
tangential connection. He does, however, state that inhabiting both a white and 
a Muslim identity does make him relate differently to his whiteness than he 
would have if he had not converted. He attributes this feeling to being a 
Muslim who is part of a global anti-racist struggle and simultaneously in a 
position of power in relation to other non-white people. Although he doesn’t 
identify it as a factor, his development of a white anti-racist identity may also 
have been amplified by living in Indonesia. 
This section has highlighted conversion to Islam can reveal or reinforce one’s 
whiteness, which may signal a shift in the racial repertoires a person utilised 
when thinking about their whiteness. For some participants, their change in 
approach to their whiteness came very soon after conversion, as they began to 
associate with non-white Muslims. This was usually the case for participants 
who had been raised in areas with very little cultural diversity, and for whom 
becoming Muslim also meant entry into a new and culturally heterogeneous 
community – and greater knowledge of the racism that members of that 
community faced. For other participants, the fact that they were racialised as 
white became apparent to them some time after conversion, after receiving 
“special treatment” from non-white Muslims, or feeling that their whiteness 
was glorified by born Muslims. Still others located the source of their 
knowledge of racialisation with non-Muslims who called them race traitors. In 
the following section, I will explore the opposite phenomenon – where 
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conversion to Islam led to participants feeling less white than before, or like 
they had left – or been evicted from – whiteness. 
7.3.2 Less white than before 
The previous subsection explored how participants’ whiteness was revealed or 
reinforced after their conversion. In this section, I start to examine the ways in 
which conversion significantly challenged or disrupted participants’ white 
identities. Numerous reasons offered by white converts, mostly relating to their 
interactions with other people, have already been documented in Chapters Five 
and Six. In those previous chapters, I chronicled the diverse ways in which both 
Muslims and non-Muslims propagate the notion that Islam is a racialised 
religion that is culturally foreign to whiteness. This section adds to the 
discussion by describing the impact of racialisation on white converts who 
discussed feeling that their whiteness decreased or was otherwise mitigated by 
their conversion to Islam. 
Some participants attributed their feelings of no longer being as white as they 
once were primarily to negative reactions to their conversion from white non-
Muslims. Participants who described experiencing racialised abuse or 
harassment from non-Muslims, usually from strangers or colleagues, were 
more likely to express feeling like they had in fact been relocated to the borders 
of whiteness, whereas previously they had been secure in the centre of 
whiteness. In reference to the Islamophobic and often racialised abuse he 
receives when he wears traditionalist Muslim garb such as the thawb or kufi, 
Xander stated: 
It’s like they can’t see past your clothes, so all they see is a dark-skinned 
bearded Arab man even when the guy in front of them is as white as snow and 
blonde to boot. They don’t want to believe you’re white. And after a while, you 
stop believing it yourself. Because it’s that persistent, you just start thinking 
297 
 
that hang on, maybe I’m not white. What does white even mean? You really 
start to question everything, yeah. 
Riley posits a similar theory, stating that the occasional times she wears a 
headscarf these days, such as on Eid or on the way to religious classes, she feels 
like she does not fit in with the broader Australian population: 
But it’s not even that they’ll say something to you, it’s more a feeling that you 
get. Maybe it’s all in my head. But I do think that people look at you like you’re 
different, and then you feel different, and then you start getting – or I do anyway, 
I start getting worried about being seen as different and so I’ll do something 
that’s like, super Aussie like my accent gets more bogan or I’ll start, I dunno, 
talking about rugby or something. I can’t help it… in those moments I definitely 
feel like people don’t see me as white, and I start to question it too so I start 
doing things to prove it. 
In these quotations, both Riley and Xander refer to ‘questioning’ their own 
whiteness in response to treatment or perceived treatment from other white 
people.  While Xander describes accepting his new non-white status to some 
extent, Riley attempts to regain her whiteness by performing ‘Aussieness,’ 
which in her quotation she states manifests in a ‘bogan’ accent and sports talk. 
It is clear through her quotation that Riley associates these cultural aspects of 
Australianness with whiteness, and she feels that the ḥijāb locates her as being 
outside both of these identities, leading to anxiety about her racial positioning 
in such contexts. 
For other participants, the feeling that they had ‘left,’ or in some cases been 
‘evicted’ from, whiteness stemmed not from responses to their clothing but 
from their lack of participation in certain cultural norms and customs. One 
participant, Paul, mentioned that not participating in Christmas made them feel 
like “an outsider… like I’m not really white anymore.” Fatima did not point to 
any specific cultural norms or customs, but indicated that she felt that she was 
no longer as white as she once was, because of the way that non-Muslims 
perceived her: 
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I think a lot of people do question that. A lot of Australians – when they’ve 
asked me my ethnic background and I’ve told them truthfully, I have found 
that they’ve sort of questioned… or not so much questioned but they have 
acted like I’m not white anymore. And particularly being Australian, there are a 
lot of cultural elements that they know that I won’t do anymore… I know that 
practising Islam will make me live different to a lot of other Australians. And so 
I think particularly a lot of Australians, in the past they’ve reacted to me in a 
way that’s just, “she’s not white anymore”. 
While Riley, Xander, Fatima and Paul referred to feeling like they were no 
longer white because of their interactions with white non-Muslims, for Daniel it 
was his non-white friends who would “pull [him] into the brown category.” 
Referring to a South Indian friend of his, he states: 
Because he was a lefty [politically left wing] he would have a lot of anti-
American politics. And a lot of times due to generalisations cross over to white 
people. And several times when he would have one of these rants going on he 
would turn over to me and say, “Daniel – you’re not white.” And I knew what 
he meant. He wasn’t denying my genetic heritage. 
Omar too indicated that it was through socialising with his new Muslim peer-
groups that his whiteness started to become challenged and disrupted: 
People like labels, it makes them feel safe. So if you have the label of Muslim, 
well that’s synonymous with being any background that’s not white. And 
they’ll kind of… give you a pass. It comes up a lot more with things like 
humour or pop culture references, where they might be making jokes about 
their own cultural group and you don’t know whether to laugh or not, cos it 
might be racist… Sometimes it’s mild, like a joke about Arab time or brown 
people time, and it’s okay for you to make a joke about it too cos you’re given 
an honorary brown person status, almost. But there have also been times when 
they’re more, well they’re less mild. I don’t feel comfortable making jokes at 
those times as a white person. 
When asked to give some examples of those times, Omar replied: 
…there was a conversation about so-called “moderate Muslims,” who are seen 
as sell outs. There are quite a few white converts in the [Facebook] group, and 
one of them was calling these other moderate Muslims, ‘Uncle Toms’. And 
none of the others in the group pulled him up on this. I remember reading it 
and thinking, that’s not cool. You’re white. You shouldn’t be using that kind of 
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language. But it seemed acceptable, people accepted it because he was Muslim 
and so I guess there’s a certain level of oppression that attaches there, and 
people might feel like they relate somehow to black people. 
Omar’s discomfort with a white person’s use of the term ‘Uncle Tom’ to refer to 
a Muslim who is perceived to be carrying out the aims of the government is due 
to the origins of the term, which is sometimes used by Black people to refer to 
other Black people who are viewed as “sell outs.” Omar expressed uneasiness 
about a white person appropriating the term to refer to Muslims because he felt 
that for a privileged white person to use the word to put down a person of 
colour denied the political realities of their respective subject positions.  For 
Omar the issue is clear cut, as he feels that the level of disadvantage that he 
might experience as a white person is not comparable to that of a Black person 
in America, or a non-white Muslim in Australia, particularly as a Muslim who 
does not visibly identify as Muslim on a day to day basis. In Daniel’s 
experience, he found that while “some Muslims will be pulling me more into 
the brown people category, which I don’t mind,” “there is a risk that one person 
will definitely not feel that way.” Because of this perceived risk, Daniel stated 
that he tends to prefer the safer option of not using certain language or making 
particular jokes, even if a non-white Muslim friend gives him permission to do 
so. Daniel noted, however, that his self-perception of where he fits on the 
white/non-white scale has changed considerably over the last three years: 
I guess before I was in the middle, I didn’t know where I fit. At this stage I 
guess I can see kind of, I guess it’s a journey and I’m somewhat on one side of 
it. It’s hard to explain. Not white... Whatever the other side is called. It probably 
has a lot to do with the type of politics that over the last few years I’ve seen 
change, been attracted to, then identity per se. Because I still identify as a white 
Muslim whatever that means. But at the same time, there seems to be two types 
of white Muslims. The type that are generally – they know what they’re talking 
about in terms of minority politics, privilege, and all this type of stuff. And on 
the other hand, the ones who – if I was being harsh to them – I would say, they 
either don’t know about their own privilege or they want to keep it as much as 
possible. 
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In this quotation, Daniel adds another dimension to whiteness, beyond that of 
culture, identity and power. While he acknowledges that he is still a white 
Muslim and still calls himself a white Muslim, he simultaneously states that he 
feels that he is on the other side of whiteness because of his cognisance of 
whiteness and race politics. He positions himself in contrast to white converts 
who put “their heads in the sand,” and refuse to recognise their positionality as 
people with privilege in comparison to non-white Muslims. In this way, Daniel 
implies that a convert’s whiteness can be somewhat mitigated if they have a 
strong understanding of race politics and commitment to racial justice. This 
raises the possibility for further delineating Frankenberg’s power/colour 
evasive repertoire to distinguish between those whose evasiveness is 
intentional and calculated and those whose evasiveness primarily stems from a 
lack of thought about the topic. 
The above quotation provided by Daniel contradicts itself as within a short 
space of time he states that he is on the other side of white, but that he identifies 
as a white Muslim. One interpretation of his words could perhaps suggest that 
he is taking a similar position to that of Ignatiev and Harvey. Writing in the 
1990s, Ignatiev and Harvey developed the concept of the ‘race traitor’ as a term 
for white people who understood their complicity in racist structures and 
wished to abandon or deidentify with whiteness. Their motto, “treason to 
whiteness is loyalty to humanity” (1996, p. 10), entreats white people to 
“struggle to abolish the white race from within” (1996, p. 2). Ignatiev and 
Harvey describe whiteness as a club, and explain that their journal is an attempt 
to “reach out to those who are dissatisfied with the terms of membership in the 
white club” (1996, p. 13)… “Race Traitor aims to dissolve the club, to break it 
apart, to explode it” (1996, p. 11). The idea of the ‘race traitor’ proposed by 
Ignatiev and Garvey, just like Thomas’s self-characterisation of his racial 
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identity, appears to promote a reassertion of white racial identity while 
concurrently rejecting membership to that very club. 
The danger in Ignatiev and Garvey’s work is that fervent proclamations of race 
treason by white people can lead to the belief that they have managed to 
disown their whiteness, and repudiate the benefits they accrue as a person who 
is racialised as white. This weakness is highlighted by Alcoff in her article 
‘What Should White People Do?’ when she states, “One’s appearance of being 
white will still operate to confer privilege in numerous and significant ways, 
and to avow treason does not render whites ineligible for these privileges, even 
if they work hard to avoid them” (1998, p. 17). Daniel’s political beliefs, no 
matter how strongly anti-racist or radical they are, are not apparent on his body 
like his skin colour, and do not absolve him of his privilege. Thus, holding the 
belief that one’s political inclinations mitigate one’s whiteness can potentially 
lead to less-than-ideal outcomes, as encapsulated by Alcoff:  
…some “treasonous” whites, with white privilege still largely in place, might 
then feel entitled to disengage with whiteness without feeling any link of 
responsibility for white racist atrocities of the past; or they might consider a 
declaration that they are “not white” as a sufficient solution to racism without 
the trouble of organizing or collective action. This position would then end up 
uncomfortably similar to the “colorblindness” attitude that pretends ignorance 
about one’s own white identity and refuses responsibility (1998, p. 17). 
To a certain extent, Daniel’s interview gives credence to Alcoff’s concerns, as he 
rapidly alternates between describing himself as white while also repudiating 
his whiteness because of his political beliefs. While Daniel does not use the term 
‘race traitor,’ it is clear that he believes that his anti-racist beliefs distinguishes 
him from white converts with “their heads in the sand,” and contributes to him 
no longer being as white as he was before. However, the interview did not 
reveal whether Daniel considered his declaration “a sufficient solution to 
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racism,” and so further conclusions cannot be drawn from the data as to 
whether or not his disengagement was politically inexpedient.  
The other aspect of Daniel’s interview that is useful to discuss is his description 
of other white converts who intentionally blind themselves to their privilege. 
Daniel comes back to this point a few minutes later in the interview, when 
discussing his first memory of recognising his own white privilege, stating, 
“But yeah, at the same time I know some Muslims who convert, particularly 
from Anglo-Saxon background who have been able to avoid it. I don’t want to 
make judgement calls about if they’re putting their heads in the sand, but 
there’s that as well.” The phenomenon Daniel describes has been referred to as 
“white ignorance” by Caribbean philosopher Charles Mills (2007), who argues 
that epistemic ignorance such as the type engendered by white ignorance can 
be characterised as “group-based cognitive handicaps” (2007, p. 15). Mills 
suggests that white ignorance “is the idea of an ignorance, a non-knowing, that 
is not contingent, but in which race - white racism and/or white racial 
domination and their ramifications - plays a crucial causal role” (2007, p. 20). 
Important to this definition, and as Alcoff points out, the concept of ignorance 
in this context is not simply the absence of knowledge, but a wilful and 
structurally rooted denial of knowledge, which again raises the question of 
whether Frankenberg’s racial repertoires could be extended to consider the 
intentionality of ignorance within her repertoires. Of ignorance, Alcoff states:  
Even in mainstream epistemology, the topic of ignorance as a species of 
bad epistemic practice is not new, but what is new is the idea of 
explaining ignorance not as a feature of neglectful epistemic practice but 
as a substantive epistemic practice in itself. The idea of an epistemology 
of ignorance attempts to explain and account for the fact that such 
substantive practices of ignorance - wilful ignorance, for example, and 
socially acceptable but faulty justificatory practices - are structural. This 
is to say that there are identities and social locations and modes of belief 
formation, all produced by structural social conditions of a variety of 
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sorts, that are in some cases epistemically disadvantaged or defective 
(2007, p. 39-40). 
If we are to apply Alcoff’s description of epistemic ignorance to the converts 
that Daniel refers to, their “put[ting their] head in the sand” is not simply 
indicative of a deficiency in their epistemic practice, but is indeed a substantive 
part of their (structurally defined and maintained) white epistemic practice; a 
key component of which is to choose to wilfully ignore racism around them. 
However, rather than being a fixed state, Alcoff suggests that it is possible for 
epistemologies of ignorance to be challenged (2007). She and other philosophers 
such as Jose Medina (2012) suggest that at least minimal self-knowledge and 
social knowledge are integral to responsible epistemic practice (Medina 2012, p. 
55). The idea that both self-knowledge and social knowledge are required to 
break out of epistemic ignorance is captured in his quotation when Daniel 
states, “I would say, they either don’t know about their own privilege or they 
want to keep it as much as possible.” Only one of the participants, Liam, 
suggested that their conversion to Islam led to a complete disassociation with 
racial privilege. Liam indicated that he felt that he was no longer white because 
he no longer associated himself with privilege or oppression. When asked about 
how he conceptualised whiteness, Liam replied first by stating that he was 
“colour blind,” but then going on to say that he felt it was about cultural capital: 
Well see for me, I’m completely colour blind. I think colour is just BS you know. 
I know that’s probably because I’m a product of my environment and in terms 
of how things did turn out in terms of shaping my own identity…. So again, it’s 
about cultural capital, it’s about participation and belonging. 
Liam goes on to argue that he does not see himself as white because of his lack 
of cultural capital due to being from a low socioeconomic background: 
I think that there’s all these assumptions about whiteness and it plays out in 
some of my relationships in terms of how other people perceive it. I have a lot 
of friends from various low socioeconomic backgrounds who assume that 
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because I’m white I have it better. And I often find myself in this discourse 
where they look at me and go, “Well what’s your problem, you’re a white guy.” 
And I go well I’m a white guy but I have nothing. In fact, you’ve got more than 
me. Your family back in your country wherever it is in Asia have probably 
huge tracts of land that they can sell tomorrow if they wanted to. Or that they 
can produce something from. My mother lives in a housing commission, in a 
government housing unit, and when she’s gone – that’s it. I don’t have any 
assets... I don’t have any of that. I don’t have any of that to rely on. And that 
sort of brings a strain sometimes in my relationships in terms of ethnics 
discourse and ethnically based assumptions about socio economic power. 
Liam’s references to his class background mirror the discourse of the ‘white 
worrier,’ as described by Hage in his 2003 book ‘Against Paranoid Nationalism.’ 
Hage employs the concept of ‘white paranoia’ in his formulation of the term 
‘white worrier’ to describe white Australians, typically working class men, who 
are beset by the insecurity that they have been left out of Australia’s vision for 
the future. Hage argues that this white paranoia was particularly apparent in 
working class communities that felt they had been negatively impacted either 
economically or ideologically under the policies of the former Keating 
government. Embedded in this discourse is the fantasy of a white-supremacist 
nation, which exists in the minds of racists and multiculturalists alike, because 
as Hage contends in an earlier book, “both White racists and White 
multiculturalists share in a conception of themselves as nationalists and of the 
national as a space structured around a White culture, where Aboriginal people 
and non-white 'ethnics' are merely national objects to be moved or removed 
according to White national will” (1998, p. 18). In the case of racists, this occurs 
through exclusion and marginalisation, while for multiculturalists it is through 
their belief that they and other white people have the power to decide to 
welcome or tolerate ethnic others and regulate the space of the nation through 
their benevolence (Hage 1998). Although Hage’s analysis is now dated, given 
that he was referring to specific national discourses arising from the Howard 
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era, it can be argued that Liam’s insistence that his racial privilege is expunged 
by his economic disadvantage emanates from a similar fear. 
Liam’s interview is elucidating because he is the only participant to directly 
‘reject’ his whiteness, while at the same time agreeing to be part of a study on 
white converts to Islam. While other participants may have stated that they did 
not like to use the term white or they saw it only as a skin colour, Liam 
demonstrated an understanding and acknowledgement of the arguments 
relating to white privilege, but actively rejected the idea that he himself 
benefited from white privilege. Indeed, Liam stated that at one point in time he 
believed those arguments, but that he had since “gotten beyond it” after 
disassociating himself from his whiteness: 
I’ve gotten beyond it a lot now. Because I’ve largely managed to disassociate 
myself and disconnect myself from being known as white. And most of my 
friends that I have now don’t see me as white. But in the past when I did still 
see myself as white, I associated that with being a member of an oppressive 
class who came and took land that didn’t belong to them, and *inaudible* 
luxury throughout the colonial era even though I never got a taste of it. Who 
now in the postcolonial era are somehow paying the penance for my ancestors. 
And so there’s this kind of shame attached to my identity cos I see that there’s 
still so many ignorant white folk. And I’m ashamed to associate with so many 
ignorant white folk. So again I sort of managed to disassociate myself. 
Liam acknowledges the “shame attached to [his] identity,” but contends that it 
is something of a bygone colonial era and that it has nothing to do with him and 
his life today. His desire to distance himself from his whiteness is common 
amongst white people who feel shame due to their whiteness – as Alcoff has 
noted, shame is “a painful emotion. One wants to avoid it or avoid thinking 
about it seems to debilitate thoughtful agency and productive action, forcing an 
inward focus rather than on what needs to be done” (2015, p. 137). Shame thus 
operates in a similar way to guilt, which I discussed with reference to the work 
of Leonardo earlier in this chapter. Alcoff goes on to quote the work of Sandra 
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Bartky who contests the idea that shame and guilt are always demobilising, and 
suggests that guilt and shame can be politically productive if focused on the 
right targets. It is clear from his interview however that Liam’s shame is not 
politically productive, or at least had not been to date, as he instead expresses 
irritation at the idea that white people in the postcolonial era should be held 
accountable for something that happened long ago, employing a strategy that 
Jacqueline Nelson terms the “temporal deflection” of racism. In her work on 
anti-racism local action in New South Wales and South Australia, Nelson found 
that temporal deflection was often a common technique to distance oneself 
from racism, defining it as “a strategy of denial or minimisation where a 
passage of time separates a person or place from racism” (2013, p. 99). Fozdar 
(2008) uncovered similar sentiments to those expressed by Liam amongst 
Pākehā in New Zealand in reference to Māori people. She states that almost all 
of her interview participants, regardless of political background, stated that 
“since the wrongs done to Māori were generations old – itself an arguable 
contention - the degree to which these wrongs should be addressed by the 
current generation is debatable” (2008, p. 541). Fozdar suggests that “Such a 
framing utilises a discontinuous formulation of history to the present current 
injustices as contained in the past and enacted by people for whom the current 
generation cannot be held responsible” (2008, p. 541). In a similar fashion, Liam 
attempts to deflect his own racism and white privilege by positing that he 
himself is not racist or privileged, and should not be held accountable for the 
actions of his ancestors. 
Liam’s interview is at times illuminating, and simultaneously obfuscating. It is 
clear that Liam has given a great deal of thought to the concept of whiteness, 
moving from guilt and shame about his white ancestry and heritage to 
attempting to disassociate himself from “so many ignorant white folk” – even 
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adopting an Asian identity: “I joke all the time and say ‘Look I’m Asian okay, 
it’s Australasia.’ Get over it, we’re not in Europe. I’m Asian. I eat Asian cuisine, 
I speak Asian languages, I spend time with Asian people from various other 
Asian countries including my own, Australasia.” Thus, in Liam’s interview, he 
not only distances himself from the political, social and economic advantages of 
whiteness by referring to his low socioeconomic status both growing up and 
even now, but he also distances himself from the cultural aspects of whiteness, 
referring to food and language.  
The experiences of white converts documented in this section reveal that while 
not all white converts articulate a change in their racial identity post-
conversion, for some converts becoming Muslim meant not just a shift in their 
religious identity, but also in their formulation of their racial identity. This 
section has highlighted that converts’ characterisation of these changes is 
strongly influenced by their interactions with Muslims and non-Muslims, 
documented in Chapters Five and Six, and how their whiteness is perceived by 
the people around them.  For some participants, it led to a stronger realisation 
and recognition of their whiteness, which for some led to racial awareness and 
for others, an evasion of the knowledge. Other participants stated that 
converting to Islam made them feel less white, because both Muslims and non-
Muslims would treat them as though they were no longer white. The findings 
of this section have also presented an opportunity to augment and extend 
Frankenberg’s matrix of racial repertoires by utilising the work of Medina, 
Alcoff and Mills to consider the pivotal role of white ignorance in white 
people’s racial repertoires. 
 
7.4 Inclusion, Exclusion and Being In Between 
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Up until now, this chapter has focused on explicitly racialised constructions of 
identity and culture offered by participants. However, it is also important to 
discuss the racialised frames of seeing and knowing that emerged through 
discussions of culture and belonging, even where whiteness or race were not 
directly mentioned. Almost half the participants referred to feeling like they 
were in an ‘in-between’ space, where they felt they were not quite white and 
not quite non-white, or that they no longer “fitted in” with white Australians. 
These feelings point to a troubling of whiteness instigated by their conversion 
to Islam. Participants who described feeling like their racial surety had come 
into question were often aware of their whiteness prior to their conversion, or 
had become aware of it after their conversion because of the different responses 
they received from both non-Muslims and non-Muslims, as illustrated in 
chapters 5 and 6.  Thus, in this section I will examine participants’ expressions 
of belonging in both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, the factors that 
impacted on their feelings of exclusion and inclusion and the strategies that 
they employed in order to be more accepted. Where relevant, I will also 
demonstrate how ‘belonging’ impacted on some participants’ sense of racial 
identity as well.  
Analysis of the interview data revealed that the concept of belonging or not 
belonging to a community featured frequently in almost all of the participants’ 
stories, and that participants adopted different strategies to gain or regain 
acceptance amongst Muslims and white non-Muslims. Central to many of the 
stories of belonging was the suggestion that truly belonging anywhere was out 
of reach for white converts to Islam. Indeed, for most participants who related a 
change in their racial identity post-conversion, their conversion to Islam did not 
solely reinforce their whiteness or solely make them feel that they were no 
longer white; the vast majority of these participants instead described feeling 
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like they were in an in-between space, on the borders of both white and Muslim 
identities, and simultaneously on the borders of two communities – unsettling 
the dualistic division between ‘whiteness’ and ‘Islam.’ For example, Michelle 
describes feeling ‘very white’ around Muslims, whereas “when I’m with 
Australians I don’t see myself as white. At all.” She suggests that as a white 
convert you “stop belonging to either side… you don’t truly belong to either,” 
referring to an “other space that you dwell in, in the middle.” Michelle adds 
that she feels that she does not fit neatly into any part of society, because as a 
white Muslim, “I have issues with the white people that hate Muslims and I 
have issues within the Muslim community because I don’t look the same as 
everybody else.” Michelle’s sense of not belonging anywhere represents the 
feelings of many of the white converts interviewed, suggesting that feeling 
racially ‘in-between’ is the norm rather than the exception to their experiences. 
Like Michelle, Stephanie remarked that she often felt that she vacillated 
between two communities, but that she was never truly part of any one, at least 
not in the way that she had been prior to conversion: 
Sometimes I feel like I’m in, you know, orbit? Around two planets. And 
sometimes one pulls me in and sometimes the other, but I can’t be part of two 
orbits at once without tearing myself in half. Sometimes the Muslim community 
can be so challenging… And I never really know where I can stick my head in 
or whether someone’s going to just say, keep your nose out of it, whitey. But 
then I don’t feel like I am truly accepted by my non-Muslim friends anymore 
either. It’s… something’s shifted. And I know something has shifted with me 
majorly, but it’s like for them it’s all they see anymore. They no longer see me. 
For Stephanie, the experience of being “in between” is endured as a negative 
one that leaves her feeling socially excluded from all facets of society.  Rather 
than viewing her conversion to Islam as an extension of belonging, giving her 
access to both Muslim and broader Australian communities, she characterises 
her conversion as a loss of both communities – the community she once had, 
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and the Muslim community she never had a chance to get to know. Fatima, on 
the other hand, suggested that there are positive implications for having an “in 
between” identity. Speaking of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism, she 
posits that white converts can disrupt and challenge non-Muslim constructions 
of what Muslims represent in ways that non-white Muslims cannot: 
Because when such people who have those sorts of ideas, they can be exposed 
to as many raised Muslims, they can be as exposed to as many non-Muslims, 
white non-Muslims as they can, but it actually takes someone who is sort of in 
between like a convert to confront that, to really confront that idea. 
Fatima’s interview reveals that despite difficulties in finding a space where she 
felt she “belonged,” she believed that she and other white converts could help 
to disrupt the racialisation of Muslims and Islam in Australia by their very 
existence. Fatima thus suggests that there are political benefits to the presence 
of white converts, as they challenge reified racial constructs of what it means to 
be white and what it means to be Muslim.  Fatima’s experience speaks to Homi 
Bhabha’s theory of cultural hybridity, which suggests that the creation of new 
subject identities that emerge from the repudiation of essentialised cultural 
identities (in this case, through the process of conversion to Islam) disrupts 
dualistic and hegemonic structures constructed by the coloniser.  Bhabha refers 
to the new liminal space that develops through hybridity as “the third space,” 
an identification which is “the cutting edge for negotiation and translation” 
(Bhabha 1994, p. 38) between cultures.  If we presume that white converts 
occupy the liminal space in between essentialised cultures that Bhabha refers to, 
disrupting reified and racialised ideas of both whiteness and Islam, then this 
space can potentially be a positive and productive one for challenging the 
constructed binaries of Islam and whiteness. Bhabha’s suggestion that the third 
space is a productive space is concisely summarised by Meredith, who states: 
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Thus, the third space is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a 
productive, and not merely reflective, space that engenders new possibility. It is 
an ‘interruptive, interrogative, and enunciative’ (Bhabha 1994) space of new 
forms of cultural meaning and production blurring the limitations of existing 
boundaries and calling into question established categorisations of culture and 
identity (Meredith 1998, p. 3). 
In this conceptualisation of the liminal space that white converts operate within, 
the “space between” acts as a space within which culture can be challenged, 
negotiated and troubled, as Fatima astutely points out, rather than remaining 
mired in static structures. 
As stated earlier, one of the recurring themes within the interview data was a 
pervasive sense of being excluded or on the outer of different communities. In 
her interview, Michelle remarks that she wanted to appear to be anything but 
white so as to fit in amongst other Muslims and not have her religious 
commitment questioned.  When asked whether she thought she would be 
treated differently by other Muslims if she was not white, Michelle replied: 
In a way, within this particular context in Sydney, where there’s kind of like an 
Arab majority community, sometimes I really wish I wasn’t white. I wish I 
looked like something else. I wish I could just appear to be something else… I 
know it’s not possible. Just because of my appearance, I can’t hide it, even if I 
wear a scarf. I have issues both ways. I have issues with the white people that 
hate Muslims and I have issues within the Muslim community because I don’t 
look the same as everybody else. 
Michelle admits that she does not know whether acceptance into the 
community is any easier for non-white Muslim converts, but suggests that their 
integration into Muslim communities may be easier for them purely because 
unlike her, their appearance would not automatically reveal them to be 
converts.  Michelle adds that she thinks the desire to fit in is common amongst 
other white converts as well, and that some converts lie about the fact that they 
are converts as a result. Referring to one Muslim woman she knew, Michelle 
stated that she was 99% sure she lied about her convert status by claiming that 
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one of her parents was Muslim. Michelle suggested that the reason she lied not 
just to fit in, but to gain more credibility, particularly as she worked at an 
organisation that supported new converts:  
And then she started to cover more, wearing the full burqa around Lakemba… 
she lived with other converts and she always used that to gain leverage within 
the other girls, to kind of be like, “No, no, it’s done this way, I’m born Muslim.” 
And I thought that that was a very interesting illustration of the way that she 
wanted to have this status of being a born Muslim or at least having one of her 
parents be ethnically Muslim. 
Regardless of whether the woman in Michelle’s story was a convert or not, the 
fact that Michelle believed it to be likely is illuminating, as are the reasons she 
gave for why a person might pretend that they had been raised Muslim their 
whole lives. As I illustrated in section 6.3.2 in chapter 6, it was common for 
white converts to express that other non-white Muslims often treated them as 
though they were not authentic’ Muslims. In the interactions outlined in that 
section, not only did participants express that some non-white Muslims acted as 
though white converts would always be more ignorant that non-white Muslims 
when it came to knowledge about Islam, but that the immorality of whiteness 
would always be attached to them, unless they worked to display greater acts 
of piety, such as wearing the burqa as described above. 
Some participants stated that they felt that being a white convert meant that 
they were exposed to more questions about their conversion, and that they felt 
alienated by the constant reminders that they were “different”. In part, this was 
due to the fact that the assumption was that a white Muslim must be a convert: 
Kim hypothesised that converts from other backgrounds were not necessarily 
as noticeable as converts unless they identified themselves as being a convert, 
whereas people were immediately able to tell that she was white and therefore 
unlikely to be a ‘born’ Muslim. For one participant, Fatima, the extent of the 
questioning of her religiosity and commitment to Islam because she was a white 
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convert led her to start avoiding discussions about her racial and ethnic 
identity, and ultimately to lie about it. Her reasoning behind her response 
stemmed from a discomfort with the personal questions that people felt entitled 
to ask her about her identity, religion and pre-conversion life as soon as they 
found out that she was white, which often forced her to reveal personal 
information about her family and relationship with her parents: 
There actually was a time, whenever someone would ask me my ethnic 
background, because I do still get that question a lot, I would just tell them. 
And that would bring out a whole raft of questions. “Oh when did you 
convert? How did you convert? Why did you convert?” 
To avoid the questioning, Fatima would often tell people that she was half-
Pakistani: 
I would just tell people that I was half Pakistani and half white – “Oh, but you 
look very white, your eyes are so light blue!” “Yeah I look more like my dad.” 
And it did make it easier because then people would just assume I was raised 
Muslim, whereas beforehand they would ask a lot of questions. You know, 
how, why, this and that – and it just got to the point where they were asking me 
very, very personal things and I hadn’t known them for very long. So there are 
a lot of people in my life who still don’t know that I converted. 
In this situation, Fatima states that she lied not to accrue greater credibility as 
an authentic Muslim, but to stop people from asking questions that she found 
invasive. She noted that as soon as she told people that her mother was 
Pakistani, people were much more likely to accept her as a Muslim, though she 
adds that that did not always stop people from persistently questioning her. 
As well as examples of feeling excluded from Muslim communities and peer 
groups, some converts indicated that they felt like they no longer belonged in 
mainstream society, often pointing to their changed relationships with their 
family, friends and colleagues (some details of which have been discussed in 
Chapter Five).  The way that participants dealt with the social exclusion they 
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experienced differed from person to person. For some, their response to feeling 
ostracised by their friends and colleagues was to simply change peer groups, 
and to avoid interacting or socialising with colleagues outside of work. In 
relation to Islamophobia he experienced from his workmates, Xander stated, 
“You have to grow a thick skin and not let it bother you. It does still bother me 
sometimes though – not even just the Islamophobia, ‘cause that’s only a few 
people, but even with the good guys, we’re not as - friendly as we used to be. 
Yeah, there’s some tension there.” When asked why his relationship with them 
had changed, he replied, “Like I said before, the alcohol, everything they do is 
around drinking. But more so than the alcohol itself, but also their stubbornness 
about not changing anything about themselves or their culture, their work 
culture, to be more including of other people.” Xander differentiates between 
blatant Islamophobia and subtle forms of exclusion practised by his colleagues, 
but notes that both have the effect of positioning him outside or on the borders 
of their group. 
Participants who did not visibly identify as Muslim sometimes referred to the 
concept of “passing,” which meant that they were often exposed to racist 
perceptions and attitudes because they were included as a white person. If they 
challenged those attitudes, they were sometimes ostracised or excluded from 
that point on. Max stated that being ‘included’ as a white person meant that he 
heard a lot of anti-Muslim racism that he would not have otherwise heard: 
I guess because I’m a white Anglo and not everyone knows that I’m a Muslim 
so I get to probably see a lot more racism than people who are Muslims or not 
just even Muslims but people who are from other backgrounds. ‘We can say 
whatever we want in front of him, he isn’t going to really care.’ 
 
In this quotation, Max positions his whiteness as something that gave him 
greater access to the racist attitudes of white non-Muslims who assumed that all 
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white people felt the same as they did.  In Cassie’s words, because she does not 
“look Muslim,” she "would kind of passively come across some racist stuff 
that’s not directed at me but things that people say and because I’m kind of 
undercover it’s actually really bad in that sense.” Like Max and Cassie, Michelle 
also felt that she was able to pass and be included within conversations because 
of her whiteness. Michelle indicated that once people found out that she was 
Muslim, however, she was excluded from certain conversations or topics of 
discussion: 
Because I don’t wear the ḥijāb or anything, some people don’t know that I’m 
Muslim and they’ll make bad comments about Muslims. And I’ll be like “hey, 
do you know that I’m Muslim?” And they’ll just kind of say “Oh… really? Oh... 
okay.” And then things kind of really, they won’t be around me as much. So I 
think in that way it’s still – some kind of people have a reaction to it because 
they don’t think that I’m going to be Muslim so they feel free to say what they 
like. And then when they find out that I am they don’t really like that very 
much. 
Michelle remarks that incidents like the one documented above caused her to 
feel excluded from white communities, as her Muslimness casts her as an 
outsider because she does not participate in making racist jokes against 
Muslims.  
It was far more likely for participants to describe experiences like the one 
described by Michelle in terms of feeling included or excluded within white 
culture and communities, as opposed to a sense that they themselves were no 
longer white. For example, when asked what his perception of Muslims were 
after he first converted, Max replied, “At least when I’m around Muslims, I 
know I can be a Muslim.” He added that while it could be annoying to get 
asked questions about his conversion, it did not bother him as much as how he 
felt when he was amongst white non-Muslims: 
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That’s better than getting, like for example one day I’m sitting down having 
lunch, not on topic, there’s about 3-4 people there. Two of them are having a 
conversation. One guy just looks at me and goes, “Do you drink?” And I say 
“uh no.” And he goes, ”Oh why not, aren’t you allowed?” And I’m just like, 
“oh jeez,” and stuff like that where it gets to the point where you almost get 
your guard up so to speak when you’re around people who are like the same 
background as me, they’re born in Australia they’re from, you know, you do 
get your guard up. 
Max’s evident discomfort about being questioned about his personal practices 
and habits stems from a sense of disconnection from people who are otherwise 
“the same background as him,” but that he does not trust, or cannot let his 
guard down around.  
While most participants’ descriptions of being in an ‘in between space’ socially 
and culturally were negative in tone, Jason offered a potentially positive 
outcome of operating in a space which he describes as the “nexus” of two 
worlds, stating, “I’d like to think that some of my friends have learnt a little bit 
more about Muslims because of me, maybe become more open-minded.” When 
I prompted him to explain why, Jason stated that the vast majority of his family 
and social group had never interacted or spoke to a Muslim before him, and 
their only knowledge about Islam was transmitted to them through (largely 
negative) news media. Jason suggested that as a white person he was less 
threatening to his friends and family than a non-white Muslim would be, and 
so they were comfortable to ask him questions about Islam, even though he felt 
that sometimes the questions seemed designed to provoke him. Despite this, 
Jason is confident that some of his peers’ attitudes towards Muslims have 
altered for the better as a result of their interactions with him, suggesting that 
white converts and indeed, any Muslim converts, may in some situations be a 
conduit between non-Muslims and Muslims to promote greater intercultural 
communication. Jason’s experience, like Fatima’s earlier in this section, suggests 
once again that Bhabha’s theory of cultural hybridity may be a salient one 
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through which to analyse the potentially positive and productive aspects of the 
‘nexus’ or ‘in between space’ between whiteness and Islam. 
In this section, I explored how participants’ feelings of belonging and not 
belonging, of inclusion and exclusion, have been impacted by their conversion 
to Islam. While some participants stated that they felt little had changed in their 
lives since they converted, most participants indicated that their change in 
lifestyle and certain restrictions on things such as alcohol meant that they no 
longer “fit in” with their non-Muslim colleagues and friends as they had in the 
past. This appeared to be one of the key challenges for converts, as the 
development of a support network to act in place of those social networks often 
took time to establish, if they were established at all. Participants also reflected 
on the fact that they often felt isolated within Muslim communities as well, and 
this was often cited as an even bigger challenge for converts, as they hoped to 
find a sense of belonging within Muslim communities.  
The findings of this section indicate that for some participants, they felt that 
they occupied an in-between space in the middle of two communities, not quite 
fitting in anywhere, which sometimes manifested in feeling that they were on 
the borders of whiteness as well. While for many participants, this resulted in a 
sense of loss – loss of belonging, loss of community – for others, such as Jason 
and Fatima, their in-betweenness was viewed as a productive space. Their 
experiences suggest that Bhabha’s theory of cultural hybridity could well apply 
to white converts who are seen to disrupt the essentialised categories of Islam 
and whiteness, by complicating and troubling both identities, and also allowing 
for greater intercultural communication. 
 
7.5 Attitudes Toward Culture 
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Participants interviewed demonstrated a variety of different attitudes and 
responses towards the concept of culture, often revealing how participants felt 
about whiteness, Australianness, belonging and ‘ethnic’ cultures in more subtle 
ways than when they were asked directly about the same concepts. This section 
will detail two of the most common approaches to culture and cultural practice 
as discussed by participants in their in-depth interviews. On one hand, a 
number of participants described adopting certain cultural customs, traditions 
and attributes associated with a particular ethnic group, often one that their 
husbands or wives were part of, or alternatively one that may have been 
dominant or numerous in their neighbourhood.  Of these participants, some 
embraced the cultural customs and traditions of that ethnic group holistically 
and wholeheartedly, while others integrated parts of it into their lives as it 
suited them and their families. Examples of cultural attributes that were 
adopted by converts included such things as food, language, wedding 
traditions, Eid traditions and gender roles.  It should be noted that amongst 
these participants, most indicated that they approached the adoption of cultural 
traditions and attributes critically, and rejected elements that they disagreed 
with or felt went against Islamic principles – often framed as being “just 
cultural, not Islamic.” As was demonstrated in section 6.4, many of the 
participants interviewed had some experience of being told that something was 
a religious requirement when it was actually a cultural norm.  
On the other hand, some participants actively rejected the idea that converts 
should adopt a particular ‘ethnic’ culture. Reasons given for this rejection 
ranged from believing that there was no need to do so, to consciously wanting 
to stop the idea that Islam is associated with particular ethnic cultures and not 
others; in other words, to ‘deracialise’ Islam to some extent. A small number of 
participants located their own practice of Islam as acultural, and promoted 
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what some termed an ‘Australian Islam’ which would ostensibly be free of the 
cultural baggage that some ethnic groups brought to Islam. In addition, two 
participants stated that they made a conscious decision to retain parts of their 
white culture that they felt did not contradict Islam. 
Analysis of the qualitative data gathered during this project suggests that 
amongst the white converts interviewed, some perpetuated well-worn 
stereotypes about Muslims. The most common of these included the idea that 
Muslim societies were more sexist than Western societies, and that non-white 
Muslims were premodern or primitive in their thinking, due to their adherence 
to traditions that appeared to be at odds with modern ways of thinking. Such 
stereotypes were often framed in terms of ‘culture’ – in other words, the 
problems that they witnessed within the Muslim community were issues to do 
with practices and traditions of specific ethnic groups, rather than a problem 
with Islam. These tropes emerged in interviews with people who chose to adopt 
certain ‘ethnic’ customs, as well as those who chose to reject them. 
Some participants, such as Michelle, indicated that while they knew Muslims 
from a diverse range of cultures, they were particularly invested in some 
ethnocultural groups over others. In Michelle’s case, many of her interactions 
with Muslims were with people of various Arab ancestries, including Lebanese 
and Palestinian Muslims. She attributed this mostly to the area that she grew up 
in, in Wiley Park, and the fact that her high school had a high proportion of 
Arab students. She explained: 
I was around a lot of Arab people so at the time I started to learn to speak 
Arabic, I started to eat Arabic food, and I think I probably have been to one 
Caucasian wedding in my life and I’ve been to at least 25 Arab weddings. So I 
definitely kind of learnt what would happen at an Arab wedding more than I 
would know what would go on at a Caucasian wedding.’ 
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Michelle went on to state that she felt this had also been in part due to her 
marriage to an Arab man soon after her conversion, and her regular contact 
with his family. Michelle explained that in many ways she felt that she had 
become, in her words, “Arabised,” which for her meant having learnt to “blend 
in culturally very well with Arabs” and “cope in their particular culture.” She 
actively embraced many aspects of Arab culture such as food and social 
customs and visualised having “the big Arab wedding.”  
Fatima described a similar experience to that of Michelle’s, whereby her familial 
connections with a particular culture caused her to become immersed in that 
culture and its traditions to the point where her biological ancestry started to 
seem irrelevant. After leaving home at the age of 16, she moved in with a 
Pakistani couple whom she terms her ‘adoptive parents’, and describes having 
picked up much of their cultural practices. When they later helped her find a 
Pakistani husband, she became even more entrenched and invested in Pakistani 
culture. She frames this as a positive phenomenon precisely because it gave her 
connections to a large, well-established Muslim community in Sydney, which 
she feels gave her stability after her conversion. She qualifies though that she 
does not take parts of the culture that she disagrees with, specifically sexist 
attitudes or traditions: 
My husband being Pakistani, there are plenty of sexist things about Pakistani 
culture. Honestly. He doesn’t really follow that, as well. And he’s not just like, 
“You go in the kitchen cos you’re a woman and you’re supposed to do that.” 
He can’t cook so I cook. That’s more the reason for that. 
 
She notes that it was her interactions with other Muslims who confirmed for her 
that many of the things she disagreed with were not religious requirements. 
Fatima recollects: 
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Quite frankly I do find that a lot of Middle Eastern cultures can tend to be quite 
sexist. They can tend to have some – in the West we would call them quite 
sexist views, and in many ways they are often quite un-Islamic views as well… 
I think it was a little bit confusing at the time, but my gut feeling was that that 
was not Islam. Because on the same token I was meeting people of different 
cultural backgrounds, and plenty of them were honest enough to say “Well my 
culture is actually pretty sexist, in that we don’t think women should work, we 
don’t think women should be outside of the house. But then again, that’s not 
what the Qur’an says.” So I did also meet people who were honest enough to 
talk about it in that way, and that just drove the point home for me even more, 
that there was a separation between culture and religion. That’s always 
something I’ve tried to maintain. 
Fatima’s decision to adopt elements of Pakistani culture was partly a practical 
one, as she felt that it made her transition into her marriage and relationship 
with her Pakistani husband and in-laws easier. However, she also notes that she 
felt some pressure to do so from the broader Pakistani community that she 
socialised within, as well as other Muslims. Fatima remarked that she had only 
once had her ability to be a ‘real’ Muslim questioned because of her whiteness, 
but that she felt that Muslims were more able to accept her as a Muslim if they 
thought she had made an effort to appear ‘culturally’ Muslim as well; in other 
words, if she adopted customs associated with a cultural group that had a long 
history of Islam. Speaking of women she met in the Sydney Pakistani 
community, Fatima stated: 
Overall I just found the more Australian I acted, the more Anglo I acted, the 
more of a divider it became between me and them. And in some ways the more 
Australian I acted it almost became like, well, how much of a convert is she if 
she behaves like that? Muslim girls should behave like this... I did try and 
understand their culture a bit more and try and fit in with the sort of ideal. The 
more cultural I was, the more I was like them culturally, the more socially 
acceptable I became. 
When asked why she felt that this was the case, Fatima posited that Islam is a 
“highly racialised” religion in Australia, and that in order to be accepted she 
had to be perceived to be racialised too. Within the Pakistani community, that 
meant adopting Pakistani customs and traditions, and acting less Australian.  
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Fatima recognised that many of the cultural practices she engaged in to appease 
this expectation were not necessarily rooted in Islam, but that they still 
contributed to her Muslimness because they were associated with a culture that 
was seen to have strong links to Islam, unlike Australianness. In other words, 
converting to Islam and practising the tenets of Islam were not enough to 
establish her Muslim identity – she needed to become “more cultural” in order 
to be socially accepted as a Muslim. Fatima indicated that although she 
recognised that there was no religious compulsion to do so, she stated that as 
long as the cultural expectations of her Pakistani family members and the 
broader Sydney Pakistani community that she socialised with did not conflict 
with her morals, she was happy to adopt them in order to “meld into the 
culture and community.”  
Fatima noted that as well as integrating parts of Pakistani culture into her life 
and into her identity, she also had to actively leave behind some aspects of her 
white culture because they actively contradicted Islamic commandments. 
Fatima stated that it was hard for some of her family to understand; she refers 
in particular to her aunt, who “...did not like that I could not live what she saw 
as a typical Australian lifestyle. She thought it was important for me to drink 
and experiment with drugs, she thought it was important for me to go and 
sleep with guys, she thought it was important for me to have these sorts of 
experiences.” 
Angela’s experience was similar to that of Fatima’s. She stated that after her 
marriage to her Sri Lankan husband, she went to great lengths to immerse 
herself in his culture and community as much as possible. Angela attributed 
this partly to their decision to live in Sri Lanka for some time early on in their 
marriage, which meant that it was easier for her to learn to speak Singhalese 
and cook Sri Lankan food. She adds that she also grew accustomed to wearing 
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traditional Sri Lankan dress, despite the fact that her urban in-laws themselves 
wore Western clothing for most of the time, and only wore traditional dress on 
celebratory occasions. For Angela, her adoption of such customs was important 
to her because she felt it gave her a sense of “belonging to something.” This was 
particularly significant for Angela because she had lost most of her friends after 
her conversion, and had unresolved and tense relationships with many of her 
close family members. Importantly, Angela also refers to feeling that she had 
not had any culture growing up, and going to a multicultural school, she 
always felt that she was missing out on something. 
Angela described the relationship between culture and religion as one of 
symbiosis, stressing that: “...you have the religion and the culture, it doesn't 
have to clash, people try to make out that it clashes but it doesn't have to clash, 
because I have no clashes between religion and culture. I think it gets on fine.”  
Angela’s exposition on culture differs significantly from that of Fatima and 
other participants who felt that there could be significant conflicts between 
ethnocultural ideology and Islam. Because she didn’t see herself as having a 
culture beyond that of her adopted Sri Lankan culture, it became clear that 
when she referred to culture, she did not include Australian culture. 
In the media they say that – we Muslims we should adopt the Australian 
culture and the Australian lifestyle and so forth, but we have particular dress 
codes, we have particular food requirements, we have particular requirements 
for prayer and how we pray and where we pray has to be clean, and so forth. 
And a lot of things they don't understand. 
 
Other participants felt that rather than being immersed in one ethnic culture, 
their exposure to a variety of Muslim communities allowed them to absorb a 
number of cultures. This also meant that they felt they were able to differentiate 
better between elements and practices that were taught to them as religious and 
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those that were purely cultural.  This was framed as a process, however, which 
for some took a number of years to establish. Paul viewed his ability to 
participate in a number of different cultures as a positive thing, because it gave 
him greater insight into how different people lived and allowed him to “have 
the best of all worlds.” Referring to the fact that he has lived in various parts of 
Sydney since becoming Muslim, Paul noted: 
Living in so many different places, you start to learn about different cultures a 
lot more. Like in Greenacre, it’s a different ethnic mix to, say, Tempe. And you 
go to different mosques and even just hearing different languages, and meeting 
people from all kinds of nationalities… I think it can’t help but make you a 
better person. 
Like Angela, Paul felt that as a Muslim he now had access to culture that he 
didn’t before - “I never had a real culture, a strong culture” - later stating, “I 
was always a little jealous of the kids who got to eat noodles at school. We only 
ever got ham and cheese sandwiches.” For both Paul and Angela, their view of 
whiteness was that it was acultural, and in some cases, somewhat bland. 
During his interview, Paul reflected on whether his desire for culture was in 
part what attracted him to Islam in the first place, stating that, “I converted 
because I believe that Islam is the one true religion, but you can’t ignore other 
factors that might come into it as well… maybe they’re not the reason I 
converted but it plays a role in drawing me to the faith in the first place.”  
The notion of conversion to Islam as fulfilling the desire for a culture was also 
raised by Edward. Although he himself indicated that he had never felt the 
desire to adopt another culture after converting, he attributed it to the fact that 
he already felt he had a strong culture, due to his Southern European ancestry. 
However, like Paul, Edward suggested that some converts might try to 
immerse themselves in another culture because they felt that they lacked 
culture themselves. He stated: 
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I certainly know of some purely Anglo converts, and then I know of other 
converts that are – they’re Italian or Greeks and stuff like that. And I think in 
terms of retaining cultural identity, I think for Anglos given that I don’t think 
there is a strong sense of culture, it’s very easy to just adopt a new culture and 
change your whole life. Whereas I’ve anecdotally seen with Italian and 
European converts where culture’s been a big part of their life, they’ve tried to 
maintain that. Particularly for family. Maybe for some of these Anglo converts 
that really do sort of get immersed in it, maybe they sort of long for that. And 
they’ve never had it. Whereas for us kids growing up, we’ve always had it. So 
maybe that’s not the part of Islam that we’re seeking out. Islam can really be a 
lot of different things to a lot of different people converting. 
Edward’s quotation highlights that the concept of white “Anglo” culture or lack 
thereof is linked to ethnicity as much as to race, and that “ethnic whites” like 
Italians and Bulgarians (in the case of Daniel) may occupy a different 
experience in relation to conversion than to Anglo-Australians, given their 
relatively recent admission into the category of “white” in the Australian 
context (Dewhirst 2008; Andreoni 2003). While Angela and Paul viewed the 
lack of culture they associated with whiteness as a negative element of 
whiteness, converts such as Henry felt that it gave them “an edge on born 
Muslims.” In Henry’s mind, white converts were better equipped to practise a 
pure Islam precisely because they did not have the “cultural baggage that born 
Muslims have.” He stated: 
I never really thought of myself as being white, but now that I’m Muslim I can 
see that it’s been a positive thing in some ways because I don’t carry all that 
cultural baggage that born Muslims have. I feel lucky in that respect, like I’m 
able to see clearer if that makes sense. I’ve been careful not to get involved with 
Muslims that are too cultural and think that their way is the only or the right 
way. 
 
Henry’s conceives of his own whiteness as being “acultural,” unlike some born 
Muslims who are “too cultural.” A number of assumptions underlie Henry’s 
quotation that require further unpacking. Firstly, he decries the practice of 
‘cultural Islam.’ When prompted as to what cultural Islam is, he gives the 
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examples of ethnic-oriented mosques where the Friday sermon is given in a 
language other than English and the expectation that he should change his 
name to an Arabic name. Henry claims that these cultural expectations and 
practices are not required within Islam, and thus sully the purity of Islam which 
he believes “should be kept simple.”  Thus, the more cultural a non-white 
Muslim is, the further they are to the true practice of Islam, in Henry’s mind. In 
contrast, Henry views himself and other white converts to be completely 
acultural. White converts are seen as neutral, uncluttered, a blank slate on 
which a pure Islam can be inscribed. This construction of whiteness enables 
white converts to ignore the fact that their values, norms, beliefs and attitudes 
are just as much culturally influenced as those of non-white Muslims, but that 
as part of a hegemonic social group, these norms, values etcetera are simply 
perceived of as natural and common-sense (Dyer 1997). A key outcome of such 
a belief in one’s own neutrality is an inability to acknowledge how the 
experiences and needs of non-white Muslims are different to those of white 
Muslims. For example, the conviction that all mosques should provide sermons 
in English is itself a cultural expectation, but because English is the dominant 
language in Australia, it is not seen as such. Instead, non-white Muslims are 
depicted as the problem for not learning English, rather than acknowledging 
the reasons for why some congregations would prefer their sermons in their 
first language – such as, because the majority of attendees speak that language 
more proficiently than English, the imam speaks that language more 
proficiently than English, there is less chance of misunderstanding, and because 
mosques are for immigrant Muslim communities often a piece of ‘back home’ in 
which they can communicate with members of their community. 
Far from being a sentiment that was unique to Henry, the description of 
whiteness as being free from the cultural baggage that born Muslims carry was 
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repeated by other participants as well. In those interviews, white converts were 
often portrayed as being the saviours of Islam in Australia, which was in 
danger of being eroded by ‘culture.’ Importantly, some participants also stated 
that it was a generational gap, and that it was the older immigrant communities 
that were the real threat to Islam. In his interview, Ali stated that as well as 
white converts, second and third generation born Muslims from non-white 
backgrounds were also crucial to the construction of an acultural Islam, as they 
were often “less likely to practice a strict form of their culture” and be “more 
critical of parts of their culture that conflicted with Islam.” Ali used the example 
of the difficulties he faced when getting married, stating that his in-laws were 
strongly opposed to his marriage to his wife, and that this was “because they're 
the immigrant generation as opposed to the Australian generation.” Ali’s words 
raise the prospect of there being many racialised Islams in Australia, insofar as 
it is interpreted by Muslims themselves, and that the extent of racialisation 
differs within Muslim communities based on how “Australian” or 
“immigrant/ethnic” the Muslims are. He added however that while in smaller 
Australian cities the “Australian generation” bridged ethnic divides because 
there were far fewer Muslims, in cities with large Muslim communities such as 
Sydney the same attitude was being passed down to the “Australian 
generation” as well. 
The phenomenon described by Henry and Ali is called “Australian Islam” by 
Tasneem, who strongly contended that it was “the only way forward” for 
Australian Muslims. Tasneem stated that it is through the development of an 
Australian Islam that Muslims can start to become accepted and integrated into 
Australia more fully. In the above examples, Ali, Henry and Tasneem separate 
the notion of ‘culture’ from ‘Islam’, choosing instead to embrace an Australian 
identity. Their vision of Australia and an Australian national identity is 
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equivalent to a blank slate where Muslims can practise a “purer” Islam 
untainted by ethnocultural baggage. Henry’s choice of words reveals that he 
believes that white converts have greater ability to separate Islam from the non-
Islamic cultural customs practised by some non-white Muslims who are “too 
cultural” – their whiteness is constructed as a neutral subject position which 
allows them to “see clearer” and remain objective and impartial, unlike non-
white Muslims who will always interpret Islam through a culturally-inflected 
lens. 
A growing literature is emerging that discusses the trend towards “de-
ethnicising” Islam practised by second-generation immigrant Muslims in 
Western nations that aim for an Islamic revival, termed 'newer Islamic 
movements' by Lars Pedersen (1999).  De-ethnicisation is viewed as a crucial 
tool to reviving a truer and more religiously-oriented form of Islam, and is 
illustrative of the modernist approach taken by Islamic revivalist movements, 
that reject “ethnic” traditions while simultaneously seeking to more firmly 
establish Islamic traditions in their lives and as a part of their communities. 
However, far from being contradictory, the desire amongst some Australian 
Muslims and in particular, white convert Muslims, to establish a ‘pure’ Islam in 
their nation is indicative of the nationalist projects underlying modern Islamic 
revivalist movements. In the lineage of other scholars before her, Turkish 
sociologist Yildiz Atasoy posits that “the Islamic revival is far from a 
traditionalist desire to return to a ‘golden age’” (1997, p. 84), and it needs to be 
understood in a modern context in which Islam is consistently being used for 
political and often nationalist goals. The search for a de-ethnicised, de-racialised 
and whitened “Australian Islam” cannot be divorced from this context, even in 
countries where Muslims are a minority population. In Australia, the desire to 
reinforce an Australian Islam is not manifested in a “political struggle for state 
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control” (1997, p. 84), as Atasoy contends was the case in Turkey, but to unify 
Muslims by appealing to a national, Australian Islam which can be created by 
integrating Muslims into the existing nationalist political and cultural systems 
of Australia. The purpose of the “Australian Islam” alluded to by Tasneem is 
not to establish an Islamic government or a system of Sharia in Australia, but to 
de-ethnicise and de-racialise Islam so that it is better able to be absorbed into 
the broader Australian polity and culture. 
This position is clearly exemplified in Tasneem’s interview. Tasneem locates the 
disunity and lack of cohesion amongst Muslim communities with their 
adherence to separate ethnic cultures and traditions. Tasneem suggests: 
For a lot of Muslims, they equate the religion with their culture, because that’s 
what they grew up with. ‘This is the way we do things around here.’ That’s 
why we don’t have unity in the Muslim community, because a lot of people 
look down on other cultures as not Muslims, as not practising the religion as 
well as they can. So there’s this attitude that everybody is… I often get people 
telling me, ‘Oh you know, you can’t trust the Egyptians.’ They categorise it.  A 
lot of Muslims are really quite racist. It’s only the young people these days that 
are Aussie, that I don’t find that racism. But certainly amongst the… even my 
own husband, he used to, and this was within his community – when we were 
interviewing for the school, the staff. The first thing, if they were Lebanese, the 
first thing he would ask them is what village do you come from? What’s your 
family? To me that was irrelevant. Was this person qualified? Did they 
understand the job? It’s very nepotistic. 
 
In the above quotation, Tasneem draws a broad brush to indicate that Muslims 
who were mired in cultural traditions were more likely to be ethnocentric and 
racist towards other cultural groups, as well as nepotistic. She situates “young 
people these days that are Aussie” in opposition to the older first generation 
migrant groups in which she is more likely to find ethnocentric and narrow-
minded attitudes. Tasneem’s interview indicates that she views Australian 
culture to be less racist and more inclusive of multiculturalism because it is 
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acultural and not strongly attached to any one culture, thus denying that 
Australian culture does indeed exist and is often deployed in the furtherance of 
Australian nationalism. Tasneem’s binary construction of “immigrant” Muslims 
versus “Aussie” Muslims is highly racialised, and implies that the more 
integrated Muslims are into white Australian culture, the less likely they are to 
be racist, ethnocentric and narrow-minded Her reasoning exemplifies a 
colour/power evasive racial repertoire through which she denies the role of 
white supremacy in the construction of Australian nationalism, and her own 
complicity in that nationalism through her suggestion that Muslims need to 
become ‘more Aussie’ (read white) in order to be better Muslims. In her 
interview, Tasneem emphasised her perception of the racism of non-white 
Muslims, while downplaying Islamophobia towards Muslims, stating that she 
had very rarely experienced Islamophobia and that that was likely because she 
was well-spoken and had a classy accent. Through such statements, Tasneem 
reveals that she believes that Islamophobia is racialised, as it is not just about 
her being Muslim but also about her sounding Australian, but also implicitly 
places the blame for experiencing Islamophobia on non-white Muslims who 
aren’t well-spoken like her. 
Tasneem’s views are highlighted in her response to my question about the 
concept of an Australian Islam: 
That’s something that will not eventuate for another ten years, I reckon. We’re 
getting there. I think it’s a more egalitarian Islam. I think it’s a less ritualised 
Islam. It’s in many ways more liberal and – an Australian Islam will be a lot less 
suspicious of institutions and government. So you’ll find that the Pakistanis 
don’t trust the politicians, and the Lebanese only trust Lebanese politicians. 
They don’t have the confidence to cope with the Australian society. And they 
don’t know how to deal with a lot of the institutions here. And they think they 
do, and they argue a lot. And they go around demanding their rights when 
they don’t really have any rights and they don’t demand their rights when they 
do. Whereas I think that Australian Muslims are a lot more capable of dealing 
with that kind of stuff. And they’re a lot more relaxed. Got a sense of humour. 
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Can joke. Can do crazy things. I think this is where we are starting to see the 
development of a civilisation. 
Tasneem’s quotation reveals a dualistic attitude that Muslims who reject or de-
prioritise their ethnic culture in favour of an Australian culture are less rigid, 
more relaxed and jovial, and more able to seamlessly engage with and integrate 
into the dominant Australian polity. Her conception of a ‘civilisation’ is one that 
is built on Australian nationalism, and which effectively is assimilated into 
Australian culture. Her view is similar to that of those expressed by relatives of 
participants, detailed in Chapter Five, who felt that Islam was too rigid and 
extreme and encouraged their children and siblings to practices a ‘more secular’ 
form of Islam. Although she acknowledges the hybridity of their identities, she 
sees more merit in the adoption of Australianness. 
Like Tasneem and Xander, Daniel actively rejected the adoption of another 
ethnic culture’s traditions and customs, particularly where such traditions were 
posited as religious when they were not. Referring to the first generation 
Turkish and Afghan immigrants he lived with in Auburn, he stated, “I 
developed an issue with them because particularly first generation migrant 
Muslims can have this love for their particular culture or their particular way of 
doing things, which is often justified through dīn… So eventually I kind of 
began to have some frictions over that.” Daniel added that he actively resisted 
“being pulled into the cultural category” because he wanted to highlight that it 
was possible to retain one’s cultural identity after converting to Islam, and that 
there was a clear separation between the religion of Islam and the traditions of 
what he termed “Islamised cultures.” In doing so, Daniel attempted to assert his 
own cultural identity in the face of what he perceived to be an attempt to 
assimilate him into another culture.  
332 
 
As well as resisting cultural erasure, however, Daniel added that an ignorance 
about the differences between culture and religion could also have a negative 
impact on the post-conversion experiences of converts, as they were more 
vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation from certain groups. He stated: 
I mean it’s good, because the sooner a convert recognises the difference 
between culture and religion, the sooner they get out of some stuff that they 
shouldn’t be involved in anyway. ‘Cause I’ve seen some stuff online of 
converts… That’s what I mean, when converts realise what’s up, the sooner the 
better. 
Daniel’s warning was reiterated by other participants as well, some of whom 
phrased their distaste for certain practices within Muslim communities by 
stating, “If I had met Muslims before I became Muslim, I wouldn’t have 
converted.” In participants’ interviews, this statement was often made in 
reference to practices that they witnessed amongst Muslims that they viewed as 
being cultural, or following a strict interpretation of Islam that they felt did not 
align with their own approach to Islam. This is highlighted in Ali’s interview, 
who related an experience which he stated left him questioning his very faith in 
Islam. The incident took place soon after a Muslim man he had met at 
university moved into his Kingswood flat with him: 
He came back one night with Mum’s kitchen knife and it had blood on it. I 
thought he murdered somebody. Turned out he killed a dog. Seen him in the 
street and he was black. I didn’t even – I was watching like – some science 
program. He comes in and he’s holding my mum’s kitchen knife which she 
gave me when I moved in, it’s got blood on it, he’s got blood running down his 
leg. I said, “What the hell have you done?” He said, “I killed that black dog that 
lives in that street over there.” I said, “You killed someone’s dog with my 
mum’s kitchen knife?” He said, “I had to. It’s a duty. If you see a black dog, kill 
it, even in the masjid.” 
Ali goes on to state that the incident affected him deeply.  Even after he learned 
that the man had taken a very literal and non-contextualised interpretation of a 
ḥadīth and that it was not a requirement upon Muslims to kill all black dogs as 
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he had been told, Ali explained that the fact that there were Muslims who 
would accept such readings unquestioningly bothered him greatly, attributing 
it partly to an uncritical tradition of some Islamised cultures. 
In this section, I have demonstrated that for some participants, their 
engagement with non-white ethnic cultures was directly influenced by their 
attitudes about their own racial identity as well as other racial identities. The 
post-conversion narratives of some converts indicate that they felt that 
whiteness was acultural, and that they did not have a culture themselves. The 
response to this recognition differed between converts – while some took it as 
an opportunity to immerse themselves into a community and culture that was 
underpinned by a strong Islamic identity, others chose to actively reject the 
invitation to adopt another ethnic culture, and instead stayed committed to 
white Australian culture. For many of the participants who fall into the latter 
category, they viewed adherence to another, racialised cultures as a barrier to a 
pure Islam, unlike whiteness which allowed Muslims a neutral, blank slate 
identity through which to access the true Islam. 
This section has also introduced the concept of “Australian Islam,” and 
demonstrated how some Islamic revivalism in Australia and indeed worldwide 
has sought to de-ethnicise, whiten and some may say, homogenise, diverse 
Muslim communities in this quest for the true Islam. In contrast to Muslims 
who believe that whiteness is incompatible with Islam, this project of 
Australian Islam views ‘cultural/immigrant Muslims’ as the problem, and white 
converts and ‘acultural’ “Aussie Muslims” (second and third generation non-
white Muslims) as the solution. The aims of this project of Australian Islam 
aligns and supports the current Australian polity and through it. Australian 
nationalism, as it locates problems within the Muslim community with the 
culture of non-white Muslims and their inability to integrate into Australian 
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society and its institutions. Proponents of this perspective deployed a 
colour/power evasion repertoire that failed to acknowledge that 
“Australianness” was as much as a culture as any other, and could also be 
racist, ethnocentric and narrow-minded, and demonstrated how colour/power 
evasive repertoires can operate through culture as code for ‘race,’ in an era 
where explicit references to race are largely frowned upon. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attended to the question of how white converts to Islam 
perceive, reinforce, challenge, disown and otherwise negotiate their whiteness 
before and after their conversion to Islam. For several of the participants, 
talking about whiteness was a difficult task for them, and they did not discuss 
their views on whiteness or their racial identities in depth. Many of these 
participants enacted what Frankenberg terms “colour or power evasive” racial 
repertoires, but their interviews revealed that there were differences in how 
these repertoires were deployed, and suggests that the subtleties of the racial 
repertoire could be further attended to in her schema. Others demonstrated a 
keen and often insightful understanding of race and whiteness, demonstrating 
race cognisance; however, their expression of this cognisance varied 
significantly from person to person, suggesting that Frankenberg’s schema 
could be expanded upon and her categories further delineated to capture the 
complexity of white people’s interpretations of whiteness and its role in their 
own lives. 
The findings of my research indicated that amongst participants who were 
comfortable to talk about race and whiteness, converting to Islam either 
precipitated their cognisance, reinforced their perception of themselves as 
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white, or made them feel ‘less white’ than they were previously. These 
responses often arose out of a combination of their interactions with Muslims 
and non-Muslims, as documented in Chapters Five and Six, and their own 
political, ideological and intellectual leanings. While some participants 
expressed their feelings of being a white Muslim through explicit references to 
race and whiteness, others did so through more indirect ways, by talking about 
their feelings of belonging and exclusion, and their attitudes towards ‘culture,’ 
which was often seen through racialised lenses. 
This chapter has highlighted that for many of the white converts to Islam that I 
interviewed for my thesis, race plays a significant role in their day to day 
interactions and exchanges as a Muslim, and that their understandings of race 
are sometimes refracted through their lived experience of ‘Muslim-ness.’ It has 
suggested that the confluence of their racial and religious identities can create a 
sense of being ‘in between’ two worlds. Being located in this nexus is for some 
participants isolating, unsettling and destabilising, whereas others find it 
liberating in its fluidity, because it challenges and disrupts dominant ideas 
about what a Muslim can – or should – be. It has been suggested as well that 
white converts could potentially act as an avenue towards more dialogue 
between white non-Muslims and non-white Muslims, because they straddle 
both worlds. While this is a question that cannot be answered comprehensively 
by this thesis, it is certainly a possible area for further research. 
  
336 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has utilised the conceptual framework of racialisation, and the 
unsettling of whiteness to explore the lived experiences of white converts to 
Islam in Australia. Australia has been constructed as a nation where Islam is 
broadly racialised as a ‘non-white’ religion.  My in-depth interviews with white 
converts not only contributes to our understanding of the Australian experience 
of religious conversion to Islam, but also demonstrates how these experiences 
can be understood through the lenses of racialisation and whiteness. In this 
chapter, I compile the research findings of the previous four discussion chapters 
and suggest ways in which these findings can contribute new insights to the 
existing literature on conversion to Islam, the operation of whiteness in 
Australia, and the sociological analysis of the racialisation of religion. As well as 
outlining how my findings have addressed my original research aims, I 
highlight areas for future research that could further our understanding of 
racialisation and whiteness as it relates to Muslim communities. 
Several research findings emerged from this doctoral project, which is the first 
qualitative study of white converts to Islam in Australia and one of the very few 
studies on Muslim converts in Australia generally (Stephenson 2011; Woodlock 
2010; Alam 2012). By using the conceptual frames of racialisation and 
whiteness, I highlighted the disparate ways in which white Muslim converts 
can reinforce or subvert existing racial structures in Australia which position 
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whiteness in opposition to Islam. The following sections will outline the key 
research findings of this thesis, drawn from the four discussion chapters 
(Chapter Four to Seven). 
 
8.2 Empirical Contribution to Studies of Religious Conversion 
In embarking on this doctoral project I did not set out to uncover the reasons 
why white Australians chose to convert to Islam, given the substantial amount 
of existing empirical and theoretical studies on motivations for religious 
conversion. However, after my thematic analysis of the interview transcripts, it 
became apparent that the interviews provided a rich source of qualitative data 
about the participants’ pre-conversion religious histories, contact with Muslims 
and motivations for conversion. The conversion narratives of ‘new Muslims’ are 
noticeably lacking from the current literature on the Muslim experience in 
Australia, and so the inclusion of their conversion journeys serves to expand the 
scholarship on the Muslim experience in Australia. My findings on conversion 
motivations also contribute empirical data to the sociology of conversion 
studies, which is demonstrably lacking in Australian Muslim voices. 
The vast majority of participants in this project identified that prior to their 
conversion to Islam they had been Christian, with a minority of participants 
claiming that they had been agnostic or atheist. Among those who had been 
Christian previously, participants varied in their assessments of their religious 
conviction and level of practice, with most stating that they had been “nominal” 
or “non-practising” Christians, and a far smaller number identifying themselves 
as having been “religious Christians.” These findings were not surprising, as 
previous academic literature on conversion to Islam in other Western Muslim-
minority countries has found a similar pattern of conversion from Christianity. 
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The smaller number of prior atheists and agnostics can additionally be 
explained with reference to religious demographic data from the most recent 
Australian Census from 2011, which indicates that 61.1% of Australians 
identified as Christian compared to 22.3% of Australians who subscribed to no 
religion. 
The reasons why the participants of this project converted to Islam varied, but 
overall reflected the pre-existing literature on conversion. Only two of the 
participants in this study explicitly stated that their conversion was ‘for 
marriage,’ however a large number of participants stated that they were 
initially introduced to Islam through their relationships with Muslims. Many 
participants described their conversion as an “intellectual decision,” which was 
in some cases juxtaposed against an emotional or mystical experience. These 
narratives often stressed the role of rational thinking, critical analysis, reading 
and research in their journeys, with some participants citing that they had 
intentionally searched for fallacies within Islam and it was the absence of 
inconsistencies in the religion that had led to the eventual conversion. A smaller 
group of participants described their conversion journeys as being spiritual, 
emotional or metaphysical. For some of the converts interviewed, their 
experiences did not fit neatly into any single category provided by Lofland’s 
and Skovond’s schema, and may have crossed two or more categories at any 
one time, thus highlighting the complexity of the conversion process. 
Importantly, however, this thesis moves away from an Orientalist fascination 
with the reasons for why people convert to Islam, and contributes to the study 
of religious conversion to Islam by documenting the post-conversion 
experiences of participants – an area that had not been addressed as thoroughly 
in the existing literature with its disciplinary preference toward psychology. In 
particular, my project focused on how white converts negotiated their white 
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racial identity after their conversion and how their whiteness impacted on their 
post-conversion experiences, which to date has only been explored by three 
other researchers, two of whom only published their first articles on the topic in 
the last two years and neither of which were based in Australia (Galonnier 2015; 
Moosavi 2014, 2015). The focus of this doctoral thesis is thus novel while still 
speaking to questions which are gaining notable interest internationally. The 
following sections detail the contributions that this doctoral project makes to 
the sociology of racialisation and whiteness. 
 
8.3 Utility of ‘Racialisation’ and ‘Whiteness’ 
One of the aims of this doctoral project was to explore the utility of the concept 
of racialisation to understanding Muslim experiences in white dominant 
countries such as Australia. This thesis contributes to the growing body of 
literature that argues that the religion of Islam is a racialised one that is 
juxtaposed against the ‘unraced’ whiteness of the West (Dunn et al 2007; 
Galonnier 2015; Humphrey 2007; Joshi 2006; Kyriakides et al 2009; Meer & 
Modood 2009; Moosavi 2015; Poynting et al 2004; Selod & Embrick 2013). Most 
of the previous literature deals with macro-level racialisation deployed through 
institutions, legislation and policy, social structures and public discourses about 
Muslims. However, my research has detailed how this racialisation is 
experienced at the micro-level by white converts who enter Islam, moving from 
an “unraced” or invisible racial positioning to a highly racialised one. 
Interviews with white converts to Islam revealed that racializing practices and 
discourses that positioned Islam as incompatible with whiteness were deployed 
by both non-Muslims and Muslims in their interactions with white converts. In 
interactions with non-Muslims, this was done by explicitly framing Islam as a 
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non-white race, or through the more subtle approach of constructing Islam as 
antagonistic to the Australian nation (which is underpinned by a national 
construction of whiteness).  
The idea that the religion of Islam is a non-white race was expressed through 
three key frames:  
1) Converts were no longer seen as being white after their conversion; 
2) Racialised abuse directed to the converts; and 
3) White converts were seen as ‘race traitors.’ 
Many participants described incidents in which they felt that they were no 
longer seen as ‘white’ by non-Muslim friends, family members and strangers. 
Sometimes, the charge of having left whiteness was explicit, and participants 
were told outright that they were not white anymore. Other times, they were 
told that they had ‘become Arab.’ This sentiment arose mostly when 
participants were wearing visible markers of Islam, such as ḥijāb or a kufi. 
Unlike abstract and hidden cultural inscriptions such as belief or prayer, Islamic 
clothing is of the body just as much as it is on the body, as I argued in Chapter 
Five with reference to the work of Al-Saji (2010). As a result, the racialisation of 
the ḥijāb and the kufi is closely tied to the racialisation of bodies that occurs 
against non-white peoples who are racialised for their physical bodily features. 
Other examples of incidents in which participants were made aware of the fact 
that their conversion meant that others may see them as having changed race or 
acted against their race included racialised abuse and the charge of race treason.  
Racialising discourses were also found to be manifest in constructions of 
Australianness, and the implication that white converts had ceased to be 
“Australian.” My thematic analysis uncovered four key frames that spoke to 
this construction: 
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1) Islam as rigid and contrary to the aims and ideals of secularism; 
2) Islam as a threat to the Australian nation; 
3) Islam as culturally foreign; and 
4) Islam as oppressive towards women. 
By analysing these frames as they appeared in participants’ stories, this research 
project found that the juxtaposition of Islam as oppositional to Australian 
culture and the Australian ‘way of life’ relies on the construction of Muslim as a 
racialised identity, unlike whiteness which is normative and ‘unraced’, and 
secondly, the more cultural capital a person accrues from their whiteness, the 
larger their claim to being Australian. The identification of the seven 
expressions discussed in this thesis contributes to the study of racialisation by 
highlighting the key frames through which the racialisation of Islam is 
operationalised in an Australian context. 
Another important finding of this thesis is that participants indicated that non-
white Muslims had dualistic and essentialised views of Islam and whiteness 
that constructed Islam as incompatible with whiteness. This was made apparent 
to white converts through both the questioning and glorification of their 
convert status. For some Muslims, whiteness was so embedded in Western 
hegemony, colonialism and/or immorality, all of which were seen as 
oppositional to Islam and the Muslim experience in the West, that white 
converts were viewed with suspicion as potentially being fake Muslims. Some 
participants stated that they felt they were forced to prove themselves by being 
exceptionally pious and practising, or by making a concerted effort to adopt the 
cultural practices of a non-white cultural group. Other participants stated that 
their whiteness was glorified by non-white Muslims and they were seen to be 
better and more pious Muslims because they had to make a greater ‘jump’ from 
whiteness into Islam, where whiteness is coded as both secular and Christian at 
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the same time. Although they manifest in different ways, both views position 
Islam and whiteness as two dichotomous and oppositional identifications.  
These findings make an important contribution to the study of the racialisation 
of Islam, which has typically examined racialisation as a top down approach 
and has not yet adequately addressed how racialised groups may themselves 
participate in racializing structures. As this doctoral project focused only on the 
experiences of white converts to Islam, I did not have the capacity to explore 
this issue further by questioning non-white Muslims about their perception of 
whiteness. However, given that there is a scarcity of literature on the question 
of how non-white Muslims perceive white people in white dominant nations, 
these findings point to a potentially fertile area for future research to help 
extend our current understandings of whiteness and of racialisation. 
 
8.4 Australia’s Religious Identity 
The proposition that Islam is a religion that is racialised as non-white in 
Australia gives rise to questions about the religious coding of whiteness. As I 
stated in my review of the literature in section 2.4, several sociologists of 
religion and sociologists of race have contended that ‘the West’ and Europe has 
for several centuries been articulated through reference to a white racial 
identity in conjunction with a Christian religious identity (Daulatzai 2012). 
Similar arguments have been made in the specifically Australian context, with 
scholars such as Farida Fozdar (2011) and Holly Randell-Moon (2006) making 
convincing arguments for the centrality of Christianity to the construction of 
Australian nationhood through their analysis of political speeches and 
parliamentary debates (see also; Casey 2006; Crabb 2009; Maddox 2005; 
Sunderland 2007; Warhurst 2007). It was on the basis of this research that I 
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developed my fourth research aim. Interestingly, this research project found 
that Christianity did not feature as strongly in the interview data collected 
during the course of this project as these previous Australian studies would 
suggest they may have. Instead, participants were more likely to state that their 
family and close friends juxtaposed the hypervisibility and perceived rigidity of 
Islam with a secularism that they felt aligned with Australia’s “laid back” 
national identity. This finding indicates that the prevalence of Christian terms 
and motifs in Australia’s public life (such as in politics and the commercial 
sphere) may not be as clearly identifiable in the private spheres of home and 
family. Alternately, it could be argued that in these spaces, Christianity has 
successfully recreated itself as secularism, as is contended by sociologists of 
religion such as Gil Anidjar and Talal Asad. My research makes a significant 
contribution to the existing Australian literature on Australia’s religious 
identity by demonstrating how the theories that Anidjar and Asad have 
examined in light of other Western contexts operate within an Australian 
national context. 
The majority of my participants described Australia as having a “broadly 
secular” religious identity, but they infer a Christian core. It suggests that 
participants are aware of the central role of Christianity in Australian 
nationhood while simultaneously contending that the negative reactions of 
their friends and family members to their conversion was due to their 
perception that Islam was too overt and visible in contradiction with secular 
Australia. This finding is encapsulated in the words of participants who 
indicated that “being casually Buddhist” or converting to a different 
“spirituality” that entailed a belief in the supernatural but no overt religious 
practices would have engendered far less concern and hostility amongst their 
family members and friends. The problem appears to be less about leaving 
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Christianity, as many of the participants indicated that their families were 
nominal Christians who did not follow the doctrines and practices of 
Christianity themselves, but the fact that they had joined a religion that had 
strict sets of doctrines and religious practices at all. 
These findings make an important contribution to the sociology of whiteness 
and national identity which has not dealt sufficiently with its religious 
dimension. It suggests that secularism, and specifically a form of secularism 
that is essentially ‘Christianity rebranded,’ has in the modern era come to be 
synonymous with whiteness and the West – not as a replacement for 
Christianity, but in addition to Christianity, which is possible through the 
‘reincarnation’ of Christianity that Anidjar refers to. White converts to Islam are 
seen to become less white not because of their departure from Christianity, but 
because of their departure from a secular lifestyle which is constructed as 
integral to Australian culture, Australian values and the Australian way of life. 
While this is not true for all participants, of course, as some stated that they 
were religious Christians prior to their conversion to Islam, the idea that a move 
away from secularism was indicative of a corresponding departure from 
whiteness emerged as a strong theme in the interviews, and is a key finding of 
this research project. This thesis thus builds on the work of Fozdar and Randell-
Moon by interrogating the salience of Anidjar’s and Asad’s theories of 
secularism and applying them in an Australian context. 
 
8.5 Constructing, Disrupting and Negotiating White Identities 
In Chapter Seven, I returned to one of the central aims of this doctoral project, 
which was to explore how white converts to Islam negotiated their racial 
identity post-conversion. I began this chapter by examining how participants 
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constructed their whiteness generally, and employed Frankenberg’s schema of 
what I call “racial repertoires” to do so. I found that participants exhibited 
either ‘race cognisance’ or ‘power/colour evasion’ repertoires but not 
‘essentialist racism,’ to use Frankenberg’s language. Often, participants 
deployed a mixture of both repertoires, which suggests that Frankenberg’s 
schema could be further delineated or even extended to allow for the subtle 
differences in how the repertoires she identifies are deployed. For example, 
while some race cognisant participants exhibited strong feelings of guilt about 
their whiteness, others indicated that their anti-racist politics allowed them to 
distance themselves from their whiteness, leading to a very specific form of 
colour/power evasion.   
The question of how white people experience white identities has been well 
attended to in the literature, although it is undoubtedly focused on the United 
States of America. There is a paucity of empirical research on the topic in 
Australia, with noticeable exceptions in the work of Jane Durie (2003) and 
Emma Kowal (2012). This thesis contributes innovative insights to this field by 
not only introducing more Australian perspectives, but by exploring what 
happens to a person’s white racial identity when they convert to a religion that 
is racialised as non-white. This research project found that among the white 
converts interviewed, there were three responses: participants felt that there 
had been no change in their racial identity (the majority of participants), 
participants felt that they had ‘left’ whiteness or were situated on the borders of 
whiteness, and finally, participants felt that their conversion revealed or 
reinforced their whiteness.  
Amongst participants who felt that their whiteness has been revealed or 
reinforced to them after their conversion, they stated that becoming Muslim 
made them conscious of their whiteness in a way that they had not recognised 
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before, or alternatively made them more aware of the privilege that their 
whiteness afforded them in mainstream society. For some, this came about 
through the process of entering a religion racialised as ‘non-white’. Gaining 
access to racialised Muslim communities gave them insight into how their 
whiteness operated and the privileges it afforded them compared to the racism 
that they witnessed against other, non-white Muslims. For others, the fact that 
they were racialised as white became apparent to them some time after 
conversion, after receiving “special treatment” from non-white Muslims, or 
feeling that their whiteness was glorified by born Muslims. Still others stated 
that they became aware of their own whiteness through their interactions with 
non-Muslims who called them race traitors. 
Some participants indicated that they felt less white after their conversion, or 
even that they had left whiteness altogether. In other words, the racialisation 
process appeared to them to work effectively; their entry into a racialised 
religion meant that they were perceived as non-white by some Muslims and 
non-Muslims, with mixed consequences. This was transmitted to the 
participants through racialised abuse and being told that they were no longer 
white by non-Muslims, or being accepted into Muslim communities on the 
basis of how much they embraced their new racialised status by adopting the 
cultural traditions of existing racialised Muslim communities. Of those 
participants who described feeling less white than before, some also expressed 
that they did not feel like they belonged anywhere; that they were stuck in 
between two worlds, neither of which truly accepted them. 
My study of how white converts described their sense of racial identity after 
their conversion adds new insights into the relationship between race and 
religion in an Australian context, thereby contributing to the sociology of both 
whiteness and racialisation.  While studies of whiteness have already attended 
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to the issue of people moving in and out of whiteness, there had been little 
research on how one’s religious identity can inform one’s racial positioning in 
terms of whiteness. My research has also contributed new empirical knowledge 
to the examination of the racialisation of religion, which is an emerging area of 
study. 
 
8.6 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
A number of limitations of this project and directions for future research have 
been identified throughout the course of this thesis, but it is useful to reiterate 
them here. Throughout the course of this project, it became apparent that there 
was limited academic research available on Muslim converts to Islam in 
Australia, and references to statistics in media articles about Muslim converts 
were often drawn from other countries or were guesses drawn anecdotally from 
one or two religious organisations. While the qualitative research methods I 
chose for this project were the most suitable for the aims of this project, a 
comprehensive national quantitative study on Muslim converts would be 
useful for future research in the area, and to better place the findings of my 
current research in a national context. 
The decision to only interview white converts to Islam stemmed from my 
overarching research question and allowed me to fulfil my research aims. 
However, when analysing the interview transcripts with regards to how non-
Muslims and non-white Muslims constructed whiteness and Islam through 
racialised frames, it became clear that there were significant limitations in what 
the interview transcripts allowed me to say. While I could comment on how 
interactions with Muslims and non-Muslims made the participants feel about 
their racial identities, and analyse their interpretations of those interactions, I 
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had to be careful to avoid projecting my analyses onto the third parties that the 
participants referred to, as they were not the subjects of the interviews.  For 
example, while I could comment on how participants’ interpreted remarks from 
non-white Muslims about the immorality of whiteness, and how it impacted on 
their sense of their racial identity, I was wary of making the claim that non-
white Muslims believe whiteness to be immoral as I had not spoken to non-
white Muslims themselves about their thoughts on the matter. I had anticipated 
in advance that this would be a limitation, but I had not anticipated the dearth 
of academic literature on the topic of how non-white subjects generally, and 
non-white Muslims specifically, perceive whiteness. This signals an interesting 
and relevant area for future research to contribute to more multi-faceted 
understandings of whiteness. 
A third limitation of this research project was that I only began to ask 
participants about what ‘Australian Islam’ means to them over halfway through 
the interviews. Given the rich data that emerged when I did start to ask that 
question, it is disappointing that I did not ask it from the beginning, as I suspect 
that I would have uncovered more diversity of views on what is a relevant and 
interesting question. If future research were to address the question of Muslim 
engagements with Australian nationhood again, it could be useful to broaden 
the sample group to include non-converts and non-white Muslims. This would 
enable scholars to develop a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding 
of the emergence of ‘Australian Islams,’ and how they interact with existing 
constructions of ‘Australianness’ which may or may not serve to exclude 
Muslims from Australia’s national identity. 
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS 
This thesis utilises the ALA-LC (American Library Association – Library of 
Congress) method of transliteration. 
ʿAbāyah   A loose cloak/dress worn by some Muslim women. 
Al-Fātiḥah ‘The Opening’, an important verse of the Qur’an which is 
recited in daily prayer and is the first chapter in 
compilations of the Qur’an. 
Alḥamdulillāh 'All praise is due to God', a very common exclamation of 
acceptance and praise 
Burqa Usually refers to an over garment like an ʿabāyah but with a 
semi-transparent piece of fabric which, when worn with a 
niqāb, covers the entire face.  
Da’wah ‘Invitation (to Islam)’. Similar to ‘proselytise’ in English but 
refers to efforts to increase religious practice within the 
Muslim community as much as seeking conversion outside 
it. 
Dīn  ‘Religion’ or ‘faith’. 
Dhikr ‘Remembrance (of God)’. Repetition of important phrases 
or supplications, often counted using ‘tasbih’ (prayer 
beads). 
Ḥadīth Collected narrations about the life and religious practice of 
the Prophet Mohammed. 
Ḥajj   Pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of faith in Islam.  
Ḥalāl 'Permissible.’ A phrase from Islamic jurisprudence which 
classifies actions according to levels of permissibility.  
Ḥarām ‘Impermissible’/’prohibited.’ A phrase from Islamic 
jurisprudence which classifies actions according to levels of 
permissibility.  
Ḥijāb A screen or veil, most often used to refer to a headscarf 
which covers the hair but not the face. 
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Ḥijābi   Colloquial; a woman who wears the ḥijāb. 
ʾImān ‘Belief’/’personal faith'. Refers most simply to a Muslim’s 
intellectual acceptance of the theological tenets of Islam. 
Jāhilīyyah  ‘Ignorance (of God)’. Usually used to refer to pre-Islamic 
Arabia, but is sometimes used to refer to the period prior to 
an individual’s conversion or sometimes Western societies 
generally. 
Jihād ‘Struggle', refers to both the military and individual efforts 
of Muslims.  
Jumuʿah  Friday congregational prayers. 
Kāfir  ‘Disbeliever’ or ‘non-believer’ of Islam  
Keffiyeh A square patterned scarf worn as a headdress. It has been a 
male fashion in the Levant and Arabian Peninsula for 
several centuries. 
Khalas   ‘It’s finished’/’that’s enough.’  
Kufi   A brimless hat traditionally worn by Muslim men. 
MāshāʾAllāh 'God willed it', an exclamation of gratitude, admiration or 
amazement 
Najas   Major ritual impurity, a term used in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Nikāḥ An Islamic marriage contract or the ceremony where it is 
signed. Often used as a shorthand for ‘wedding.’ 
Niqāb A face veil which usually covers the entire face save the 
eyes. 
Salat Ritual prayer. One of the five pillars of Islam and an 
obligatory religious duty for every Muslim. 
Shahādah The Islamic ‘testification of faith’, namely the phrase in 
Arabic; ‘lā ʾilāha ʾillā-llāh, muḥammadur-rasūlu-llāh’; ‘There is 
nothing worthy of worship save God, and Muhammad is 
the messenger of God’. Shahādah is one of the 5 ‘pillars of 
Islam’ and recitation of the phrase is the act by which a 
person converts to Islam. 
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Shaykh  An honorific title usually used to refer to Islamic scholars. 
Subḥān’Allāh 'Glory to God', an exclamation of awe and sometimes 
bewilderment 
Thawb  An ankle length robe worn by men. 
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APPENDIX A 
Summary of Participant Profiles 
 
 
Name Gender Age Years since 
conversion 
Local Government Area Country of 
birth 
Michelle Female 29 11 Sydney Australia 
Stephanie Female 33 12 Liverpool Germany 
Omar Male 45 22 Campbelltown Australia 
Liam Male 35 8 Auburn Australia 
Tasneem Female 60 38 Parramatta Australia 
Ben Male 34 12 Cumberland Scotland 
Cassie Female 27 5 Georges River Australia 
Penny Female 23 2 Canterbury-Bankstown Australia 
Paul Male 33 11 Kogarah Australia 
Salwa Female 70 25 Cumberland Australia 
Bridget Female 32 10 Canterbury-Bankstown Australia 
Edward Male 39 4 Canterbury-Bankstown Australia 
Katherine Female 24 3 Hills Shire England 
Ahmed Male 40 18 N/A Australia 
Fatima Female 23 7 Parramatta Australia 
Xander Male 28 5 Burwood Australia 
Ali Male 40 19 Penrith Australia 
Belinda Female 34 5 Auburn Australia 
Florian Male 43 18 Georges River France 
Saffiah Female 35 15 Hills Shire New Zealand 
Jason Male 29 4 Sutherland Shire Australia 
Jim Male 46 1 Hills Shire Australia 
Max Male 27 8 Cumberland Australia 
Imogen Female 30 7 Fairfield Australia 
Henry Male 36 9 Campbelltown New Zealand 
Daniel Male 28 6 Hornsby Shire Bulgaria 
Michael Male 37 2 Pittwater Australia 
James Male 36 9 Ryde Australia 
Ibrahim Male 20 4 Inner West Australia 
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APPENDIX D 
Interview Schedule 
 
It is important to note that as the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured 
format, the below is simply a rough guide and do not necessarily reflect the content of 
each and every interview. Additionally, the below prompts are not always phrased as 
questions within the schedule, which was done so as to facilitate a natural questioning 
style and discourage rote progress through the interview. However, some sample 
questions and topic areas are provided to indicate the types of questions that were 
asked. 
 
A. Introduction  
Introduction to researcher. 
Summary of project. 
Reviewing information sheet and signing of consent form. 
 
B.  General 
Tell me a little bit about yourself – how old are you, what do you do 
during the week, who do you live with? 
 
C. Contact with Islam 
 
First memory of Islam or Muslims. 
Most common perceptions or understandings of Islam amongst the 
people they knew. 
Own perception of Islam as they were growing up. 
The mediums through which they learnt about Islam – e.g. books 
(specific names?), movies, news, etc. 
Did you know any Muslims while you were growing up? 
 
D. Personal History 
 
Where did you grow up? 
Could the area that they you grew up in be called multicultural? 
What was your family situation growing up – living with parents, 
grandparents, single parent household, siblings. 
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What the religious environment was like for them in their household. 
Whether they had any religious education during 
childhood/adolescence; if so, what religion. 
Their relationship with religion throughout their 
childhood/adolescence; did they reject it; were they interested in it; how 
did they practice it if they did? 
Family history – ancestry, when they came to Australia. 
What traditions, customs and events did their family practice, they 
associate with their culture. 
Did they associate with a culturally diverse range of people? 
 
E. Conversion 
When did you start to develop a serious interest in Islam? 
What inspired you to look into it in more depth? 
Concerns about Islam/becoming Muslim during research. 
-  relating to how family/friends/others would react. 
− relating to possible clash between religion and culture. 
− relating to impact on social life or lifestyle. 
 
How long ago did conversion take place? 
Whether they made it known to friends + family straight away/before 
conversion/significantly after conversion. 
Did you find that there was adequate information and resources 
available for new converts? 
Biggest challenges following conversion. 
 
F. Interactions with non-Muslims 
Reactions from non-Muslims after finding out about conversion. 
Were there any changes in how people treated you or talked to you? 
Any changes that you feel had an impact on your relationship with 
people already in your life, either positively or negatively? 
What do you believe are some common perceptions of Muslim converts 
(even if these were not directed to you personally). 
 
G. Interactions with Muslims 
Contact with Muslims following conversion. 
− Did you seek Muslims out? 
− Where did you search for Muslims? 
 
If this was your first significant contact with Muslims, what was your 
perception of the community? 
How did you find that the Muslim community or individuals within it 
responded to you? 
Some common perceptions of converts encountered within the Muslim 
community. 
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Common expectations of converts. 
Do you associate or socialise with other white converts? 
Do you get asked about your conversion story much? 
What do you think Muslims want to hear when they ask you about your 
story? 
 
H. Whiteness 
To be a part of this project you had to self-identify as white. What does 
being white mean to you? What characteristics make you identify as 
white? 
Did you ever question or wonder if white people could become Muslim, 
before you became Muslim? 
Did you ever feel your racial identity was being challenged or under 
threat, pre or post conversion? 
Did you ever feel that whiteness and Islam are incompatible, or that 
others believed they are? 
Do you ever feel that being white makes Muslims respond to you 
differently than they do non-white Muslim converts? 
 
I. Racism and Discrimination 
 
Can you recount any incidents of racism or discrimination, before you 
became Muslim? 
Can you recount any incidents of racism or discrimination, after you 
became Muslim? 
Common circumstances during these incidents. 
How the experience made them feel about their racial or religious 
identity. 
Do you think Australia has a problem with Islamophobia? 
 
J. Concluding and Miscellaneous 
 
How would you describe the religious identity of Australia? 
What role does religion play in Australia today? 
What kind of support is needed for converts after conversion – 
immediately, short-term, long-term. 
What does Australian Islam mean to you? 
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APPENDIX E 
Coding Framework 
 
 
1. Background of participant to be tagged using descriptors (not coded) 
a. Gender 
a.i. Female 
a.ii. Male 
b. Level of education completed 
b.i. Did not complete year 12 
b.ii. Year 12 
b.iii. TAFE or University 
c. Number of years since conversion 
c.i. Less than 3 years 
c.ii. 3-10 years 
c.iii. 11+ years 
d. Ancestry 
d.i. Anglo-Saxon 
d.ii. Anglo-Celtic 
d.iii. Southern European 
d.iv. Western European 
d.v. Northern European 
d.vi. Eastern European 
d.vii. Other 
e. Residential location in Sydney 
 
2. Personal History  
a. Faith or lack of before converting to Islam 
b. Relationship with religion throughout life 
c. Cultural practices and traditions 
d. Religious education 
 
3. Contact with and conversion to Islam 
a. Earliest memories of Islam 
a.i. Media except news media e.g. books, films. 
a.ii. News media 
a.iii. Friends, partners or neighbours 
a.iv. Educational institution 
b. Perception of Islam prior to conversion 
c. Catalyst for learning about Islam 
d. Process of learning 
e. Concerns about Islam during process of learning 
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e.i. Reactions from family 
e.ii. Reactions from friends 
e.iii. Change in social life/lifestyle 
e.iv. Too hard to practise Islam 
 
4. Response from non-Muslims when hearing of conversion 
a. Have not told family and friends 
b. Positive 
c. Neutral 
d. Negative 
d.i. Due to change in religion generally 
d.ii. Antipathy towards religion generally 
d.iii. Islam as associated with terrorism 
d.iv. Islam and women’s rights 
d.v. Islam as too rigid 
d.vi. Islam as too visible/public 
d.vii. Islam associated with particular ethnic groups or class 
d.viii. Islam as foreign or unfamiliar 
e. Experiences of racism and discrimination 
 
5. Changes in relationships with non-Muslim family/friends 
a. No significant change 
b. Relationships ended after conversion 
c. Social interactions with family/friends changed 
c.i. Alcohol 
c.ii. Food 
c.iii. Beach 
c.iv. Ḥijāb/clothing 
c.v. Cultural/religious events 
 
6. Challenges after conversion 
a. Isolation 
b. Problems with Muslim community 
c. Lifestyle change 
d. Family and friends 
e. Religious educational 
f. Work 
g. Sense of belonging and identity were impacted 
 
7. Perception of white converts encountered from the general public 
a. Radical/extremist 
b. ‘Race traitor’ 
c. Crazy 
 
8. Response from Muslims when hearing of conversion 
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a. Surprise 
b. MāshāʾAllāh brother/sister! 
c. You are better than us. 
d. Do you know how to pray? 
e. Skepticism 
f. Neutral 
g. Why did you convert? 
h. Seen as flaky/liberal/not a real Muslim 
 
9. Expectations of converts from other Muslims 
a. Clothes 
b. Marriage 
c. Name 
d. Arabic language 
e. Food 
 
10. Participants’ adoption of cultural attributes 
a. Resistance to adoption 
b. Clothes 
c. Changed name 
d. Learnt another language 
e. Association with particular ethnic/cultural groups 
 
11. Being a white Muslim 
a. Special treatment because they are white, compared to non-white 
converts 
b. Feeling like other Muslims feel validated by their conversion because 
they are white 
c. Being asked about their ethnicity 
d. Feeling that white and Muslim are seen as mutually exclusive. 
e. Feel that they lack culture compared to other Muslims (as a negative) 
f. Feel that they have less cultural baggage than other Muslims, are 
acultural (as a positive) 
g. Feel that other Muslims see them as frauds. 
h. Their feelings about being seen as a convert 
 
12. Whiteness and Racial Identity 
a. Cultural attributes of... 
b. Feeling guilty about... 
c. White privilege 
c.i. Cognisant of white privilege 
c.ii. Rejects the concept of white privilege 
c.iii.  Does not discuss white privilege 
d. Colonialism and/or racism 
e. Feelings about own whiteness: 
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e.i. I’ve never thought of myself as being white until now 
e.ii. I don’t like to use the term/call myself white 
e.iii. I don’t see race 
e.iv. White is purely a skin tone 
e.v. I have been aware of being white for some time (including pre-
conversion) 
e.vi. I started seeing myself as white after converting to Islam 
e.vii. I feel like I am less white now after converting to Islam 
e.viii. I feel like I am in an ‘in between’ space as far as whiteness goes 
 
13. Australian culture, identity and nationhood 
a. Drinking culture 
b. Laid back 
c. Public expression of religion is frowned upon 
d. Geographical regions 
e. Racist 
e.i. Towards Muslims 
e.ii. Towards non-white groups including Indigenous people 
f. Tolerant 
 
14. Belonging and place 
a. Feels like they do not fit within broader mainstream Australian society, 
or some elements within it 
a.i. Not being able to socialise in the way that is expected of them 
a.ii. Being told they are no longer ‘white’ or ‘Australian’ 
a.iii. Racism or discrimination 
b. Feels like they do not fit within the Muslim community, or some 
elements within it 
b.i. Muslim community as being ethnically divided 
b.ii. Isolation due to not having a Muslim family 
b.iii. A lack of spaces where they feel they belong 
 
15. Thoughts on an “Australian Islam” 
a. Acultural 
b. Cultural attributes of... 
 
16. Perspectives on Islamophobia 
a. Islamophobia is a problem globally 
b. Islamophobia is a problem in Australia 
c. The behaviour of Muslims is what causes Islamophobia 
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